Integrity in Economic Life: An Aristotelian Perspective by GUNARDI ENDRO
 INTEGRITY IN ECONOMIC LIFE : 









A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 








The idea of doing this research began six years ago when I decided to resign from 
a managerial job in a multinational corporation and attended the Master Program in 
Economics at the National University of Singapore to learn the theoretical aspects of the 
economy. I had written a thesis in the area of Aristotelian Business Ethics for my 
master’s degree in Philosophy at the University of Indonesia. But only after doing this 
research can I get a clear picture of what I should know about integrity and corruption 
from the Aristotelian perspective. I consider this a great achievement. I hereby would like 
to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Ten Chin Liew and Assoc. Prof. Cecilia Lim 
Teck Neo for their advice and supervision of this research. I wish to thank Assoc. Prof. 
Anh Tuan Nuyen for his suggestions and criticisms during the qualifying examination 
that contributed to making the research more focused. I also thank Assoc. Prof. Tan Sor 
Hoon and Dr. Michael Pelczar for allowing me to attend their lectures that in some way 
contributed to the form and content of this work. I thank all my colleagues with whom I 
had the opportunity to have fruitful discussions during my time in the Department of 
Philosophy. I owe many thanks to Mrs. Devi Asokan and all the staff for helping me with 
the administrative matters. 
I wish to thank Dr. Haryatmoko of the University of Indonesia and Dr. Reza 
Yamora Siregar of the University of Adelaide for writing the letters of recommendation 
which were required as part of my application for the admission to the NUS Graduate 
 ii
Research Program. I wish to thank Assoc. Prof. Hui Weng Tat of the Department of 
Economics for providing me with the opportunity to work as part-time research assistant 
from which I learnt many issues in Labor Economics, and received some additional 
funds. Special thanks go to my wife Evi Affiatin and my daughter Niajeng Nayenggita 
for patiently waiting at home for my return. Finally, thanks go to the National University 
of Singapore for providing me with all the necessary facilities, especially the financial 
support under the NUS Graduate Research Scholarship.   
 
 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………........         i 
S U M M A R Y                    …..…..………………………………………………        vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS …………………………………………………      viii 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  …………………………………………         1 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: INTEGRITY AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS ASCRIPTION   ……       16 
2.1 The Nature of Integrity …………………………………………………       18 
2.2 The Problem in the Ascription of Integrity …………………………………       27 
2.3 The Reductive Accounts: A Concern for Self Identity Only   …………………       31 
2.4 The Reductive Accounts: A Concern for Morality of Actions Only  …………       36 
2.5 A Non-Reductive Account: The Challenge …………………………………       41 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC LIFE AND ITS ETHICAL PROBLEMS …………       43 
3.1 Economic Life, Corporation and Profit Maximization …………………       45 
3.2 The Stakeholder Paradox and the Stakeholder Syntheses ………………....       57 
3.3 Beyond the Stakeholder Synthesis …………………………………………       68 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH TO ETHICS IN 
      ECONOMIC LIFE  …………………………………………       75 
 
4.1 Aristotle’s Concept of the Good Life  …………………………………       77 
4.2 Business as a Practice  …………………………………………………       91 
4.3 The Corporation and the Market as Communities …………………………     102 
4.4 Role Identity in Business …………………………………………………     112 




CHAPTER 5: THE VIRTUE OF INTEGRITY IN ECONOMIC LIFE …………     133 
5.1 An Aristotelian Conception of the Expanded Self …………………………     135 
5.1.1 The Expanded Self in Aristotle’s Friendship …………………………     137 
5.1.2 The Boundary of the Self and the Search for the Unity of the Self   ……    140 
5.1.3 On the Expansion of the Boundary of the Self  …………………     144 
5.1.4 The Individual Autonomy and the Inchoateness of the Self …………     151 
5.1.5 The Inclusion of Future Generations  …………………………     156 
5.2 Individual Integrity …………………………………………………………     158 
5.2.1 On the Right Actions as the Ground of Integrity …………………     162 
5.2.2 Integrity, Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues …………………     166 
5.2.3 Individual Integrity in Economic Life  …………………………     178 
5.2.4 The Realization of the Ideal Communities as the Main Motive    ………     185 
5.3 Institutional Integrity  …………………………………………………     190 
5.3.1 Corporate Integrity …………………………………………………     191 
5.3.2 Market Integrity  …………………………………………………     200 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: INTEGRITY AND CORRUPTION …………………………     213 
6.1 The Nature of Corruption and Its Vices …………………………………     215 
6.1.1 Corruption as a Non-segregating Concept …………………………     226 
6.1.2 Corruption as a Moral Concept  …………………………………     232 
6.1.3 Corruption as a Causal Concept    …………………………………     235 
6.1.4 On the Vice of Corruption ................................................................     238 
6.2 The Nature of Corruption in Economic Life    ………………………………...     242 
 v
6.2.1 Economic Corruption with the Involvement of Public Officials       …...     244 
6.2.2 Economic Corruption without the Involvement of Public Officials   …..     249 
6.2.3 Noble Cause Corruption and Morally Justified Corruption ………....     252 
6.3 Building Integrity to Curb Corruption  …………………………………     258 
6.3.1 Three Basic Principles …………………………………………………     259 
6.3.2 The Proposal …………………………………………………………     263 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: C O N C L U S I O N …………………………………………     277 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  …………………………………………………………     290 
 
 
APPENDIX: A RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS AND CRITICISM OF 
      THE EXAMINERS …………………………………………     310 
 
 vi
S U M M A R Y 
 
By nature, a thing of integrity performs simultaneously an internal self-
governance, by which its elements coordinate in a way that would result in the expression 
of a single identity, and an external participation, by which it contributes to manifesting 
the integrity of the whole of which it is a part. For a person of integrity, these two 
processes correspond respectively to the way he builds and expresses his self-identity (the 
personal element) and the way he acts morally (the moral element). An adequate account 
of integrity must integrate both elements and maintain the sense of wholeness. It must 
take the individuality of persons into account. 
Interestingly, the ethical problems in economic life can only be satisfactorily 
solved if the aspect of the individual person is adequately addressed. The problems 
typically emerge from the tendency of treating the economy as a separate realm. The best 
solution of these problems is to reject at the individual level the thesis that separates 
economic responsibilities from social-moral responsibilities. Thus, an ethics that can 
support an adequate account of integrity must reject the separation thesis at the individual 
level. 
The Aristotelian ethics meets the requirements, because, for Aristotle, the ultimate 
end of every activity is happiness and his concept of happiness is a concept of the good 
life that inseparably links the personal and the moral elements. The good life is a life of 
virtuous activities. If business is to be ethically unproblematic, it has to be a virtuous 
activity. The corporation and the market are treated as communities, and become the 
mediating institutions for the individuals to obtain the good life. By appealing to the good 
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life as the ultimate end, individuals contribute to the realization of the ideal communities 
in which the values of autonomy, friendship and justice are indispensable.  
Integrity is a virtue that disposes the possessors to take the right decisions and 
actions that would promote the realization of ideal communities. Right decisions and 
actions do not only constitute the good life (the moral element), but also express the 
wholeness of the self (the personal element) because the self is an expanded self that 
includes, in a sense, the ideal communities. The integrity of the individuals is necessarily 
associated with the integrity of the institution. For, when individuals contribute to the 
realization of the ideal communities, they contribute to the integrity of the respective 
institutions. Corporate integrity (similarly market integrity) depends on the integrity of 
individuals and the process of interplay in which the corporation enables individuals to 
develop and express their integrity. 
This account of integrity provides a normative foundation for evaluating 
corruption. For, while integrity disposes the possessors to express their particularities for 
the promotion of the common good, corruption is an expression of a vicious character 
that disposes the possessors to abuse power by manipulating the common good for some 
particular interest. Developing integrity is indispensable to any reliable program to curb 
corruption. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
The following abbreviations will be used in the footnotes to designate three frequently 
referred treatises. 
 
“NE” is to designate: Aristotle, “Ethica Nicomachea”, The Works of Aristotle: Volume 
IX, translated into English by W.D. Ross, edited by W.D. Ross, 1st edition (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1915).  
 
“P” is to designate: Aristotle, “Politica”, The Works of Aristotle: Volume X, translated 
into English by Benjamin Jowett, edited by W.D. Ross, Revised edition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1921). 
 
“DA” is to designate: Aristotle, “De Anima”, The Works of Aristotle: Volume III, 
translated into English by J.A. Smith, edited by W.D. Ross, 1st edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1931). 
 
The book number, the chapter number, the page number, and the line numbers will 
follow in order. Thus, for example, NE (I.1-1094a.1-3) means the “Ethica Nicomachea”, 







Economic activities are generally associated with a socially recognized goal or 
purpose, namely, to provide the material goods for a good life. But this does not 
necessarily mean that economic activities are ultimately instrumental, merely a means to 
an end, for the activities are parts of life and should be constitutive of a good life. Indeed 
moral problems in economic life mostly emerge from the situation that the economy is 
instrumentally treated as a separate realm on which individuals depend for obtaining 
material goods. In such a separate realm, money, capital and the division of labor are the 
detaching impersonal forces that support the economic structures and command the logic 
of a process that is believed to be amoral.1 Individuals have no choice but to occupy some 
of the interrelated roles or positions in the structures and to perform them according to 
the logic of the process. Those who fail to comply with the requirements must undergo a 
‘disciplinary punishment’ to ensure the fulfillment of that logic. The more advanced an 
economy, the more complex the structures, the greater is the loss of control of individuals 
over their own life in the economic system. Under such pressure, moral considerations 
                                                 
1 Financial capital, for example, would move from the places of the lower rate of return on investment 
(ROI) to those of the higher rate until the market competition adjusts the move to the equilibrium state. The 
logic consists in the maximization of profit or in the corporate lingo “the maximization of shareholder’s 
value”. 
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are likely to have less influence on their economic behavior; and the economic activities 
are perceived rather as amoral pursuits of efficiency.2 
The increased autonomy of the economic domain of life may have a further 
profound effect. In virtue of being a separate domain, moreover a dominant one, it may 
have a corrosive influence on other domains of life to the extent that the other values in 
life are conceived as reducible to economic value or market value. Thus, when society is 
believed to be best understood as a series of markets, or driven by market mechanisms, 
everything is likely priced for sale.3 Market solutions will be highly praised; externalities 
are internalized into the market system in order to secure the market from failure.4 But 
the worst effect may follow from the behavior of the market players as the externally 
imposed laws, moral norms and codes of ethics are practically not immune to pricing. 
These laws, norms and codes are vulnerable to violation when the market players 
consider the ‘price’ of the probable punishments less than the possible benefit. The 
amoral activities easily descend into immoral activities.       
Given the pace of contemporary globalization, the increased autonomy of 
economic  life  can be  thought  of  as  one  that  stimulates  the  widening, deepening and 
                                                 
2  In general, efficiency refers to the efficacy of an action, a quantitative measure that can be calculated 
simply as the ratio of output to input. Thus, for a certain amount of input, the highest efficiency is achieved 
by maximizing the amount of output. In the economic context, the highest efficiency of the usage of certain 
resources is achieved by maximizing the amount of revenue and profit. 
3 Robert Kuttner, Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 
1997), pp. 39-71. 
4  John McMurtry (1998) uses the term “value program” to illustrate how the market value system 
standardizes all values. The market value system cannot itself be evaluated and, therefore, it must be the 
basis for the overriding principles. Anything that occurs in accordance with the requirement of the market 
is bound to be the best, and thus has to be secured. See: John McMurtry, Unequal Freedom: The Global 
Market as an Ethical System (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998), pp. 11-13.  
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speeding up of global interconnectedness.5 The perceived neutrality of money, capital 
and market encourages people to undertake investment, production and trade with other 
people in different countries and different cultures. It is evident that the extent and 
intensity of trade across the world and a global division of labor have grown rapidly. 
Multinational corporations develop transnational networks of production to take 
advantage of cost differences in anticipating global competition. Huge amounts of 
financial assets and foreign exchange are traded globally at staggering speed,6 owing to 
the advance development in telecommunication and information technology. It seems 
difficult for any country, any national economy, to defy global influences; globalization 
may be just a reality, an international system that cannot be altered or reversed.7 Yet, the 
degree of economic integration is such that it makes national economies highly uncertain. 
A shock in the New York financial market, for example, may affect the performance of 
other distant national economies within which the survival of many individuals is at 
stake. Thus, despite offering chances of increasing welfare, by providing a variety of 
goods at cheaper prices, globalization with its complex interconnected economies makes 
the influence of individuals over their own life in the economy more uncertain than ever 
before. 
 
                                                 
5  Apart from the disagreement over the role of the contemporary globalization, whether it really leads to a 
global economy or merely reflects extensive and intensifying international economic relations, it is 
generally agreed that any proper sense of globalization must include the extensity, intensity, velocity, and 
impact propensity of global interconnectedness. See: David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and 
Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999), p. 16.   
6  In 1995, for example, the amount of foreign exchange that is traded on a typical day reached roughly fifty 
(50) times of the value of the world trade in goods and services. See: The Economist, “Mahathir, Soros and 
the currency markets”, The Economist, September 27th 1997, p. 93. 




Under the increased autonomy of the economic domain and the influences of 
globalization, the lives of individuals in the economy depend so much on the market 
process in which money and capital – the impersonal forces – play a commanding logic 
that brings with it an unequal distribution of power. Those who have money and capital 
and those who have knowledge of the markets gain stronger indirect control over their 
opportunities in the economy than those who do not have them. Capital owners can 
reduce the demand for labor – thus the opportunities of those who are dependent on 
wages to survive – by diminishing the capital employed for production and trade in the 
economy.8 Disaster might occur when the reduction of capital comes suddenly, such as in 
1997 when the abrupt withdrawal of more than US$100 billion from South Korea, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, an amount equivalent to 11% of those countries’ 
combined gross national product,9 led to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. About 
eight million workers lost their jobs and about 50 million people suffered from the plight 
                                                 
8  Adam Smith, the early modern economist, had recognized the power of those who have capital, as he 
wrote: “Every increase or diminution of capital, therefore, naturally tends to increase or diminish the real 
quantity of industry, the number of productive hands, and consequently the exchangeable value of the 
annual produce of the land and labour of the country, the real wealth and revenue of all its inhabitants” 
(Vol. I, Book II, Ch. III, par. 13) “By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of productive 
labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which adds a 
value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and, consequently, the value of the annual produce of the 
land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants”(Vol. I, Book II, Ch. 
III, par. 20). See: Adam Smith, “Of the Accumulation of Capital, or of Productive and Unproductive 
Labour” (Volume I, Book II, Chapter III), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
Volume I, edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press; NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1976).  
9  David Friedman, “How Wall Street’s Moral Hubris Condones Social Inequality”, Los Angeles Times, 
May, 31, 1998, Los Angeles, California. See also: UNDP, Human Development Report 1999 (Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp.3-4.  
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of being sent into living below the poverty line, as the result of the crisis.10 Here, I shall 
argue that we must raise concern for moral issues in such a crisis. 
Against the argument that morality is irrelevant in the crisis because capital 
withdrawal does not breach any rule in the market and that the morality of the market 
should have been reflected in a pareto-optimal efficiency, I contend that we are indeed 
terribly insensitive if we regard the suffering of those individuals who may have nothing 
to do with financial trading – and may not even understand anything about financial 
trading – as a matter of fate, while it is clearly the result of human enterprises. However, I 
                                                 
10 Indonesia alone claimed about 3.8-5.4 million of additional job losers ((Firdausy, 2002), (Lee, 1998)) and 
about 21-40 million people sent into living below the poverty line ((Atinc & Walton, 1998), (Hill, 2001), 
(Booth, 1999b), (Lee, 1998)). South Korea claimed about 0.8 to 1.5 million of additional job losers ((IMF 
Staff, 1998), (Lee & Lee, 2000), (Atinc and Walton, 1998), (Yoon, 2001)) and about 5.5 million increase in 
the number of the poor (Lee, 1998). Thailand claimed about 0.8-1.3 million of additional job losers 
((Kittiprapas, 2000), (Krongkaew, 2001), (IMF Staff, 1998), (Lee, 1998), (ILO, 1999)) and about 6.7 
million increase in the number of the poor. The exact figures are, of course, still debatable. Some 
institutions like the World Bank estimate lower numbers, but those like the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the national boards of statistics estimate higher numbers. In the case of Indonesia, 
for example, the ILO and the Central Board of Statistics (CBS) estimate more than 50 million increase in 
the number of the poor (Booth, 1999a). See: Anne Booth, “The Impact of the Crisis on Poverty and 
Equity”, in H.W. Arndt and Hal Hill, eds., Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons, and the 
Way Forward (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999a), pp.128-141; Anne Booth, “The 
Social Impact of the Asian Crisis: What Do We Know Two Years On?”, Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature 13:2 (November, 1999b), pp.16-29; Carunia Mulya Firdausy, “The Impact of the Regional 
Economic Crisis on Employment and an Evaluation of Public Work Programmes in Indonesia”, EADN 
Regional Project on the Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (January 2002), available at 
http://www.eadn.org/eadnrr.html; Eddy Lee, The Asian Financial Crisis: The Challenge for Social Policy 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 1998); Hal Hill, “Indonesia in crisis : causes and consequences”, in 
Yun-Peng Chu and Hal Hill, eds., The Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Publ., 2001), pp.127-166, p.144; IMF Staff, “Mitigating the Social Costs of the Asian 
Crisis”, Finance and Development 35:3 (September, 1998), available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/09/imfstaf2.htm; International Labour Organization, World 
Employment Report 1998-99 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1999); Medhi Krongkaew, “A tale of 
an economic crisis: how the economic crisis started, developed and is ending in Thailand”, in Yun-Peng 
Chu and Hal Hill, eds., The Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publ., 2001), pp.27-80, p.52; Sauwalak Kittiprapas, “Thailand: The Asian Financial Crisis and Social 
Changes”, in Tran Van Hoa, ed., The Social Impact of the Asia Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp.35-
56; Suk Bum Yoon, “Causes of the Korean financial crisis and its social impact: 1997-99”, in Yun-Peng 
Chu and Hal Hill, eds., The Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publ., 2001), pp. 233-52, p.248; Tamar Manuelyan Atinc and Michael Walton, “Social Consequences of 
the East Asian Financial Crisis”, Paper presented in the World Bank’s 1998 Annual Meetings (1998), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/pdffiles/EA-3.pdf; Young Youn Lee and Hyun-Hoon Lee, 
“Korea: Financial Crisis, Structural Reform and Social Consequences”, in Tran Van Hoa, ed., The Social 
Impact of the Asia Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp.57-84. 
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would not argue against the natural form of capitalism, namely the market economy, 
since I believe that the market is roughly the best system for determining the economic 
worth and allocation of resources, as it is evident that command economies are not viable. 
Nor would I argue only in favor of imposing more stringent rules, economic policies and 
codes of ethics, because these constraints, as I argued earlier, can be undermined and 
treated merely as variables in the cost-benefit calculation of the market players. Rather, I 
argue that the source of the moral problem lies in the attitude of the individual market 
players toward their own activities, i.e. whether they perceive their economic activities 
merely as a means to obtain material goods or as parts of the good life. That is, whether 
they regard their life as a mere aggregation of the fragmented domains of life or as one 
that should be a wholly meaningful life. In short, I claim that what matters most is 
whether individual market players possess the virtue of integrity. Integrity would not be 
possessed by an individual whose life is fragmented, incoherent, or even contradictory in 
itself. 
In order to capture the sense of integrity, as well as why and how integrity is 
important in economic life, a closer look at the moral dimension of the economic agents’ 
behavior before and during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 is worth taking. Indeed, 
generally speaking, it is easy to identify a genuine person of integrity in a situation of 
crisis, dilemma and conflict where most people lack it. The origin of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997-98 has been  largely  debated  by the economists. Two dominant arguments 
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are widely believed to explain the causes of the crisis, namely the moral hazard argument 
and the financial panic argument.11 
The moral hazard argument emphasizes domestic economic conditions as the 
primary cause of the crisis.12 When assets are overpriced, and when they are not used 
efficiently in economic production, a risky bubble economy emerges. The Asian financial 
crisis is simply a bursting of the economic bubble, when foreign creditors and investors 
withdraw their funds suddenly after recognizing the beginning of a diminishing return on 
investment. The source of the asset overpricing is the problem of moral hazard especially 
on the part of the financial intermediaries who take advantage of the presence of the 
‘blanket’ guarantee (the government’s bailout scheme), the intervening industrial and 
stable exchange-rate policies, and imperfect financial regulation and supervision.13 Crony 
capitalism and corruption, in addition, worsen the problem of moral hazard. In the moral 
hazard problem, corporations and financial intermediaries are induced to undertake 
economically inappropriate risks, borrowing short-term unhedged funds from foreign 
lenders for the purpose of investments in seemingly profitable long-term ventures, while 
                                                 
11 For the discussion of these two arguments, see for example: Michael R. King, “Who triggered the Asian 
Financial Crisis”, Review of International Political Economy 8:3 (2001), pp.438-466; Reuven Glick, 
“Thought on the Origins of the Asian Crisis: Impulses and Propagation mechanisms”, in William C. 
Hunter, George G Kaufman, and Thomas H. Krueger, eds., The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, 
Implications, and Solutions (Boston/ Dordrect/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 33-53.    
12 For the moral hazard argument, see for example: Paul Krugman, “What happened to Asia”, in Ryuzo 
Sato, Rama V. Ramachandran, Kazuo Mino, eds., Global competition and integration (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998), pp.315-328.  
13 The problem of moral hazard occurs when one party in a transaction may take an action that affects the 
other party’s valuation, while the other party cannot observe the action perfectly (the problem of 
asymmetric information). Before the transaction the problem of moral hazard involves lying or deception, 
whereas after the transaction it amounts to cheating. Since there is asymmetric information, the action one 
party would take may not be pareto-optimal. Moral hazard induces one party to maximize his/her own 
benefit at the expense of the other party(ies). In the case of the expansive lending, for example, the 
creditors believe that, irrespective of the soundness of financing, they always get somebody else to absorb 
the costs of their mistake. See: Bernard Salanie, The economics of contracts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 
p.107; Peter Pou, “Moral Hazard and the Role of International Rescue Programs”, in William C. Hunter, 
George G Kaufman, and Thomas H. Krueger, eds., The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications, and 
Solutions (Boston/Dordrect/ London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 389-394, p. 391. 
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foreign lenders keep their belief in the domestic borrowers under the assumption that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the government would in the guise of liquidity 
protection provide a scheme of financing bank bailouts if the situation goes wrong. But 
these investments are indeed unjust, because corporations and banks take the profit for 
themselves in the case of success, but shift the losses to the government, and ultimately to 
the society, in the case of collective failures. They undertake irresponsibly high-risk 
business ventures at the expense of the society. Since the emerging economies14 
practically need intervening policies, in which a blanket guarantee cannot be eliminated 
entirely without provoking a disruption in the financial system, while the supervisory 
evaluation is never perfect, it is only through the virtue of the market players that we can 
expect society to be free from the burden of the irresponsible business ventures. 
The financial panic argument addresses the crisis as a self-fulfilling financial 
panic.15 When the Asian economies are expected to grow rapidly, foreign investors and 
creditors move their funds to the region, irrespective of whether they can expect a bailout, 
under the belief that high profitability is still to continue. They become cautious, 
however, after learning that, as a result of the speculative attacks, the currencies of the 
countries are depreciated to a level that makes some corporations and banks suffer 
liquidity problems to settle the dollar nominated short-term debts. They withdraw their 
funds immediately after maturity and refuse to rollover their loans. Without rollover, the 
illiquid borrowers become insolvent and ultimately bankrupt. The flight of foreign funds 
further worsens the value of the currencies and subsequently makes the economy fall into 
                                                 
14  Emerging economies are the economies that do not have permanent access to the international capital 
markets. See: Peter Pou (1999), ibid. p. 389.  
15  For the financial panic argument, see for example: Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, “The Onset of the 
East Asian Financial Crisis”, Working Paper 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
Series (1998), http/www.nber.org/papers/w6680. 
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a vicious circle and a deep crisis of confidence. Thus, according to the financial panic 
argument, the crisis is the result of failure in obtaining a proper credit rollover to resolve 
the liquidity problems and avoid the crisis of confidence. It reflects the lack of 
commitment on the part of the foreign creditors and investors to keep their funds in 
service to the functioning of the emerging economies, for what they are primarily 
concerned with is their own funds’ safety and maximum profitability. The healthiness of 
the economies in which their funds’ contribution is necessary and the role of the 
economies in producing goods and prosperity for the society become their concern only 
to the extent that the maximum safety and profitability of their funds are served. If every 
market player thinks that the healthiness of the economy has to come first before his or 
her involvement, then the economy may easily fall apart. An economy would remain 
healthy only if those involved in it possess a virtue that guides them to make their 
contribution to its proper functioning. 
The virtue I have just been discussing, the lack of which to a great extent 
constitutes the cause of the crisis, is integrity. During the crisis, the lack of integrity is 
more apparent. In Indonesia, for example, some ailing banks use their depositors’ money 
and divert the money from the liquidity protection facility for currency speculation in the 
hope of gaining a substantial profit for resurrection. Several industrial corporations 
convert their funds employed for productive activities to idle funds in dollar currency 
under the belief that the profitability of currency speculation is much higher than that of 
normal production of goods. Many rich domestic citizens follow the herd,16 hunting for 
dollars with an expectation of getting windfalls from the worsening value of the domestic 
currency. Since the demand for dollars is heightened, the domestic currency plunges into 
                                                 
16  The Economist, “Asian currencies: Downhill racers”, The Economist, December 20th, 1997, pp. 113-114. 
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a severe depreciation, as expected.17 The whole economy that is still mediated by the 
domestic currency suffers from recession, because the banks cannot properly function as 
financial intermediaries and the productive corporations slow their activities down, in 
particular after the government increases the basic interest rate and tightens financial 
regulation to halt capital-outflows. The cost of the crisis, high inflation, lack of goods, 
massive unemployment, and the costs incurred in the economic recovery program have to 
be borne by the whole society. Thus, not only do those ‘amateur’ domestic speculators 
refuse to make their contribution to rectifying the improper functioning of the economy, 
but also, on the contrary, they contribute to the improper functioning and take advantage 
of it. 
In sum, I can conclude that those who lack integrity treat their economic life as a 
separate realm and, as a result, they display at least three distinct characteristics: (a) they 
are primarily concerned only with their own maximization of profit; (b) they accept the 
proper functioning of the economy only to the extent that it contributes to their own 
maximization of profit, or in other words, they would exploit the proper functioning of 
the economy for their own maximization of profit; and (c) they exploit the improper 
functioning of the economy, rather than contribute to rectify it, for their own 
maximization of profit. The proper function of the economy is to mediate the production 
                                                 
17  One may argue that any kind of business-venture inherently contains some risks of failure and a possible 
fortune. Accordingly, business can be understood as a kind of speculation, and therefore it is no evil for one 
to change the mode of speculation from economic production to currency trading. In order to counter such 
an argument, we have to refer to the consequences of speculation in the economy. It is true that currency 
speculation may add real value to the economy when it functions as an arbitrage to equilibrate prices 
between different points of time so as to provide liquidity in the money market and help matching buyers 
and sellers. [See: Peter Koslowski, “The Ethics of Banking: On the Ethical Economy of the Credit and 
Capital Market, of Speculation and Insider Trading in the German Experience”, in Antonio Argandona, ed., 
The Ethical Dimension of Financial Institutions and Markets (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp.180-
232, pp. 208-9]. But if speculative activities strongly destabilize the market prices, the volatility of which 
can create adverse consequences in the economy, they are indeed inappropriate activities.        
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of goods for the prosperity of the society.18 Thus, an economy is improperly functioning 
if people are systematically impeded from producing goods and the prosperity of the 
society is not promoted. Since the proper functioning of the economy brings about a 
moral content, whereas the improper functioning gives rise to a moral defect, we expect 
those who possess integrity to be actively concerned with the proper functioning of the 
economy. In contrast to those who lack integrity, persons of integrity would not treat their 
economic life as a separate realm, and would display at least three characteristics: (a) 
they would be concerned with the proper functioning of the economy; (b) they would 
pursue their own maximization of profit to the extent that it contributes to the proper 
functioning of the economy; and (c) they would contribute to rectify the improper 
functioning of the economy. 
But the currently available accounts of integrity are not adequate to characterize 
the persons of integrity that I have just described. An adequate account of integrity must 
be one that advocates treating economic life as an integral part of the good life. Also, it 
must work well with a concept of the good life that shows that contributing to the 
common goods, e.g. the proper functioning of the economy, is a constitutive part of the 
good of the individuals. Aristotle’s ethics embodied in his Ethics and Politics provides 
such a concept of the good life. Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to explore his ethics as 
far as I can go to develop an account of integrity that satisfies these descriptions. 
                                                 
18 The material goods may represent prosperity, but prosperity is not reducible to the aggregate volume of 
goods. Prosperity has productive, distributive and externalities dimensions. Besides considering the 
availability of goods, a prosperous society has to pay attention to the fairness of the distribution of goods 
and the effect of the production of goods on the environment. See: Michael Phillips, “How to Think 
Systematically About Business Ethics”, in Earl R. Winkler and Jerrold R. Coombs, eds., Applied Ethics: A 
Reader (Cambridge-MA: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 185-200, p. 191-192.    
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Different from the other accounts of integrity which also refer to Aristotle’s 
ethics, such as one that defines integrity as a synthesis of virtues,19 or one that 
emphasizes integrity as a good management of self conflict,20 the account of integrity that 
I hold will show that integrity is a virtue that promotes the common good without 
necessarily denying the particular identity or the good of the individual. Integrity can be 
discerned as a unique virtue though it may reflect a synthesis of virtues. More than a 
good management of self-conflict under present circumstances, I argue that integrity 
should be an active and progressive approach to morality. Moreover, since integrity 
properly promotes the common good without neglecting the good of the individual, 
integrity is the opposite of corruption and, therefore, is indispensable to any reliable 
program of curbing corruption. In fact, integrity should be indispensable to a viable moral 
economy and a viable moral society in general. 
I put the argument in the following way. In the next chapter, I offer a basic 
concept to articulate the nature of integrity. I claim that a sense of wholeness is 
indispensable for integrity and, when integrity is ascribed to a person, two aspects are 
indicative of integrity, namely the way the person builds and expresses the wholeness of 
his self, and the way the person acts morally. I will show that the reductive account of 
integrity that emphasizes only one of the two aspects is defective. Thus, I will defend the 
view that the adequate account of integrity must cover both aspects of integrity. An ethics 
that can support this view must take the individuality of persons into account.  
                                                 
19  Robert C. Solomon, A Better Way to Think About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate 
Success (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 38-40. 
20  Damian Cox, Marguerite LaCaze and Michael P. Levine, Integrity and the Fragile Self, (Aldershot-
Hants: Ashgate, 2003), p. xix.  
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In chapter 3, I will discuss the everlasting conflict between the demand for 
efficiency and the demand for morality in economic life in the context of the so-called 
‘stakeholder paradox’. I will show that many theories are not successful in responding to 
the paradox. I argue that a satisfactory answer to the paradox must be one that rejects at 
the individual level the thesis that separates the economic responsibilities and the social-
moral responsibilities. It requires that the aspect of the individual person must be 
adequately addressed. As a result, I argue, an ethics that is able to solve ethical problems 
in economic life and support the adequate account of integrity has to reject the separation 
thesis at the individual level.  
The aspect of the individual person occupies an important place in the Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. In chapter 4, I will show that the rejection of the separation thesis at the 
individual level is fundamental in the Aristotelian approach to ethics in economic life. 
Beginning with the teleological thesis, I will argue that business, in order to be a part of 
the good life, should be treated as a virtuous activity. But this treatment presupposes 
communities, within which the individual agents share common goods and norms. 
Therefore, the corporation and the market must be regarded as communities within the 
larger whole community, and the role and the good of the smaller communities (the 
corporation and the market) have to be inseparably defined in terms of the good of the 
larger whole community. Yet, individuals as the actual moral agents are protected from 
the domination of actual communities, because communities in their ideal state, 
conceived by the respective individuals, are those to which the building and exercise of 
virtues is to refer. Within such an understanding, the individuality of persons remains 
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central, while economic responsibilities and moral responsibilities are inseparably 
integrated in the exercise of the virtuous activity. 
Following the Aristotelian approach to ethics in economic life, I will develop an 
account of integrity in chapter 5. First of all, I will argue that in the Aristotelian 
framework the self must be understood as a moral self, which is intersubjective in its 
process of development. Accordingly, the individual should develop an ‘expanded’ self 
that is constituted by and identifies itself with the ideal state of the communities of which 
he is a member. For example, an employee should identify himself with the ideal state of 
the corporation he is working for, the ideal market, and eventually the ideal larger whole 
human community. He should promote the goods of these communities, for these 
communities are all constitutive parts of his expanded self. He would be ‘a good 
economic agent’ by promoting the good of the corporation and the good of the market, 
and simultaneously ‘a good man’ by promoting the good of the larger whole human 
community. The morality of the individual’s action flows directly from the wholeness of 
the expanded self, in the sense that being a good man is achieved through the individual’s 
capacity as a good economic agent. In other words, integrity promotes the good of the 
larger whole community, the common good, without denying the identity of the 
individual and the good of the individual’s smaller communities. Arguably, this account 
of integrity may encounter problems due to possible conflicts between the good of the 
larger whole community and the good of the smaller communities. I will discuss this 
problem and offer solutions. After comparing this account of integrity with the other 
Aristotelian accounts of integrity, I will also discuss institutional integrity and its relation 
to the integrity of individuals. 
 15
Additionally, I will contrast integrity with corruption. I expect that, through the 
contrast, I can give a clearer picture of integrity, as well as a better understanding of 
corruption. If integrity promotes the common good, corruption can be understood as an 
abuse of power by exploiting the common good for some particular interest. In chapter 6, 
I will discuss the vice of corruption, the nature of corruption in economic life, the 
problem of noble cause corruption, and the indispensability of building integrity to 
curbing corruption. I will try to make it clear that the Aristotelian account of integrity can 
provide a normative foundation for evaluating corruption in any sphere of life. In the 
closing pages, chapter 7, I will point out that the argument set forth in this work is helpful 
in providing a perspective for ensuring that anti-corruption programs and integrity-
promotion projects, in particular those targeted at the people in the developing countries, 





INTEGRITY AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS ASCRIPTION 
 
 
             Integrity as an ethical discourse primarily involves the quality of the moral agent 
in responding to moral requirements. In discussing the strategies for implementing ethics 
in business and management, Lynn Sharp Paine (1994, 1996) distinguishes the integrity 
approach from the compliance approach.1 A compliance approach, relying on the 
imposition of laws, regulations and codes of ethics, emphasizes the threat of detection 
and punishment to prevent individuals from committing moral misconduct. By contrast, 
an integrity approach to ethics advocates value-oriented self-commitment and self-
governance in guiding moral conduct, and views the need to obey the rules rather as a 
valuable aspect of life than a sort of constraint.2 Although no definition of integrity is 
offered in such a comparison, it seems clear for Lynn Sharp Paine (1997) that integrity is 
‘the quality of moral self governance’.3 Her description shows that integrity, insofar as it 
relates to ethics, is a virtue; and a person of integrity is always praiseworthy. 
          However, the fact that integrity is also attributed to various aspects of a person’s 
life, such as intellectual integrity, professional integrity and artistic integrity, besides 
                                                 
1 Lynn Sharp Paine, “Managing for Organizational Integrity”, Harvard Business Review (March/April 
1994), pp. 106-117; Lynn Sharp Paine, “Venturing beyond Compliance”, in Karen E. Edelman, ed., The 
Evolving Role of Ethics in Business: A Conference Report (New York: Conference Board, 1996), pp.13-16. 
2 Acting with integrity requires more than simply acting in accordance with ethical or moral norms, for it 
needs the norms to be self-imposed and self-accepted. 
3 Lynn Sharp Paine, “Integrity”, in Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman, eds., The Blackwell 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997) pp. 335-7. 
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moral integrity, leads to a question as to how integrity relates to ethics when it is ascribed 
to a person. A clear indication in all such attributions is that integrity always deals with 
the quality of one’s relation to one’s actions. But the quality of the relation tends to be 
interpreted in two different ways: first, it is seen as a quality represented by the quality of 
the actions;4 and second, it is regarded as a quality measured in terms of how the actions 
fit into one’s sense of the self. This dual interpretation gives rise to problems in finding a 
certain feature as the criterion in the ascription of integrity. Yet, most philosophical 
accounts of integrity tend to focus on one side of the interpretation to the detriment of the 
other. By virtue of the fact that integrity is basically honorable, the accounts of integrity 
that emphasize the quality of actions treat integrity as having a necessary connection to 
acting morally. The other accounts focusing on the agent’s integrated-ness regard the 
connection to moral actions as a contingent connection and reduce integrity to a formal 
relation between parts of one’s self or to maintaining personal identity. I designate these 
two kinds of account as the reductive accounts of integrity. 
           In this chapter, I will argue that the reductive accounts of integrity are not able to 
capture the full sense of integrity. The challenge is therefore to find a non-reductive 
account of integrity that can accommodate both the quality of the self and the way to 
acting morally. But before embarking on the argument, I will explore the nature of 
integrity to establish a concept that will serve as a foundation for supporting the 




                                                 
4  Genuine professional actions can reflect a good relation between the actions and the professional actor. 
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2.1 The Nature of Integrity 
 
Etymologically, the word “integrity”, “integration”, and “integral” have the same 
root as “integer”, which means whole or entire.5 Therefore, like the usage of the word 
“integer” to mean a whole number, a thing of integrity is a whole thing, an undivided 
thing, in which the sense of wholeness is indispensable. Although something possessing 
integrity may consist of several parts, a thing of integrity must be more than the 
aggregation of its parts, or in other words, integrity is rather a product of interrelationship 
between those parts. Yet, in contrast with the term ‘unity’, integrity does not eliminate 
the identity of its parts. A certain degree of individuality of each element is still 
recognized, but its function is inseparable from the whole. It is this sense of wholeness, I 
claim, that the term ‘integrity’ originally connotes.  
Thomas P. Kasulis (2002) makes an interesting contrast between integrity and 
intimacy.6 Referring to a dyadic relationship between two things, he delineates intimacy 
as a relational orientation that emphasizes internal relation, in which these two things 
belong together in such a way that each does not sharply distinguish itself from the other. 
By contrast, he considers integrity as a relational orientation expressed by an external 
relation, in which the interaction between the two things would not violate each one’s 
identity or intrinsic nature. Kasulis exemplifies the relation between salt and water in the 
seawater as an intimate relationship, and points out the relation between seawater and 
sand as an example of an integrity relationship. But describing integrity in terms of 
                                                 
5 Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, new edition revised and enlarged 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 303. 
6 Thomas P. Kasulis, Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2002), pp. 27-32, 53-61. 
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dyadic relationships seems to be too narrow or otherwise misleading. It is right that the 
identities of the things in an integrity relationship are maintained by the external relation, 
but in order to sustain their identities, these things must depend on their internal relation 
with the whole of which they are parts. The identity of a thing of integrity does not 
change by the external relation but would likely be changed through its internal relation 
with the whole of which it is a part. Thus, it seems not quite right to derive integrity 
simply from an external relationship in which the thing allegedly possessing integrity 
maintains its inviolable identity. Integrity is rather concerned with how the intimate 
relationships between the parts and the whole (thing) can work well to keep the nature of 
the thing intact in its external relationships with the other things.7 Both the ‘parts – 
whole’ internal relationship and the ‘thing – others’ external relationships should be dealt 
with when we speak of a thing possessing integrity. 
Interestingly, upholding the identity against external disturbances through 
maintaining the intimate relation with its parts can mean that a thing possessing integrity 
carries out, in a sense, a self-governance. But this does not necessarily imply that a thing 
of integrity can be understood in isolation from other things, for all things seem to be 
interrelated and interdependent, while the identity of a thing is generally construed in its 
external relationship with the other things. And if a thing is part of a whole, while the 
integrity of the whole requires an intimate relationship between the whole and its parts, 
the integrity of a thing must be in a certain association with the integrity of the whole of 
                                                 
7 In other words, I argue that integrity cannot be correctly explained in the framework of a dyadic 
relationship, and thus cannot be correctly put in contrast to intimacy. It is more appropriate to explain 
integrity in the framework of a triadic relationship, such as, for example, between A, B and AB, where A 
and B are parts of AB. Integrity consists in the external relationship between A and B and the intimate 
relationships between A and AB and between B and AB.  
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which it is a part. How is the integrity of the whole associated with the integrity of its 
parts?  
It seems clear that through the process of self-governance, the integrity of the 
whole would emerge only if its parts are functioning well. In other words, the integrity of 
the whole requires or depends on the integrity of its constituents. The converse doesn’t 
seem to hold, viz. the integrity of a thing does not depend on whether the whole, of which 
it is a part, does possess integrity. Nevertheless, the integrity of a thing presupposes the 
integrity of the whole of which it is a part.8 For example, the integrity of computer data in 
a database, expressed as the correctness of the data, does not depend on whether the 
database (the whole) possesses integrity, for the data can still be correct under the 
integrity rules of the Database Management System (DBMS), regardless of whether or 
not the other data fulfill the integrity rules.9 But there is nothing we can say about the 
integrity of the data without presupposing the integrity of the database, achieved through 
constantly following the integrity rules (and, of course, assuming that the DBMS is not 
faulty), for the data can only reveal its correctness in that database and yet that database 
can only possess integrity if every data is correct. Such a relation suggests that in 
expressing its integrity, a thing of integrity contributes to the integrity of the whole of 
which it is a part. In sum, not only would a thing of integrity perform internal self-
                                                 
8 In other words, the integrity of a thing is only explainable under the presupposition that the thing in 
question is situated in the framework of the ideal state of the whole of which it is a part.  
9 In the context of computer database, integrity means accuracy, correctness, or validity. Integrity is also 
understood as a general term that refers to several processes which keep the data in the database error-free. 
See: C.J. Date, An Introduction to Database Systems Volume II (Reading-Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1983), 
p. 35; Mark Whitehorn and Bill Marklyn, Inside Relational Databases (London: Springer-Verlag, 1998), 
pp. 106-8. In the actual cases, it is difficult to set up integrity rules that can perfectly guarantee the database 
is error free. For example, a simple integrity rule is imposed on a database containing the data of the date of 
birth of the respondents, as follows: ‘date’ is designated by two digits of a real number less than or equal to 
31 and ‘month’ is designated by two digits of a real number less than or equal to 12. This integrity rule 
provides a guarantee that there is no invalid data in the database such as [33, 10] and [31, 14]. However, 
this rule is not able to reject the entry of incorrect data like [11, 05], [05, 10], or [04, 11], of which the 
correct data is actually [05, 11]. 
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governance but it also engages in external participation in contributing to the integrity of 
the whole of which it is a part. 
To the extent that a thing of integrity performs internal self-governance, its 
elements are coordinating themselves in a way that would ultimately result in the 
expression of a single identity. In such coordination, there is a sense of harmony and 
stability in the interrelationship between the diverse elements. Each element has its 
distinct role and no element is suppressed or alienated. But this does not necessarily mean 
that a thing of integrity must be free from inner conflict. Some degree of inner conflict 
and tension may even contribute to integrity,10 for conflict that is healthy, in the sense 
that it may strengthen the expression of identity, is always accompanied with an effective 
energy capable of resolving tension and bringing the parts into a more significant 
relationship. This seems to suggest that the coordination inside a thing of integrity is a 
kind of so-called ‘functional dynamic coordination’ with the goal expressed in a 
process,11 rather than a kind of coordination barely aimed to restore a static ‘ideal’ state.12  
To the extent that a thing of integrity engages in external participation in 
contributing to the integrity of the whole of which it is a part, its behaviors are expected 
to meet the integrity requirement of the whole while consistently reflecting its intrinsic-
nature or identity. It implies that the identity of the thing possessing integrity is one that 
                                                 
10 James Gutmann, “Integrity as a Standard of Valuation”, Journal of Philosophy 42 (1945), pp. 210-6, p. 
213.  
11 Laura Westra cites Peter Miller’s analysis of integrity in which integrity is described in terms of 
functional-dynamic coordination, i.e. “an interactive system with feedback mechanisms which preserves 
certain features or controls a directional transformation-dynamic equilibrium (vs. functional failure and 
uncoordinated processes)”. See. Laura Westra, An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of 
Integrity (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), p. 36.  
12 It is useful to mention the characteristics of a disintegrated thing in order to see the contrast. A 
disintegrated thing tends to reduce the diversity of its elements through simplification, alienation, or 
extinction, following sustaining pathological conflicts. As a consequence, the disintegrated thing breaks the 
interrelationship between its elements and leads them to unstable and inharmonious coordination. In the 
worst case, the disintegrated thing ends up with a total functional failure.   
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is necessarily in line with the integrity of the whole of which it is a part. Furthermore, 
there is a sense of consistency between inner disposition and outward behavior and 
between its behaviors across time in such participation. However, this consistency should 
be properly interpreted, for in some particular cases the behavior needs to be adjusted in 
order to fit the dynamic coordination required for the integrity of the whole. It is the 
intimate relationship between the thing of integrity and the whole of which it is a part that 
makes the adjustment or a change necessary. Yet, it remains true that no change should 
occur for any cause directly attributed to its external relationship with other things. The 
term ‘adaptability’ may be used in this context, in the sense that a thing of integrity 
undergoes a change to adapt itself to the integrity requirement of the whole of which it is 
a part, while at the same time strengthening its identity in its external relationships with 
the other things. In sum, it is fair to conclude that consistency is the feature of a thing of 
integrity in its external relationships with the other things, whereas adaptability is the 
feature due to its internal relationships with the whole of which it is a part.13 
As internal self-governance and external participation are simultaneously 
performed by the same thing, that is to say that both of them are expressing the 
wholeness of the thing of integrity while the wholeness is more than the sum of those 
which express it, they have to be viewed as two inseparable processes. To show this, we 
can associate these two processes, respectively, with two closely related aspects of 
integrity, namely structural and functional integrity. Structural integrity points out the 
completeness of the parts and the way in which the parts are constructed in and 
                                                 
13 Individual organisms of a certain species, for example, would consistently strive to exist and maintain 
their identity against a warmer environment. But if the warmer environment is systematically conditioned 
by the whole global ecosystem, a mutation and propagation of their genes has to follow the requirement of 
the new environment.   
 23
interrelated with the whole thing. Functional integrity refers to what the whole thing 
does, or the way it functions, in expressing its intrinsic nature or identity. At this point, 
Laura Westra (1994) is concerned with the question of whether structural integrity or 
functional integrity is the most significant aspect of integrity, as she claims that one 
aspect might be present when the other is not.14 But her claim is incorrect, as it is obvious 
that both aspects are always present together when a thing possesses integrity. Cutting off 
the appendix (allegedly not a vital part of the body), for example, cannot be said to be an 
assault on one’s integrity if the appendix (the part) has loosened its intimate relation to 
the whole body.15 Conversely, when the intimate relation is present, cutting off the part 
would reduce not only one’s structural integrity but also one’s functional integrity. 
Hence, it is not right to consider the wholeness as divisible into two aspects and then 
regard one aspect as more valuable than the other. Integrity is valuable due to its sense of 
wholeness rather than a sense derived from the fact that a thing of integrity is structurally 
complete or functionally fit. It is for the sense of wholeness that both aspects of integrity 
are valuable, not the other way around. Similarly, it is for the sense of wholeness in 
integrity that harmony in the internal self-governance of a thing of integrity and 
consistency and adaptability in its external participation are valuable,16 not the other way 
around.  
           The question arises as to which kind of value is necessarily attributable to 
integrity. Since the value of wholeness is the ultimate value to which the other values of 
                                                 
14  Laura Westra cites these two aspects of integrity for the case of a living organism. See: Laura Westra 
(1994), op. cit., p. 35-9. 
15  When the appendix has to be removed, lest the health of the body is in danger, an assault of integrity can 
only be claimed for the reason that the way the cutting is done can damage the existing intimate parts. 
16  The immediate consequence is clear that, if we really value integrity, taking either one of them would 
not be sufficient to represent integrity. Pursuing adaptability without considering the requirement for 
harmonious inner coordination, for example, would not make the thing have integrity. 
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harmony, consistency and adaptability are to refer, the value of integrity must be an 
intrinsic value. It means that integrity is good in itself – that it is good in virtue of what it 
is rather than in virtue of how it is related to other goods. There is a sense of non-
instrumentality and objectivity in such a value, for if integrity is a means to some other 
valuable end or if the value of integrity is dependent on the attitude of the valuer, it would 
not be good in itself. Anything or any being – human or non-human being – that is 
disposed to have integrity is disposed because integrity is good in itself.  
Accordingly, the term ‘integrity’ can be treated either as a non-evaluative term or 
as an evaluative term. As a non-evaluative term, integrity is not used in making value 
judgments but rather in stating or trying to state a fact. Integrity becomes an evaluative 
term when the thing of integrity is a human being or a thing partly composed of human 
beings as members. Thus, I will distinguish two kinds of thing of integrity based on 
whether a human being is a part of it. For a thing of integrity of which a human being is 
not a part, its identity is predetermined while its external-performance or its function is 
causally interrelated to the functions and the interrelationships of its parts. The laws of 
nature fully prevail in such a thing of integrity. Therefore, the performance or the 
effective functioning of the thing can explain the quality of the functions and the quality 
of the interrelationships of its parts, and thus can explain its integrity. For example, the 
performance of the electrical power system in supplying the uninterruptible power to the 
consumers, despite resting some of the parts for maintenance purpose, can explain the 
integrity of the system. The performance of a bridge in supporting the traffic vehicles 
without deformation in its shape can indicate the integrity of the bridge. In this regard, 
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the term ‘integrity’ portrays the inner interconnectedness and the functioning of the thing, 
but it amounts to nothing more than just stating a fact. 
When a human being is the thing of integrity, the identity is not predetermined, 
but dependent on the ideals or the projects of life with which he chooses to identify 
himself. Human beings have no choice but to choose what they want to be and to do, and 
to act on their choice. As the act of choosing is necessary for a human being,17 there is no 
necessary connection between the identity and the actions that one would ultimately 
perform, for both are subject of one’s choice. The actions one performs may not express 
one’s identity, and the ideals being chosen may not lead to an identity that one is 
supposed to have. Therefore, integrity is not achieved through fulfilling the laws of 
nature but actively pursued through value judgments, that is to say that one ought to make 
some particular choices and to act on these choices for there is more of value in virtue of 
integrity to be gained by these choices. In this regard, integrity can justify actions or 
choices, and thus it is evaluative. 
When a human being is a part of the thing to which integrity is to be ascribed, 
such as a corporation, a state, and an ecosystem, integrity remains evaluative. As 
described earlier, the integrity of the whole requires the integrity of its constituents, for 
integrity proceeds with an internal self-governance in which the participation of the 
constituents is necessarily required. Once the participation of some of the constituents 
(human beings), which is the expression of their own integrity, is carried out through 
value judgments, the integrity of the whole would be the result of value judgments. The 
inclusion of a human being in the thing to which integrity is to be ascribed makes 
                                                 
17 We may want to avoid making a choice, but refusing to choose is something that we have chosen 
anyway. The act of choosing is thus necessary for us.  
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integrity evaluative.18 This clears up the ‘is/ought’ confusion in the use of the term 
‘integrity’: integrity is stating ‘what it is’ when it is attributed to a thing having no human 
being as a constituent, but it is stating ‘what ought to be sought’ when it is ascribed to a 
human being or a thing of which a human being is one of the constituents. 
The area of concern of this thesis is the integrity that is attributed to a person or a 
human organization, such as a corporation or a professional organization. What makes 
integrity of a person or integrity of an organization important is that it deals with 
morality. For morality is concerned with actions that are believed to be good for the 
agents by virtue of their being humans, while no person can escape being a human, 
necessarily, a person of integrity is expected to act morally. Yet, for a person of integrity, 
what it is to act in a certain way depends on his own judgment as to whether it fits into 
his sense of self-identity. Therefore, there are two aspects of integrity when it is ascribed 
to a person, and similarly to a human organization: first, that integrity is associated with 
how the individual builds his self-identity; and second, that integrity is related to how the 
individual is acting morally. The nature of integrity, as described earlier, is calling for 
both aspects inseparably; that is to say that integrity involves a self-governance for 
building and maintaining self-identity and moral actions as the expressions of self-
identity. In other words, integrity is essentially a virtue when ascribed to a person. 
                                                 
18  Scientists tried to describe ecosystem integrity in terms of what it is rather than what it should be, but the 
result remains ambiguous. In the case of the global ecosystem, though we (as human beings) have the 
capability to transcend nature, it is hard for us to show whether there is any external participation of the 
global ecosystem in expressing its identity. The readily perceivable indicator for explaining the integrity of 
the global ecosystem is the characteristics of the ecosystem in its internal self-governance, such as the 
harmony in the interaction between all the constituents of the ecosystem. Yet, the problem remains due to 
the fact that human beings are part of the ecosystem and that the interaction between all the constituents of 
the ecosystem involves the integrity of human beings that is evaluative. Scientists can successfully speak of 
the integrity of the global ecosystem only if human purposes have been projected onto nature. It seems true 
that the empirical description of ecosystem integrity always encounters problems attributed to the ‘is/ought’ 
distinction.     
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However, it seems difficult to take an observable feature, representing both senses 
altogether, as the criterion for ascribing integrity to a person. In the following sections, I 
will explore the problem in the ascription of integrity.    
 
 
2.2 The Problem in the Ascription of Integrity 
 
           What is the criterion commonly used in ascribing integrity to a person? In the field 
of business administration, the word ‘integrity’ is used as a synonym for honesty, more 
specifically reliability in financial matters, as if it is always acceptable to say that those 
who are ‘honest’ are persons of integrity. But this seems not quite right, for the meaning 
of integrity is different from honesty. It is true that one cannot have integrity without 
being honest, but it is not impossible that one can persistently reveal his honesty and yet 
have little integrity.19 Though honesty, simply defined as dedicating oneself to truth, 
requires one always to be truthful with oneself, caring about truth, reasoning on the basis 
of concern for truth, and telling the truth on every appropriate occasion, but telling or 
presenting a blatant truth – a full disclosure – without discerning the contextual propriety 
of the utterance may even indicate one’s lack of integrity. Ruthless truth-telling can be 
harmful to others, and may even reveal moral insensitivity and disguise self-righteous 
narcissism,20 characters that are contrary to integrity. Interestingly, some lies that are still 
in direct opposition to honesty can function as a strategic mechanism to preserve social 
                                                 
19 Stephen L. Carter, Integrity (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 52. 
20 Mike W. Martin, Love’s Virtues (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 121. 
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interaction,21 within which one can express his integrity. A small lie, by mentioning that 
the negotiated price is a rock bottom price,22 for example, can be the only effective way 
for two parties to continue the interaction and reach a business deal, since bargaining 
seems impossible in a situation of complete honesty. What makes integrity and honesty 
appear to be intersecting each other might be that honesty is necessarily demanded for 
one’s self-governance to build true self-identity and to express it when the context gives 
the possibility for its expression. However, when the context goes otherwise, one is 
required to deliberate and find a proper way for making its expression possible. Without 
honesty, one would fall into committing self-deception and consequently holding an 
obscure self-identity (thus one would have lack of integrity), but it is not right to suppose 
that because one has been honest one has fulfilled all that integrity demands. 
            We, then, seem to expect those to whom we ascribe integrity to have a reflective 
character, for we feel we can trust that what they would do is just right. Without a 
reflective character, one tends to be either unscrupulous in his decision or fanatical in his 
belief, without knowing how to justify it. A person of integrity must undertake a process 
of deliberation before endorsing what is right and deciding what to do. However, a person 
of integrity should not be too calculating, taking decisions based only on an impartial 
rational outlook, without giving adequate weight to personal attachment, affection, 
compassion, and moral emotion. Indeed, we also admire a person of integrity because he 
                                                 
21 Janet Ruane and Karen A. Cerulo, Second Thoughts: Seeing Conventional Wisdom through The 
Sociological Eye, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2000), p. 148. These lies are 
called ‘normal lies’, lies that represent a socially acceptable practice linked to productive social outcomes. 
They are contrasted with ‘deviant lies’ that are always judged to be wrong by the society as they can 
destroy trust or mutual confidence between the individuals.     
22 Lying can be technically described as “for A to lie to B is for A to say something to B, believing it to be 
false but expecting or inviting B to take it to be true”. See: A.T. Nuyen, “Lying and Deceiving: Moral 
Choice in Public and Private Life”, International Journal of Applied Philosophy 13:1(1999)), pp. 69-79. 
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reveals compassion to those who have emotional relationships with him.23 Feeling is part 
of human nature and what one feels has more values than the values in its use to conform 
rational principles. The value of compassion, for example, is not simply reducible to 
pleasure and subjected to the rational principle of the maximization of welfare, for 
compassion has a valuable directedness toward those with whom one is in close 
connection. In building and maintaining one’s self-identity through a self-governance 
process, the affective faculty deserves to secure and instantiate the directional character 
without necessarily weighing down the rational faculty and its principles. Thus, it is not 
right to equate a person of integrity simply with a person who constantly shows a 
reflective character, disregarding his genuine affective feeling towards his family and 
friends.  
            Another approach to identifying integrity is to address it in terms of a person 
steadfastly and consistently ‘being true to his or her commitment’. Being true to one’s 
commitments indicates that one is truly honest in what one said, having gone through a 
reflective thought before engaging in commitments. For if we know that a person is not 
honest in making a statement, or is making a statement without thinking it through, we 
would never rely on that statement and we would never believe that there is a 
commitment. We expect persons of integrity to act in ways that are consistent with what 
they say despite facing adversities and temptations. But commitment is not limited only 
to what one has said, for it can exist in many different kinds of objective, ideal, principle, 
                                                 
23 Stephen L Carter (1996) cites one reason why Michael Dukakis failed to attract American people in the 
presidential campaign in 1988. When he was asked in a debate whether he would alter his stance against 
the death penalty if his wife were murdered, he answered by citing all the reasons but showing little 
emotion on the assumed case of who was murdered. Michael Dukakis was perceived by a majority of 
voters, those who are expecting a leader of integrity, as having lack of passion. Stephen L. Carter, Integrity 
(New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 43. 
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conviction, intention, expectation, promise, relationship of trust, and institution, whether 
it is verbally stated or not. In some particular cases where conflict between commitments 
is unavoidable, a person of integrity must be open to reassess the commitment. Yet, 
reassessing the commitment and revising it for good reason do not necessarily mean that 
one is making a compromise in the face of adversity.24 Making a commitment and being 
committed to it as well as reassessing the commitment and being recommitted to it are 
part of the self governance process with which one is building self-identity. Reassessing 
and revising a commitment can be considered necessary for the reason that one must 
prevent incompatibility that turns one against oneself .25 Therefore, in an extraordinary 
case, a person of integrity may change a commitment. What remains true for a person of 
integrity in relation to his commitments is that he would never compromise them once 
they are committed or recommitted, as the reason for making a compromise is typically 
addressed only to the presence of adverse circumstances rather than the critical presence 
of self-identity. Thus, though one cannot have integrity without being true to one’s 
commitments, it is not sufficient to say that having integrity simply requires one being 
true to one’s commitments, denying any possibility for revising the commitments.  
           In sum, it is difficult to capture a single criterion for ascribing integrity to a person, 
and similarly to human organizations, for what appears to be the trait of a person of 
integrity cannot represent all the characteristics demanded for a person of integrity. The 
trait seems true for a person of integrity only to the extent that the self-identity, its 
                                                 
24 I do not mean that making a compromise is necessarily bad. In Chapter 4, I will show that making a 
compromise is compatible with, and even is required by, integrity if it constitutes the way the ideal 
community is to be realized. 
25 Victoria M. Davion (1990) argues that when fundamental values are in conflict, they must be changed so 
as to prevent a person from turning against himself. See: Victoria M. Davion, “Integrity and Radical 
Change”, in Claudia Card, ed., Feminist Ethics (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1990), pp. 180-192, p. 
191. 
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expression, and the self-governance process for its formation are not in trouble. Perhaps, 
the importance of self-identity in relation to integrity is the reason that partly motivates 
some philosophers to argue that integrity is essentially related to a person’s self identity. 
In the following section, however, I will show that the philosophical accounts of integrity 
that emphasize only a concern for self-identity face serious problems. 
 
 
2.3 The Reductive Accounts: A Concern for Self Identity Only    
 
          One class of accounts of integrity can be generally viewed as those that maintain 
integrity as a matter of how one builds and maintains his or her self identity. Three 
accounts have been frequently mentioned in the philosophical discussions,26 namely the 
‘integrated self’, the ‘identity’, and the ‘clean-hands’ pictures of integrity. The integrated-
self picture reveals integrity in terms of how one evaluates, separates, rejects, endorses, 
and integrates competing desires into a single order and thereby creates a unified self. 
With that endorsement and ordering, a person of integrity claims that desires are truly his 
own and, as a result, his actions reflect the sort of person he really wants to be. On the 
identity picture, integrity is explained in terms of a person’s being true to his own 
character, that is, a person who has some ground projects and principles with which he is 
strongly identified. And on the clean-hands picture, integrity is associated with a person 
who maintains the purity of his own agency, a person who refuses to violate the 
principles and the ideals he endorsed. Although these accounts of integrity can capture 
                                                 
26 Referring to the classification offered by Cheshire Calhoun (1995). See: Cheshire Calhoun, “Standing for 
Something”, Journal of Philosophy XCII: 5 (1995), pp. 235-260. 
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some features of integrity, they are insufficient and may lead to something which is 
incompatible with integrity. 
Gabriele Taylor (1985) argues for integrity in terms of a person whose choices 
and actions are consciously determined by his own endorsements.27 The argument relies 
on the concept of person offered by Harry Frankfurt (1971), according to which the 
special characteristic of persons is to be found in the person’s will or the ability to form 
‘second-order desires’.28 Second order desires are desires directed toward first order 
desires, whereas first order desires are desires simply to do or not to do one thing or 
another. Having the capacity to form second order desires means having the capacity to 
want certain first order desires to be effective and to reject the others. A person of 
integrity is not a ‘wanton’ who acts on whichever first-order desire happens to be the 
strongest, but he must evaluate his desires and decide to act on those desires with which 
he is strongly identified. To this extent, a person of integrity is capable of reflective self-
evaluation and of controlling his desires. In order for him to be a unitary being with a 
clearly defined identity, a person of integrity must be autonomous, sincere, consistent, 
and non-ambivalent in his identification and his actions. Frankfurt (1987) describes such 
a person as a person who is ‘wholehearted’ about what he is doing.29 Thus, following the 
argument that integrity involves reflexivity and high order volitions, integrity is a matter 
of selecting and integrating desires or a matter of unifying the person’s will. But this 
interpretation of integrity seems insufficient to figure out the sort of persons who possess 
                                                 
27 Gabriele Taylor, “Integrity”, in Gabriele Taylor: Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotion of Self Assessment 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 108-41, pp.109-111. 
28 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy LXVIII:1 
(1971), pp. 5-28. 
29 Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, 
Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cabridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), pp. 27-45.   
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integrity. It is right that autonomy and sincerity should be the characteristics of persons 
who possess integrity, but persons of integrity do not necessarily need to form a rigid 
unity of the self by neatly unifying the will and thereby avoiding the conflicting aspects 
of the self. A certain degree of conflicts and ambivalence can be part of integrity, because 
the conflicts can be brought into a healthy state that ultimately transform one toward a 
more enriched and stronger self.30 Insisting on the unified will can lead to satisfaction, 
but satisfaction is more a form of self-indulgence than a sign of integrity. Integrity seems 
more complex than simply integrating one’s wills, desires, and actions.   
             If the integrated-self account relies on one’s unified will in building and 
maintaining self-identity, the identity account confines the self-identity by discriminating 
between desires and projecting them to something that one is standing for. In a critique of 
utilitarianism, Bernard Williams (1973) is explicitly concerned with such a form of 
integrity that, according to him, has no place in the utilitarian conception of negative 
responsibility.31 For Williams, integrity means fidelity to some ground projects with 
which one is most closely identified and from which one’s actions and decisions have to 
flow in order for one’s life to be meaningful. Similarly, Jeffrey Blustein (1991) argues for 
integrity in terms of persons who “are faithful to their core commitments, to those 
commitments, in other words, that have a privileged status in their lives because they 
                                                 
30  Cheshire Calhoun (1995) argues that “integrity may sometimes in fact require resisting the impulse to 
resolve inconsistencies and ambivalence”. That is to say that there can be a good reason for one to resist 
resolving value conflicts that are associated with two identities that one may hold. Victoria Davion (1990) 
suggests that we see integrity as one that has a relation to the process of growth in which the conflict 
between two identities is understood as a connection of criticism that would prevent the process of 
becoming a larger-self from fracturing. See: Cheshire Calhoun, op. cit, p. 238; Victoria Davion, op. cit., p. 
189-90.  
31 Bernard Williams, “A critique of Utilitarianism”, in J.J. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism for 
and against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-155. In fact, the target of Williams’s 
criticism goes beyond utilitarianism for it includes also his objection to Kantian impartiality. See: Bernard 
Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality”, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19. 
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reflect what is most important to them and give them reasons for living”.32 Blustein calls 
such commitments identity-conferring commitments. The identification of oneself with 
something is obviously, at least partly, a psychological phenomenon that reveals the 
character of the person, which is necessary to answer the questions about what sort of 
person they are, what their life is all about and what things are important to them. This 
account has intuitive appeal, for persons of integrity are indeed required to be true and 
faithful to their own identity. However, limiting the scope of integrity only to identity-
conferring projects and identity-conferring commitments is counter intuitive, because 
non-identity-conferring commitments seem to be important also for persons of integrity. 
Betraying or being self-deceived about one’s non-identity-conferring commitments can 
indicate a lack of integrity. As Calhoun (1995) correctly notes, “[we] expect persons of 
integrity not only to stand up for their most deeply held and highly endorsed 
commitments, but to treat all of their endorsements as ones worthy of being held by a 
reflective agent”.33     
           The clean-hands account of integrity attempts to underline the importance of how 
one’s self-identity has to remain uncorrupted in order for one to maintain one’s integrity. 
Such an uncorrupted identity consists of a condition that, in Lynne McFall’s (1987) 
words, “there are some things that one is not prepared to do or some things one must 
do… [or] that some of one’s commitments be unconditional”.34 This implies that acting 
with integrity involves refusals to compromise on endorsed commitments. Persons of 
integrity do not allow themselves to be bribed or cajoled at the expense of violating their 
                                                 
32  Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment: Taking the Personal Point of View (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p.231. 
33 Cheshire Calhoun, op. cit., p.245. 
34 Lynne McFall, “Integrity”, Internatioal Journal of Ethics 98:1 (October, 1987), pp.5-20, p.11. 
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own identity-conferring commitments. After all, it is right that persons of integrity are not 
vulnerable in their (external) relationship with other people, but integrity, as I have 
argued earlier, cannot be derived simply from an external relationship that shows persons 
allegedly possessing integrity maintain their inviolable identities. Persons of integrity 
should be more concerned with how the internal relationship between the identity-
conferring-commitments is such as to make their identities remain intact in their external 
relationship with other people. Such an internal relationship is reflected in the quality of 
the person’s judgment. Seemingly, the clean-hands account of integrity is more a 
complement of the other accounts than an alternative account of integrity. In fact, as 
Damian Cox et al. (2003) contend, the issue of clean-hands only presents some case 
studies for testing an account of integrity in particular kinds of difficult situations.35 
           The common feature of those three reductive accounts of integrity is that they 
place only formal conditions upon the kind of person to which integrity can be ascribed, 
but do not place normative constraints on the elements under which such conditions are 
fulfilled. There is no constraint on the kinds of desires that constitutes the integrated self, 
the kinds of identity-conferring projects, and the kinds of unconditional commitments 
that one endorses. As long as one’s attitude towards one’s endorsed desires, projects, and 
commitments meets the formal conditions, one is a person of integrity under such 
reductive accounts. In effect, such reductive accounts signify only one sense of integrity 
in which acting with integrity merely means acting on one’s own view rather than a 
morally justified view. Moral justification can only contingently coincide with one’s own 
view and the coincidence depends on one’s self-awareness and commitments as a moral 
                                                 
35 Damian Cox, M. La Caze and M. P. Levine, Integrity and the Fragile Self (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 
p.37. 
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agent. Therefore, such reductive accounts cannot rule out a possible ascription of 
integrity to a genocidal Nazi who may have an integrated-self and identity conferring 
commitments though he is morally despicable. Integrity cannot really then be a virtue, 
which is always praiseworthy. But shifting the emphasis of integrity only to a concern for 




2.4 The Reductive Accounts: A Concern for Morality of Actions Only  
 
           The relation between integrity and the morality of actions is perceived differently 
by philosophers. Bernard Williams (1973, 1981) regards integrity as having no necessary 
connection with certain views of morality, for he persistently puts integrity in direct 
conflict with the impartial demands of morality, prescribed in Utilitarianism and Kantian 
deontology.36 Similarly, Gabriele Taylor (1985) holds that “the person of integrity need 
not be a morally good person, she may not be much, or possibly not be at all, moved by 
other-regarding reasons”.37 Both philosophers assert that there is no necessary association 
between integrity and morality, for personal engagement in one’s ground projects and 
moral commitments can be two different matters. If there is any link at all, for one cannot 
wholly ignore others, the connection must consist in a sense of respect for the others who 
also have ground projects according to their own evaluations.  
                                                 
36 Bernard Williams, “A critique of Utilitarianism”, op. cit., pp.108-18; Bernard Williams, “Persons, 
Character and Morality”, op.cit., pp.1-19.  
37 Gabriele Taylor, “Integrity”, op. cit., p.128. 
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In a rather different illustration, Lynne McFall (1987) seems to hold a sort of 
supplemental, or external, connection between integrity and morality in drawing the 
distinction between moral integrity and personal integrity.38 For McFall, personal 
integrity is adherence to any set of one’s endorsed principles or commitments, whereas 
moral integrity is just adding a moral requirement to personal integrity. Accordingly, one 
could possess personal integrity without moral integrity, but one could not have moral 
integrity without personal integrity. Following McFall’s argument that every morality is 
fundamentally a personal morality,39 personal integrity is necessary and sufficient 
condition for one just to have integrity. If integrity has to be linked to morality, the 
argument suggests that the agents’ moral self-conceptions should provide baseline 
constraints on the acceptability of moral requirements.40  
However, taking the primacy of the agents’ moral self-conceptions over the 
acceptability of moral requirements can lead to moral subjectivism and relativism, 
according to which moral principles are created, rather than discovered, and are valid 
relative to individual choice and cultural norms. The implication is paradoxical because 
evil Nazis could be persons of integrity for they were able to retain their self-conception 
as morally decent according to the prevailing accepted norms of the Nazi society. 
Accepting no necessary association between integrity and morality, and supplementing 
morality under the agents’ self conceptions in order for the agent to have integrity, could 
not rule out the possibility of an evil person being a person of integrity. This seems to 
                                                 
38 Lynne McFall, “Integrity”, op. cit., pp.14-16. 
39  Her argument emerges from her rejection of the claim that, under genuine moral conflict between 
personal and social morality, (1) every person should, under the same circumstances, do the same thing, 
and (2) there is always an impartial moral duty. Social morality is the set of principles applied to everyone 
and is characterized by impartiality, whereas personal morality need not be constrained by impartiality. 
See: ibid., pp.19-20.     
40  As pointed out by Elizabeth Ashford (2000). See: Elizabeth Ashford, “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and 
Partiality”, Journal of Philosophy XCVII:8 (August 2000), pp. 421-439, p. 423.  
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suggest that the relation between integrity and morality must be intrinsic, and allow no 
possible dissociation between them. It is true that persons of integrity should not betray 
their self-identity but they cannot eschew the demands of morality for non-moral reasons. 
Persons of integrity are always expected to act morally when the circumstances demand. 
Such an intrinsic relation can be interpreted in many different ways, but interpretations 
that give too much emphasis on the moral requirements, or that reduce integrity to the 
morality of the person’s actions would likely fail to capture the full sense of integrity. 
Mark S. Halfon (1989) and Cheshire Calhoun (1995) see the intrinsic relation 
between integrity and morality in a formal way.41 In their views, integrity is closely 
connected with the agents’ moral deliberation and the actions in the light of it. Persons of 
integrity, according to Halfon, are committed to do what is best by imposing on 
themselves a moral point of view that is conceptually clear, logically consistent, and 
weighing all relevant empirical evidence and moral considerations. Whereas, according 
to Calhoun, what is best in the judgment of persons of integrity is one that matters, or 
ought to matter, to fellow deliberators. For Calhoun, persons of integrity have a proper 
regard for their own best judgment as a deliberator among deliberators, and properly give 
regard to the others’ best judgment while they are standing for their own best judgment. 
However, these views provide no substantive restriction on the content of what is best, 
and draw no clear demarcation between integrity and fanaticism over what the proper 
regard to one’s best judgment amounts to. Still, the agents’ moral self-conceptions take 
precedence over moral requirements. As a result, these views cannot completely rule out 
                                                 
41 See: Mark S. Halfon, Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1989), 
pp.36-7; Cheshire Calhoun, op. cit., pp.257-60. 
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the possible case of a fanatic Nazi coming to have integrity, though the case is highly 
unlikely to happen.42              
           In order to avoid such a possibility, Elizabeth Ashford (2000) argues for a 
substantive constraint in respect to the intrinsic relation between integrity and morality.43 
She argues that one’s self-conception has to be grounded in reality, viz. rather than 
constraining the acceptability of moral requirements, one’s self-conception has to be 
constrained by moral requirements. Ashford takes the primacy of moral requirements 
over the acceptability of the agents’ self-conceptions in what she called ‘objective 
integrity’. In order to have objective integrity, according to Ashford, the agents have to 
abide by their commitments to the moral obligations that they actually have in order to 
lead a morally decent life. This clearly suggests that integrity is only ascribed to a person 
with whom those who ascribe it are in moral agreement. But the ordinary ascription of 
integrity does not seem to presuppose unambiguous moral agreement. As Cox et. al. 
(2001, 2003) correctly point out,44 we can regard someone as a person of integrity despite 
disagreeing substantially with his views on a certain moral issue. Conversely, we may 
claim a person is lacking in integrity despite the fact that we agree with him on many 
important matters. The moral concern in the ascription of integrity seems deeper than 
merely a conformance with the standard morality actually endorsed in society. It is 
correct that integrity has a substantive moral aspect, but constraining integrity with the 
                                                 
42  The case might happen, for example, in the circumstances of ordinary Germans in the 1940s, when – 
without necessarily committing self-deception, rationalization and hypocrisy – they believed that Nazism 
was an alternative moral principle. 
43 Elizabeth Ashford, op.cit., pp.423-5. 
44  Damian Cox, M. La Caze and M. P. Levine, “Integrity”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/integrity/ ; Damian Cox, M. La Caze and M. P. Levine, 
Integrity and the Fragile Self, op.cit., p.57.  
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actual standard morality is too strong to preserve the sense of integrity in the ordinary use 
of the term. 
            Moreover, the emphasis on morality in the ascription of integrity tends to 
undermine the personal aspect of integrity. When morality, generally defined, requires 
agents to adopt impartial points of view, and conflicts between impartial moral 
commitments and partial personal commitments are unavoidable, an omission of the 
personal aspect requires agents to give up their emotional engagement in their personal 
ground projects and their particular relationships. The problem is that integrity is 
concerned with agents and their own actions, not only their actions as such. Abandoning 
the emotional engagement of the agents can mean to a certain extent undermining the 
agents, the source of the actions, and thus the sense of integrity itself.  
            In sum, the relation between integrity and morality seems to be intrinsic and 
substantial, but reducing integrity to the morality of the person’s actions deprives us of 
the sense of integrity in the ordinary use of the term. Integrity seems to have inextricably 
two potentially conflicting elements: the personal element which is associated with what 
constitutes the self-identity of the agent, and the moral element that rules out the 
possibility of a grossly evil person being a person of integrity. The challenge is to find an 
account of integrity that is non-reductive and able to harmoniously integrate both 






2.5 A Non-Reductive Account: The Challenge 
 
           A non-reductive account of integrity should consider that, when it is ascribed to a 
person, integrity is a virtue that is always concerned with the relation between self-
identity and actions. Integrity involves both a self-governance for building and 
maintaining self-identity, and moral actions as the expressions of self-identity. The self-
governance for building and maintaining self-identity – the personal element – reflects 
the individual’s particularity and subjectivity in the sense of being conscious about where 
he stands, where he likes to be, and where he should go with the values in the light of 
which he acts and speaks. The morality of actions – the moral element – requires 
universality and objectivity, both of which should be largely explainable in terms of 
reasonableness in the evaluation of one’s judgment to act morally. As moral actions are 
parts of the expression of self-identity, there is no necessarily irresolvable conflict 
between the personal element and the moral element. Conflicts may occur but the 
conflicts are part of the dynamism of the process of judgment, while the dynamism is 
constitutive of integrity. These two elements – the personal and the moral elements – 
must be inseparably integrated if the indispensable sense of wholeness in integrity is to be 
preserved.  
              Thus, an ethics that can support the non-reductive account of integrity has to 
provide a way to integrate the personal and the moral elements. It is not merely 
concerned with the morality of the person’s actions, but also, and more importantly, with 
how one comes to act morally. The personal limitations, relationships, and aspirations for 
what makes life worth living should be involved in the judgment of what is right for the 
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individual to do in particular circumstances at a particular time. Morality should not be 
understood as an external pressure that forces the individual to abide by rules – as if the 
individual is obliged to cast himself as a ‘slave’ of morality – but rather perceived as a 
large ‘map’ where the individuals can articulate their aspirations. The aspect of the 
individual person is treated as an indispensable aspect.  
           Interestingly, ethical problems in economic life can only be satisfactorily solved if 
the individual personal aspect is adequately addressed. In the following chapters, I will 
examine the ethical problems in economic life and argue that only an ethics that takes the 
aspect of the individual person into account can satisfactorily solve the problems. 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics can meet this requirement. I will develop a non-reductive account 
of integrity that has its foundation in Aristotle’s ethics. I will show that personal and 
moral elements can be integrated in the perspective of Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia 
in which the good life has two aspects: first, it is personally fulfilling, and second, it is 
one that we value most in our lives as human beings. From an Aristotelian perspective, 
the integration of the two elements can be realized, because to engage in the good life is 









          Ordinarily understood, economic life is a domain of life in which individuals aim 
to fulfill their needs, interests and wants through production, distribution, exchange, and 
consumption of goods. It is a cluster of activities that has two aspects, namely a technical 
aspect and a social aspect. The technical aspect is concerned with a relation between 
individuals and goods and the ways in which goods are used economically. The social 
aspect comes to exist for, in the process of using the goods, individuals encounter each 
other, establish cooperation and struggle in competition, and in these circumstances may 
inflict harm or benefit on others. Reflections on the ethics of this domain typically 
involve two questions: (1) what basic economic institutional system best serves 
individuals and (2) how can individuals under such a system be best regulated and 
motivated? In this chapter, I will not focus on the first question, nor will I seek 
justification for the current entrenched institutions and system in modern societies today, 
namely private-property, market and capitalism.1 Rather, I assume that the capitalist 
institutions and system are basically right and will focus on the second question within 
the scope of this assumption.    
                                                 
1 I understand ‘capitalism’ generally to mean an economic system in which the means of production are 
privately owned and the distribution of goods takes place through a market mechanism.  
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            The ethical problems in economic life can be typically seen in a corporate setting 
(business). The problems involve conflicting expectations between those who refer to the 
technical aspect and those who refer to the social aspect of activities. Those who refer to 
the technical aspect are expecting the agent to maximize the economic use of goods and 
to maximize profit. But profit maximization in a business that disregards morality can 
indeed bring adverse effects to people. Therefore, referring to the social aspect, business 
should deal with morals and ethics. In many cases, however, the agent faces a dilemma 
over whether to undertake profit maximization at the expense of moral considerations, or 
to fulfill moral requirements at the expense of profit maximization. A paradox may also 
arise if keeping profit maximization is considered to have moral content. The managers 
of a corporation, for example, usually face a situation in which maximizing profit is a fair 
promise to the shareholders, and yet they are required to give moral considerations to the 
people affected by the business. I will show that accounts that present a synthesis but put 
the emphasis on either profit maximization or moral considerations to the affected parties 
are equally ethically problematic. Preserving the paradox and leaving the synthesis open 
is also elusive. I argue that the problem can be plausibly seen as an ethical problem 
typically faced by individuals in their multiple roles in communities, and that the solution 
of the problem would eventually lie in the quality of the moral character of the 
individuals who are involved in the decision making process. The quality of character 
that can resolve the paradox is one that enables individuals to orient their economic life 
as an inseparable constituent of the good life. Referring to the importance of the quality 
of character of individuals, I shall conclude that personal involvement of the individuals 
is indispensable to the solution of ethical problems in economic life. Thus, if ethics and 
 45
integrity are to be meaningful terms for solving ethical problems in economic life, the 
aspect of the individual person, in addition to the aspect of the morality of actions, has to 
be adequately addressed.   
 
 
3.1 Economic Life, Corporation and Profit Maximization 
 
Economic activities in recent times have been growing more and more 
complicated. With the development of technology and the introduction of money, 
corporations and financial institutions, we can see on the surface a web of activities 
involving labor unions, wages, markets, commercial banks, export-import, credits, 
foreign exchanges, glaring advertisement and promotion, to name only a few. However, 
regardless of the complex structure of economic life we can always find three essential 
features, namely production, exchange and consumption. Every individual is 
economically involved in the production, exchange and consumption of goods (including 
services). Outside of a corporate setting, people sell goods and buy other goods for 
consumption. Inside a corporate setting, employees produce services for a corporation 
that is managed to produce and sell goods in the market, while as a return they receive 
salaries with which to buy goods for their own consumption. The economic characteristic 
of what the people, the employees and the corporation are doing is the same in that they 
are basically ‘businesses’ with the same objective, measured in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency. In fact, as a kind of firm, the corporation can be seen as an organization 
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established in light of the objective to increase effectiveness and efficiency.2 It is in the 
corporation that the objective of effectiveness and efficiency takes explicit form, for 
without the achievement of this objective the corporation could not be sustained. The 
corporation can be seen as a reification of business in which its policies and decision-
making procedures formally guide decisions and actions to achieve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the activities. Therefore, it is fair to take business in the corporate setting as 
a typical unit of economic activity for further assessment. 
We may argue that business as a unit of activity in the economy should be run 
effectively and efficiently to produce the goods for the material well-being of society. 
Indeed, since the available resources in society are limited, we obviously tend to praise an 
effective and efficient business and to denounce inefficient businesses that utilize 
resources without consideration of better alternative usages. From the society’s point of 
view, the more effective and efficient a business is, the better it is for society. In 
quantitative monetary terms, the most effective and efficient business corresponds to the 
maximum profit that the business can create. Thus, effectiveness and efficiency are the 
fundamental values of business, and profit maximization becomes the economic norm of 
business.3 However, if business should literally follow the economic norms, there are 
questions about the status of business in human life and the moral status of the 
corporation as a reified entity of business in society. If business life is conceived as a 
                                                 
2 It is because of the increasing return to scale that people likely have reason to establish organizations. 
Because people naturally tend to avoid complexity, setting up specializations and organizations would 
make them more effective and efficient in their cumulative efforts. A firm is a business organization that 
follows such a rationale. A firm can take one of the three forms, i.e. sole proprietorship, partnership, and 
corporation. A corporation is a firm that is chartered by the state and received legal rights as an entity 
separated from its owners.        
3 The term ‘profit’ is generally defined as a positive financial gain resulting from the business operation. In 
the context of corporation, “maximizing shareholders’ value” is a common term used to mean profit 
maximization, for the firm’s value that is owned by the shareholders is generally the market value of the 
long-term stream of the positive financial gains (profits).  
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separate realm of life with its own norms and the corporation is treated as an artificial 
being merely to accommodate these norms, business has nothing to do with the prevailing 
traditions of morality and the ethical ideals of human relationships. Accordingly, what 
businessmen should abide by in doing their business is only the rules set up in light of the 
objective of realizing economic norms. Albert Carr (1968) argues that business is like a 
poker game, the goal of which is plainly to win within the accepted rules of the game.4 
As long as the rules imposed in the economy are obeyed, any immoral trick to maximize 
profit is allowed as part of the game; hence, for Carr, business seems to be amoral and 
have no social responsibility. But the fact that a business can harm people evokes serious 
questions over whether it is right to grant business and corporations (as reified entities of 
business) moral neutrality. This leads us to two fundamental issues in business ethics that 
have widely been debated, namely the nature of the corporation and corporate social 
responsibility.                  
With respect to the nature of the corporation, we may critically ask whether the 
corporation is a kind of entity capable of having any responsibility at all, for moral 
responsibilities are normally attributed to individual persons while corporations are not 
individual persons. As pointed out by Richard T. De George (1981), there are two views 
on this, namely the Organizational View and the Moralistic View.5 The Organizational 
View regards the corporation as an instance of a formal organization that is, by definition, 
artificially structured and bound by rules merely for the purpose of attaining specific 
goals. According to the Organizational View, we cannot properly count the corporation 
                                                 
4 Albert Z. Carr, “Is Business Bluffing Ethical?”, Harvard Business Review 46.3 (1968): 143-53, reprinted 
in Ruth Chadwick and Doris Schroeder, ed., Applied Ethics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy – Volume V 
Business and Economics (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 64-75.   
5 Richard T. De George, “Can Corporations Have Moral Responsibility?”, in Tom L. Beauchamp and 
Norman E. Bowie, ed., Ethical Theory and Business, 3rd edition (New jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp.62-8. 
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as a moral agent and evaluate corporate actions with ordinary ethical standards applicable 
to individual persons. John Ladd (1970) argues that what is ideal in such a formal 
organization can be incompatible with the ordinary ideals of morality, for the rules and 
rationale obtaining in the organization make the activities logically autonomous, 
independent of external considerations, while the rules should be unchallenged by any 
criticism from the individuals in the organization who must functionally act merely as 
impersonal agents of the organization.6 Under such a view, the corporation is like an 
artificial ‘machine’, an instrument created for the purpose of maximizing profit. It is 
argued that, as legally created entities, corporations can have legal (artificial) 
responsibilities but neither the corporations nor the impersonal agents of corporations can 
properly be assigned moral responsibility for their profit maximizing actions. 
Accordingly, to speak of moral responsibility of corporations is to make a category 
mistake and to labour under moral confusion.7 
The opposing view, the Moralistic View, claims that the corporation satisfies the 
conditions for being a moral agent. Peter French (1979) argues that corporations can be 
said to act intentionally through the exercise of what he calls the Corporate Internal 
Decision (CID), which is embedded in the organizational structure and the corporate 
policy.8 For French, corporate actions and corporate intentions can only be attributed to 
the corporation, not to any of the individual members of the corporation, and thus the 
                                                 
6 John Ladd, “Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations”, Monist 54 (1970): 488-516. 
7 John Ladd, “Corporate Mythology and Individual Responsibility”, The International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 2 (1984): 1-21, reprinted in Thomas I. White, ed., Business Ethics: A Philosophical Reader 
(NY: Macmillan; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1993), pp. 236-51. 
8 Peter French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person”, American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1979): 207-15, 
reprinted in Thomas I. White, ed., Business Ethics: A Philosophical Reader (NY: Macmillan; Toronto: 
Maxwell Macmillan, 1993), pp. 228-235. The CID is, in fact, part of the rules that John Ladd uses to 
characterize the corporation as being amoral. By contrast, French uses the CID to explain the corporation in 
terms of corporate moral agency. 
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corporation can have moral responsibility in the same sense as individual moral persons 
have it. Similarly, Kenneth Goodpaster and John Matthews, Jr. (1982) argue that though 
the corporation is not a person in a literal sense, the process associated with the moral 
responsibility of individual persons, which is characterized by rationality and respect for 
others, can be projected to the level of corporations in such a way that, by analogy, we 
can meaningfully and appropriately speak of moral responsibility with respect to 
corporations.9 Analogous to an individual person, a corporation is believed to have the 
ability to exercise independent moral judgments and control its own behavior through the 
hands of its managers. 
Neither the Organizational View nor the Moralistic View is wholly convincing, 
once the implications of the assumption underlying the views are carefully observed. The 
Organizational View assumes that the corporation is a formal organization, denying any 
possible process of decision making other than those merely fulfilling the ‘rules of the 
game’ to maximize profit. If we endorse this, following the argument, we cannot morally 
evaluate corporate decisions and actions. But this is clearly mistaken, because corporate 
decisions and actions are essentially activities that are in principle controllable by the 
human members of the corporation, while all human activities are and should be subject 
to moral evaluations.10 By virtue of being controllable, corporate actions and decisions 
can be turned by the human members into activities that either harm or serve human 
beings, and thus should be subject to moral evaluations. Indeed, it is hard to accept the 
model of formal organization that treats the human members of a corporation merely as 
                                                 
9 Kenneth E. Goodpaster and John B. Matthews, Jr., “Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?”, Harvard 
Business Review (Jan/Feb 1982), reprinted in Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, ed., Ethical 
Theory and Business, 3rd edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 76-86. 
10 Richard T. De George (1988), op. cit., p. 65. 
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instruments to serve the corporate ‘machine’ for creating a profit. On the other hand, the 
Moralistic View assumes that the corporation is a solid entity with a single locus of 
intentions and judgments analogous to that of an individual moral person. But the single 
locus seems to be more metaphorical than real, as those who are in the corporation may 
have different interpretations on ‘what a given corporate act is intended to accomplish’.11 
The Moralistic View exaggerates the corporation as something like a larger-than-human 
person with the interests and identity likely to swallow up the interests and identity of its 
human members.12 As the source of moral actions, the individual human members are 
treated merely as functionaries for the moral projects of the corporation. 
The Organizational View and the Moralistic View assume very different models 
of organization, but they both equally oversimplify the workings of corporate 
organizations. Does it mean that the right answer to the problem of corporate moral 
agency depends on the actual fact of whether a corporation meets the conditions required 
by the assumed model of organization? Some people may think so. Thomas Donaldson 
(1982), for example, states two conditions a corporation has to fulfill in order to qualify 
as a moral agent, i.e. the capacity to use moral reason in decision making and the capacity 
of the decision making process to control not only the corporate behavior but also the 
applied rules.13 Following Donaldson, we may then find some corporations are qualified 
as moral agents while some are not. But this line of argument can be misleading, because 
the human members of a corporation may intentionally make the corporation either 
                                                 
11 Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 22. The managers 
may see it as a means to make a profit, while the employees see it as a means to earn salary. 
12 Manuel G. Velasquez, “Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do”, 
Business & Professional Ethics Journal 2 (1983) 1-4, 6-17, reprinted in Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman 
E. Bowie, ed., Ethical Theory and Business, 3rd edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 69-76. 
13 Thomas Donaldson (1982), op. cit., p. 30. 
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satisfy or dissatisfy the conditions, depending on whether, on a case-by-case basis, they 
can appropriate the benefits.14 Therefore, it is not quite right to solve the problem of 
corporate moral agency by referring to the fact that the corporate organizations work one 
way or another. 
Instead of referring to the workings of corporate organizations, I shall argue for 
the moral agency of the corporation by referring to the fact that the corporation is in 
principle controlled by human beings, and the fact that corporate activities are basically 
human activities. If we are serious about morality, we should treat all human activities, 
whether or not the activities are incorporated, as being subject to moral evaluation. By 
virtue of the fact that the corporation is in principle controlled by human beings, we 
should not exclude the corporation from being a moral agent. Thus, the right question is 
not whether the corporation is or is not a moral agent, or whether the corporation satisfies 
or dissatisfies conditions needed to qualify as a moral agent, but rather whether the 
corporation should or should not be treated as a moral agent. And the answer is, I argue, 
unconditionally positive. The people in a corporation are human beings who must have 
the capacity to control corporate activities and thus must have the capacity to make the 
corporation fulfill any reasonable condition of moral agency. Some people employed in a 
corporation may be ignorant or powerless, but this does not necessarily cancel the 
principle that the corporation should be treated as a moral agent. Although it is still 
reasonable to say that the moral agency of the corporation must be limited or special in 
                                                 
14 The corporate people may not properly respond to the urgent request of the disaster victims for the reason 
that the corporation is not fully qualified as a moral agent. On another occasion, they may try to shift their 
own responsibility over the corporate activities to the corporation for a reason that, as a moral agent, the 
corporation shall bear most of the responsibility. 
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kind, due to the fact that the corporation is not a person, the principle remains that the 
corporation should unconditionally be treated as a moral agent. 
But if we accept the argument that corporations should be treated as moral agents, 
capable of bearing responsibilities, the second issue is what their responsibilities are. 
With respect to the issue of corporate social responsibility, two positions are generally 
identified, namely the Classical View and the Managerial View.15 Milton Friedman 
(1970) is widely regarded as one of the most articulate spokespersons for the Classical 
View with his argument that the sole social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profit.16 Friedman’s argument can be seen as a slight twist of the moral neutrality 
argument of the Organizational View, for, according to Friedman, only persons can have 
responsibilities and as ‘artificial persons’ corporations can only have artificial 
responsibility. The responsibility of corporations is then derived from the understanding 
that corporations are private properties and instruments of the owners, designed primarily 
to make a profit. On the other hand, the Managerial View denies that corporations are 
mere private properties of the owners. The denial is supported by widely held concerns 
over the fact that modern corporations are able to have tremendous impacts on society 
while the shareholders who own the corporations have only a limited controlling power 
over the operation of the corporations. Because corporations may have great social 
power, they should be designed to bear extensive social responsibilities, more than 
merely to maximize profit for the shareholders (shareowners). And the managers who 
                                                 
15 John Danley, The Role of the Modern Corporation in a Free Society (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994), p. 3.  
16 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits”, The New York Times 
Magazine 13 September 1970, reprinted in Ruth Chadwick and Doris Schroeder, ed., Applied Ethics: 
Critical Concepts in Philosophy – Volume V Business and Economics (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002), pp. 57-63. Friedman’s profit-motive argument is very much in line with the argument presented by 
Theodore Levitt. See: Theodore Levitt, “The Dangers of Social Responsibility”, Harvard Business Review 
36:5 (Sept-Oct 1958): 41-50.  
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control the daily operation of the corporations must play a definite role with respect to 
these responsibilities. 
What Friedman tries to do in the Classical View is to separate business from 
morality and then argue that the separation is morally justified. For Friedman, the 
responsibility of corporations is economic in nature, which is to make a profit for the 
owners of the corporations, and with the economic (profit) motive the corporations 
operating in the capitalistic system would ultimately contribute to social welfare. To exert 
non-economic social responsibilities is to reduce the efficiency and profit of the 
corporations that in effect, besides violating the property rights of the owners, also 
hinders a process for promoting social welfare. Thus, the defense of the view can appear 
in a deontological form, which is concerned with the property rights of the owners, and a 
teleological form, which is concerned with social welfare as the ultimate consequence.17 
The deontological defense seems to rely on the assumption that the rights of property 
ownership entail an overriding liberty of the owners to dispose of their properties as they 
wish, and the assumption that the exercise of the property rights would not infringe other 
rights or the rights of other people. The teleological defense relies on the assumption that 
the property owners are rational economic men who are only concerned with profit 
maximization through the use of the property, and that the free market system could 
transform the self-interested profit maximization into social welfare.   
Friedman’s argument has been widely criticized on several grounds. Against the 
deontological defense, critics typically show that the use of property may conflict with 
other rights or the rights of other people and, for that reason, the critics usually argue for 
alternative concepts of property and property rights that tie the owners with obligations 
                                                 
17 Thomas Donaldson (1982), op. cit., p. 71. 
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associated with the rights to the property.18 The rights of property ownership should be 
constrained by moral obligations for they cannot be isolated from conflicts with other 
rights. A corporation, for example, should respect persons’ rights to life by not producing 
and selling products that may endanger the lives of the users. Similarly, against the 
teleological defense, the critics attack the unrealistic assumptions underlying the defense. 
For the model of the free market is a model of voluntary exchanges, all participants must 
be assumed to have possessed perfect knowledge in addition to the assumption that they 
possess perfect rationality. This is because the free market system transforms self-
interested profit maximization into social welfare only insofar as each market participant 
is fully informed and the transactions are voluntary.19 But this may not obtain, as perfect 
information and perfect rationality can conflict. Obviously, rational market participants 
would choose to refrain from disclosing the needed information if by so doing they can 
maximize their interests and, conversely, they might have no choice other than to accept 
imperfect information if they are not able to bear the cost of acquiring further 
information. As a result, there is in fact no such social welfare, envisaged in the model, 
for moral justification. If there is anything of ‘social welfare’ at all, it is likely to be one 
that contains moral problems, most notably the problem of injustice and unfairness. 
Moral problems come up typically in circumstances where the ‘big’ and wealthy 
participants have the excessive power to take benefits from the free market system over 
those that the small and poor participants can take. It is hard to deny, for example, that 
                                                 
18 Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, “Toward a Democratic Theory of Property and the Modern Corporation”, 
International Journal of Ethics 81:4 (July 1971), pp. 271-86; Michael Hoffman and James V. Fisher, 
“Corporate Responsibility: Property and Liability”, in Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, ed., 
Ethical Theory and Business, 1st edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1979), pp. 187-97. 
19 Rationality in economic activities may not even be limited to profit maximization, for a market 
participant can not be said to be less rational when he or she prefers to protect important measures other 
than profit maximization, such as liquidity, security, and technological advancement. 
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the power of shareholders who have massive capital reserves to withhold a transaction 
and to demand a preferred price is more easily exercised than that of the workers who 
may only have one choice to sell their labor for survival. Thus, neither the deontological 
defense nor the teleological defense is successful.  
It is true that Friedman does not completely reject morality in business as he 
subsequently states that the pursuit of profit has to be constrained by the law and ethical 
customs and the commitment to no deception and fraud in order to maintain open and 
free competition. But these constraints are not sufficient to absolve the market 
participants from the need to confront moral problems, because the problems originate in 
the behavior of the market participants rather than arise from the incompleteness of the 
system. Adding constraints to complete the system would not make the morally 
neutralized business decisions and actions free from moral issues. Apart from the fact that 
not every constraint is morally defensible, it may even sound ironic when the spirit of 
neutralization goes far beyond the constraints, in the sense that the market participants 
consider the infringement of the constraints only as one among the other factors in their 
calculation of profit maximization.20 On the other hand, if the constraints are enforced by 
the power of government in order to prevent any possible infringement, the enforcement 
can be interpreted as a governmental interference in business that the concept of free 
market essentially opposes.21 
                                                 
20 It is thought that to break the law or ethical customs is all right as long as they do not get caught or the 
cost due to the punishment in the case of being caught can be absorbed by its benefits. It is a kind of 
rationalization that induces managers to commit unethical acts in the interest of their corporation.        
21 The enforcement can only be effective if the constraints are formalized and legislated as laws. But not 
every ethical matter can be legislated. Moreover, some laws enacted by the state legislature, as a result of 
political lobbying processes, can be unjust.   
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In sum, Friedman’s argument is not successful in justifying the separation of 
business from morality. Business cannot and should not be separated from morality. This 
conclusion supports the Managerial View that corporations not merely have the 
responsibility to make a profit, but should also have extensive social responsibilities. But 
the Managerial View is not without problems, for many different and conflicting ethical 
values seems to be involved in the issue of social responsibility. An ethical dilemma 
could arise when corporate managers have to confront responsibilities to the shareholders 
and responsibilities to the other constituents of the society that have stakes in the 
corporation.22 On the one side, managers have the responsibility to run the business 
efficiently and to return a profit to the shareholders. Considering that the shareholders 
have rights to withdraw their investments if the corporation is not achieving a desired 
return, the managers may have to suppress their response to the interests of those who 
have other stakes in the corporation in order to achieve the desired return. On the other 
side, the managers should keep the corporate responsibilities, not only to the 
shareholders, but to the stakeholders generally (including the shareholders) that in 
practice may reduce the return to the shareholders. The dilemma leaves the managers in a 




                                                 
22 Gerald F. Cavanagh and Arthur F. McGovern (1988) describe thoroughly the ethical dilemmas arising 
from the requirements to absorb two conflicting values, the traditional business values and the social 
values, in the American modern corporations. See: Gerald F. Cavanagh and Arthur F. McGovern, Ethical 
Dilemmas in the Modern Corporation (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 12-33. 
23 Kenneth E. Goodpaster, “Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis”, Business Ethics Quarterly 
1(January 1991), pp. 53-73, p. 53. 
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3.2 The Stakeholder Paradox and the Stakeholder Syntheses 
 
            The idea that the corporation has stakeholders to consider in decision making 
processes reveals an attempt to make a radical shift from treating the corporation as an 
input-output ‘black box’ with a single purpose towards treating it as a part of a social 
network with multiple purposes. It is a shift of concerns from the technical aspects of 
business to the social aspects. However, the stakeholder theory of corporation is not 
always presented in normative forms. A simple reference to the commonly used 
definition of stakeholder as presented by R. Edward Freeman (1984), that “[A] 
stakeholder in an organization is … any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”24 might imply a sense that it is just a 
matter of fact that corporations have stakeholders, therefore, the stakeholder theory can 
be presented in descriptive form. Another reference to the definition originally offered by 
the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), in which stakeholders are “those groups without 
whose support the organization would cease to exist”, 25 might imply a sense in which 
managers would maintain good relationships with them in order to get their support for 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives and, thus, the stakeholder theory can 
also be cast in instrumental terms. Nevertheless, as Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston 
(1995) have correctly pointed out, the normative aspect of the stakeholder theory is more 
fundamental than the other aspects of the theory, as the normative justification ultimately 
serves as a basis for the justification of the theory in all its forms.26 The justification of a 
                                                 
24 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman, 1984), p. 46. 
25 Ibid, p. 31. 
26 Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, “The Stakeholder Theory of The Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications”, Academy of Management Review 20:1 (January 1995), pp. 63-91.  
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descriptive stakeholder theory of corporation can only be accurate if the corporations do 
consider their stakeholders accordingly, but people in such corporations would likely 
need to have presumed the truth of the normative justification when they implement it in 
their works. The managers of the corporation may have to evaluate the legitimacy of the 
‘stakes’ in the corporation before considering various parties as its stakeholders, and their 
evaluation appeals to the normative justification. The stakeholder paradox can be seen as 
a paradox that comes out of the problem of normative justification as to how the 
introduction of the stakeholder theory can bring ethical values into business.   
            A first possible approach to justify the application of the stakeholder theory refers 
to the fiduciary relationship between the shareholders and the managers of the 
corporation. In this relationship, the managers have a discretionary power to dispose the 
corporate assets on the shareholder’s behalf. The shareholders, as the beneficiary, have to 
trust and rely on the judgment of the managers (the fiduciary). For the managers to 
receive trust to hold the assets for the shareholders, they must have the responsibility to 
manage the corporation for the interest of the shareholders. Misappropriating assets for a 
purpose other than the interest of the shareholders undermines the nature of trust, and 
hence it is immoral. The obligation of the managers is to maximize the shareholders’ 
value, by keeping the operation of the corporation in the most efficient state. With respect 
to the (other) stakeholders, the managers should take the effects and interests of the 
stakeholders into account because the support of the stakeholders is essential to the 
successful performance of the corporation. Hence, treating stakeholders ethically is seen 
as instrumental to the success of the corporation. Descriptively, it is claimed that dealing 
with the stakeholders ethically is correlated with the performance of the corporation. 
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Ethically, it is admitted that managers have responsibilities to stakeholders but the 
responsibilities are subordinated to their obligation to the shareholders. In sum, managing 
stakeholders is viewed as part of the strategy to achieve the objective of the corporation, 
therefore, this approach is also known as the strategic stakeholder approach to ethics and 
management.27 
          A strategic stakeholder approach that synthesizes the stakeholders’ interests 
strategically, however, raises ethical problems. If the performance of the corporation is 
only measured in terms of financial efficiency and (long term) market value of the firm, 
the descriptive claim that ethical stakeholder management is correlated with the corporate 
performance is not wholly accurate. Apart from the fact that there is as yet no compelling 
empirical evidence to support the claim,28 an argument that may defend the claim is 
dubious for it typically neglects the fact that a stakeholder management, dedicated to 
financial performance, would naturally ignore the potential stakeholders who morally 
need consideration but are powerless in effect. Success in achieving high efficiency and 
high market value does not necessarily indicate that the managers of the corporation have 
dealt with all the stakeholders ethically. Furthermore, if the responsibility of the 
managers to take account of moral considerations is subordinated to their obligation to 
serve the interest of the shareholders, as the strategic stakeholder approach insists, the 
issue of moral concern over the corporate decisions and actions is indeed undermined. 
For moral concern is generally a concern over actions that potentially harm or benefit 
                                                 
27 Goodpaster (1991), op. cit., p. 57-8; see also: Archie B. Carroll and Ann K. Buchholtz, Business & 
Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management, 5th edition (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College / 
Thomson Learning, 2003), p. 76, 89.  A set of principles of stakeholder management developed under the 
strategic stakeholder approach is known as “The Clarkson Principles”. The principles guide the 
corporations to act in moral ways, but the reason for their actions remains a strategic reason.      
28 Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, op. cit., p. 78. See also: Wesley Cragg, “Business Ethics and 
Stakeholder Theory”, Business Ethics Quarterly 12:2 (2002), pp. 113-42, p. 117. 
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other human beings or ourselves; it cannot be simply answered by consulting whether the 
actions ultimately suit the interest of a single party, whoever the party is. It is always 
morally wrong to harm stakeholders in order to satisfy the interest of the shareholders, 
and it is also not always right to help the stakeholders simply because this suits the 
interest of the shareholders.29 Essentially, moral concern must be shown to all those who 
can be harmed or helped. Therefore, the interests of the stakeholders should be treated as 
having intrinsic value.30 The corollary is that the interests of the shareholders should not 
be privileged over the interests of the other stakeholders.  
A stakeholder approach that takes the idea of equal normative status for all 
stakeholders is known as ‘multi-fiduciary’ stakeholder approach.31 It takes a stakeholder 
synthesis that places impartiality as the central criterion. In this approach, each 
stakeholder is seen as providing the corporation with specific resources, i.e. shareholders 
with capital investment, managers and employees with time and skills, creditors with 
finances, suppliers with raw materials, customers with revenues, local community with 
location and infrastructures, etc. In return, each stakeholder expects its interests to be 
considered and satisfied. For the managers receive trust to manage all the resources, their 
fiduciary obligation is not to the shareholders only but to all the stakeholders.32 They 
have to treat the interests of all the stakeholders as equally important. How such an 
impartial treatment manifests itself in the corporate decision making process is another 
                                                 
29 It is indeed a false sense of helping others if the basic motivation is not related to those who are helped. 
Appearance of ethical conduct is not in itself a justification that the conduct is ethical.  
30 Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston (1995), op. cit., p. 67. 
31 Goodpaster (1991), op. cit., p. 61. 
32 It is more appropriate to see this fiduciary relationship as a product of implicit or explicit contracts 
between the managers and the other stakeholders than to see it as a product of relationship between the 
principals and the agents implied in the agency theory, because the employees are not hiring the managers, 
but are hired by the managers. See: Charles W. L. Hill and Thomas M. Jones, “Stakeholder – Agency 
Theory”, Journal of Management Studies 29: 2 (March 1992), pp. 131-54, p. 134. 
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matter. William M. Evan and R. Edward Freeman (1988) seem to suggest that in order to 
maintain the impartiality of treatment to all stakeholders, the purpose of the corporation 
has to be redefined, namely “to serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder 
interests”.33 Based on the Kantian dictum of respect for persons, Evan and Freeman argue 
that each stakeholder has rights not to be treated only as a means to some end, and 
therefore stakeholder groups must actively and substantially participate in the corporate 
decisions. Evan and Freeman propose an idea that a corporation of a certain size should 
include representatives of some particular stakeholder groups in the Boards of Directors. 
Another way to substantiate impartiality, a way that can be interpreted as another kind of 
participation, is by treating the corporation as a nexus of contracts or a series of 
multilateral consensual agreements in which stakeholders can negotiate benefits and 
define obligations.34 Robert A. Phillips (1997) argues that persons or groups of persons 
voluntarily accepting the benefits of a mutually beneficial cooperative scheme should 
impose on themselves the obligations of fairness in proportion to the benefits accepted.35 
In such a scheme, managers should manage the corporation in a way that fulfills the 
obligations of stakeholder fairness. If a fair distribution of economic outcomes is not a 
crucial issue, such as in the case of a multicultural society in which some stakeholders 
might have completely different worldviews, the managers may have to turn the 
                                                 
33 William M. Evan and R. Edward Freeman, “ A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian 
Capitalism”, in Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, ed., Ethical Theory and Business, 3rd edition 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 97-106, p. 103.  
34 R. Edward Freeman and William M. Evan, “Corporate Governance: a Stakeholder Interpretation”, 
Journal of Behavioral Economics 19: 4 (1990), pp. 337-59. 
35 Robert A. Phillips, “Stakeholder Theory and Principle of Fairness”, Business Ethics Quarterly 7:1 
(1997), pp. 51-66. 
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corporation into a place for an ongoing debate on values, rights, and interests in which 
different perspectives can clash.36  
           Impartiality in treating the interests and rights of stakeholders seems to bring a 
truly ethical substance into the corporate decision making process. But it may create 
another ethical problem. In a world of private-property rights, supported by the existing 
laws, institutions and moral convictions, it is natural to object to any attempt that would 
take the power of the corporation away from the shareholders and distribute it to many 
inclusive parties. The corporation is not a public institution that is subject to 
‘democratization’ in which many competing parties with their own purposes participate 
in the decision making process.37 Because the corporation is built on the institution of 
private property and the system of trust, both of which have been publicly recognized and 
affirmed, the democratization that distributes the power of the corporation to many 
parties can be thought of as undermining the nature of the corporation and the system of 
trust. Moreover, democratizing the corporation through stakeholder representation in the 
Boards of Directors or stakeholder ‘participation’ in the consensual agreements, implicit 
or explicit, is indeed impractical.38 When there is no common purpose among the 
stakeholders, as it is likely to be the case, democratization would make it difficult for the 
corporation to arrive at appropriate decisions. Exerting multiple objectives and multiple 
measures of corporate performance is flawed, for it is almost impossible to maximize the 
performance in more than one dimension at the same time without a common ground 
                                                 
36 Harry Hummels, “Organizing Ethics: A Stakeholder Debate”, Journal of Business Ethics 17(1998), pp. 
1403-19.  
37 Norman Barry, “The Stakeholder Concept of Corporate Control is Illogical and Impractical”, The 
Independent Review 6: 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 541-54. 
38 On the other hand, one may argue that it would be dangerous to let the managers have an absolute power 
in making corporate decisions without any kind of stakeholder participation. But this argument does not 
necessarily imply the rights of stakeholders to participate in the corporate decision making process.  
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commensurate to all the measures.39 After all, the arguments that suggest stakeholder 
participation are not clear, for neither their rights not to be treated only as a means to 
some end, nor their rights to withdraw their support to the corporation necessarily imply 
rights to participation.40 It is true that the obligations to the stakeholders cannot be 
denied, but stakeholder participation is not a moral requirement. Hence, the shareholders 
and the managers should remain in the conventional position as the only stakeholders 
who have legitimacy to participate in the corporate decision making process. As a result, 
the fiduciary obligation owed by the managers to the shareholders must be special in kind 
as compared to their obligations towards the other stakeholders. A breach of such a 
special obligation for a reason other than the interests of the shareholders can be 
considered unethical. 
            Since taking either the strategic stakeholder approach or the multi-fiduciary 
stakeholder approach seems to be ethically problematic, managers are left in a paradox. 
Kenneth E. Goodpaster (1991) calls such a paradox the stakeholder paradox and 
formulates it as follows: 
It seems essential, yet in some ways illegitimate to orient corporate 
decisions by ethical values that go beyond strategic stakeholder 
considerations to multi-fiduciary ones.41 
        
 
                                                 
39 Michael C. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function”, 
Business Ethics Quarterly 12: 2 (2002), pp. 235-56. Jensen argues for a single objective of the firm that he 
calls ‘the enlightened value maximization’. In the enlightened value maximization, maximization of the 
long-term value of the firm is claimed to be the ground for making tradeoffs between the interests of the 
stakeholders. Although Jensen seems to support the strategic stakeholder approach whose normative 
justification is insufficient, his argument against the multiple objective of the firm and the use of the 
balance scorecard seems to be right. According to Jensen, “[I]t is logically impossible to maximize in more 
than one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are monotone transformations of one another” 
(p. 238). One may argue that joint maximization (satisficing) is possible, but joint maximization is one 
thing while maximization of a (single) performance is another thing. 
40 David Pass, “Stakeholders and Participation in Corporate Governance: A Critique of Some of the 
Arguments”, Business and Professional Ethics Journal 15: 4 (1995), pp. 3-19. 
41 Kenneth E. Goodpaster (1991), op. cit., p. 63.  
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In the stakeholder paradox, ethics seems to forbid but also to demand a strategic 
economic mission. The resolution of the paradox offered by Goodpaster refers to the 
understanding that taking ethics seriously does not necessarily mean that the managers 
have to treat all the relationships as fiduciary relationships. For Goodpaster, the 
managers’ obligation to the shareholders remains fiduciary in nature, whereas their 
obligations to the stakeholders other than the shareholders are non-fiduciary, though as 
morally significant as the fiduciary one. Non-fiduciary obligations are perceived as the 
obligations that would apply to any private individual in the society whose actions affect 
the others. As the argument goes, the non-fiduciary obligations of managers should come 
together with their fiduciary obligation, for the shareholder cannot expect of the 
managers “behavior that is ethically less responsible than what he would expect of 
himself”.42 Goodpaster appeals to what he calls the ‘Nemo Dat Principle’ and states in 
general terms that “investors cannot expect of managers…behavior that would be 
inconsistent with the reasonable ethical expectations of the community”.43 His recourse to 
the status of shareholders for corporate moral behavior is then brought into a conclusion 
that the resolution of the paradox consists in understanding that the conscience of the 
corporation is a projection of the consciences of its shareholders. Corporations, like 
private individuals, are members of society who may pursue private values but have to 
bear moral obligations towards those affected by their actions. Accordingly, corporations 
preserve their legitimate status as private institutions while keeping ethical values 
manifested in the non-fiduciary obligations towards the stakeholders. 
                                                 
42 Ibid, p. 68. 
43 The principle is developed from a Latin proverb ‘nemo dat quod non habet’ that literally means “nobody 
gives what he does not have”. See: ibid., p. 68. 
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           Goodpaster’s argument, however, leaves out some questions about the special 
status of shareholders. John R. Boatright (1994) criticizes the basis of fiduciary obligation 
that makes the relationship between the managers and the shareholders so special.44 
According to Boatright, the fact that the shareholders own the firm and need protection 
for their investment against a preponderance of risks is not sufficient to justify the claim 
that the managers should have fiduciary obligation to the shareholders only, because the 
other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees and local communities, can face a 
similar amount of risks or even bigger risks than those borne by the shareholders. The 
supposition of a contract, or an agency relation between the shareholders (as a principal) 
and the managers (as an agent), to justify the exclusive fiduciary obligation of the 
managers to the shareholders is also not clear, for in many cases the managers seem 
rather to be the agent of the corporation than the agent of the shareholders. Boatright’s 
suggestion is to take public policy as the basis for the fiduciary obligation of the 
managers for the reason that retaining the exclusive fiduciary obligation to the 
shareholders makes all the other stakeholders better off. If his suggestion is accepted, 
assuming that all the other obligations are rooted in public policy as well, then there is 
nothing special about shareholders and there is no paradox anymore. But this seems to be 
oversimplifying the matter. In answering the critics, Kenneth E. Goodpaster and Thomas 
E. Holloran (1994) correctly point out that reducing the obligations to a common 
denominator, such as that explainable in terms of public policy, would likely ignore the 
other moral dimensions such as liberty, fairness, relationships and community.45 
                                                 
44 John R. Boatright, “Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, What’s So Special 
About Shareholders?”, Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (1994), pp. 393-407. 
45 Kenneth E. Goodpaster and Thomas E. Holloran, “In Defense of a Paradox”, Business Ethics Quarterly 
4: 4 (1994), pp. 423-29.  
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Goodpaster and Holloran insist that, for a good reason, the stakeholder paradox is better 
preserved rather than eliminated by such a reduction. 
            But Goodpaster’s argument remains unclear on the extent to which the special 
status of shareholders is brought into the core of the resolution that involves a claim that, 
according to him, the conscience of the corporation is a logical and moral extension of 
the consciences of the shareholders. It shows a personification of the corporation 
comprehended in the Moralistic View of corporation that, as I have argued earlier, is not 
an adequate account. Suppose that the corporation has a conscience, it remains difficult to 
assert that the conscience of the corporation has necessary links with the consciences of 
its shareholders. For in the case of contemporary investing, investors may not own 
corporate stocks directly but rather own shares in funds that are managed by the 
managers of funds who in turn purchase several corporate stocks and other types of 
securities.46 The investors may not be aware that they are ‘partly’ the shareholders of 
particular corporations. Therefore, there is little sense to claim any connection between 
the conscience of the corporation and the consciences of its shareholders. Moreover, the 
claim also degrades the moral status of the managers who have the definitive roles in the 
process of making decisions and actions. It is indeed highly questionable to treat the 
managers as moral agents only by proxy in which they surrender their moral characters 
and become an instrument for the moral project of the shareholders. As the decisions and 
actions of the corporation is the result of deliberation of those who are really involved in 
the decision making process, it is more reasonable to say that if there is any conscience of 
the corporation at all, it should be a projection of the consciences of those who are 
                                                 
46 Earl W. Spurgin, “Do Shareholders Have Obligations to Stakeholders”, Journal of Business Ethics 33 
(2001), pp. 287-97. 
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involved in the decision making process, in particular the managers. The corporation 
should be seen as a moral agent, not merely because of its shareholders, but because 
those who are involved in its operation are human beings. 
          Nevertheless, with the Nemo Dat Principle, Goodpaster presents an important point 
that the way out of the stakeholder paradox lies in the recognition that moral personality 
is indispensable. The shareholders cannot expect of the managers behavior that violates 
the moral expectations of the community. Neither the shareholders nor the managers can 
claim ‘moral immunity’ as a result of a fiduciary relationship. To be correctly interpreted, 
this is to mean that while the managers have fiduciary obligations to the shareholders, 
they do not cease to be moral agents in their own right.47 A management role, or more 
generally any other professional role, does not remove the holders of the role from their 
status as moral agents. The remaining problem is, however, a practical problem as to how 
individual managers and those who are involved in the operation of a corporation 
collectively come into a resolution of the conflicting obligations. The stakeholder 
paradox may be theoretically resolved but a practical paradox remains in existence.48 
Goodpaster’s attempt to offer a better stakeholder synthesis than the syntheses offered by 
the strategic stakeholder approach and the multi-fiduciary stakeholder approach is 
unfinished. It seems likely that we must go beyond the stakeholder synthesis in order to 
settle this remaining problem. 
 
                                                 
47 Wesley Cragg (2002) proposes two possible interpretation of the principle. While the managers bear the 
obligations to the shareholders, one may interpret that either (1) they remain moral agents in their own right 
or (2) they would be moral agents only by proxy. See: Wesley Cragg, “Business Ethics and Stakeholder 
Theory”, Business Ethics Quarterly 12:2 (2002), pp. 113-42, p.121. As I have argued earlier, the second 
interpretation, implied in Goodpaster’s account of the conscience of corporation, is morally questionable. 
Thus, I believe that the first interpretation is the correct one. 
48 Kenneth E. Goodpaster and Thomas E. Holloran (1994), op cit., p. 428. 
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3.3 Beyond the Stakeholder Synthesis 
 
             In general, stakeholder approaches have at least two common problems, the 
problem of identification as to which (and why) individuals and groups of individuals 
should be counted as stakeholders, and the problem of consolidating various obligations 
once the stakeholders have been identified. The first problem is a problem of stakeholder 
analysis and the second problem is a subject matter of stakeholder synthesis. With respect 
to the first problem, reference to the common definition of stakeholder offered by 
Freeman (1984) would likely lead to a conclusion that every individual is in some way a 
stakeholder in just every firm’s activity.49 But this vague conclusion does not help to 
clear up the problem of stakeholder identification. Though a qualifying measure has been 
suggested to justify the status of stakeholder, such as contractual relationship to the 
firm,50 legitimate moral claims on the firm,51 and the principle of fairness,52 the extent to 
which such a measure can be applied to identify stakeholders remains unclear. Supposing 
that increasing prices of the goods might indirectly cause higher inflation to the whole 
economy that ultimately affects the poor people in far distant places, are these poor 
people also considered as stakeholders? Is the natural environment where the firm 
operates considered as a stakeholder? After all, even if the stakeholders are successfully 
defined, consolidating obligations to the stakeholders – and thus resolving the practical 
paradox – is still problematic. Questions may arise as to which stakeholder deserves more 
                                                 
49 Bruce Langtry, “Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilities of Business”, Business Ethics Quarterly 4 
(1994), pp. 431-43, p. 432. 
50 R. Edward Freeman and William M. Evan (1990), op. cit.  
51 Stephen Cohen, “Who Are the Stakeholders? What Difference Does It Make?”, Business and 
Professional Ethics Journal 15:2 (1996), pp. 3-18; Alexei M. Marcoux, “Who are the Stakeholders?: The 
Failure of the Stakeholder-as-Contractor View”, Business and Professional Ethics Journal 17:3, pp. 79-
108. 
52 Robert A. Phillips (1997), op. cit. 
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weight in ethical consideration and to what extent an obligation to certain stakeholders 
takes precedence over the same obligation or other obligations to the other stakeholders. 
Insofar as there is no framework to resolve the conflicting obligations, there is no better 
way to accommodate ethics in business decision making. 
Obviously, the solution of the practical problems depends largely on the 
understanding of the origin and ramification of obligations. I contend that the solution of 
the problems lies in understanding the fact that responsibilities and obligations are 
ordinarily defined by the roles of individuals in the communities, while stakeholders, 
individuals and groups of individuals, are basically members of the communities. The 
primary source of the stakeholder paradox is actually the fact that all of us as individuals 
hold at least two roles in life, for example, as professionals, managers, employees, 
shareholders, consumers, members of the larger community, and most importantly as 
persons, members of the whole humanity, where these roles may come into conflict. The 
way out of the practical paradox would then involve the interplay between individuals 
and the communities from which the roles of individuals are recognized. And the 
framework for resolving the conflicts is based on the recognition that the community of 
individuals exists, but its role is defined inseparably from the role of the larger 
community of which it is a member. I refer to this ‘resolution’ as the community-based 
synthesis. It transforms fiduciary and non-fiduciary relationships between the managers 
and the stakeholders into unified purposeful relationships in which all the stakeholders 
have their proper roles in the communities with the associated goals defined in line with 
the goal and purpose of the larger whole community. The issue is shifted from the profit 
maximizing obligation vis a vis the non-fiduciary obligations to an issue of setting up a 
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profit maximizing practice in light of the purpose of the larger whole community for the 
good life, while the purpose of the larger whole community for the good life essentially 
respects all the fiduciary and non-fiduciary relationships among the stakeholders. Since 
the community covers more than the list of individual members who are regarded as 
stakeholders and the obligations towards them, the community-based synthesis must be 
the most comprehensive synthesis beyond a mere stakeholder synthesis.  
In the community-based synthesis, two components require further explanation, 
namely the corporation as a community and the individual’s moral character as the key 
factor to actualizing the synthesis. As a community, the corporation can maintain its 
characteristics as a private institution in the sense that its judgments and decisions do not 
necessarily need voluntary active-participation and voluntary agreement of the 
individuals outside the community. Nonetheless, the corporation as a community remains 
responsible for its judgments, decisions and actions that affect the parties inside and 
outside the community. Like private individuals, the corporation as a community 
embraces beliefs and values, cast in the corporate culture and policies, which guide the 
individuals inside the corporation to take corporate decisions and actions. But unlike 
private individuals, the corporation as a community may not have the properties of a 
person that, some theorists argue, give it a status of moral agent. As I have argued earlier, 
the corporation is not taken for granted as a moral agent by virtue of a possible fact that it 
has certain properties that resemble the properties of an individual person. Rather, it 
should be treated as a moral agent because its decisions and actions are basically 
decisions and actions of human beings. This implies that the individuals who are involved 
in the corporate decisions and actions and their moral characters are important in 
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determining the moral quality of the corporation. In other words, the quality of character 
or the virtue of the individuals who are involved in the decision making process and 
actions is indispensable to actualizing the synthesis and resolving the paradox. But a 
further question arises as to which moral character of the individuals in the corporation is 
required to resolve the paradox.  
Following the arguments I have put earlier, it is obvious that the individuals 
would never find justification for treating their roles in the corporation as morally neutral. 
Nor would they be justified, following Friedman’s argument, to say that working 
effectively and efficiently for the sake of profit maximization is their exclusive 
responsibility when they are engaged in corporate life. Therefore, the individuals in the 
corporation should not separate business from morality, nor should they separate 
corporate life from the life as a whole. They should rather take business as part of moral 
activities and orient their corporate life as one that constitutes the good life. 
Indeed, there would be no stakeholder paradox anymore if business and ethics are 
not separated. R. Edward Freeman (1994) points out in response to the stakeholder 
paradox that a stakeholder paradox is actually built on the separation principle or ‘the 
separation thesis’ that he describes as follows: 
The discourse of business and the discourse of ethics can be separated so 
that the sentences like, “x is a business decision” have no moral content, 
and “x is a moral decision” have no business content.53 
 
As long as the separation thesis is accepted, there is the possibility for one to connect 
both discourses and compose them in a way that ultimately puts the obligation enjoined 
by business and the obligations demanded by ethics in confrontation. Up to this point 
                                                 
53 R. Edward Freeman, “The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions”, Business Ethics 
Quarterly 4:4 (1994), pp. 409-21, p. 412. 
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Freeman is right, but he goes too far in suggesting the multi-fiduciary stakeholder 
approach as a way to dissolving the paradox. The multi-fiduciary stakeholder theory 
presupposes an ideal ‘just’ society and demands radical changes in laws and institutions 
that accommodate public participation and agreement in corporate affairs. It neglects the 
fact that people still hold the belief that business is a private endeavor. I contend that 
rejecting the separation thesis does not necessarily need to make business a public 
endeavor, but rather needs to inculcate the individuals who are involved in business with 
a moral character that enables them to treat business as part of moral activities and orient 
their lives in the corporation as part of the good life. Thus, instead of insisting on radical, 
institutional changes, I suggest that we reject the separation thesis at the individual level. 
This does not mean that I deny any possible legal and institutional changes that may 
increase the public responsibility of corporations. Rather, I believe that such changes are 
still subject to the evolution of public understandings and would only be effective if the 
individuals who are involved in the corporate affairs have the required moral character.   
            The rejection of the separation thesis implies an assertion that good business 
decisions have moral content and moral decisions in business have business content. By 
taking this assertion at the individual level, I will draw two important implications. First, 
the rejection of the separation thesis should be applicable not only to those people who do 
business in the corporate setting, but also to all of us in our economic life. I take business 
in the corporate setting as a typical unit of economic activity because its objective 
appears in explicit forms.  But  the argument  should be  valid  for  economic  activities in 
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general, which basically involve a process of production, exchange and consumption.54 It 
suggests that when we are engaged in economic activity, whether in the corporation or 
outside of the corporate setting, we ought to treat it as a moral endeavor, and when we set 
a moral project in an economic process, we ought to take the values respected in the 
process into account. Second, the rejection of the separation thesis involves the inclusion 
of efficiency and effectiveness, the fundamental values in business, in the paradigm of 
moral values in economic life. Thus, we can claim that, for example, it is unethical for us 
to shirk in our jobs, not simply because we breach our promise for we may have no 
promise to anyone, but mainly because our shirking undermines the value of efficiency 
and effectiveness that in effect may undermine the well-being of ourselves and the well-
being of others. The rejection of the separation thesis encourages excellence and the 
responsibility to excel in every job that we take. It denies the separation of treatment 
between the social aspect and the technical aspect of the economy, for to do the economic 
job excellently means to have taken both moral consideration and economic 
consideration into account. The excellent activities likely constitute the good life that we 
ought to live. Thus, it is in the rejection of the separation thesis at the individual level that 
the aspect of the individual person is reasonably and consistently addressed. 
            In sum, the solution and resolution of the ethical problems in economic life 
eventually need personal involvement of the individuals – those who are involved in 
making decisions and actions – and their quality of character that enables them to 
                                                 
54 It is important to note that the term ‘economic activity’, which I have frequently mentioned, should be 
understood as one that involves a complete process of production, exchange and consumption. Purchasing 
the goods or consuming the goods is part of the economic activity, but does not represent the economic 
activity in the current usage of the term. With this understanding, a consumer can be said to bear social 
responsibility but only in the context of the whole process of production, exchange and consumption that he 
or she is involved directly or indirectly. 
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integrate, rather than to separate, the technical aspect of the economy and the social 
aspect of the economy. Therefore, if an ethics and its account of integrity are to be 
meaningful for solving ethical problems in economic life, the aspect of the individual 
person, in addition to the aspect of the morality of actions, has to be adequately 
addressed. The concept of the good life being offered has to be one that ensures the 
inseparability, at the individual level, between the technical aspect and the social aspect 
of the economy. In the next chapters, I will show that the Aristotelian virtue ethics has 
sufficient ground to offer for solving the problems and develop an integrity account that 
captures the characteristics as required.   
  





AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH TO ETHICS IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
 
 
              Aristotle’s reflections on ethics are found mainly in his works collected in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and the Politics (P).1,2 These two books have to be seen as one 
complementing the other, and regarded inseparably as expounding his conception of the 
good for human beings.3 What Aristotle is concerned with, however, is not a theoretical 
knowledge of the good but rather a practical matter as to how to become a good person 
qua member of a community. The Nicomachean Ethics generally describes the good life 
and the right states of human character (the virtues) from which the good life would 
emerge, while the Politics depicts the social and political conditions under which 
individuals can actualize the good life in a community. It should be clear that in his ethics 
the aspect of the individual person takes an important position. 
              For Aristotle, the good for human beings is happiness (eudaimonia), manifested 
in virtuous activities. The good human life is thus a life that consists of virtuous 
activities. Based on Aristotle’s concept of the good life, I will argue that if business is to 
                                                 
1 For references, I will use the English version edited by W.D. Ross for these two treatises. Aristotle, 
“Ethica Nicomachea”, The Works of Aristotle: Volume IX, translated into English by W.D. Ross, edited by 
W.D. Ross, 1st edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1915). Aristotle, “Politica”, The Works of 
Aristotle: Book X, translated into English by Benjamin Jowett, edited by W.D. Ross, Revised edition 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1921).  
2 Though there are two other treatises on ethics often claimed as Aristotle’s, viz. the Eudemian Ethics (EE) 
and the Magna Moralia (MM), there are still disagreements among scholars on the authenticity and the 
validity of statements in these treatises and on whether these treatises can represent Aristotle’s ethical 
theory. See: W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980), p.5-9. 
3 H.H. Joachim, “Introduction”, in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, A Commentary by the late H.H. 
Joachim edited by D.A.Rees (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p.17-8. 
 76
be ethically unproblematic, it has to be a virtuous activity. But undertaking business in 
this manner requires us to revise our understanding of business, viz. we should perceive 
and treat it not merely as a way to produce something (profits) and to engage in 
consumption, but also and mainly as an ‘action’ that can be carried through virtuously. In 
the social context, this understanding of business posits business as a ‘practice’, a term 
that Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) introduces in his After Virtue to describe a socially co-
operative activity that can bring humans to achieve excellence.4 It suggests that business 
should be treated as an activity performed within the community where its cultural values 
and norms should define the standards of excellence.5  
In the modern era, business as a practice presupposes that corporations and 
markets are communities in the first place, but they are members of the larger whole 
community from which the role of the market, the corporation and the individuals in the 
corporation are recognized. Since the concern is how individuals, having their multiple 
roles, attain happiness through participation in communities, the market and the 
corporation have to function also as mediating institutions within which individuals can 
build and exercise virtues to achieve excellence. However, though virtues are built and 
exercised within actual communities, the ideal communities as pondered by the 
individual are those to which the building and exercise of virtues should refer. Thus, 
individuals remain decisive in solving ethical problems in economic life, and the solution 
of the problems lies in their virtues. Integrity is expected to be the main virtue that 
                                                 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory, 2nd edition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 187.  
5 Business and economic activity in general are thus re-embedded within the culture of the community in 
which they exist. 
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4.1 Aristotle’s Concept of the Good Life            
 
Aristotle makes the crucial assertion at the beginning of the Ethics that every 
activity is by nature purposeful. Every activity aims at an end (a telos) that is good, 
therefore, the good is “to be that at which all things aim”.6 But for Aristotle, unlike Plato, 
the good is not a transcendental Idea of pure goodness separated from the sensible world. 
The good is immanent in the ends that are to exist in the terrestrial world. Considering 
that some ends are good but only instrumental to other ends, he goes on to point out that 
the good and the chief good must lie in the final end,7 which is the end in itself. Thus for 
Aristotle, the end is essentially the primary aspect of the good and the final end is 
predominant in the hierarchy of goodness.  
As the good is rooted in diverse reality, or thought to be different in different 
activities, Aristotle makes a second important assertion, that the good must reside in the 
proper function (ergon) of the thing that has a function or activity.8 With this assertion, 
the goodness of X depends on how well X is doing its function.9 Thus, the proper 
function is associated with the good while the good is associated with the end. In 
Aristotle’s Ethics, goodness (arête), end (telos) and proper function (ergon) are mutually 
                                                 
6 NE (I.1-1094a.1-3) 
7 NE (I.2-1094a.18-25), (I.7-1097a.25-35) 
8 NE (I.7-1097b.25-30) 
9 For example, the function of ‘a harpist’ is to play the harp; therefore, ‘a good harpist’ is a harpist who 
plays the harp well. 
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complementary, and used together to expound the characteristics of a thing. What is, 
then, the good for us as human beings? What is the final end for us as human beings, an 
end that we desire only for its own sake? And what, if we can say, is the function of a 
human being?10 
The good for human beings, as Aristotle argues, is happiness (eudaimonia), since 
it is generally accepted that being happy is “the highest of all goods achievable by 
[human] action”.11 When we are happy, there seems to be nothing more to desire, 
therefore, happiness is the final end for all that we choose to do. It is what we desire for 
its own sake and for whose sake we desire everything else. With respect to the content of 
happiness, Aristotle refers to what he thinks to be the function of man (human being). 
According to Aristotle, the function of man must be peculiar to man. Since man is a 
composite in nature, comprising body and soul (psyche),12 different from plants and 
animals in that a man has the rational element in his soul, the function of man must lie in 
the activity of the soul that follows or implies a rational principle.13 Happiness is then 
said to be the excellent activity of the soul that implies a rational principle. Happiness is 
also said to be an activity of the soul in accordance with human virtue. By human virtue, 
Aristotle means the best state of capacity to conduct activities relative to the proper 
                                                 
10 For an X that cannot be readily said to have a function, we need to refer to its characteristic activity. 
Accordingly, “it [the ergon of X] is what X does that makes it just what it is, and if for any reason X 
becomes unable to perform its ergon, it is then no longer genuinely an X at all (cf. De anima 412b20 ff)”. 
Quoted from: Kathleen V. Wilkes, “The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics”, in Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1980), pp. 341-57, p. 343. 
11 NE (I.4-1095a.15-20) 
12 In Aristotle’s term, soul (psyche) is the organizing power of a living body, a capacity that distinguishes 
living things from non-living things. 
13 NE (I.7-1098a1-15) 
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function of a human being.14 In this way of construing happiness, it is important to note 
that happiness is neither a state of the good external to the body and soul of a man nor 
simply a state of the mind of a man in the modern framework of mind-body dualism, but 
rather an activity of the soul in the framework of the inseparable body and soul,15 a 
virtuous activity peculiarly attributed to human beings.16 Though people may identify 
happiness with the existence of external goods, pleasures, and even virtues,17 these 
external goods, pleasures and virtues are only the features of happiness, i.e. the 
potentialities or the consequences of happiness. In other words, though it has commonly 
identified features, happiness is something more than its features. Aristotle remains firm 
on his definition of happiness that happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with 
human virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most 
complete one.18 But the question remains as to what exactly the virtues peculiarly 
attributed to human beings are. 
To answer the question, Aristotle refers to the facts about the soul. For Aristotle, 
the soul has two elements, one element is non-rational and the other one has a rational 
principle (reason).19 The non-rational element can be divided into two parts, namely the 
vegetative part that merely causes nutrition and growth and the appetitive part (the 
                                                 
14  Aristotle seems to define the virtue of ‘a thing in general’ as the best state of capacity to conduct 
activities relative to its proper function [See: NE (VI.1.1139a.15-2.1139a.17)]. Human virtue is thus the 
best state of capacity to conduct the activity of the soul that implies a rational principle. Such a definition of 
virtue may clarify the use of the word ‘virtue’ to mean the ‘excellence’ of a thing to which it is ascribed. 
15 For Aristotle, no dualism of body and soul is entertained. The relation between the body and the soul is a 
relation between ‘matter’ and ‘form’, in which the soul is the form of the living body (the matter). I will 
further discuss this subject (body and soul) in relation to the conception of self in the next chapter.  
16 Defining happiness as some sort of activity of the soul implies that the activity itself is an end in itself. 
Therefore, the good is a good of the soul rather than a good external to it. Happiness (eudaimonia) is also 
not a feeling of a certain kind, i.e. feeling happy, for ‘feeling’ is only one of the non-rational elements of 
the soul that has to share a rational principle if it is to constitute happiness.  
17 NE (I.8-1098b.10-1099b.10) 
18 NE (I.7-1098a.18) 
19 NE (I.13-1102a.26-1102b.30) 
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desiring part) that can be trained in some way to have the ability to share and follow a 
rational principle. Because the exercise of the virtue of human beings must imply a 
rational principle, the virtue of human beings takes two forms, one is associated with the 
activity of the rational element of the soul, and the other is associated with the activity of 
the appetitive non-rational element of the soul that shares a rational principle. The former 
is called intellectual virtue and the latter is moral virtue.  
With regard to moral virtue, it is important to note that the capacity of the desiring 
element of the soul in following the rational principle is not given by nature or driven 
coercively by the rational element, but rather is a result of habit. The desiring element is 
in some sense persuaded by the rational principle to respond in a certain way and to 
habituate itself that way. The nature of the desiring element remains uncorrupted but it 
takes the rational principle into account in its function. It begins with a habit to choose an 
intermediate between excess and defect, and then the rational principle guides it further to 
reach the right (accurate) mark. Thus, moral virtue is a result of habit but is not defensible 
without a rational principle provided by the rational element. Because the best state of 
capacity by which the rational element exercises its function is intellectual virtue, there 
must be a tight-knit relationship between moral virtue and intellectual virtue.   
With regard to intellectual virtue, Aristotle undertakes an inquiry of the five states 
of capacity by which the rational element of the soul grasps truth through affirmation and 
negation, i.e. scientific knowledge (episteme), philosophic wisdom (sophia), intuitive 
reason (nous), art (techne) and practical wisdom (phronesis).20 The objects of scientific 
knowledge and philosophic wisdom are the things of necessity viz. things whose 
originative causes are invariable, whereas the objects of art and practical wisdom are the 
                                                 
20 NE (VI.3.1139b.15-18) 
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variable things viz. things whose origins admit of being otherwise. The objects of 
intuitive reason can be things of either kind. Scientific knowledge demonstrates the truth 
of the invariable things following the presupposed truth of the first principle (premise).21 
Intuitive reason grasps the truth of the first principle that can only be taken for granted in 
scientific knowledge.22 Philosophic wisdom is intuitive reason combined with scientific 
knowledge to grasp the truth of the invariable things that are the highest by nature.23 As 
for the two states of capacity that deal with the variable things, art involves a true course 
of reasoning for the things to be made (production) whereas practical wisdom involves a 
true course of reasoning for the things to be done (action), 24 and in these courses of 
reasoning intuitive reason grasps the truth of the last premise (the last fact).25 Among the 
states of capacity that deal with the things of necessity and universality, philosophic 
wisdom must be regarded as the intellectual virtue, since it is the best state of capacity to 
grasp the truth of these kinds of things while the truth about the highest (the best) of these 
kinds of things is good and an end in itself (final). And among the states of capacity that 
deal with the kind of things that are variable and particular, practical wisdom is the other 
intellectual virtue, since the object at which practical wisdom aims, i.e. the good (the 
best) action, is an end in itself. Art (techne) is not regarded as an intellectual virtue, 
because the object at which an art aims, i.e. the best production, is by nature having an 
end external to it and this end is not an end in the unqualified sense.26 Thus, if the rational 
element of the soul is assumed to be composed of two parts, namely the scientific part by 
                                                 
21 NE (VI.3.1139b.25-35) 
22 NE (VI.6.1141a.3-8) 
23 NE (VI.7.1141a.18-20) 
24 NE (VI.4.1140a.1-23); NE (VI.5.1140a.25-1140b.5) 
25 NE (VI.11.1143a.35-1143b.5) 
26 NE (VI.2.1139b.1-3) 
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which we contemplate the things of necessity, and the calculative part by which we 
deliberate the variable things,27 there are two intellectual virtues, each corresponding to 
each part, viz. philosophic wisdom and practical wisdom respectively.28             
Aristotle claims that philosophic wisdom is superior to practical wisdom since he 
believes that the activity that flows from philosophic wisdom (the contemplative activity) 
is the noblest and the most divine activity.29 The activity of philosophic wisdom involves 
the best reason, deals with the best objects, and offers the best performance in terms of 
durability and self-sufficiency, and hence the exercise of it would constitute a perfect 
happiness.30 However, Aristotle admits that a contemplative life is too high for ordinary 
human beings, because ordinary human beings cannot set themselves free from the 
demand of the material necessity to sustain life, which seems to require them to 
communicate and deal with one another. The life appropriate for ordinary human beings 
is a practical life, and the intellectual virtue associated with this life is practical 
wisdom.31 Thus, it is practical wisdom that is the intellectual virtue with a tight-knit 
relationship with moral virtue; both virtues deal with actions as the objects.  
Aristotle further describes the relationship between practical wisdom and moral 
virtue as follows. Moral virtue, which is acquired through habituation, is a state of 
character that gives human beings who possess it a disposition to take the good choices 
and do the actions accordingly for the sake of the actions themselves. According to 
                                                 
27 NE (VI.1.1139a.6-10) 
28 NE (VI.11.1143b.14-16). These (only) two intellectual virtues are also W.F.R Hardie’s interpretation. 
See: W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p.226. 
29 NE (X.8.1178b.7-33) 
30 NE (X.7.1177a.11-1177b.25) 
31 In the practical life, the exercise of the scientific part of the rational element of the soul may not 
necessarily be excluded. But the point which Aristotle may want to raise is that happiness can be attained in 
the practical life, because what is common and peculiar to human beings is rationality in general whereas 
philosophical insight is only one specialized way of being rational. See: W.F.R. Hardie, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
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Aristotle,32 the origin of action is a man’s choice and the origin of choice is desire and 
reasoning with a view to an end. Hence, choice is a deliberative desire, and if a choice is 
to be good, the desire must be right and the reasoning must be correct while the action 
that comes from it is an end in itself. Good choice and good action cannot exist without 
the right desire and the correct reasoning, and the correct reasoning is provided by 
practical wisdom. But conversely, practical wisdom cannot exist if the desire is not 
always oriented to the right mark that the faculty of cleverness should hit in reasoning. 
For if the oriented desire, which is the starting point of the reasoning (practical 
syllogism), is wrong, the faculty of cleverness would be deceived by a bad choice and a 
bad action.33 Thus, moral virtue cannot be defended without practical wisdom, and 
conversely practical wisdom cannot come to exist without moral virtue. Both kinds of 
virtue are inseparable. A man who possesses moral virtue (a virtuous man) must also be a 
man of practical wisdom (phronimos),34 and this man will grasp happiness if he exercises 
these virtues accordingly. In virtuous activities, both the virtue of the non-rational 
element and the virtue of the rational element of the soul are involved. 
It is clear then that, for Aristotle, happiness is attainable in practical life through 
virtuous activities. For the good for human beings is happiness, and happiness consists in 
virtuous activities, so the good for human beings consists in virtuous activities. The good 
life is thus simply a happy life, a life that consists of virtuous activities. The good life, in 
a sense, is not a life in the pursuit of happiness, since virtuous activities are essentially 
                                                 
32 NE  (VI.2.1139a.22-1139b.5) 
33 NE (VI.12.1144a.11-35) 
34 NE (I.8.1098b.30-1099a.5): A man who possesses virtue is not necessarily happy. For, if he “is asleep or 
in some other way quite inactive”, we cannot say that he is happy. There is substantial difference between 
the good in possession and the good in use. Happiness is the good in use, because it is an activity of some 
sort (of the soul). 
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not exercised for the sake of something external to the activities, but for the sake of 
themselves. Happiness, on the other hand, is not a goal to be secured by certain (virtuous) 
activities but rather a goal identified with virtuous activities.35 Following Aristotle, one 
would attain happiness simply by living a life of virtuous activities. In this concept of the 
good life, virtuous activity is construed not as a means to happiness but rather as an end 
that constitutes happiness.  
My account of what Aristotle says about happiness and the good life conforms to 
the interpretation that claims that Aristotle’s happiness is a dominant end, not an 
inclusive end.36 Roughly defined, a dominant end means a monolithic end or an end 
having a single good as the dominant element, whereas an inclusive end means an end 
combining two or more equally valuable goods.37 The different interpretations on 
Aristotle’s happiness stem mainly from the problem in interpreting the finality condition 
and the self-sufficiency condition that are used by Aristotle to characterize happiness. 
Aristotle says that happiness is something final and self-sufficient, viz. it is the final end 
that “we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else”,38 and no 
                                                 
35 It seems to be notoriously apparent that in his pursuit of happiness one may have secured some goals he 
believed to bring happiness and yet not be happy. 
36 Among others, the philosophers who claim that Aristotle’s happiness is a dominant end are W.F.R. 
Hardie, Anthony Kenny, and Richard Kraut. See: W.F.R. Hardie, op. cit., pp. 12-27; Anthony Kenny, 
“Aristotle on Happiness”, in Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji, ed., Articles on 
Aristotle: Ethics and Politics (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 25-32; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the 
Human Good (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). A discussion on the debate over whether 
Aristotle’s doctrine of happiness is inclusive or dominant can also be found in: Daniel T. Devereux, 
“Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness”, in Dominic J. O’Meara, ed., Studies in Aristotle (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 247-60. Most of the arguments that favor the 
sense of a dominant end in Aristotle’s happiness highlight the case in which Aristotle praises the 
contemplative life as the only good that constitutes the perfect happiness. I prefer to highlight the 
importance of the rational activity in general in order to come to the dominant end account of happiness, 
since I believe that happiness in practical life is the only happiness appropriate to human beings in general.    
37 J.L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”, in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 15-33, p. 17. 
38 NE (I.7.1097b.1) 
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addition of any good can make it more desirable.39 On the fact that some other goods 
such as honour, pleasure, reason, and virtue are also chosen for themselves, Aristotle 
claims that we choose these goods for themselves but we choose them also for the sake of 
happiness.40 This claim, however, creates a puzzle over what Aristotle might suggest for 
the relation between the goods chosen for themselves and happiness. These goods are the 
ends-in-themselves, which logically have no further end, while happiness is said to be the 
final end. J.L. Ackrill, who holds an inclusive end account of Aristotle’s happiness, 
argues that the relation between the ends-in-themselves and the final end must be a 
‘parts-whole’ relation in the sense that when the parts are chosen for the sake of 
themselves, they are chosen because they are parts of the whole.41 Accordingly, since all 
goods are inclusive in the whole, there is nothing to add in order to make it more 
desirable, and hence happiness (as the whole) is by definition self-sufficient. For Ackrill, 
happiness seems to be seen simply as an aggregate of all goods that are desirable in 
themselves, including honour, pleasure, reason and virtues. But this account of happiness 
is clearly incompatible with the definition of happiness that Aristotle keeps insisting on; 
viz. happiness is an activity of the soul according to virtue, which is not a state of the soul 
and not something like honour that depends on the approval of others.  
I contend that to trace the hierarchy of ends in order to find the content of 
Aristotle’s happiness is misleading. As I understand it, Aristotle uses the hierarchy of 
ends only to characterize the form of happiness, but the content of happiness has to be 
seen as something related to the proper function of a human being. In Aristotle’s Ethics, 
the good, the end and the proper function are used together as expounding the 
                                                 
39 NE (I.7.1097b.8-21), see also NE (X.6.1176b.1-8) 
40 NE (I.7.1097b.1-5) 
41 J.L. Ackrill, op. cit., p. 19. 
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characteristics of a thing. Therefore, it is not surprising that rational activity, which is the 
representation of the proper function of human beings, takes the central role in his 
exposition of happiness. Accordingly, I argue that the view that Aristotle’s happiness 
consists in virtuous activities alone, a view derived from the concept of the proper 
function of human being, is not inconsistent with the finality condition and the self-
sufficiency condition of happiness. For if happiness consists in virtuous activities alone, 
and considering that virtuous activity is the end-in-itself that has no further end, 
happiness is simply the final end. For if happiness consists in virtuous activities alone, no 
increase or decrease of any good other than virtuous activity by itself constitutes an 
increase or decrease in happiness.42 It is true that virtuous activity may involve and do 
involve honour, pleasure, reason and virtue, which each can be pursued separately for its 
own sake, but this does not mean that each of these goods pursued for its own sake 
should by itself constitute happiness. Honour, pleasure, reason and virtues are desirable 
only in their relation to virtuous activity. By contrast, virtuous activity is in itself 
unconditionally desirable; therefore, virtuous activity alone is sufficient to constitute 
happiness.  
The concept of happiness and the good life, as thus construed, answers a puzzle in 
Aristotle’s ethics pertaining to the morality of happiness about why we in some sense 
ought to desire happiness.43 The answer lies in understanding that happiness, in this 
sense, consists in virtuous activities, which are goods in themselves, while the moral 
                                                 
42 Richard Kraut, op. cit., p. 9. 
43 Henry B. Veatch uses the term ‘obligatory ends’ to explain the ethical status of human telos in 
Aristotelian ethics. R.A. Gauthier speaks of a duty to be happy with which he argues that: “man is ‘happy’ 
when he realizes that for which he is made; and to realize that for which he is made is the duty of man”. 
See: Henry B. Veatch, “Telos and Teleology in Aristotelian Ethics” in Dominic J. O’Meara, ed., Studies in 
Aristotle (Washington, D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 279-96, pp. 281-2.  
 87
goodness of the virtuous activities is reflected in the rightness of actions in which the 
goods for others are directly or indirectly secured. For Aristotle, happiness in practical 
life is to be attained in the polis, a sort of political community, so that which actions are 
right (virtuous) are not only right relative to the individual but also right in terms of what 
the rational people in the community would approve and praise as noble.44 If everyone 
strives towards what is right (virtuous), then everything would be done for the common 
good, and everyone would secure the goods for himself.45 The individual who exercises 
virtuous actions to attain happiness, which is undoubtedly his own good, would 
essentially promote the common good of the community in which he lives. Happiness is 
thus the foundation of morality, but morality in this sense has to be understood in terms 
of enlightened prudential (self-regarding) concerns rather than the straightforward other-
regarding concerns.46 
Indeed, enlightened self-regarding concerns are obvious in Aristotle’s ethics, 
since what Aristotle is mostly concerned with is not only whether the action is in fact 
right but also and mainly the way the right action is to emerge from the psychological 
state of the individual agent. The right action may be objectively good, constituting the 
individual’s own good and promoting the common good, and therefore the individual 
ought to do it, but what is more important is that the individual himself has to be the one 
                                                 
44 Aristotle defines virtue as “a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean 
relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of 
practical wisdom would determine it”. EN (II.6.1106b.36-1107a2). It is implicit in Aristotle’s definition of 
virtue that the benchmark of what is right (virtuous) is what the virtuous man would do or what the man of 
practical wisdom (the wise man) would determine. People in the community must praise this man as a 
noblest man and what he would do or determine as a noble one. 
45 NE (XI.8.1169a.5-11). The egoistic sense of Aristotle’s ethics is thus not self-interest in a non-moral 
sense or selfishness in the pursuit of material goods and sensual pleasures. It lies rather in the proper 
valuing of one’s self, of others, and of noble actions. See: Roger J. Sullivan, “The Kantian Critique of 
Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy: An Appraisal”, The Review of Metaphysics 28 (1974): pp.24-53, p. 42.       
46 Kathleen V. Wilkes, “The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics”, in Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 
pp. 341-57. 
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who chooses it,47 after his own deliberation and by considering his own endowments, 
aspirations, limitations and particular circumstances. Thus for Aristotle, the right action 
may be thought to be right relative to the individual agent and right relative to the 
circumstances at a particular moment, but the individual must choose it because he is 
disposed to desire and like it. In other words, what Aristotle is mostly concerned with is 
the quality of character of the individual, whether the right action is coming from a 
settled disposition, or whether the individual who undertakes a right action is a virtuous 
individual. A virtuous individual is different from one who does a right action out of self-
control (continence), by pressing upon their own emotions. A virtuous individual would 
do what he ought to do and take pleasure in it as he really wants to do it, while the self-
controlled individual would do it with internal conflict.48 A virtuous individual has no 
conflict between moral (virtuous) actions and his own aspirations, or between what he 
ought to do and what he wants to do. The good life for virtuous individuals meets both 
objective moral requirements and their subjective aspirations. As a consequence, 
happiness is not only something that ought to be desired but also something that is really 
desired by the virtuous individuals. 
It is plain that happiness, according to Aristotle, is not found in a passive state but 
obtained through an active exercise of virtuous actions. However, it is almost impossible 
                                                 
47 For Aristotle, the choice of the good must come from ‘within’, not by dictation from ‘without’. 
Differently from Plato, Aristotle asserts the need of deliberative autonomy in the good life. See: Martha 
Craven Nussbaum, “Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato”, in Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1980), pp. 395-435, p. 423. 
48 Aristotle identifies six (6) possible states of character, i.e. superhuman (heroic) virtue, virtue, continence, 
brutishness, vice, and incontinence (EN – VII.1.1145a.15-20). As a result of habituation, a virtuous man 
would be doing what he ought to do, liking it, wanting it, enjoying it, and taking pleasure in it. He would be 
doing it without any internal conflict. See: J.O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, in Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1980), pp. 157-70, p. 158-9. 
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to undertake virtuous actions without being sufficiently equipped with external goods. 
Aristotle concedes that one may need friends, wealth, political power, good birth, good 
children, beauty and fortune, the availability of which would provide him with greater 
possibilities to exercise virtuous actions and the lack of which may impede him in such 
actions.49 An adequate supply of external goods seems to be necessary for happiness, but 
it would be misleading to conclude that these external goods are constitutive elements of 
happiness. What makes happiness possible does not necessarily determine what 
happiness is. Happiness is the highest good, the standard of value to which the hierarchy 
of goodness refers. Since external goods are only instruments to happiness, their values 
cannot be the highest value or parts of the highest value. The value of external goods is in 
a sense determined by happiness. Therefore, external goods are not the determinant of 
happiness, nor the constitutive elements of happiness.50   
It seems appropriate to interpret Aristotle as suggesting that we appreciate the 
available external goods rather than demand external goods every time before 
undertaking virtuous actions, for even with a modest level of the external goods we must 
be able to act virtuously.51 A virtuous man would not be frustrated by the unavailability 
of certain external goods, nor would he underestimate the importance of external goods. 
He would likely bear to the best advantage whatever amount of the external goods is 
available to him at every point of time and make the best of circumstances to exercise 
virtuous actions and grasp happiness.52 Yet, if virtuous actions result in the enhancement 
                                                 
49 NE (I.8.1099a.31-1099b.8), (I.10.1100b.22-1101a.20). 
50 If this interpretation is correct, then we should not make the charge that Aristotle has an unstable view of 
happiness, a kind of charge raised by Julia Annas. See: Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 368.   
51 NE (X.8.1179a.5) 
52 NE (I.10.1100b.35-1101a.2) 
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of external goods, he would make the enhancement as much as it can for it is best to have 
greater possibilities to exercise virtuous actions in the future. This does not mean that the 
purpose of virtuous actions is to maximize external goods, for virtuous actions are desired 
only for their own sake and never for the sake of something else.53 Two points may 
clarify the matter. First, maximizing the enhancement of external goods resulting from 
virtuous actions does not stand alone but has to be put in the context of seeking an 
extreme “with regard to what is best and right”.54 Secondly, while maximization of 
external goods alone (production) may lead to the end of a man in a particular relation, 
maximization of what is best and right (virtuous action) leads to the end of a man qua 
man, an end in the unqualified sense.55 
Given that the possible enhancement of external goods is taken into account in 
virtuous actions, happiness under Aristotle’s concept of the good life is in a sense 
progressive. Being happy or living the good life is identified not only with ‘living well’ 
but also with ‘doing well’, ‘flourishing’, ‘being productive’, ‘excellent’ and ‘successful’. 
What is more important in Aristotle’s concept of the good life, however, is that there is 
no conflict between what one ought to do and what one desires to do, or between 
morality and self-interest. By holding Aristotle’s concept of the good life, there should be 
no ethical problem arising from the conflict between morality and self-interest. 
Therefore, economic life as a domain of life concerned with the availability and 
enhancement of external goods has to be a part of the good life if it is to be ethically 
                                                 
53 NE (X.6.1176b.1-9) 
54 NE (II.6.1107a.6-8): “Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue 
is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.” W.F.R. Hardie suggests that we interpret 
Aristotle as pointing out that a virtue is above the corresponding vices (excess and deficiency) and not 
between them. See:  W.F.R. Hardie, op. cit., p. 136. 
55 NE (VI.2.1139b.1-3) 
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unproblematic. And business as a typical unit of economic activity has to be a virtuous 




4.2 Business as a Practice 
 
           Treating business as a virtuous activity is not quite straightforward, for virtuous 
activity is an action of a certain quality while business involves ‘production’ that is 
different in kind from that which Aristotle describes as an ‘action’. According to 
Aristotle, action (praxis) and production (poiesis) are different, for good (virtuous) action 
has an end in itself while production always has an end other than itself.56 If the 
distinction is correct, the question arises as to how we are going to deal with productive 
activities, such as businesses, that bring about the external goods necessarily required for 
the exercise of virtuous actions, while the good life, which we wish to have, consists only 
of virtuous actions. J.L. Ackrill argues that the distinction is not obvious because “actions 
often or always are productions and productions often or always are actions”.57 As an 
example, Ackrill takes the case of a just man paying off his debt by mending his 
neighbor’s fence. For Ackrill, it doesn’t make sense to say that the just man has done two 
separate things at the same time, namely paying off the debt (an action) and mending a 
fence (a production), for the ‘actual thing done’ is a single thing of which one would say 
that it is done for the sake of itself and for the sake of something else. I suspect that 
                                                 
56 P(I.4.1254a.5); NE (VI.5.1140b.6) 
57 J.L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Action”, in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 93-101, p. 94. 
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Ackrill has misunderstood Aristotle with regard to the hierarchy of ends and the concept 
of the good life. In the case of the just man, there is no doubt that the ‘actual thing done’ 
is a single thing, but this fact does nothing to disprove the distinction between action and 
production. In Aristotle’s concept of action and production, as I understand it, the end or 
the aim asserted by the agent is the determining factor that distinguishes them. It is a fact 
that, in the case of the just man, the ultimate aim of the just man is to exercise for its own 
sake ‘what is right’ at the particular circumstance with respect to his nature as a human 
being in his relationship with the others. Thus, the ‘actual thing done’ by the just man is 
an action,58 not a production, though mending-a-fence partly defines what it is. The fact 
that mending-a-fence is the characteristic of the ‘actual thing done’ does not necessarily 
explain the real aim of the agent, and thus it cannot be used to prove that the activity 
committed by the agent is a production. In fact, by doing for its own sake ‘what is right’ 
at that particular circumstance, the agent extends his aim from one that is merely related 
to his capacity or skill in mending a fence to one that is related to his capacity as a human 
being. He in a sense transforms the good internal to the activity of mending-a-fence into 
the good appropriate to a human being, and therefore the ‘actual thing done’ is a good 
(virtuous) action, the constitutive element of the good life. 
            A similar argument should apply for business activities. If business is to be a 
virtuous activity, the good internal to the activity has to be transformed into the good 
appropriate to a human being. For the good appropriate to a human being is the chief 
(highest) good, desirable only for its own sake, it should be more desirable than the 
                                                 
58 We consider this action a just action and by accident we call it ‘paying off the debt’. Of course, it is not 
always just to repay a debt by mending a fence, nor is ‘mending a fence’ always a just thing to do, but at 
that particular circumstance the right thing to do is to repay the debt by mending the fence.  
 93
external goods that are brought about as the result of the activity.59 This does not mean 
that the external goods as the result of business are discredited in a virtuous business. It 
rather means that the goodness of the external result does not stand alone, but derives 
from the intrinsic goodness of the virtuous activity that brings it about. Like the case of 
mending-a-fence in which the fence is the defining element of the activity, and has to be 
appropriately mended in order for it to be a just paying off of debt, the external result of 
business is the defining element of business, and has to be appropriately brought about if 
a business is to be virtuous. For, if the activity does not bring about the external result for 
which business is defined to exist, it is not a business at all. But if the business brings 
about the external result inappropriately, it does not reflect the best capacity of a human 
being, and hence such a business is not a virtuous business. The question, then, arises: 
which external goods are the defining elements of business? 
           As discussed in Chapter 3, business is a typical unit of economic activity that has 
to be operated effectively and efficiently in order to make a profit. As an economic 
activity, business is involved in the production, exchange, and consumption of goods or 
products (including services).60 Thus, in contrast with the other kind of activities such as 
gift giving and extortion, a business must have something to produce and exchange, and 
from the exchange process it is expected to gain a profit. Business exists to produce 
products and to make a profit. Without producing a product and without being intended 
to make a profit, the activity is in a strict sense not a business. Both product and profit are 
the external goods essential to business. Interestingly, if a business is carried out 
                                                 
59 We may need to recall Aristotle’s statements in the beginning of the Ethics that if there is an end apart 
from the activity, the nature of the product is better than the activity (NE – I.1.1094a.5), and if the activity 
itself is its end then this must be the good and the chief good (NE – I.1.1094a.11). 
60 I use the term ‘products’ instead of ‘goods’ which I use extensively in Chapter 3 in order to avoid 
confusion with regard to the categories of external and internal goods. 
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virtuously, the profit earned from it can be very supportive to the virtuous activities. For 
if the profit were reinvested to produce the other products, it would magnify business as a 
virtuous activity and the products used for consumption would be useful for the exercise 
of virtuous actions. Profit becomes inimical to virtuous activities only if the agent of 
business proclaims profit as the ultimate end of business, depriving it of the good internal 
to the activity that brings it about. Since the true ultimate end and the chief good 
appropriate to human beings consists in the virtuous activities, not in the possession of 
external goods, proclaiming profit as the ultimate end would hinder the way of converting 
business into a virtuous activity. 
            It is important to note that business as a virtuous activity is not what Aristotle 
himself considers in his ethical reflection. Aristotle even despises a mode of acquiring 
wealth that today we call ‘business’. He approves the natural mode of acquiring wealth 
such as husbandry, but he strongly criticizes commercial trade (a commercial business) 
and usury (a financial business) as he argues that these two modes of acquiring wealth are 
unnatural, and are modes by which one makes gains at the expense of the other.61 I 
believe that Aristotle’s critique of commercial trade and usury is rather influenced by the 
prejudice of the aristocratic class against these activities in his period of life. His 
objection has to be readily adjusted if his ethics is still to be considered relevant to the 
modern business world, since there is almost no place in the modern world where people 
can defy all kinds of involvement with commercial and financial businesses and depend 
largely on the natural mode of acquiring wealth. To argue for the naturalness of acquiring 
                                                 
61 P (I.10.1258a.38-1258b.8), see also NE (IV.1.1121b.31-1122a.12) 
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wealth is indeed unpersuasive.62 Moreover, to make a profit from trades or an interest-
income from lending money does not necessarily mean to take undue property from 
others. For profit and interest income can be interpreted as a ‘product’ exchanged for the 
services (an intangible product) provided by the trader or the lender,63 there can be no 
essential difference between such an exchange and a simple barter to which Aristotle 
himself has no objection. For Aristotle, barter is not a mode of acquiring wealth,64 but 
productive activity is. If the main motive of the trader and the lender is to generate 
excellent services for their customers and the exchange is just, their productive activities 
should be praised rather than despised. But if the main motive of the trader and the lender 
is profit and interest-income, then Aristotle’s objection is justified as they would 
naturally focus on the exchange, rather than the productive activity, and tend to maximize 
profit and interest-income regardless of whether they are injurious to others. Thus, the 
critical point is whether business is first appreciated as a productive activity or as a way 
merely to exchange products and make a profit; the former can be turned into a virtuous 
activity while the latter is inimical to virtuous activities (and thus to the good life). 
             In the modern world, however, business seems to be perceived and appreciated 
more as a way to exchange products and make a profit than as a productive activity. The 
end of economic activity is thought to be the external goods that are preserved for 
consumption as if happiness consists in consumption. In order to maximize external 
goods, the agent seeks to find the exchange process that gives the maximum profit. 
                                                 
62 Aristotle’s argument on slavery faces the same fate. Aristotle defends slavery by arguing that slavery is 
natural. See: P (I.5.1254a.18-1255a.3).  
63 The service of the trader is to bridge over between those who have an excess of goods and those who 
need the goods, and to take the risks associated with it. The service of the lender is to provide the use of 
loans and to take the risks associated with it. 
64 P (I.9.1257a.28) 
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Products are produced not exclusively for their use-values but specifically for exchange. 
The whole process of economic activity is oriented towards maximizing goods for 
consumption. Production is in a sense subordinated to exchange and exchange is 
subordinated to consumption.65 But such a thought is clearly misleading, for consumption 
leads only to living a life, which is not necessarily the good life. It is true that 
consumption can be the means of gratifying desires and of obtaining pleasures, but the 
good life cannot be replaced by the satisfaction of desires and the experience of 
pleasures, since some desires and pleasures may be wrong and evil. The good life cannot 
also be presented by splitting the life into two episodes: in one episode the agent is 
absorbed (like a slave) in producing the products; and in the other episode he is 
consuming and using products to undertake virtuous actions. In such a split life, only the 
later episode constitutes the good life but the whole life is not really the good life. 
Therefore, if business is indeed intended to lead to the good life, it should be first 
appreciated as a productive activity and exercised rightly as a virtuous action. Business is 
not a means to the good life, but in itself should be a constituent of the good life. Modern 
people who spend most of their waking times working wholeheartedly in business should 
not worry about whether they can achieve the good life, for they would have had it if they 
were treating business as a virtuous activity.            
                                                 
65 It is not clear whether the attitude of modern business agents is in some way influenced by the 
mainstream (neoclassical) economics that they learn from economics textbooks or mainstream economics 
is just modeling the actual average behavior of the agents. Mainstream economics views the economy as 
comprising of rational economic agents who maximize their utility, or minimize their expenditure, subject 
to some constraints. It takes consumers as the most fundamental decision units and identifies their 
preference maximizing behaviors as the standard economic decision making processes. The profit 
maximization objective of production firms is basically derivable from the preference maximization model 
(see: Andreu Mas-Colell, M.D. Winston and J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 17, 128). In any case, individual business agents are responsible for 
their own behavior and their own perceived happiness. If their behavior is misleading, they should amend it 
themselves. This does not mean that individuals should not care about any possible structural change that 
may support the amendment of their behavior. Rather, any amendment and change should begin from 
individuals themselves. 
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             It is clear from the Ethics and the Politics that, for Aristotle, the (practical) good 
life cannot be lived except in the Polis, understood as a form of political community. It is 
also very clear that business is defined to exist only in a social context. Therefore, what is 
right and appropriate in doing business has to be placed in a social context, in a 
community of some kind. Alasdair MacIntyre introduces the term ‘practice’ to illustrate 
the social arena in which the virtues and virtuous actions are exhibited.66 By a practice, 
MacIntyre means 
 “…any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended”.67    
 
 
In a practice, the human telos is settled down as a social telos. With the concept of a 
practice, MacIntyre seems to argue that the goods internal to the practice are what one 
ought to obtain if one is to be a virtuous person and to undertake virtuous actions.68 But 
one cannot identify and achieve the goods internal to a practice unless one is socially 
involved in the relationship and participating in the practice.69 And to participate in a 
practice, one has to accept the authority of the best standards and rules that have been 
                                                 
66 MacIntyre’s conception of virtue involves three conceptual backgrounds, namely an account of what he 
calls a practice, an account of the narrative order of a single human life and an account of what constitutes 
a moral tradition. See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, op. cit., p. 186-7. 
67 Ibid., p. 187-8. MacIntyre gives several examples of a practice: football, chess, architecture, farming, 
physics, chemistry, biology, painting, music, politics in the Aristotelian sense, and the making and 
sustaining of family life. 
68 The goods internal to the practice are the motivating reason for one to act virtuously (ethically). In 
relation to practices, MacIntyre defines virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods”. Ibid, p. 191. 
69 Ibid, p. 188-9. 
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socially approved and so far realized as partially definitive of the practice.70 By obtaining 
the goods internal to a practice, one would realize and develop one’s virtue of being a 
human. Business is then expected to be a practice if it is to be done virtuously. 
              MacIntyre, however, is not very optimistic about whether business in the modern 
world can be turned into a practice. He characterizes and criticizes modernity as bringing 
about the irreconcilable conflicts and dilemmas that people in the modern world and 
especially business executives have to live with.71 There are dilemmas arising from the 
incompatible claims of the conceptions of justice, the conflict between the conception of 
justice and the conception of individual liberty, the conflict between the ideals of justice 
and the price mechanism of the market economy, the conflict between those who have 
capital and those who lack it, and the conflict between the power of the state and the 
power of the market. The end of these conflicts and dilemmas would likely be channeled 
through the politicization of ethics, through a sort of negotiation and power compromise, 
in order to come into an operating decision and action. In the modern world, the 
effectiveness of action is viewed as more appropriate than other standards of excellence, 
and the external goods brought about by an action are more aspired to than the goods 
internal to the action. The business executives are situated and shaped by modern culture 
so that what they are concerned with is the technical aspect, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of an activity and the maximization of profit rather than the social and moral 
aspect and the excellence of the activity. In this kind of context, business and virtues are 
mutually antithetical, in the sense that the possession of virtues may hinder business 
                                                 
70 Ibid, p. 190. 
71 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble?”, in Bernard Baumrin and 
Benjamin Freedman, eds., Moral Responsibility and the Professions (New York: Haven Publisher, 1982), 
pp. 350-9. 
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executives in achieving the maximum profit, and conversely their profit maximization 
motive might deter the development of virtues in business activities.72 Thus, according to 
MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, business in modern social and cultural structures 
cannot be a practice.         
              Interestingly, MacIntyre does not limit the context of business only to that 
conceived in modern social and cultural structures.73 In discussing productive activities, 
such as farming, fishing, architecture, and construction, he states the difference between 
two types of fishing crew. The first type is a crew which is “organized and understood as 
a purely technical and economic means to a productive end, whose aim is only or 
overridingly to satisfy as profitably as possible some market’s demand for fish”, and the 
second type is “a crew whose members may well have initially joined for the sake of their 
wage or other share of the catch, but who have acquired from the rest of the crew an 
understanding of and devotion to excellence in fishing and excellence in playing one’s 
part as a member of such a crew”.74 The business of the fishing crew of the first type can 
only bring about external goods, while the fishing business of the second type brings 
about three kinds of goods altogether, i.e. the goods internal to the activity, the goods of 
the individual life, and the goods of the community. It is clear that only the fishing 
business of the second type is a practice. MacIntyre claims that the modern modes of 
institutionalization have corrupted and distorted practices by allowing consideration for 
                                                 
72 Since MacIntyre builds his critique of modernity partly upon a fundamental dichotomy between the 
intrinsic goods (virtuous activities) and the extrinsic (economic) goods while arguing the importance for 
pursuing the former and criticizing the motive for the latter, he is sometimes accused of being anti-
business. See: Andrew C. Wicks, “On MacIntyre, Modernity and the Virtues: A Response to Dobson”, 
Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (October 1997), pp. 133-5.             
73 John Dobson, “MacIntyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks”, Business Ethics Quarterly 4 
(October 1997), pp. 125-32, p. 127. 
74 Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Partial Response to my Critics”, in John Horton and Susan Mendus, ed., After 
MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 
283-304, p. 284-5. 
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the external goods to invade practices and dominate over goods internal to practices.75 In 
the end, MacIntyre seems to suggest that the remedy for the problem lies not in the 
resolution of individuals, but in changing social and cultural structures, which have cast 
modern business institutions, into those that can patronize practices.76  
              I see MacIntyre’s suggestion for a radical cultural change as quite difficult to 
actualize. Although culture is always an important factor in shaping the behavior of 
individuals living with it, demanding a radical cultural change as a precondition for a 
virtuous business seems to be too utopian. First, MacIntyre’s dichotomy between internal 
goods and external goods, between virtue and modernity, is a kind of separation thesis, 
which R. Edward Freeman (1994) posits as the source of the dilemma and paradox in 
business ethics, 77 with the consequence that if some firms were to have to choose 
internal goods at the expense of external goods, virtue at the expense of modernity, and to 
compete against modern firms that choose contrariwise, they would rapidly perish before 
establishing a culture that is conducive to practices.78 Secondly, though MacIntyre may 
be aware of the danger of the dichotomy, as he asserts that external goods can be 
understood “as integrative of and partly structured in terms of the goods internal to 
particular practices [businesses]”,79 building and sustaining a culture that is conducive to 
practices would naturally come from and depend on the perceptions and the resolution of 
                                                 
75 Ibid, p. 289. See also: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, op. cit., p. 194. 
76 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble?”, op. cit., p. 358. 
77 R. Edward Freeman, “The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions”, Business Ethics 
Quarterly 4:4 (1994), pp. 409-21. The paradox is a stakeholder paradox, which is discussed earlier in 
chapter 3. Referring to the separation thesis, Andrew C. Wicks points out that the dichotomy makes both 
virtue and modernity impossible to work together and, as a result, any account of business ethics that is 
based on the thesis would be an oxymoron. See: Andrew C. Wicks, op. cit. p. 134.  
78 John Dobson reaches the conclusion that, following MacIntyre’s arguments, the ‘virtuous’ fishing crew 
would ‘rapidly perish’ if it has to ‘compete’ with the modern fishing crew at the same fishing grounds. See: 
John Dobson, “The Feminine Firm: A Comment”, Business Ethics Quarterly 2 (April, 1996), pp. 227-33, p. 
227; John Dobson, “MacIntyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks”, op. cit., p. 130.  
79 Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Partial Response to my Critics”, op. cit. p. 288. 
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the individuals who are involved in the practices. It is at first the responsibility of every 
individual who is involved in business activities, rather than the collective responsibility 
of all individuals in society, to show that business can be turned into a practice without 
necessarily discrediting external goods, such as profit, which partly defines what the 
modern business is for. Relying only on collective responsibility is indeed unrealistic or, 
at best, over-optimistic. The imposition of responsibility on the individual is a logical 
consequence of the understanding that each individual has the responsibility for his own 
happiness (no matter what the circumstances are) and that each individual ought to have 
the good life of which virtuous actions, exhibited in practices, are constitutive parts.80                  
              In sum, I contend that the individual business agent, whether inside or outside of 
the corporate setting, ought to perceive and treat business as a practice. However, unlike 
Robert Solomon (1992), the prominent Aristotelian business ethicist, who claims that 
business is a practice with goals, rules, boundaries, and a purpose inseparable from the 
cultures, norms and values that guide the working of the society,81 I will maintain that 
business ought to be treated as a practice rather than that it is in fact a practice. I agree 
with Solomon that if business is treated as a practice, its goals, rules and purpose should 
be inseparable from the cultures, norms and values of the society that accommodates it. 
But I also consider a fact that the prevalent modern business whose aim is primarily to 
maximize profit cannot be called a practice under MacIntyre’s definition of the term. 
Only those individuals who have been enlightened by the concept of the good life would 
                                                 
80 I suspect that MacIntyre does not come into this conclusion because he is strongly committed to locating 
the point and function of virtues in terms of practices, whereas Aristotle locates the point and function of 
virtues in terms of the notion of the good life. Though MacIntyre’s teleology is still an Aristotelian 
teleology, he does not identify and derive his teleology from nature. He seems to ascribe a pure type of a 
socially teleological account. See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, op. cit., p. 201, 196-7.  
81 Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Corporation and Integrity in Business (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 119. 
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likely perceive, treat and develop their business as a practice. With this position, I argue 
that the individual business agent should not wholly depend on the actual condition of 
communities in which he is living to make a virtuous business; instead, he should impose 
on himself a responsibility to improve the communities in which he is living through the 
exercise of virtuous business activity. Since a virtuous business can only be exhibited in a 
practice, while a practice presupposes the existence of communities, the individual 
business agent who does business in corporate settings should perceive the corporation 
and the market as a community of some kind.   
 
 
4.3 The Corporation and the Market as Communities 
 
              Before moving further, let me take a note on some issues that have been raised 
so far. Following the fact that human beings are by nature rational and social, most of the 
virtuous activities, which are the constitutive parts of the good life, are realized as 
practices. In order for a business to be virtuous and realized as a practice, it should be at 
first perceived and treated as a productive activity, rather than as a way merely to 
exchange and acquire products for consumption and to make a profit. This is true for the 
reason that, in the capitalistic system, acquisition and consumption are essentially 
designed to exclude other people, whereas  a productive activity is fostered to include and 
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invite the others into ‘cooperation’.82 A productive activity that is treated as a practice 
would bring about the goods internal to the activity (excellence), the goods of the 
individual agents (happiness), and the goods of the community in which the practice 
takes place and through which the goods of the individual agents are attained. The 
products and profit (the external goods), which partly define business, are not only 
produced and fulfilled but also systematically structured in terms of the goods internal to 
the practice such that what we characteristically call an excellent (virtuous) business is 
one that produces the best products and generates the highest profit, relative to the 
particular circumstances and the niche in which the business is engaged, but subject to 
the nature of human relationships expressed in the form of ‘cooperative human activity’ 
to obtain the good life.83 In short, the individuals who are involved in the business as a 
practice are basically engaged in a kind of communal cooperation to obtain the good life. 
The corporation and the market are indeed institutions, which MacIntyre posits 
characteristically as having the corrupting power that undermines the internal goods in 
favor of the external goods, but they are also the houses of the practice in which the 
                                                 
82 For this reason, I don’t believe that the ethical problems in economic life can be solved by restraining our 
desire for consumption. The interdependency between national economies may prove that the decrease of 
the aggregate consumption in a big national economy (say the USA) may adversely affect the people in the 
exporting small national economies (such as most of the emerging economies).  It is also a fact that, when 
we increase or decrease our consumption, we tend to overlook the effect of our increasing or decreasing 
consumption on other people, because the essence of consumption is basically to exclude others, i.e. what I 
consume cannot be at the same time what you consume (and vice versa). Therefore, I argue, to develop an 
economy by advocating either the maximization of consumption or the minimization of consumption is 
ethically problematic. The best strategy to develop a moral economy is not by attending to concerns over 
the availability of material goods for consumption, but rather over the way the material goods are produced 
(production). Following this best strategy, the problem is formulated as a problem of turning the production 
process into virtuous actions. 
83 I hold a view that there is a strong sense of maximization in a virtuous business, though it remains under 
the category of a practice. This is in contrast with the point made by Geoff Moore (2002), after exploring 
MacIntyre’s practice – institution distinction, that business can be a practice but that a virtuous business 
(corporation) is “one which pursues the external goods in so far as they are necessary to and support the 
development of the practice”. See: Geoff Moore, “On the Implication of the Practice – Institution 
Distinction: MacIntyre and the Application of Modern Virtue Ethics to Business”, Business Ethics 
Quarterly 1 (January 2002), pp. 19-32, p. 30. 
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individual agents may obtain the good life. Therefore, if business is to be a practice, the 
corporation and the market have to be perceived and treated as a community in which its 
individual members are devoted in cooperation to obtain the good life. 
              Perceiving the corporation and the market as a community would dismiss any 
temptation to perceive them merely as an input-output black box, a mechanistic 
bureaucracy, or a legal fiction (in the case of the corporation), and as an economic 
machine of capitalism (in the case of the market), for what one is mostly concerned with 
when he perceives a community is the members of that community who have the value in 
themselves, rather than the value of the members as being instrumental to a certain goal. 
However, although a community has the goal or the end shared by its members, the goal 
or the end does not eliminate, nor does it depend on, the private interests of the individual 
members. A community is neither a monolithic entity nor a mere association of 
individuals who accidentally have the same goal to pursue. The individual member of a 
community conceives of the goal shared with the other members as essentially the 
common goal attributable to all members, so that when one identifies himself as a 
member of a certain community, beside describing the characteristics of his identity in 
terms of that community, he must accept the goal of that community as his own goal and 
preserve the commitment to attain it.     
Arguing for the corporation as community, Robert C. Solomon (1992) insists that 
the corporation is not a mere collection of self-interested individuals because the 
individuals in the corporation typically characterize and identify themselves with the 
corporation and the corporation is greater than the sum of all the individuals that 
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constitute it.84 In contrast to the Hobbesian view that portrays individuals as atomistic and 
self-interested creatures competing with one another in a struggle for survival of the 
fittest, Solomon argues that the individuals in the corporation and generally all 
individuals are in fact social creatures, “part of a complex interwoven metaphysical social 
fabric”, and for that matter their identities are always socially situated and essentially 
constituted by their membership in the communities.85 Solomon’s argument is supported 
by the concept of a corporate culture in which the culture of the corporation is identified 
as having a structure and a history; the former holds the individuals together in the form 
of interpersonal relationships that make up the community and the latter sustains the 
community over a period of time despite some of the individuals coming and going.86 In 
the structure of a corporate culture, ethics is built in the beliefs, knowledge, expectations, 
rules, goals, norms and values that are shared by all the individuals in the corporation. 
The ethics emerging from the corporation (the corporate ethics) does not go against the 
prevailing ethics in the larger communities for the corporation is itself a member of the 
larger communities.87 It sanctions mutual cooperation among the individuals and shapes 
the role of the corporation in the larger communities. If there is any competition among 
the individuals or among the divisions in the corporation, it should be a way, or a kind of 
‘cooperation’, to make the corporation more powerful in exercising its role in the larger 
communities. As a result, the corporation is a potential place for the individuals to work 
together, develop and exercise virtues to obtain the good life. 
                                                 
84 Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence, op. cit., pp. 152. 
85 Ibid., p. 147-8. 
86 Ibid., p. 132. 
87 It is possible for a corporate culture to be ethically superior to the culture of a larger community 
where the corporation operates, but it is impossible that in its ideal state a corporate culture ignores the 
ethics prevailing in the larger whole community. In other words, the prevailing ethics in the larger 
whole community has to be part of an ideal corporate culture. 
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With regard to the market, Solomon argues that “[the market] must be understood 
not as an empty unstructured space in which free agents voluntarily test their skills 
against one another but as a preexisting community with a network of values and 
needs…and a system of rules that define and constrain the nature of negotiation and the 
sorts of things that can be negotiated”.88 Any business interactions, deals and contracts 
must have already presupposed some mutually shared conventions, expectations, 
dependable commitments and trusts among the individuals involved. Indeed, it is not 
really controversial to think of the market as a community, once the nature of human 
beings as social beings is properly understood. Although the market, as we know it, is 
essentially characterized with competition, rather than cooperation as such, the market 
cannot be isolated from the society in which the mutually shared concerns and 
cooperation are the prime cause of sustainability. Therefore, competition in the 
marketplace makes sense only within the bounds of culture, ethics and mutual 
cooperation that prevail in the society. Competition in the marketplace is not morally 
neutral, as we can find a healthy, fair, positive and constructive competition in one 
instance, and a sick, depraved, negative and destructive competition in the other instance. 
Competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive, as we can find an underlying 
cooperation in healthy competition, similar to competition among the individuals or 
among the divisions in the corporation that makes the corporation more powerful in 
exercising its role in the larger communities. Healthy competition can even be a moral 
force, encouraging the market participants to be honest and productive, courageous and 
                                                 
88 Ibid., p. 122. 
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innovative, and fair and respectful for others.89 Thus, the underlying culture, ethics and 
mutual cooperation in the marketplace would make the market conceivable as a 
community, in which the market participants can develop and exercise virtues to obtain 
the good life. 
It is reasonable to think that the corporate community is part of the market 
community and consecutively the market community is part of the larger whole 
community. In the modern business world, however, it is difficult to make a clear-cut 
boundary to separate the market community from the larger whole community, since the 
power of business and its pervasiveness are such that no one seems to be able to place 
himself outside of its reach. It is also not so easy in some cases to have a clear separation 
between those who are the members of a particular corporate community and those who 
are not members, considering the fact that, for example, some outstanding individuals 
hold position of chief executive officer of more than one corporation and many rich 
individuals establish and own several corporations. In the case of the corporate 
community, a rough indication can be sensibly proposed that the members of the 
corporate community are those who are involved in the internal workings of the 
corporation, particularly its employees and managers, for they are those who develop and 
exercise virtues along with the internal workings of the corporation. In effect, unless the 
stockholders (owners) are involved in the internal workings of the corporation, they are 
better viewed as the members of the market community, for what they are expecting is 
                                                 
89 Ian Maitland (1997) argues that the market can reproduce virtues such as trustworthiness (honesty), self-
control, sympathy, and fairness, which are necessary for its own function and existence, because these 
virtues are not just public goods but also are the source of private economic benefit (rewarded in the 
market). From the MacIntyrian perspective, Geoff Moore (2002) says that the argument is right in so far as 
business is treated as a practice. See: Ian Maitland, “Virtuous Markets: The Market as School of the 
Virtues”, Business Ethics Quarterly 1 (January 1997), pp. 17-31, p. 23; Geoff Moore, “On the Implication 
of the Practice – Institution Distinction: MacIntyre and the Application of Modern Virtue Ethics to 
Business”, op. cit. p. 25-6.   
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the financial product (output) of the corporation rather than their involvement in the daily 
operation of the corporation.    
Since business as a practice operates through the corporate community and the 
market community while these communities are embedded in the larger whole 
community, Solomon argues that business is severely limited in its ability to “deviate 
from more general practices and basic social guidelines.”90 Because the values of the 
business community (the corporate community or the market community) are mostly the 
values of the larger whole community, the values internally applauded in the business 
community should be sufficient, and hence requiring no ‘externally imposed’ values or 
principles, to evaluate the practice of business. Solomon believes that the internal process 
and interactions within the business community are capable of producing criticism and 
correction against any deviating practice of business, which is unjust and exploitative, 
such as one that possibly condones the use of slave and child labor. He is even willing to 
appeal to the human community, the largest whole community, to ensure that such a 
practice would not escape from critics and correction.91 Thus, Solomon bids us keep 
business in moral line by making an appeal to the internal moral process in the business 
community and to the embeddedness of the business community in the larger whole 
community.          
I agree for the most part with Solomon’s argument on the corporation and market 
as a community of a certain kind, but I doubt the adequacy of his argument on how the 
business community can criticize and reform itself from unjust practices. John Boatright 
(1995) argues that internal criticism will not be effective if the overall system in the 
                                                 
90 Solomon, op. cit., p. 205. 
91 Ibid., p. 206. 
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business community is itself corrupt.92 Roger J. H. King (2001) argues that the business 
community has been so powerfully developed and grown that the public discourse is 
much influenced and even dominated by the economic and commercial way of thinking, 
and as a result the business community has begun to usurp the guardian power of the 
larger whole community.93 When the system in the business community is corrupt and 
the guardian power of the larger whole community recedes, there is theoretically no hope 
for a criticism and reform to emerge if we rely only on the interacting mechanism within 
the communities. Solomon has neglected the power of the individuals in the community 
of which they are the members, which I believe Aristotle himself had given no strong 
indication to eliminate. It is generally right that the individuals are “part of a complex 
interwoven metaphysical social fabric”, but they are not a passive ‘receptacle’ of the 
multiplicity of cultures of which they are the members. In the modern world, the 
individuals are able to switch over or choose the culture which they think to be fit for 
themselves, and through their self-constitution and identification with the culture that 
they have voluntarily chosen they in fact actively contribute to make and remake that 
culture.94 During the process of making and remaking culture, the individuals may seek 
to adjust their culture into an ideal culture they think is fit for all its members; therefore, 
the individual can be another potential source of criticism and reform. In other words, I 
                                                 
92 John Boatright, “Aristotle Meets Wall Street: The Case for Virtue Ethics in Business”, Business Ethics 
Quarterly 2 (April 1995), pp. 353-59, p. 357. 
93 Roger J.H. King, “Virtue and Community in Business Ethics: A Critical Assessment of Solomon’s 
Aristotelian Approach to Social Responsibility”, Journal of Social Philosophy 32(4) (2001), pp. 487-499, 
p. 493-4.  
94 Referring to the words of Bruce Jennings, who takes the interpretive approach in social sciences, the 
individuals are conceived “as acting subjects rather than behaving objects – as persons in situations, as 
agents acting within a public world of understandable norms, conventions, and rules” (Italics are my 
emphasis).  Quoted from: Jeffrey Nesteruk, “Law and the Virtues: Developing a Legal Theory for Business 
Ethics”, Business Ethics Quarterly 2 (April 1995), pp. 361-369, p. 363. In my case, the acting subjects do 
not only employ the norms, conventions and rules available in the community but also actively criticize 
them before accepting and putting them into actions at the particular circumstances. 
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argue for two guardian entities that may shape the morality of the business community, 
namely the larger whole community and the individual(s) within the business community 
itself. As a result, the internal moral process in the business community needs to be seen 
as a kind of dynamic interplay between the individuals and the business community, 
rather than a process that merely involves “the egalitarian sensibility and the sense of 
fairness shared by the business community itself”.95 
By taking the individual as one of the guardian entities, I recognize the 
importance of fostering the autonomy of the individual in the business community. I take 
this position for at least two reasons. First, every individual in the business community 
has the responsibility for his own happiness or for the good life he wishes to obtain, no 
matter what the conditions of the business community are. This is basically right, 
considering that the virtuous man, who has the potentiality to obtain the good life by 
exercising virtuous actions, would take the most advantage of the existing external 
conditions, rather than demand certain external conditions and depend on the satisfaction 
of the conditions every time before exercising virtuous actions. Secondly, every 
individual has to impose on himself the responsibility to participate in turning the 
community into one that is conducive for the good life if he is really consistent with his 
aim to obtain the good life. This is basically a denial of the view that the virtuous 
individual is absorbed by the community in obtaining the good life and may not have 
aspirations for the improvement of the community. Since moral virtues are inseparable 
from practical wisdom (phronesis) while practical wisdom (phronesis) involves a true 
course of reasoning with the view of the good life at the end, the understanding of the 
form or structure of the good life partly plays in the development and exercise of moral 
                                                 
95 Solomon, Ethics and Excellence, op. cit., p. 205.  
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virtues.96 If the good life presupposes the aspiration for the ideal community, and indeed 
it does,97 but phronesis and correspondingly moral virtues do not lead to the ideal 
community, the result would be a serious inconsistency and tension within the rational 
element of the soul and between the rational and the irrational elements of the soul, and 
therefore there would be no good life at the end.  
By taking the individual as one of the guardian entities, I place the individual as 
an indispensable target for moral improvement in the business society. Instead of merely 
prescribing the corporation and the market as ‘such and such’ communities, I put a 
normative emphasis on the individuals who are involved in the business activities that 
they ought to perceive and treat the corporation and the market as communities of a 
certain kind and then to turn them into the ideal communities.98 An ideal community 
means a community that exists for its true purpose, the community in which the 
individual members, though performing different roles, are united in the pursuit of the 
good life. It is the role that relates the individual to the community, with respect to a 
practice. The role provides the individual who holds it with the identity from which he 
understands his own position in the community and the manner in which he can work 
together with the others in order to obtain the good life. Since business has many things 
to do with the multiplicity of roles, as a result of specialization and the division of labor 
                                                 
96 The state of capacity by which the rational element of the soul grasps the truth of the form of the good 
life is philosophic wisdom (sophia). It is philosophic wisdom (sophia) that provides the knowledge of what 
the good life and the ideal communities consist of. Although Aristotle does not state clearly the relation 
between philosophic wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis), it is reasonable to say that 
philosophic wisdom (sophia) provides a perspective to practical wisdom (phronesis) and thus also to the 
development of moral virtues.    
97 The best life can only be lived in the best Polis.   
98 Indeed, even an appeal to the human community, as Solomon has suggested, seems to make sense only if 
the human community is not a factual community but an ideal ‘hypothetical’ community that is conceived 
by the individuals in their ethical reflections. 
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inside and outside of the corporations, every individual has to be aware of his or her role 
in the business community.  
 
 
4.4 Role Identity in Business 
 
When the individual is aware of his role in the community, he realizes that it is 
the community that defines and assigns him the role. In some cases, the individual may 
be the creator who initiates the role, but still it is the community that approves and gives 
the legitimacy for the role to perform.  Since every community is established with some 
purpose,99 each role should be defined and performed in connection with the purpose of 
the community. Smaller communities are parts of the larger community, and the parts 
must share the purpose for which the whole exists; thus, the smaller communities must 
have the roles defined with respect to the purpose of the larger community. At the end, 
the larger whole community is considered self-sufficient and having as its purpose the 
good life, the life of virtues, for its all individual members.100  
With regard to business and economic activity in general, the individual agent 
identifies his role in the business community (the corporate community or the market 
community), and the business community in turn has a social role in the larger whole 
community. At the corporate context, the employees and the managers identify their roles 
                                                 
99 P (I.1-1252a.1) 
100 Aristotle argues that the polis is the end of the natural development in which human beings seek the way 
to establish the association that can provide not only the means of life but also the good life. For Aristotle, 
the polis is self sufficient in the sense that the individual members can fulfill the need for the means of life 
and the need for the good life, which the smaller communities like the family and the village are not large 
and complex enough to provide. See: P (I.2-1252b.11-35).  
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in the corporation; the corporation has a role to play in the market; and the market has a 
social role to serve the society as a whole. Each role carries the purposes of the 
community of which the member who holds it is a part. Thus, the role of the manager 
carries the purpose of the corporation, the purpose of the market, and the purpose of the 
larger whole community. But from the Aristotelian perspectives, the purpose of the larger 
whole community should become the first priority in any ethical consideration, because 
the good life is the ultimate end and the good life cannot be lived except in the context of 
the larger whole community. This leads to at least two important consequences. 
First, the individual agents in business, whether inside or outside of the 
corporation, should be first seen and treated as persons, members of the larger whole 
community who have the need for the good life, rather than as ones with the specific 
roles and identities with regard to their memberships in the smaller communities. The 
employees working in the production line of a corporation, for example, are essentially 
and primarily the members of the larger whole community, persons who have the need 
for the good life, not just being the machine operators or even the shop cleaners who need 
some little money for living. Each of them is hired as a whole person with all the 
complex personalities, roles, personal concerns and relationships. Their complexities as a 
person should not be seen as something that necessarily hinders the realization of the 
purpose of the corporation. For, if they were aware that their jobs are parts of a practice, 
which demands excellent accomplishments, they would do their jobs excellently and 
therefore contribute to fulfill the purpose of the corporation. To see and treat the 
employees of the corporation primarily as persons is commensurate with the view that the 
corporation is essentially people working together for the good life. A similar treatment 
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should prevail over the consumers and the other individuals involved in the market 
community. 
Secondly, every role in business should be hierarchically defined and 
characteristically performed in the light of the good life as the ultimate end. First of all, 
the role of the overall business communities (the economy) is defined to generate the 
prosperity of the larger whole community by taking into account the good life of those 
who are involved in the activities.101 The role of the market community is to ensure that 
the prosperity of the larger whole community is generated through a system of 
competition. The role of the business agent, including the corporation, is to produce 
products (including services) and exchange them in the market for a financial gain 
(profit). The role of every position in the corporation is usually reflected in the respective 
job-description, created with respect to the spirit of cooperation between different 
positions for producing the best products and making a financial gain. It is then important 
to prescribe that the downstream role should be characteristically performed in the light 
of the roles of the larger communities of which the holder of that role is a part. 
Accordingly, the downstream roles are performed not only to produce the immediate 
results in the form of the external goods but also and mainly to bring about the good life. 
The roles of those who work in the corporation, for example, are not just performed as 
parts of the institutional project to produce products and make a profit but also and 
mainly as parts of a practice that delivers the internal goods leading to the good life. 
                                                 
101 By taking the good life of those who are involved in the business activities into account, the prosperity 
as the result of the business activities would likely have several dimensions other than the availability of 
material goods. Michael Philips (1993) argues that ‘prosperity’ has at least three dimensions, namely the 
productive, distributive, and ‘externalities’ dimensions. A society is prosperous if it can produce an 
enormous amount of the life enhancing goods, distribute them justly among the citizens, and maintain the 
quality of the natural environment wisely. See: Michael Philips, “How to Think Systematically About 
Business Ethics”, in E.R. Winkler and J.R. Coombs, ed., Applied Ethics: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 185-200, p. 191-2.  
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By an appeal to the good life, the purpose of business should go beyond an 
institutional goal of producing products and making a profit. It is true that business is 
partly defined by the existence of profit, but it is not right to pledge that profit is the only 
goal of business. For the good life is the ultimate goal, it is more proper to view profit as 
the financial reward for supplying the best products in a virtuous way (with respect to the 
good life) than to see it as the exclusive goal of business. As such, profit is not simply the 
end nor the means, but rather part of a virtuous business. The other financial gains of 
business, such as the growth of the corporate value, should not also be pledged as the 
goal of business insofar as business is conducted without regard to the good life as the 
ultimate end.102 This Aristotelian position may be better understood in contrast to the 
teleological approach offered by Elaine Sternberg (1994), who emphasizes maximizing 
the corporate value and yet claims her approach as an Aristotelian treatment of business 
ethics.103 From the Aristotelian perspective, Sternberg contends that a business is good 
and right if it follows the telos or the distinctive purpose of business that differentiates 
business from all other activities. It is wrong, according to Sternberg, for a business to be 
turned into teleopathic activity that pursues non-business ends or pursues business ends in 
the wrong way.104 Sternberg claims that the defining purpose of business is “to maximize 
owner value over the long term by selling goods or services”.105 It follows that the 
fundamental principles of business ethics are those that enjoin the values without which 
                                                 
102 One may argue that a ‘mafia’ business, conducted with extortion and exploitation of resources, can also 
be a kind of business that regards the good life as the ultimate end, if in a later time the Mafioso generously 
uses the profit earned from the business for noble purposes. But such an argument is not right, for virtuous 
activities and the good life are not potentialities. If business genuinely respects the good life as the ultimate 
end, it should not respect the good life only as a potentiality. 
103 Elaine Sternberg, Just Business: Business Ethics in Action (London: Little, Brown and Co., 1994).  
104 By introducing the jargon of teleopathy, Sternberg is ready to defend Milton Friedman’s argument 
against the social responsibility of business, although she rejects the idea that profit maximization is the 
sole purpose of business. See: ibid., pp. 41-42, 45-46, 111.  
105 Ibid., p. 32. 
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business cannot achieve its defining purpose, namely distributive justice and ordinary 
decency.106            
Mark T. Nelson (1998) criticizes Steinberg’s argument on several grounds, 
particularly those related to the stipulated definition of business.107 Besides pointing out 
that the long term and maximization conditions in Steinberg’s definition of business are 
too stringent to capture a range of activities that can still be plausibly called business, 
Nelson argues that Sternberg’s approach is missing a genuine Aristotelian flavor for 
reasons that, under the stipulated definition, the moral status of business is largely 
submitted to the intention of the owner, and that the scope of her teleological approach is 
insufficient to cover the basic ethical concerns over the effects of business activities on 
the society. As long as it can maximize the long-term owner value, Sternberg would 
likely condone selling pornography regardless of the fact that it may cause deterioration 
in the morality of the society.108 It is worth noting that the way Sternberg sets the 
defining purpose of business is not different from the way an artefact like pillow, knife, 
or car is defined.109 Sternberg ignores the important features in Aristotle’s Ethics 
regarding the hierarchy of goods, that the goals or the ends of activities must be 
understood in a hierarchical manner in which one is pursued for the sake of the other up 
to the ultimate end. The goal of business, like the goals of pillow, knife, or car, is a 
subordinate end, not the ultimate end. The ultimate end for which the goal of business 
might be pursued is happiness or the good life, while the good life cannot be lived except 
in the community. To ignore the hierarchy of goods is to miss the essential element in 
                                                 
106 Ibid., p.79-87. 
107 Mark T. Nelson, “An Aristotelian Business Ethics?”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 15:1 (1998), pp. 89-
104. 
108 Ibid., p. 101. 
109 Sternberg, op. cit., p. 4. 
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Aristotle’s Ethics; therefore, it is understandable why Nelson doubts whether Sternberg’s 
approach is genuinely Aristotelian. 
Similarly, the Aristotelian position that I hold with an appeal to the good life as 
the ultimate end can be contrasted with an Aristotelian approach offered by Karl Schudt 
(2000), who uses the method of Aristotle to define corporate virtues.110 Arguing for the 
corporation as an independent moral agent, Schudt tries to separate corporate life from 
personal life and correspondingly to distinguish corporate virtues from human virtues. As 
human virtues, described by Aristotle, are the states of human characters that make a man 
good, Schudt argues that corporate virtues must be the states of corporate characters that 
make a corporation good. Whereas the good for men is happiness, the good for 
corporations, according to Schudt, is sustainable profit. Accordingly, if the exercise of 
human virtues leads a man to happiness, the exercise of corporate virtues would lead a 
corporation to sustainable profit. Whereas Aristotle identifies human virtues following 
the kinds of activities that the man is engaged, such as that the virtue of courage is 
identified in relation to the activities of the man facing the risks of danger, Schudt 
identifies five corporate virtues in connection with five kinds of activities in which the 
corporation is typically engaged, namely efficient production (in the production 
activities), resource management (in the use of resources), correct pricing (in setting up 
prices), effective advertising (in advertising activities), and right relationship (in building 
the relationship with other corporations and humans). Schudt hopes that by instilling 
these corporate virtues, the corporate ‘monster’ can be tamed into one that protects 
humans and yet has its motivation rooted in profit. 
                                                 
110 Karl Schudt, “Taming the Corporate Monster: An Aristotelian Approach to Corporate Virtue”, Business 
Ethics Quarterly 3 (July 2000), pp. 711-723. 
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Similarly to Sternberg, Schudt ignores the hierarchy of goods that is fundamental 
in Aristotle’s Ethics. In the case of Schudt, the exclusion of the hierarchy of goods is a 
logical consequence of his treatment in separating corporate life from human life. But 
such a separation is by no means right. If one is serious enough with his life, he should 
consider his corporate life as part of his life as a whole. One should not surrender any part 
of his life to the corporation and consider only his personal life outside of the corporation 
as a human life. It is pity, indeed, for those who spend most of their waking life in the 
corporation but lose the meaning of life as a human being during their engagement in the 
corporation. To identify specific virtues in relation to the specific role of the corporation 
is all right, for we may need to know the virtues that would enable the corporation to 
fulfill the demands of the role. But, if we ignore the fact that the corporation in carrying 
out its role involves human activities,111 then we miss the important messages in dealing 
with ethics in that ethics is concerned with human activities. As long as human activities 
are indispensable in the operation of the corporation, the hierarchy of goods and the 
ultimate end of the hierarchy (human happiness) should come into consideration in the 
identification of virtues. To ignore the hierarchy of goods and happiness is in a sense to 
ignore human beings who are involved in the operation of the corporation. Therefore, 
                                                 
111 Schudt takes an example of the trading company in the stock market in which computers largely do the 
corporate decision-making process so that even individual human members have nothing to say on the 
effect of the decision (ibid., p. 718). This example is misleading, for all we know that the computers are 
only instruments to assist humans in the decision making process. If the decision severely affects human 
lives, the individual human members should have something to say and take the right actions to improve 
the system accordingly. 
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instead of taming the corporate monster, Schudt is creating another kind of monster that 
‘swallows’ human beings who are involved in its operation.112 
An appeal to the good life as the ultimate end of the hierarchy of goods, however, 
should not ever cause a distraction in the hierarchy of roles, insofar as the prevailing 
hierarchy of roles can reasonably provide the best way for all members of the 
communities to obtain the good life. In most cases, a distraction in the hierarchy of roles 
that is established in accordance with the capitalistic system cannot lead to the good life; 
an anomaly that involves activities which Sternberg calls teleopathy. But the term 
‘teleopathy’ used in this case is not to mean a business pursuing the wrong ends, but 
rather a business pursuing the right ultimate end (the good life) in the wrong way.113 For 
example, the corporation that is managed to deploy its resources most of the time to 
charity works may shortly benefit some members of the whole community but in the long 
run may fall into the risk of bankruptcy that cancels its further existence for providing the 
good life. The market that is treated like the corporation, by arranging straightforward 
cooperation among the producers, may eliminate fierce competitions but eventually cause 
adverse effects to the consumers and damage the market system as the breeding place for 
productive innovation. Such treatments over the corporation and the market may be 
                                                 
112 Alternatively, one may argue in Schudt’s case that human beings are not ignored but rather differently 
understood as those who should support the corporate virtues when living in the corporation, and support 
different virtues when living in the other institutions. Such understanding of human beings is interesting but 
misleading, because humans are not just the ‘receptacles’ of virtues (in different kinds) but rather the 
constructors who voluntarily develop virtues. Though instilling virtues is carried over through habituation, 
every habituated action should involve human capacity for correct reasoning (phronesis) in order to arrive 
at the right choice. If virtuous human beings are simply understood as those who possess and exercise 
virtues without referring to their rational capacity and happiness, there is serious deprivation in 
understanding human beings, and such understanding is not Aristotelian in nature. Since Schudt’s argument 
is either ignoring the involvement of human beings in the corporation or depriving the understanding of 
human beings, it is far from convincing. 
113 The deceptive character of teleopathy, pointed out by Sternberg, has to be interpreted as the diversion of 
the way in which business is supposed to go through, rather than the deviation from the defining purpose of 
business. See: Sternberg, op. cit. p. 111. 
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intended to aim at the good life but are taking the wrong ways to actualize. As a result, 
the whole enterprise does not reflect a virtuous business and, for that reason, it does not 
constitute the good life. 
Thus, in the light of the good life as the ultimate end, the corporation should 
remain in its natural role to make a profit by producing and selling the best products, and 
the market should remain functioning well with the system of competition.114 At the 
smaller level, the individuals inside and outside of the corporation should perform their 
own roles well according to the standards of excellence defined and assigned by the 
corporation, the market and the larger whole community. Since every role in the 
corporation carries the purpose of the corporation, the purpose of the market, and the 
purpose of the larger whole community, the good performance of the role should 
constitute the good life of the individual who holds and exercises it. It remains true that 
when the individuals are really performing their roles well, what they are concerned with 
is the intrinsic worth of the accomplishment and rightness of the actions, rather than the 
consequences of the actions. For the proper wage, salary, products and profit, which are 
essentially coming out as consequences of the actions, are and should have been 
considered and included in the rightness of the actions. In the larger picture, the good 
performance of the role can be construed as part of the ‘cooperative’ enterprise 
summarized by MacIntyre as a practice. It is then appropriate to conclude that only by 
                                                 
114 In the absence of regulation and competition policy (antitrust), the producers in the industrial markets, 
particularly those in the industry that consists of a small number of producers such as the aircraft industry 
and the electrical equipment industry, may have to arrange cooperation, not to fix prices or to make a cartel, 
but to maintain a healthy competition. It remains true that a healthy competition depends largely on the 
responsibility of the players (producers) even though the relevant regulation or competition policy is 
available, because there are usually still many possible ways to drag the competition into an unhealthy 
state. 
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actively performing their roles well or, in other words, participating in a practice could 
the individuals find the good life from their involvement in the business activities. 
Since the good performance of the role brings about the good life, the role 
becomes something that can make the individual proud. It gives the individual a sense of 
identity and correspondingly defines a set of duties and responsibilities for the individual 
to accomplish. These particular duties and responsibilities are not felt as burdens in his 
life, but rather as the ‘vehicle’ that could lead him to the good life. As a result, the 
corporation and the market within which the individual gains his identity are more 
conceived of as mediating institutions, which provide the roads to the good life, than as 
mere institutions that systematically compel him to pursue the external goods as the 
exclusive goal. With this way of conceiving the corporate and market institutions, I try to 
harmonize and put the institutions as integral parts of the practice, rather than to 
antagonistically confront the institutions with the practice, as MacIntyre suggested, or to 
elicit a creative tension that can be deduced from the relationship between the institutions 
and the practice.115  
However, different from Timothy L. Fort (1996) who introduces the notion of 
business as mediating institution and emphasizes that the role of mediating institution is 
to provide a context for the individuals to fulfill their basic needs for social interaction,116 
I hold a view that the role of a mediating institution is rather to provide a context for the 
individuals to obtain the good life within which the fulfillment of the associational needs 
                                                 
115 Based on MacIntyre’s practice – institution distinction, Geoff Moore (2002) argues that the tension 
between the practice and the institution may not be as destructive as MacIntyre suggests. He even interprets 
that what MacIntyre actually means must be “a dynamic and creative tension rather than a static and 
destructive one”. See: Geoff Moore, “On the Implication of the Practice – Institution Distinction”, op. cit., 
p. 27-8. : Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, op. cit., p. 194.  
116 Timothy L. Fort, “Business as Mediating Institution”, Business Ethics Quarterly 6 (April 1996), pp. 
149-163, p. 153; Timothy L. Fort, Ethics and Governance: Business as Mediating Institution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 28. 
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should have been included. Fort envisages that as a mediating institution the corporation 
has to be understood as a community that, like the family, the school, and the local 
community, should provide a socialization process whereby the individual members 
develop their identities and accept within their reach the concrete responsibility to 
cooperate with one another so that what they would get is not only that the corporation 
meets the organizational and social objectives but also that they can fulfill their 
associational needs. While Fort is right in stating that the mediating institution exists to 
mediate the individual persons with the society,117 he seems to overlook the possible case 
of a mafia business in which the objectives of the corporation and the associational needs 
of the individuals are satisfactorily fulfilled and yet it is hard to accept the claim that what 
they are doing is good (ethical). In order to be good (ethical), the mediating institution 
should mediate not only the way the individuals fulfill their associational needs but also 
and primarily the way the individuals obtain the good life. With this way of 
understanding the mediating institution, I reckon the good life of the individual as an 
important element in the Aristotelian approach to ethics in economic life. What matters 
most in the Aristotelian approach to ethics in economic life is how the individual, holding 
a particular role, obtains the good life through participation in the economic activities. 
But it is also important to note that the good life can only be realized by referring to the 





                                                 
117 Timothy L. Fort, “Business as Mediating Institution”, ibid. p. 150. 
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4.5 Individual Happiness and Ideal Communities 
 
I have discussed the importance of fostering the autonomy of the individual in 
pursuing the good life in the business community and the importance of maintaining the 
hierarchy of roles prevailing in the community. Their importance signifies the fact that 
the good life depends largely on the initiative and actions of the individual but cannot 
exist outside the framework of community. One cannot excel and obtain the (practical) 
good life by living in solitude, nor can he obtain it simply by following whatever the 
community tells him to do. If one wishes to obtain the good life, he should perform his 
roles well in the community with the view of the good life as the ultimate end.  
In order to perform his roles well, the individual needs to possess virtues by 
developing a habit of right actions. Certain virtues are usually attached to and considered 
as important for a particular role, such as the virtues of truthfulness and honesty for the 
role of the accounting manager and the virtues of courage and toughness for the role of 
the sales executives, but the right actions and the good life are more than a mere 
possession and consistent exercise of one or two moral virtues. The accounting manager 
cannot always find the good life simply by being consistently truthful and honest. For, 
suppose that the accounting manager is aware of the situation but has no concerns over 
the fact that the corporation for which he is working controls a mafia business; it is hard 
to believe that his participation is a constituent of the good life. The rightness of actions, 
with respect to the good performance of a particular role, should go beyond the exercise 
of certain moral virtues. Apparently, the accounting manager also needs the virtues of 
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courage and toughness in order to be virtuous.118 By having the virtue of courage, the 
accounting manager would naturally look for the best opportunity to use his competency 
to contribute, however small it may be, in the effort of removing the unethical mafia 
practice from the business activities. To commit to doing the right actions, the accounting 
manager must always try to perform his role well with the view of the ideal business 
community and the ideal larger whole community at the end. As such, the accounting 
manager would obtain the good life, constituted of the right actions, and contribute in 
reforming the existing communities and building the ideal communities.119 The ideal 
communities are communities that exist for their true purposes, viz. the purposes that are 
hierarchically defined with the good life as the ultimate end. 
It seems obvious that the individual’s happiness presupposes the ideal 
communities. Happiness consists in virtuous actions, but actions cannot be right and 
virtuous unless the individual always refers to the ideal communities at the end. 
Therefore, though virtues are developed and exercised within actual communities, the 
ideal communities are those to which the individual has to refer. The individual as the 
actual moral agent is protected from the dominance of the actual communities while his 
judgments, which are based on the principle of the golden mean,120 could not be charged 
as mediocre judgments for these judgments are aimed at the ideal purposes. In 
conjunction with the purpose of achieving happiness and realizing the ideal communities, 
three social virtues can be thought of as indispensable and essential to any role in the 
communities, namely autonomy, friendship and justice. Autonomy is about the freedom 
                                                 
118 And the sales executives need to have the virtues of truthfulness and honesty. Without truthfulness and 
honesty, to some extent, how can the customers trust the sales executives? 
119 Thus, any reform should be carried out from within, without necessarily disrupting the essence of the 
role and the hierarchy of roles.     
120 It is the principle that requires us to choose the intermediate between excess and defect. 
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and the capacity of the individual to pursue the good life. Friendship and justice are 
concerned with maintaining the vitality of total relationships that constitute the 
communities. Without individual autonomy there is no real good life to be attained, and 
without friendship and justice there are no prospective ideal communities from which the 
good life is to be attained. 
Although autonomy is not in the list of virtues mentioned in Aristotle’s Ethics, it 
can be seen from the Aristotelian perspective. In the context of virtue, autonomy is 
concerned with the problem as to how the individual rules and controls himself in the 
face of external influences. By referring to the role of practical wisdom (phronesis) in 
Aristotle, Thomas May (1994) derives a substantive notion of autonomy from the 
requirement that the individual moral agent should play “a significant role in formulating 
the content of her behavior”.121 Following May’s approach to autonomy, the virtue of 
autonomy can be understood as an individual’s disposition to decide and take action by 
referring to his own evaluative assessment over the external circumstances, rather than to 
let himself be carried away by the external influences, or conversely to despise the 
external circumstances as never relevant. This is very important, because only by 
exercising practical wisdom (phronesis) can the individual obtain happiness from the 
actions that the individual takes. On the other hand, respecting individuals as persons 
engaged in economic life, or as persons working together to obtain the good life, entails 
the requirement of respecting their autonomies. Thus, for example, a virtuous seller 
would not ‘intimidate’ the consumers by manipulating information through provocative 
                                                 
121 Thomas May, “The Concept of Autonomy”, American Philosophical Quarterly 31.2 (April 1994), pp. 
133-144, p. 141.  
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advertising in order for them to buy his products, but would rather let the consumers 
deliberate and make decisions themselves based on the true information. 
With regard to friendship and justice, Aristotle construes that the individuals who 
bind themselves in any kind of community require some form of friendship and justice in 
an equal extension, which is in other words to suggest that “the extent of their association 
is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between 
them”.122 Here, the word ‘friendship’ should be understood more broadly than mutual 
feelings between friends (in the modern English) for it refers to the Greek philia, a word 
that represents emotional attachments among those who share goods, identity, and 
activities, including the mutual concerns among family members, fellow-travelers, and 
even the exchangers of goods (buyers and sellers in business activities).123 As a virtue, 
the meaning of philia may resemble the term ‘care’ in the modern world. We can say that 
the virtue of friendship (care) is a disposition to give concerns, or to do anything good 
that we can do,124 to the individuals with whom we share goods, identity and activities, 
not for our own sake, but for their sakes. By contrast, the virtue of justice is a disposition 
to give them what is due, measured proportionally according to their merits. By 
exercising these two virtues to an equal extent, neither sacrifice nor exploitation from 
either side should exist. Friendship (care) promotes the caring practices that may ‘pull’ 
the individuals together in the community, while justice promotes the practices that may 
‘push’ the individuals to conform and sustain the standard of justice which naturally 
                                                 
122 NE (VIII.9.1159b.29-30, 1160a.6-8). 
123 Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian 
Political Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), p. 35-6. See also: 
W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, op. cit., p. 317, 321; John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship”, 
in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
California Press, 1980), pp. 301-40, p. 301-2. 
124 NE (VIII.14. 1163b.14-15). 
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emerges along with the establishment of the community.125 Friendship (care) and justice 
hold the individuals together, and are thus indispensable for the workings of the ideal 
community. 
The business community, in which exchange relations are usually associated with 
a process to seek mutual advantages, should also have some form of friendship and 
justice. In fact, Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship based on ‘the object of 
love’ that attracts and binds the individuals together, namely the good, the pleasant, and 
the useful.126 From these three kinds of friendship, one may easily come up with a charge 
that the typical friendship in the business community must be a useful-based 
friendship.127 But the useful-based friendship is obviously insufficient for a virtuous 
business. As I argued earlier, a virtuous business should refer to the good life as the 
ultimate end and, as a consequence, the individual agents in the business community 
should be essentially and primarily seen and treated as persons who have the need for the 
good life. Therefore, the proper kind of friendship for developing virtuous business 
should be the good (virtuous)-based friendship. To bring in the good-based friendship 
into a virtuous business, however, does not mean to neglect the other two objects of love. 
                                                 
125 In Bernard Yack’s words, “friendship…involves other-regarding actions we are ourselves disposed to 
perform, justice primarily concerns other-regarding actions that we are disposed to demand from others.” 
See: Bernard Yack, op. cit., p. 41.  Notice that, in Yack’s view, the exercise of friendship and justice is a 
kind of other-regarding action rather than a self-regarding action. 
126 NE (VIII.2.1155b.16-18). 
127 Arguing against Mary Catherine Sommers who identified and appraised the possibility that virtuous 
friendships may exist in some business relations, Daryl Koehn displays reasons as to why Aristotelian 
utility (useful) based friendship may remain the proper kind of friendship for business people to aspire to. 
Basically, Koehn argues that, as virtues are developed and exercised in utility relations, the utility based 
friendship can be the proper ground for gaining virtues, and hence should be ethically worthy. But Koehn 
seems to miss the point. I argue that if business is to be virtuous, the virtue-based friendship should be the 
kind of friendship that has to be implanted despite the fact that business deals with utility matters. See: 
Daryl Koehn, “Can and Should Business Be Friends with One Another and with Their Stakeholders”, 
Journal of Business Ethics 17 (1998), pp. 1755-63, p. 1758. 
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For the good-based friendship is aimed at the good, which is good without qualification, 
it should deliver pleasures and utilities.128  
With the good-based friendship, the virtuous seller would care about the effects of 
the products on the buyers and the effects of the production and selling process on the 
other parties. Rather than treat the competitors as the enemies, he would prefer to respect 
them as ‘partners’ in the race for providing the consumers with the needed quality 
products and services. He would use the shared standard of justice as the criterion in 
setting up the price of the products, in which the level of profit earned on top of the total 
cost justifies only the feasibility of taking up the risks and the true appreciation of the 
buyers in the values of the products. This does not mean that he would not be able to 
maximize profit. By exercising the virtue of friendship and keeping himself accountable 
for the use of the standard of justice, he may and ought to maximize profit through the 
maximization of the values appreciated voluntarily by the buyers. In other words, he may 
and ought to maximize profit by selling the best products, according to the right 
requirements of the buyers in the market niche that he chooses to fill, and producing the 
best services (and after-sales services) to complement the transaction.129 
It is important to note that the transaction between the seller and the buyer is not a 
kind of a simple dyadic market-transaction between two self-interested parties. It 
involves rather a triadic relation between the seller, the buyer and the ideal community 
from which the idea of realizing the ideal community comes into picture. The product 
                                                 
128 The good-based friendship may include the characteristics of the other two kinds of friendship. See: NE 
(VIII.3.1156b.13-19); W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, op. cit., p. 329-20. 
129 By ‘right requirement’, I mean the requirement of the presupposed virtuous buyers, not any requirement 
that is incompatible with the ideal state of the community of which the seller and the buyers are members. 
The value appreciated by the real buyers is expected to be objective with respect to the common goods of 
the community. If the product and the process of production are harmful to the third parties, the buyers 
should appreciate the product less.  
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being transacted is not only something that is desired by the buyer, but also a medium for 
both the seller and the buyer exercising virtuous actions. Moreover, the product itself is 
essentially a bundle of services, and these services should also be virtuous. Thus, the 
ultimate aim of the transaction, during and after the process, is the good life. The virtuous 
seller would always aspire to the ideal community in producing and selling the product, 
while the virtuous buyer would aspire to it in buying and consuming the product. In short, 
by exercising the virtue of autonomy, friendship, and justice, the virtuous seller can 
expect to fulfill material needs, obtain the good life, and contribute to actualizing the 
ideal community in which the other members are also engaged in the same pursuance of 
the good life. 
This Aristotelian approach to ethics in economic life puts a great deal of emphasis 
on the importance of the understandings that the individuals – taking any role in the 
economic activities – are and should be pursuing the good life as the ultimate end. The 
good life presupposes the ideal communities that are structured in a hierarchical manner, 
starting from the corporation, the market, and the larger whole community. Each ideal 
community works for its true purpose with the view of the good life as the ultimate end, 
which is in other words to say that the smaller communities should work hierarchically 
for the sake of the larger whole community because the good life can only be lived 
ideally in the context of the larger whole community. The corporation should be effective 
and efficient in producing the products that meet the requirement of the consumers in the 
market; the market should be efficient in using the resources to generate prosperity of the 
larger whole community; and the larger whole community should work as an ideal place 
for the individuals to develop virtues and to exercise virtuous actions. As such, business 
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is not an atomistic private activity that is concerned only with the interests of the 
particular parties (especially the shareholders), but a practice that is extensively 
concerned with the interests of the people in the larger whole community despite the fact 
that its operation remains private in nature.  
Since those who are working in the corporation are essentially and primarily the 
members of the larger whole community and the members of the market community, 
beside their status as the members of the corporate community, they share the 
responsibility for the performance of the corporation, the market and the larger whole 
community in addition to their responsibility for the performance of their own roles in the 
corporation. Through their performances in the corporation, they should contribute in 
some way to the good performances of the corporation, the market, and the larger whole 
community. In other words, the total contribution of those who are working in the 
corporation should make the corporation meet the demand of effectiveness and efficiency 
and the demand of ethics. And because both demands are satisfied, the issue of a 
stakeholder paradox and its theoretical complexities are dissolved in practical manner 
and, therefore, should never come up. The fiduciary and non-fiduciary relationships 
between the corporation and its stakeholders are transformed into unified purposeful 
relationships, in which all the stakeholders have their proper places and roles in the ideal 
communities but the goals associated with their roles are subordinated to the goal and 
purpose of the larger whole community. The responsibilities attributed to the corporations 
are practically followed and concluded, or in Robert C. Solomon’s words, “the 
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responsibilities that they [the corporations] bear are not products of argument or implicit 
contracts but are intrinsic to their very existence as social entities.”130  
However, the individual economic agent may not always find that the situation in 
actual communities is as close to the ideal as he or she presupposed. In the modern 
economic situation, the individual may find that friendship (care) is not reciprocated, the 
standard of justice is not satisfactorily respected and autonomy of individuals is not well 
preserved. In such a situation, nevertheless, the presupposed ideal communities should 
remain the reference to which the individual has to aspire in his or her ethical reflection 
and decision, because the good life can only make sense in the context of the ideal 
communities. The right decisions and actions, which are the constitutive parts of the good 
life, should be in a sense carrying a mission to transform the actual communities to the 
ideal communities. It is practical wisdom (phronesis) that enables the individual to 
deliberate such decisions and actions. Therefore, practical wisdom (phronesis) is the 
main virtue that the individual has to develop if he or she wishes to obtain the good life. 
As practical wisdom (phronesis) is an intellectual virtue that develops inseparably from 
the development of moral virtue, the individual should have also a moral virtue that 
disposes him to aspire to the ideal communities and take the right decisions and actions to 
realize them. This moral virtue is the other main virtue that the individual has to develop 
in parallel with practical wisdom (phronesis). I call this moral virtue the virtue of 
integrity. It is important to note, however, that integrity does not necessarily require the 
individuals to take supererogatory actions for the realization of the ideal communities. 
For the right actions are relative to the circumstances of the particular individual, the 
individuals who possess the virtue of integrity should consider their own capacity and 
                                                 
130 Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence, op. cit., p. 149. 
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capability in their actions. In short, it is sufficient to say that, by possessing the virtue of 
integrity, individuals would always try to perform well in their roles and make their good 
performances contribute in some way to the promotion of the ideal communities. Those 
who do not have an adequate capacity and capability to seek the transformational 
challenges would prefer to work for an ethical corporation, while those who have the 
adequate capacity and capability may be more excited to work for any corporation in 
which they can manage the possible transformation in the way to contribute to the 
promotion of the ideal corporation, the ideal market and the ideal larger whole 




THE VIRTUE OF INTEGRITY IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
 
 
Although integrity is not mentioned in the catalogue of virtues that Aristotle 
discussed in the Ethics,1 it can be seen as a virtue from the Aristotelian perspective. In 
this perspective, integrity is construed as a trait of character manifested in the disposition 
of those who possess it to take the right decisions and actions, with respect to their 
essential qualities as human beings. Based on the fact that, according to Aristotle, human 
beings are essentially rational and social, I will show that the virtue of integrity as thus 
construed can accommodate two familiar senses of integrity that I have described in 
Chapter 2, namely the wholeness of self and the morality of the person’s actions. The 
sense of the wholeness of self will explain the motivation as to why the person of 
integrity desires to take the right decisions and actions, whereas the sense of the morality 
of the person’s actions expresses itself in the rightness of the actions. In supporting this 
notion of integrity, I firstly develop an Aristotelian conception of the expanded self to 
capture the sense of social self that is implicitly expressed in the works of Aristotle.  
By exploring Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in which virtuous friends are 
supposed to be ‘other selves’ to each other, I will argue that the self should be, in a sense, 
an expanded self that grows larger beyond the body and the soul, or the natural boundary 
                                                 
1 For references, I will use the English version edited by W.D. Ross for this treatise. Aristotle, “Ethica 
Nicomachea”, The Works of Aristotle Volume IX, translated into English by W.D. Ross, edited by W.D. 
Ross, 1st edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1915). 
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of the self. Through a process of identification, the individual persons should in some 
way define themselves in terms of the communities of which they are members and in 
which friendship between them should thrive. In economic life, an employee whose aim 
is to obtain the good life should identify himself with the corporation he works for, the 
market community, and the larger whole community. Yet, the communities that the 
employee should identify himself with are not the actual communities to which he 
immediately belongs, but rather the communities of the ideal state in which friendship, 
justice and individual autonomy are truly respected and pursued. As the ideal 
communities are the constitutive parts of his expanded self, the employee (or generally 
the individual economic agent) is naturally motivated to take the right decisions and 
actions that would contribute to the realization of the ideal communities. His self-
realization will be appreciated in the light of a co-realization with the ideal communities. 
He is considered as a person of integrity because of the fact that he consistently takes the 
right decisions and actions that would contribute to the realization of the ideal 
communities and thereby express the sense of wholeness of his expanded-self. Because 
integrity produces the right decisions and actions, it is inextricably linked with phronesis; 
it carries a sense of the unity of the virtues, and is qualified as a master virtue. 
Interestingly, since the realization of the ideal communities is the main motive of 
the individual when taking the right decisions and actions, the integrity of the individual 
essentially involves the way the individual can contribute to realizing the integrity of the 
communities of which he is a member. This brings us to the idea of institutional integrity, 
e.g. corporate integrity and market integrity in the context of economic life. It implies 
that the integrity of the corporation and the integrity of the market depend largely on the 
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integrity of the individual members. In order to possess integrity, the corporation and the 
market should enable the individual members to develop and exercise virtues (the virtue 
of integrity) and thereby to obtain the good life. By appealing consistently to the good life 
as the ultimate end, I shall propose a view that integrity is a virtue that disposes the 
possessors to take the right decisions and actions that would promote the socially shared 
values and the realization of the ideal state of the communities of which they are 
members. The right decisions and actions that the possessors take do not undermine the 
particularities and uniqueness partially definitive of their identity, but rather should 
represent the best way to manage and express their own particularities and identity 




5.1 An Aristotelian Conception of the Expanded Self 
 
              The fact that every human being cannot stay clear from the identity question of 
‘who am I?’ may explain why several different conceptions of the self exist. It starts with 
the condition that, in order to know him/herself, a human being requires ‘information’, 
which can be discovered through self-reflection, perception and observation of objects, 
and communication with other human beings. Partly because there are many different 
forms of information – one may even contradict another – human beings are drawn to 
experience many different ‘selves’ and construct many different kinds of self-
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knowledge.2,3 One may claim that knowledge of the self depends on the context and that 
the self can be viewed in many different ways.4 However, notwithstanding many different 
kinds of self-knowledge, a conception of the self can be formed to help human beings 
comprehend the multiplicity of the self that they experience.5 In the conception of the 
self, a certain kind of self-knowledge is believed to be more fundamental than the others, 
in the sense that it can provide a basis for the explanation of the other kinds of self-
knowledge.6 As a result, several different conceptions of the self are possible, as many as 
can reasonably be considered as bases for explaining the various kinds of self-knowledge. 
With regard to the context of ethics in economic life, I am going to show that an 
Aristotelian conception of the expanded self can be very useful to clarify the matters 





                                                 
2 Ulric Neisser (1988) identifies five kinds of ‘selves’ or self-knowledge, namely the ecological self, the 
interpersonal self, the private self, the extended self, and the conceptual self. The ecological self is tied with 
the perception of the physical environment; the interpersonal self emerges from the communication and 
emotional linkage with other human beings; the private self refers to the conscious experience; the 
extended self appeals to the over-time consciousness that is cast in the memory and the anticipation 
associated with the future; and the conceptual self is drawn from the assumption and theories that would 
unify all the other selves. See: Ulric Neisser, “Five Kinds of Self-knowledge”, Philosophical Psychology 
1(1)(1988), pp. 35-59.   
3 Humans’ unique capacity for self-reflection seems to be particularly responsible for the dualism and 
multiplicity of the information that human beings receive, because the capacity involves the dual position 
of the self as subject and as object in the epistemic process and in every engagement of the self with other 
things. 
4 Richard Sorabji, “Soul and self in ancient philosophy”, in M. James C. Crabbe, ed., From Soul to Self 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 8-32, p. 15.  
5 Ulric Neisser (1988) refers to the conceptual self for the self that is drawn from a conception of the self.  
6 A conception of the self that places the private self at the center of the explanation typically treats the 
other kinds of self as derivatives, e.g. related to the private self by ownership or control. Another 
conception of the self that places an emphasis on the interpersonal self would consider the private self only 
as one of the several constitutive parts of the self, the recognition of which is only possible because there is 
interrelationship between the self and the other beings. 
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5.1.1 The Expanded Self in Aristotle’s Friendship 
 
            Although Aristotle did not explicitly show a philosophical investigation of the 
self, he consistently held a certain view of selfhood. When he said that for the virtuous 
man a friend is ‘another self’ (allos autos),7 he seemed to suggest a notion of the self that 
goes beyond the natural boundary of the self. Unfortunately, Aristotle did not elaborate 
what exactly another self means and how the self relates to that other self. Suzanne Stern-
Gillet (1995) points out that when Aristotle described virtuous friendship as other 
selfhood, he had been situated in a generally acceptable view that friendship (philia) 
could operate effectively to transcend the limitation induced by individual separateness 
and to facilitate a kind of psychic unity between individuals.8 If there is indeed a unity 
between individuals who befriend each other, however, a serious question may have to be 
anticipated as to how and to what extent friendship overrides individual separateness. The 
fact that friendship presupposes separate individuals who remain as separate individuals 
when they befriend each other, and that friendship sometimes involves appreciation of 
the distinctive and unique personalities of individuals, should suggest that the unity 
between friends must have some conditions. Considering that Aristotle’s description of 
allos autos is mostly associated with the relationship that involves the characteristics of a 
virtuous man in which “… if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for 
his friend is another self)”,9 I propose to devise a scheme of triadic relation that connects 
the virtuous man, a man (himself) and his friend (another self), in order to capture a 
                                                 
7 NE (IX.4.1166a.31; IX.9.1169b.7, 1170b.7) 
8 Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995), pp. 14-17. 
9 NE (IX.9.1170b.5-7), similarly NE (IX.4.1166a.30-31) 
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proper understanding of the relationship between the self and another self.10 Accordingly, 
the conditions under which the unity between friends prevails must refer to this triadic 
kind of relation. 
              I begin with the understanding that friendship is one of the characteristics that a 
good man must have. When two or more individuals proclaim they befriend each other, 
each envisages and expects that he himself and his friend(s) would behave as an ‘ideal’ 
person from whom the meaning of their friendship is supposed to derive. The ideal 
person is called ideal not in the sense that he may not be a real (concrete) person but 
rather in the sense that he represents the ideal attributes by virtue of which those 
individuals are friends to each other. Nor is the ideal person called ideal in the sense of a 
universalized ideal person that transcends all those individuals, but rather in the sense that 
each individual should know how to be a friend and behave ideally according to the 
standards that make them befriend each other, in which each individual may, to some 
extent, have to consider his own specificity and particularity.11 The best way to put it, I 
think, is that the ideal person is a representation of an ideal community of which each 
individual and his friend(s) are supposed to be members. If this ideal person is designated 
as a virtuous man,12 then we shall find a triadic relationship between the virtuous man, a 
man (himself) and his friend(s), or equivalently between the ideal community, a man 
(himself) and his friend(s). 
                                                 
10 Indeed, it seems difficult to clarify individual separateness in Aristotle’s friendship if we only use the 
dyadic relation (between a man and his friend) to interpret allos autos. 
11 In the friendship between husband and wife, the husband may have to behave with due consideration to 
the fact that he is a husband and a man, while the wife may have to behave with due consideration to the 
fact that she is a wife and a woman.   
12 A virtuous man (human) is a proper representation of the ideal human community. He is not a 
universalized ideal person that exists for any other individual human being to emulate, but rather a 
representation of attributes of a certain concrete man. A concrete man is said to be virtuous if he considers 
also his own specificity and particularity in his decisions and actions.  
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            When a man has the attributes of the ideal person (i.e. the virtuous man), the ideal 
community of which he and his friend(s) are members is in a sense a constitutive part of 
his self. As a consequence, in virtue of being essentially a member of the ideal 
community, his friend(s) is another self. He would envisage and expect that his friend(s) 
has the attributes of the ideal person too. Only because he himself and his friend(s) have 
the attributes of the ideal person does his friend(s) become another self. In other words, 
only because there is a friendship between him and his friend(s) is his friend(s) regarded 
as another self. This marks a tight triadic relationship between the self, another self, and 
the ideal community. The unity between friends is reflected in the ideal community; and 
the conditions of the unity are, therefore, the conditions of the ideal community. 
            As I have argued in the previous chapter, the ideal community is a community 
that should exist for its true purpose, a purpose that is hierarchically defined with the 
good life as the ultimate end. It should be clear that, for Aristotle, the (practical) good life 
can only be lived in the community. In order to bring about the good life, three social 
virtues have to be present in the ideal community, namely autonomy, friendship and 
justice. Autonomy brings up the capabilities of the individuals to pursue the good life, 
while friendship and justice maintain the vitality of the relationships that constitute the 
community. The need for the virtue of autonomy and justice may explain why in a true 
friendship each individual has to have both the disposition to remain self-directed while 
respecting his friends’ autonomy, and the disposition to do justice to them. Although 
friendship may initiate the association between individuals, justice is indispensable for 
finding the way to solve problems that emerge from individual differences and 
conflicting claims.  
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It is important to note that the good life is essentially each individual’s good life 
that should be achievable through the exercise of his/her particular capabilities. In the 
perspective of pursuing the good life, the individuality of each individual is neither 
eliminated nor derivable from the relationships and the unity between individuals.13 It is 
therefore appropriate to say that the unity between individuals (friends) in the ideal 
community is not simply cast from the relationship between individuals, but rather a 
result of each individual’s consistent endeavors to obtain the good life, by incorporating 
the ideal community into his/her sense of self. This suggests that, as the good life is to be 
obtained by incorporating the ideal community into the self, the self ought to expand its 
boundary beyond the natural boundary of the self. I will clarify first ‘the natural boundary 
of the self’, and then explain the process by which the boundary is to be expanded.  
 
 
5.1.2 The Boundary of the Self and the Search for the Unity of the Self 
 
The natural boundary of the self refers to what Aristotle seems to hold in the 
biological context, the sense of the self as the embodied person, in which the self is 
recognized neither as the body nor as the soul alone.14 In his work De Anima,15 Aristotle 
rejects the view that elevates the body to a prime position where the soul is predicated 
                                                 
13 For if it is simply derivable from the relationship and the unity between individuals, the particularity of 
each individual can only be explained and referred to in terms of the relationship and the unity, while any 
behavior deviating from those that maintain the existing relationship and the existing unity would be 
deemed impossible.   
14 Richard Sorabji, op. cit., p. 16. 
15 For references, I will use the English version edited by W.D. Ross for this treatise. Aristotle, “De 
Anima”, The Works of Aristotle Volume III, translated into English by J.A. Smith, edited by W.D. Ross, 1st 
edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931).  
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merely as a harmony between the constituents of the body.16 He also rejects as 
inappropriate speaking of the soul in terms of an agent of anger, fear, learning and 
thinking, because this overlooks the fact that mental activities involve some parts of the 
body.17 For Aristotle, the relation between the body and the soul is a relation between 
matter and form explained in terms of the relation between potentiality and actuality, in 
which the soul is described as “a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body 
having life potentially in it …and thus the soul is the actuality of a body as above 
characterized”.18 The soul is said to be the organizing power of a living body,19 a capacity 
that distinguishes living things from non-living things. Since according to hylomorphism 
(matter-formism) the form is inseparable from the matter,20 the soul is inseparable from 
the body. No dualism of body and soul is entertained in Aristotle. To speak of the soul is 
to speak of the form of a living body and the actuality of the potentialities of that living 
body.21 Although in the other part of De Anima Aristotle concedes that the active mind, 
as a specific part of the soul, is immortal and eternal,22 there is no indication that he 
posits the active mind as the central ‘commander’ over and above all human mental and 
                                                 
16 DA (I.4.407b.27-408a.34) 
17 DA (I.4.408a.34-408b.18): “Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as inexact as it would be to say 
that it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities 
or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul”.   
18 DA (II.1.412a.20-22) 
19 By taking an analogy with the eye, “as the pupil [material] plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so 
the soul [form] plus the body [material] constitutes the animal [the living things]”.  See: DA (II.1.413a.2-4). 
20 From the Greek words hule (matter) and morphe (form). The notion of matter and form is developed 
within the context of a theory of causation and explanation in which the ‘formal’ and the ‘material’ are said 
to describe two aspects of the same thing. To understand a knife, for example, we need to know the 
material from which the knife is made (the material aspect) and the form, structure and function of the knife 
(the formal aspect). 
21 Aristotle distinguishes two senses of actuality, corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge 
and the actual exercise of knowledge. Since the soul exists in both the sleeping and the waking states, 
similar to the case of the possession of knowledge, the soul is the actuality of the above characterized body 
in the first sense. See: DA (II.1.412a.23-7). 
22 DA (III.5.430a.23-24) 
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bodily operations.23 For Aristotle, though the operation of the active mind and the passive 
mind generates a stream of consciousness and self-awareness, the overall operation of the 
mind is seen as something inseparable from the sensory activities and the processes with 
which the numerous sensory activities are themselves organized and united.24 Perhaps the 
fairest way to interpret Aristotle is that insofar as we are thinking of a human-being in 
his/her worldly life, the soul and its mortal and immortal parts can only be properly 
understood in the worldly configuration, and hence they are subject to hylomorphism. 
The self in the worldly configuration is a unitary entity constituted of the body and the 
soul, viz. ‘I am actually this particular body and soul’.25 
However, the unity condition of the self is not naturally given but is rather an 
achievement, in particular because the human soul is constituted of some parts that may 
not function in the same direction or to the true end. The incontinent people, for example, 
are usually carried away by discordant attitudes, such as having appetites for some 
pleasant (but bad) things and rational desires for the good things.26 Such people can fall 
into frustration, a state in which they feel divided from themselves, as they hate and are 
hated for what they have chosen and done. The vicious people can also suffer a similar 
frustration, probably not because of discordant attitudes, but because of the fact that 
wickedness perverts and deceives them from the good life they wish to have. The unity 
                                                 
23 Suzanne Stern-Gillet, op. cit., p. 23. 
24 Referring to Aristotle’s statement that if we are perceiving (or understanding) we perceive (or 
understand) that we are perceiving (or understanding), while ‘being’ is perceiving and understanding, 
Suzanne Stern-Gillet (1995) infers that, for Aristotle, “self-awareness [perceiving or understanding that we 
are] is consequent upon a number of sensory activities; it neither precedes them nor is presupposed by 
them”. Ibid., p. 21. 
25 Since there is no dualism of body and soul, we may not need to be afraid of the separation of the soul 
from the body. We may speculate and believe that there is a life after death, but that is perhaps ‘the life of 
the active mind’, which is after all a different kind of life. The life of the active mind may be said to carry 
something from its integration with the other parts of the soul in the former worldly life. However, in any 
case, what matters now is how we deal with and explicate ourselves in terms of ‘who we are in this worldly 
life’, without which there is no ground for any speculative scenario. 
26 NE (IX.4.1166b.5-14) 
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condition of the self seems to involve the integration of the soul which the virtuous man 
is always committed to comply with in order to be one with himself, loving and friendly 
to himself.27 It is therefore reasonable to infer that the unity of the self can only manifest 
in a stable form if the self directs itself to the good life as the ultimate end. This requires 
two fundamental exercises. First, as the good life (happiness) consists only in the activity 
of the soul that expresses reason, the irrational part of the soul that can share a rational 
principle (the desiring element) should follow the right mark pinpointed by the rational 
part. Secondly, as the starting point from which the rational part of the soul draws the 
right mark is not available internally, the self should find the starting point externally 
through habituation of the irrational part of the soul according to the standards that exist 
or are to exist in the community. As a consequence, the right mark and the good life to 
which the unity of the self is to refer are, in some way, externally linked with the other 
individuals in the community. In other words, the unity of the self is discovered not 
through an inward turn (by looking within),28 but rather through an outward turn (by 
looking outward). The self is rather a result of social interactions than an independent 
self-contained entity. It is a moral self with a sense of achievement, and is rather an object 
of normative evaluation than purely and merely an object of descriptive conception.29 
                                                 
27 Suzanne Stern-Gillet (1995) identifies the conception of selfhood as integrated soul, as she claims that it 
appears in Aristotle’s Ethics. See:  Suzanne Stern-Gillet, op. cit., p. 25-30. The conception of the expanded 
self, as here developed, is partly an implication of the conception of selfhood as integrated soul. 
28 Charles Taylor (1989) describes in detail the historical ‘internalization’ movement to find a person’s 
standard that leads to the emergence of the disengaged (atomistic) self. According to Taylor, the search for 
the source of the unity of the self by looking within is first contemplated by Augustine (354-430) and 
completed later by Descartes (1596-1650). See: Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 127-158 (chapter 7 and 8). 
29 In recognizing Aristotle’s conception of selfhood as integrated soul, Suzanne Stern-Gillet (1995) argues 
that Aristotelian selfhood is an evaluative notion that differs from the modern descriptive conception of 
selfhood. The word ‘self’ itself connotes a sense of achievement. See: Suzanne Stern-Gillet, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Because the unity of the self is in some way related to the other individuals in the 
community, the boundary of the self is in a sense expanded, beyond the definitive 
boundary of the composite of body and soul, to include other individuals. This inclusion 
makes sense through the exercise of friendship, because friendship brings individuals 
together into a unity and, as I have earlier argued in reference to Aristotle, the unity 
between friends would prevail and be appropriately addressed only if each individual 
incorporates the ideal community, of which the other individuals are supposed to be 
members, into his/her sense of self. As thus construed, the unity of the self is achieved by 
presupposing the ideal community, in the sense that the good life to which the unity of 
the self is to refer is comprehensible only in the perspective of the way of realizing the 
ideal community. In other words, the expanded self that is demanded for achieving the 
unity of the self is a result of the expansion of the boundary of the self to include the ideal 
community that is going to be realized. The virtuous activities that are exercised for the 




5.1.3 On the Expansion of the Boundary of the Self 
  
Because the boundary of the self is expanded through the exercise of friendship, 
selfhood has to be understood in a social context. The characteristics of the expansion 
should then involve the process as to how one should socially develop the virtue of 
friendship. Since a friend is another self, one should provide a great deal of care for the 
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individuals whom one regards as his friends. While appreciating individual differences, 
one should take on his friends’ concerns, pleasures and pains as his concerns, pleasures 
and pains. The term ‘compassionate empathy’ may accurately represent what one should 
acquire in developing the virtue of friendship. However, with this compassionate 
empathy one certainly cannot place the concerns of his friends in a context other than his 
friends’ specificity and particularity, nor can one let himself be absorbed totally into what 
is claimed to be his friends’ specificity and particularity. One has to refer to the good life, 
directed towards the realization of the ideal community, in order for his compassionate 
empathy to be precious in developing the virtue of friendship.30  
Accordingly, with his compassionate empathy, one does not simply identify 
himself with his friends, but rather identifies himself with the ideal community of which 
he and his friends are projected to be members and through which his identification with 
his friends is implicated.31 While each one is identifying with the ideal community – 
implying the expansion of the boundary of the self – criticism, disagreements and 
different views between friends over what exactly the ideal community should consist of 
are allowed and even sometimes encouraged as part of the way through which friends see 
each other as ‘a mirror’ for self-introspection and self-refinement. No matter how 
different the views between friends might be, they should be able to bring them into a 
healthy   solution,  because   virtuous   friendship  should   make  one  another  good,  and 
                                                 
30 A Parent, for example, should not blindly fulfill every request of their child. Instead, they should provide 
an understanding of what their child should have, with regard to the good life everyone wishes to obtain.    
31 By identification, I simply mean an act of identifying through which something I identify myself with 
would, at least partly, define and explain who I am and why I make a certain response at a particular 
circumstance with respect to it. 
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obtaining the good life is the end that friends should share.32 The fact that different views 
of the ideal community are possible and can always be brought into a healthy solution is a 
consequence of the process of identification in which one is, in a sense, neither merging 
himself into the ideal community nor appropriating the ideal community and attaching it 
to himself, but rather, with reference to the good life, positing the ideal community as a 
constitutive part of his self.  
The Aristotelian conception of the expanded self, and the associated process of 
identification through friendship, stands in contrast to the conception of the expanded-self 
generally articulated in the philosophy of deep-ecology (Ecosophy-T in particular). In his 
Ecosophy-T, Arne Naess (1993) argues for a way of improving the human relationship 
with nature, by proposing a process of identification that results in the expansion of the 
self towards unity with the universal Self (written with capital S), the supreme whole that 
corresponds to the Hindu Atman.33 Naess defines identification as “a spontaneous, non-
rational, but not irrational, process through which the interest or interests of another 
being are reacted to as our own interest or interests”.34 By identifying with all beings in 
nature, following Naess, the mature human being would cross all the boundaries and 
experience a ‘Self-realization’ in which all beings, despite diversities, are interrelated and 
 
                                                 
32 Moreover, if there is a further conflicting claim, it should be settled on the basis of the standard of justice 
that the members of the community develop along with the establishment of the community. It is why, for 
Aristotle, friendship and justice should exist in an equal extension between the same individuals. See: NE 
(VIII.9.1159b.29-30, 1160a.6-8). 
33 Arne Naess, “Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes”, in Peter List, ed., Radical 
Environmentalism (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1993), pp. 24-38, p.30.  
34 Ibid., p. 29. 
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interdependent, and thus are one (‘oneness in diversity’).35 It is obvious that Naess’s 
expansion of the self requires individuals to merge their selves into the Self, or to lose 
their selves and gain the universal Self;36 though, as Naess believes, they do not 
necessarily become indistinguishable ontologically or unable to distinguish their 
interests.37 When Self-realization is experienced, individuals belong to the Self and have 
no sovereignty over themselves, a state corresponding to what Warwick Fox calls the 
‘cosmologically based identification’ in which individuals and all other entities are 
realized merely as aspects of a single unfolding reality.38 As a result, Naess’s expansion 
of the self gives no room for the individuals to have different views over the Self or over 
the single unfolding reality from which the state of oneness is drawn. By contrast, 
individuals in the Aristotelian conception of the expanded self have sovereignty to access 
and decide the ideal community they would take as the constitutive part of their selves, 
because the state of oneness of the self depends not only on their external relationship 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 28. A similar way of expanding the self can be found in the classical Chinese philosophy, Chu 
Hsi’s metaphysics and the metaphysic of the Ming thinkers. See: Irene Bloom, “On the Matter of the Mind: 
The Metaphysical Basis of the Expanded Self”, in Donald J. Munro, ed., Individualism and Holism: Studies 
in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The Univ. of Michigan, 1985), pp. 
293-327, p. 316-7.   
36 Ibid., p. 30. 
37 Ecofeminist Val Plumwood criticizes Arne Naess’s expansion of the self as problematic because it makes 
the individual unable to recognize the distinctness and independence of the others [See: Val Plumwood, 
“Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critiques of Rationalism”, in 
Robert E. Goodin, ed., The Politics of the Environment (Aldershot, Hants-England and Brookfield, Vt.-
USA: E. Elgar, 1994), pp. 3-27, p. 15]. In his brief paper, Christian Diehm shows that Arne Naess does not 
seem to subscribe the indistinguishability thesis that Val Plumwood claims [See: Christian Diehm, “The 
Self of Stars and Stone: Ecofeminism, Deep Ecology, and the Ecological Self”, The Trumpeter 
19(3)(2003), pp. 31-45,  http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v19.3/Diehm.pdf].       
38 Warwick Fox classifies three kinds of identification, namely, personally based identification, 
ontologically based identification and cosmologically based identification. The first identification refers to 
experiences of commonality based on personal involvement with other entities; the second one is based on 
the deep-seated realization of the fact that things are; and the third one is based on the deep-seated 
realization that all entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality. See: Warwick Fox, Towards a 
Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 1990), pp.  249-258. 
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and interaction, but also on how they manage the internal relations between the parts of 
the self that they would take.39 
The Aristotelian conception of the expanded self, and the associated process of 
identification through friendship, stands also in contrast to the conception of the 
extended-self usually exploited in the study of consumer behavior. Russell W. Belk 
(2001) explores the sense of the extended self in terms of how people are inclined to 
define themselves by things they essentially have (body, ideas and experiences) and 
things to which they usually feel attached (persons, places and physical objects).40 By 
referring to Sartre, Belk argues that the extension of the self can take place through three 
primary ways, namely, appropriating or controlling things, creating things, and knowing 
things.41 In fact, Sartre in his Being and Nothingness reduces all those three ways (plus 
the activity of playing) into an act of ‘appropriation’ in which the desire to have is clearly 
expressed and satisfied.42 Because for Sartre the desire to be is practically inseparable 
from the desire to have,43 the appropriation can express all the desires to be in and 
through the world. The appropriation synthesizes the possessor and the possessed object 
and unites them with an internal-ontological bond in which the possessed object is said to 
                                                 
39 One may argue that there must be ‘a self’ prior to any assessment and decision. However, it has to be 
understood that, in the Aristotelian framework, such a self is rather an inchoate self than a perfectly formed 
self that the unity of the self must refer to. 
40 Russell W. Belk, “Possessions and the Extended Self”, Journal of Consumer Research 15 (September, 
1988), pp. 139-168, p. 141. 
41 Ibid., p. 150. 
42 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, translated by Hazel 
E. Barnes (London: Methuen & Co, 1957), pp. 575-585. 
43 Consciousness is consciousness of something. In Sartre’s view, human consciousness first exists as a 
desire or lack (nothingness); and thus it always desires for things that exist outside it. Accordingly, human 
consciousness exists for itself (pour-soi) while any thing that exists outside human consciousness exists in 
itself (en-soi). Sartre identifies three categories of desire, namely, the desire to do, the desire to have and 
the desire to be (Ibid., p. 576). The desire to do (=make) generates a relation that can be immediately 
reducible to having; therefore, the desire to be and the desire to have are simply the only two desires 
representing human existence. Since both desires aim at the for-itself, viz. the desire to be aims at it directly 
while the desire to have aims at it through the world, the desire to be and the desire to have are separable 
only in analysis but not in reality (Ibid., p. 598-9). 
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reach in its being because it carries a special quality of ‘being possessed’ by the possessor 
or belonging to the possessor. Accordingly, the identification through appropriation is 
such that the totality of the possessor’s possessions reflects the totality of the possessor’s 
being, viz. ‘I am what I have’.44 Moreover, the appropriation may extend further to 
include symbolically the background of the world against which the possessed objects 
emerge; therefore, being-in-the-world could mean a project of possessing the world.45 
Since the project of possessing the world comes purely out of the individual’s subjective 
choice, the consistency and the oneness of the extended self remain at the discretion of 
the respective individual. Each individual has full sovereignty to choose the contents of 
the project. Conflicts between individuals are highly possible and yet there is no inherent 
measure that can function as a reference for resolving the conflicts. This marks a contrast 
with the Aristotelian conception of the expanded self, since the community and the world 
in the Aristotelian conception are not treated merely as a background or things to be 
possessed, but rather are regarded as having an active role that contributes in some way to 
bringing the individual into the right decisions and actions and to the state of oneness of 
the self. 
Thus, in the Aristotelian perspective, the expansion of the self cannot be correctly 
formulated in terms of an expectation that one should simply have ‘a sense of belonging 
to the community’ where one lives, nor can it be formulated in terms of a suggestion that 
one should have ‘a sense of owning the community’ similar to the sense that one owns 
one’s own body. The former tends to repress individual autonomy, whereas the latter 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 591. 
45 Ibid., p. 598. 
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tends to eliminate the active role of the community in favor of individual self-interests.46 
The expansion of the self should rather be formulated in terms of projecting the ideal 
state of the community where one lives into one’s sense of self, or constituting one’s self 
with the ideal community. The projection is the mode with which one identifies oneself 
with the ideal community and it is made effective by the exercise of friendship, expressed 
in one’s compassionate empathy towards other members of the community. If a line can 
be drawn between one’s self and the ideal community, the constitutive relation in-
between would be a kind of internal relation in which one’s self can only be fully realized 
if one’s decisions and actions are in some way contributing to the realization or the 
prospective realization of the ideal state of the community. Such a relation demands a co-
realization of the individual’s self and the ideal community, neither only the realization of 
the individual’s self nor only the realization of the ideal community. From the 
Aristotelian perspective, the individual self-realization is to be appreciated only in the 
light of this co-realization. 
For the fact that one is a member of several communities, as it is generally true 
for most of us who live in the modern world, one may have to identify oneself with the 
ideal state of all the communities of which one is a member, in order to achieve the state 
of oneness of the self. As human interaction or the system of human interaction goes 
wider, the-expansion-of-the-self requires one to identify with as many ideal communities 
                                                 
46 When the former president of Indonesia Soeharto was still in power in the 1990s, he often promoted 
nationalistic solidarity, by suggesting that Indonesian people should have ‘a sense of belonging to the 
country’. On another occasion, he expected the people to share a feeling of care and responsibility (melu 
hangrungkebi) for the future of the land, by suggesting that they should have ‘a sense of owning the 
country’ (melu handarbeni). His suggestion of ‘belonging to the country’ ended up with the practices of 
suppressing criticism of his corrupt government, while his suggestion of ‘owning the country’ likely gave 
legitimacy to the practices of corruption, as the corruptors think that they can take anything what they want 
because they contribute in owning the land. Soeharto seemed to overlook the need to consistently 
implement the last sentence of the old tenet, which he liked to refer to, that says roughly that we have to 
regard with care the autonomy of individuals (tut wuri handayani). 
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as one is directly and indirectly getting involved with them, starting from the small 
community from which one directly gets a specific role, to the larger community where 
the small community is a member and holding a role in it. The largest community that 
one should identify oneself with is the community that one would conceive of as an ideal 
human community, a community where the human demand for happiness will be fully 
appreciated and human rational capacity will be sensibly, best extended.47 In the context 
of economic life, for example, an employee should identify himself with the corporation 
he works for, the market community and the larger whole community. He should project 
the ideal state of these communities into his sense of self, constituting them as parts of his 
self.48 His self-realization would then include his best contribution to the realization of 
these communities while the moral-motivational aspect of his actions would have been 
cast already in his sense of self. 
 
 
5.1.4 The Individual Autonomy and the Inchoateness of the Self 
 
It is worth noting that the employee may change his role in the corporation or 
decide to move to another corporation that operates in a different market community, but 
he cannot get away from the larger whole community or the human community. His 
                                                 
47 Market community is not the candidate for the largest community, because human demand for happiness 
is not fully appreciated. A community with a certain culture, where its members trade the goods with other 
people outside it, is also not the candidate for the largest community, because, by excluding the trade 
partners for a reason that they are not members of the community’s culture, the members of the community 
hamper the possibility for the best extension of human rational capacity. 
48 Notice that this projection takes the opposite direction as compared to the projection that Kenneth E. 
Goodpaster and John B. Matthews suggest from the individual persons to the corporation (discussed in 
chapter 3). See: Kenneth Goodpaster and John B. Matthews, Jr., “Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?”, 
Harvard Business Review (Jan/Feb. 1982), reprinted in Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, ed., 
Ethical Theory and Business, 3rd edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 76-86.   
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membership of the larger whole community or the human community is, therefore, rather 
of necessity. His membership in, and the expansion of the boundary of his self up to, the 
larger whole community or the human community would constrain him to live with 
moral requirements wherever he is working or being engaged in the market. The fact that 
he has the autonomy to make a change of his membership and even to contribute to 
modify the standards of order in the business community (the corporation and the market) 
is an indication that the business community is in itself dynamic.  
The dynamism of the business community in the environment of moral 
requirements is a critical consequence of the way the self is to be constituted, in which, 
following the fact that one is able to transcend the existing community, one is able not 
only to evaluate decisions and actions by referring to the standards of order provided by 
the community, but also to evaluate those standards by referring to the standards of the 
larger community, or the standards that one thinks to be objectively provable for the ideal 
community. In other words, the dynamism exists because, when constituting the 
community as part of one’s self, one identifies oneself with, not the barely-existing 
community, but the community in its ideal state. After all, the origin of the dynamism is 
the ability of human beings to transcend their actual communities. By the term 
‘transcend’, I shall not mean that, when one is able to transcend his actual community, he 
must have a priori knowledge of his self, independent of his experience with the 
community; but rather, I mean that he has the ability to make a kind of distance from the 
community from which he can analyze and criticize the relationships which bind him 
with the others in the community. Though it is likely that the larger the community the 
lesser is the transcending ability, the sustaining expansion of the boundary of the self and, 
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correspondingly, the everlasting expansion of human interaction would always secure 
this ability. Thus, the fact that human beings have the transcending ability does not mean 
that the self must have been given as finished and complete – created ex-nihilo – prior to 
or apart from the community. Rather, it means that there is an element that makes the 
transcending ability constitutive of what we may call ‘an inchoate-self’ that seeks 
completeness through expansion of its boundary.              
By acknowledging the self as an inchoate-self that seeks to become a complete 
self through expansion of its boundary, we can secure the transcending ability of a human 
being, and correspondingly the autonomy of the individual as the essential aspects of the 
self, without necessarily asserting the view that the self is completely created ex-nihilo 
apart from the community. Indeed, securing these aspects of the self is not 
unprecedented, for these aspects have been strongly scrutinized in the communitarian 
critiques of the atomistic modern-self and, then, regarded as either difficult to be retained, 
or else as simply submerged in the communitarian conception of the self.49  
Charles Taylor (1989), for example, criticizes the modern view of the 
‘disengaged’ self, because it alienates human beings from their community and deprives 
them of the capacity for self-understanding.50 In order to know oneself, Taylor (1976, 
1985, 1989) argues, one has to be engaged in the larger order of meanings available in the 
community so that one has a moral horizon or framework within which one gets the 
ability to make a ‘strong evaluation’ of one’s own desires, inclinations, or choices, based 
                                                 
49 Jack Crittenden (1992) points out this problem; and then he proposes the theory of the self as a two-track 
system in which, following the hierarchy of self-development examined in the developmental psychology, 
personal identity is ultimately construed as a compound constituted by individual autonomy (agency) and 
constitutive relationships (self-concept). See: Jack Crittenden, Beyond Individualism: Reconstituting the 
Liberal Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 13-37.  
50 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, op. cit. 
 154
on the standards of the goods provided by the community.51 As the strong evaluation is 
central to one’s identity, to remove the ability to make it would leave one with no 
identity. But Taylor seems to face a practical difficulty as to how we should retrieve the 
larger order of meanings while retaining the individual autonomy that we have already 
had from the disengaging process of modernity,52 because the larger order of meanings 
may have disappeared after being intensely scrutinized under the power of individual 
autonomy.  
Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) takes a more straightforward approach than Taylor.53 
MacIntyre criticizes modernity that, through the rejection of teleology, progressively 
separates the self from the community. In order to preserve the self from being 
fragmented and vulnerable, he proposes to reinstate a social teleology under which the 
individual’s narrative unity, constitutive of the individual’s identity, is understood in 
terms of the standards, values and ends internal to the roles and practices that the 
individual takes within the community. As a consequence, the autonomy of the individual 
over himself is limited by the community, and cannot go beyond the line that the 
community or the tradition has already set. For MacIntyre (1988), individuals can only 
reflect and amend their selves from within the tradition.54 And because, according to 
MacIntyre, the social world is composed exclusively of rival traditions, individuals 
cannot expect to amend their selves from interaction with other traditions.  
                                                 
51 Charles Taylor, “Responsibility for Self”, in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 281-99, p. 282; Charles Taylor, “The Person”, in 
Michael Carrithers, S. Collins and S. Lukes, eds., The Category of the Person: anthropology, philosophy, 
history (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 257-81, p. 266;  Charles 
Taylor, Sources of the Self, op. cit. p. 20. 
52 The only way that Taylor suggests is that “we need new languages of personal resonance to make critical 
human goods alive for us again”. See: Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, op. cit. p. 513. 
53 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory, 2nd edition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 31-4, pp. 196-7, pp. 204-225.   
54 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), pp. 326-348.  
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In posing the limit of the autonomy of the individual over himself, Michael 
Sandel (1982) is much stricter than Taylor and MacIntyre.55 Sandel argues against John 
Rawls’s theory of the self as a subject of possession, in which the self is regarded as 
existing prior to any end that the self has.56 Sandel contends rather that the identity of the 
self is constituted by the ends or some ends that must have been existing in the 
community already before it.57 Since, for Sandel, the communal ends are the constitutive 
attachments that cannot stand apart from the self,58 the ends cannot be put as objects for 
the self to reflect on, choose or amend. As a consequence, arguably, no autonomy is 
granted to the self over itself.  
The practical difficulty and the strict limitation in maintaining individual 
autonomy in the community do not arise if the self is conceptualized as an inchoate-self 
seeking completeness through expansion of its boundary, because the self is to be found 
neither by positing the individual vis a vis the community and operating a mechanism of 
attachment (possession) such as that construed by Sandel, nor by projecting the 
individual into the community as construed by Taylor and MacIntyre, but rather by 
projecting the ideal community into the individual. Accordingly, the individual can 
reflect on, choose and contribute to amend any end of the community, as he has the 
transcending ability constitutive of his inchoate self. When he reflects on, he does not 
need to stand outside, apart from the community, because the community is in a sense the 
                                                 
55 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
56 Ibid., pp. 54-8. For Rawls, the self has to be construed in a voluntarist sense, “in which the self is related 
to its ends [only] as a willing subject to the objects of choice” (p.58). 
57 Ibid., p. 58-9, 179. For Sandel, the self has to be construed in a cognitive sense, in which “the subject 
achieves self-command not by choosing [the end] that which is already given (this would be unintelligible) 
but by reflecting on itself and inquiring into its constituent nature, discerning its laws and imperatives, and 
acknowledging its purposes as its own” (p.58).     
58 Ibid., p. 182. 
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constitutive part of his self. Standing within the community and projecting it into his self 
does not make himself limited with regard to his autonomy over his self, because it is not 
the existing community but rather the community in its ideal state that is to be projected. 
The autonomy of the individual may be limited, but not simply by the fact that the 
individual is a member of the community; rather, it is limited in virtue of the fact that the 
individual should aim at the good life and, for that aim, he should expand the boundary of 
his self by projecting the community in its ideal state into his sense of self. The individual 




5.1.5 The Inclusion of Future Generations 
 
To speak of the realization of the ideal state of the community, however, is to 
speak of the community within a comprehensible time frame. For the case of the larger 
whole community or the human community, we may be curious as to whether we have to 
include future generations. Masaya Kobayashi (1999) identifies three obstacles to any 
conception that includes consideration of future generations; namely, (1) the fact that 
future generations do not exist yet (non-existence); (2) uncertainty about what will be 
faced and preferred by the future generations (indeterminacy); and (3) the present 
generation  has  power  and  resources to influence the life of the future generations while 
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the future generations have no power to influence the present generation (asymmetry).59  
In short, I would argue that the conception of the expanded self, here developed, 
can and should take the life of future generations into consideration, because we know 
that we are the present generation that exists because of previous generations, and we are 
the source of the existence of future generations. Although we belong to the present state 
of the community, we should understand that between the past, the present and the future 
states there is a continuity that cannot be easily broken for the purpose of segregating our 
valuation and concerns.60 The community will not exist only up to the death of some 
individuals within it, but will exist over generations. Therefore when we project the ideal 
state of the larger whole community into our sense of self, we should consider that the 
ideal state will be of the future and be carried forward to the future. Accordingly, we 
should treat the ideal state of future generations as part of our selves, and our concerns 
for them should contribute to the definition of the kind of persons we are.61  
With regard to the natural environment, for example, our consideration of the 
ideal state of the future should mean partly that we will not exploit the natural 
environment in a way that would undermine the autonomy of future generations to pursue 
their own happiness. Hence, the first obstacle (non-existence) that Kobayashi is 
                                                 
59 Masaya Kobayashi, “Atomistic Self and Future Generations: A Critical Review from an Eastern 
Perspective”, in Tae-Chang Kim and Ross Harrison, ed., Self and Future Generations: an intercultural 
conversation (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1999), pp. 7-61, p. 15. Kobayashi argues that the 
contractual theory and the classical universal utilitarianism cannot overcome these three obstacles. The 
non-existence and the asymmetry are the major obstacles to the contractual theory while the indeterminacy 
is the obstacle to the classical utilitarianism.      
60 John O’Neill (1999) argues for the case of a person’s life, and similarly for the case of the community, 
that the evaluation of a certain episode cannot be made independently of the other episodes. The value of a 
certain episode can only be made plausible in the context of a larger narrative order. See: John O’Neill, 
“Self, Time and Separability”, in Tae-Chang Kim and Ross Harrison, ed., ibid., pp. 91-106, p. 96, 103.   
61 This is a kind of metaphysical picture that Ross Harrison (1999) envisages, i.e. an alternative strategy 
that deals with the metaphysics of the self to provide self-interested reasons for a concern for future 
generations. See: Ross Harrison, “My Interest in Future Generations”, in Tae-Chang Kim and Ross 
Harrison, ed., ibid., pp. 82-90, p. 84. 
 158
concerned with is comfortably overcome, for though future generations have not yet 
existed, their ideal state is considered as part of the self. Moreover, since the ideal state of 
future generations is part of the self, they in a sense have power to influence the people of 
the present generation; therefore, the third obstacle (the asymmetry of power) should 
have been taken care of. And by considering the autonomy of future generations, the 
second obstacle (indeterminacy) should have been prudentially considered in the right 
decision and actions, the precision of which, following Aristotle, cannot be expected to 
be more certain than what the nature of ethics admits of.62 
If, in the expansion of the boundary of his self, the economic individual identifies 
himself subsequently with the ideal state of the corporation, the market community and 
the larger whole community, and drives himself into a co-realization with the ideal state 
of these communities, the remaining problem is how he should coordinate all the parts of 
his self such that the sense of wholeness is maintained and reflected in the right decision 
and actions that he takes or towards which he contributes. This problem is the problem of 
individual integrity, which I will discuss in the following section.  
 
 
5.2 Individual Integrity 
 
           The first step to understand the integrity of the individual person is by thinking of 
the conditions in which the individual is really someone to whom we can refer as ‘a 
single one’, a single identity, despite the variety of life-contexts he lives in. Like the 
integrity of a bottle that proves to be true when the bottle remains as a bottle of a certain 
                                                 
62 NE (I.3-1094b.12-25) 
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kind despite being placed in various environmental conditions, the integrity of the 
individual person is also retained when in the various life-contexts he consistently 
exposes behaviors that reflect the kind of person he is. It is therefore mistaken, for 
example, to ascribe integrity to the individual who says that he believes in morality and 
yet he does not care about moral matters when he is engaged in economic life. For a 
person of integrity, the life in the economy and the life outside it are not two lives in 
different worlds, with completely different rules of engagement and ultimate ends. For if 
he regards them as two different lives in two different worlds, he basically surrenders 
himself to external influences and changes himself into a different kind of being, 
depending on the life-context he lives in. A person of integrity would regard his life in 
multiple contexts as one stream of life aimed at a single ultimate end, which, from the 
Aristotelian perspective, is the good life lived in the community. When he is engaged in 
economic life, a person of integrity would treat business as an action – or a practice in 
MacIntyre’s term – and turn it into a virtuous action, for the good life consists of virtuous 
actions. For him, business is inseparable from ethics, because business and all other 
activities prevail in the same world and can provide him with a way to obtain the good 
life. Since every domain of life is directed towards obtaining the good life, the integrity 
of the individual person has, from the Aristotelian perspective, an inextricable moral 
dimension. 
           The second step to understand the integrity of the individual person is by thinking 
about the process through which the individual comes to maintain the kind of person he 
is. Learning from the integrity of a thing like a piece of bottle that remains as a bottle in 
the various environmental conditions because the process of interactions between its 
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constitutive molecules is such that it can balance the deforming external forces that 
consistently act upon it,63 I argue that the integrity of the individual person depends also 
upon the process through which the individual coordinates what constitutes his self in a 
manner that would maintain his own behaviors as expressing the kind of person he is. 
The difference between an individual human being and a piece of bottle is clear; only an 
individual human being has to a certain extent the capacity to choose what constitutes his 
self, conceptualize his self, and decide the actions to express it.64 But whatever the 
conception of the self the individual person ascribes to, it has to offer an answer to the 
question as to what it is to be a human being. The Aristotelian conception of the 
expanded self, which I have developed in the previous section, will provide the answer, 
as it is basically built on the premise that to be a human being is to aim at a telos that 
represents the peculiar characteristics of a human being as a rational and social being, 
namely, happiness or the good life lived in the community. From the Aristotelian 
perspective, the self is an inchoate self that, in seeking completeness and unity, expands 
its boundary. By identifying itself with the ideal states of the communities of which it is a 
member, the self defines itself in terms of the ideal communities and realizes itself only 
in the perspective of co-realization with the ideal communities. The self directs itself to 
the good life, as the purposes of the ideal communities are hierarchically defined with 
                                                 
63 This is, of course, a simplified Newtonian interpretation (Newton’s first law of motion) to explain the 
process as to how the integrity of a thing is maintained. The real process can be more complex than the 
Newtonian physical process, especially when there are chemical processes or biological processes involved 
in it. Notwithstanding the complexities of the process, however, it is the capacity of the internal process to 
maintain ‘a thing as it is’ that remains to be the focus when we talk about the integrity of a thing. 
64 With respect to the ability of a human being to construct and conceptualize his own self, I remember the 
words of Eco-philosopher Joanna Macy (1991) that “The self is [just] the metaphoric construct of identity 
and agency, the hypothetical piece of turf on which we construct our strategies for survival, the notion 
around which we focus our instincts for self-preservation, our needs for self-approval, and the boundaries 
of our self-interest”. See: Joanna Macy, World as Lover, World as Self (Berkeley, California: Parallax 
Press, 1991), p. 183, 189.   
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respect to the good life as the ultimate end. In the context of economic life, for example, 
the self identifies itself subsequently with the ideal state of the corporation, the market 
community and the larger whole community. For as the good life is realized within the 
framework of the larger whole community, while the market and the corporate 
communities are members of the larger whole community, the completeness and unity of 
the self can only be manifested if the self takes the right decisions and actions that are 
aimed at a co-realization of the ideal state of all these communities. Accordingly, not 
only do the right decisions and actions express the self and constitute the good life that 
the self aims at, but also, and first of all, bring about the wholeness and unity of the self. 
Thus, we can say that the integrity of the individual person has very much to do with the 
process by which the individual comes to the right decisions and actions, and carries with 
the right decisions and actions a sense of the wholeness of self. 
           In sum, a person of integrity should meet the conditions of those two steps of 
understanding. The first step is concerned with the external conditions, which are 
relatively observable and highly related to the morality of actions and, therefore, are 
usually used as criteria for the ascription of integrity. The second step is concerned with 
the internal condition, which is existential in nature, as it is related to the wholeness of 
self. By keeping the direction of his life to the good life, through expanding the boundary 
of his self to include the ideal communities and consistently taking up the right decisions 
and actions, a person of integrity deserves moral praise and has a wholeness of his 
existence as a human being. The morality of his actions is expressed in the rightness of 
the actions, because the right actions that he takes are aimed at the realization of the ideal 
state of the communities, in which the other persons who are the members of the 
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communities can obtain the goods arising from the actions. The wholeness of his self is 
manifested when he takes the right decisions and actions, because all the ideal 
communities constitutive of his self are, in the perspective, to be co-realized by the 
actions. Thus, from the Aristotelian perspective, the term ‘integrity’ when applied to a 
person consists of two connotations, ethical and existential, the morality of the person’s 
actions and the wholeness of the person’s self. Since both connotations emerge as a result 
of taking up the right decisions and actions, personal integrity (the integrity of a person) 
is associated with the person’s capacity to take the right decisions and actions.65 
 
 
5.2.1 On the Right Actions as the Ground of Integrity 
 
           By appealing to the right actions as the ground for understanding integrity, I stand 
in contrast to the concept of integrity that is offered by Stan van Hooft (1995) who seeks 
a recourse to an Aristotelian conception of ethics to defend the moral meaning of 
integrity but, on the other hand, appeals to what he claims to be the most internal and 
primordial level of the self in clarifying the notion of integrity.66 Van Hooft argues 
against those who regard integrity as something external to the self or something like an 
object of a self-conscious project that elicits a duty of a special kind. He suggests that 
integrity must be understood as something internal to the self whose origin cannot be an 
object of any reflection. According to van Hooft, the origin of the self is the most 
primordial and least articulate level of the self, an inchoate self that is concerned only to 
                                                 
65 As a consequence, there is no essential difference between personal integrity and moral integrity. The 
quest for personal integrity is the same as the quest for moral integrity. 
66 Stan van Hooft, “Integrity and the Inchoate Self”, Philosophy Today 39 (Fall 1995), pp. 245-62.  
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constitute its identity and its significant world, through what he calls ‘primordial 
caring’.67 Following Heidegger, van Hooft contends that primordial caring is pre-
reflexive and non-intentional; its function is to integrate ‘the elements of our existence’ 
and constitute them as ‘our active identities in the world’.68 Integrity is then defined as a 
telos of our existence, a feature of our identities to the extent that the function of our 
primordial caring is just completed. For primordial caring is a pre-reflexive mode of 
being, we can neither will integrity nor evaluate the deepest content of our identity that is 
obtained from the culture we are living in and integrated by our primordial caring. With 
regard to the moral meaning of integrity, van Hooft argues that the moral meaning must 
derive from and depend on the existential meaning, for, if we accept an Aristotelian 
conception of ethics, we must accept that we are human beings who have a telos as 
human beings and cannot will ‘not to live a human life’.69  
But van Hooft’s concept of integrity clearly delimits the human capacity for self-
reflection, as he believes that we cannot totally evaluate our own identity. This 
shortcoming, I think, is a consequence of his attempt to find the basis of the unity of the 
self by looking within (inward turn). However, as I have argued earlier, if we consistently 
follow Aristotle’s framework, we should discover the unity of the self, not through 
inward turn, but rather through outward turn, by looking to the good life, constituted of 
the right actions, as the ultimate end. We should be able to reflect and evaluate our own 
identity, because we have the transcending ability and we always can secure our 
                                                 
67 Ibid., p. 255. Borrowing the term ‘primordial caring’ from Heidegger, Stan van Hooft explains that, with 
the functioning of our primordial caring, we constitute both, at the very same time, a world as already 
meaningful for us and our own identities. In this sense, “the state of my being is [always] a correlate of my 
world”. Notice that, for van Hooft, an inchoate self can be described as an unformed-self that exists along 
with the functioning of the primordial caring, while my notion of the same term consists in a state in which 
the self is in the process of becoming, as it is still incomplete and its constituents have yet come into unity. 
68 Ibid., p. 256. 
69 Ibid., p. 258. 
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transcending ability through the dynamism of the sustaining expansion of the boundary of 
the selves on our way to finding the good life. The right actions constitutive of the good 
life should become the reference from which the unity of the self and the existential and 
moral meanings of integrity are derived. With respect to the existential meaning, it is 
indeed true that our decisions and actions generally show ‘who we actually are’ as 
particular human beings. 
           As integrity is concerned with the right decisions and actions, it is inextricably 
linked with the intellectual virtue phronesis. Interestingly, in his later essay, Stan van 
Hooft (2001) asserts this link.70 Borrowing the model of Aristotle’s practical syllogism 
developed by Amelie Rorty (1988), he argues that integrity is a virtue that can overcome 
the problem of akrasia by bridging the subsequent gaps between (1) holding general 
value beliefs, (2) commitment to the beliefs, (3) situational judgments, (4) effective 
decisions and (5) actions.71 According to van Hooft, integrity is a specific executive 
virtue that turns the agent who does not have the settled virtues into a virtuous man 
whose internal inclinations are consistently brought into right actions. Since a virtuous 
man has the virtue of phronesis that is holistic in nature, in the sense that it applies to all 
aspects of human life in deciding which actions with respect to the quest for eudaimonia 
are most appropriate to particular situations, van Hooft argues that “integrity constitutes 
the personal wholeness which phronesis expresses”.72  
                                                 
70 Stan van Hooft, “Judgement, Decision, and Integrity”, Philosophical Exploration 2 (May 2001), pp. 135-
149. 
71 Amelie Rorty, Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), p. 230. 
Rorty shows that akrasia can take place between the subsequent steps from holding general beliefs (1) to 
actions that follows immediately from decisions (4&5).  
72 Stan van Hooft, “Judgement, Decision, and Integrity”, op. cit., p. 144.  
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Van Hooft is clear up to the point of overcoming akrasia and manifesting the 
personal wholeness. But his inward turn to find the basis of the unity of the self makes his 
account of integrity ambiguous. In propounding the argument of Nancy Schauber (1996), 
he seems to assert that there are fundamental constituents of the self, such as the passive 
commitments,73 which are not subject to choice and reflection, and which serve as a basis 
for the unity of the self and constitute the driving motivational force of integrity. His 
assertion may create a dilemmatic problem, for if we follow van Hooft, we may have to 
refer to our passive commitments and general value beliefs at one end and to eudaimonia 
at the other end. These two ends seems to have equally valid claims; the former strikes us 
as immediately significant, arguably inherited from the culture we live in, whereas the 
latter comes to us because we are human beings. Indeed, when there is no tension 
between these two ends, the dilemma may not arise. At least it is what van Hooft seems 
to presuppose when he contends that the meaning of integrity is not primarily moral but 
existential, and that only because we are human beings and having eudaimonia as our 
aim should we then find the moral meaning of integrity. However, there is no perfect 
guarantee that tension between passive commitments and eudaimonia will not arise. For 
example, it is hard to believe that by being committed to the Mafioso project or the 
corrupt culture one attains eudaimonia. Being committed to certain passive commitments 
will not always bring us to eudaimonia. The Aristotelian account of integrity that I offer 
can avoid this problem, because the referential basis of the unity of the self is discovered 
                                                 
73 Nancy Schauber claims that integrity is a matter of a person upholding his commitments, no matter what 
the content of the commitments are. However, she argues that only passive commitments have the intimate 
motivational characteristic of integrity. She defines passive commitment as a commitment that one 
discovers (rather than creates or makes) in one’s beliefs, concerns, and projects. The passive commitments 
are constitutive of the self. The opposite of passive commitment is active commitment, a commitment that 
one makes to others (like promises) with which one assumes special obligations and responsibilities. See: 
Nancy Schauber, “Integrity, Commitment and the Concept of a Person”, American Philosophical Quarterly 
33.1 (January, 1996), pp. 119-129.    
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not inside but rather outside of the self, expressed in the right decisions and actions that 
phronesis is concerned with. Accordingly, to attain the unity of the self is to attain it 
through ethical decisions and actions; and, therefore, the meaning of integrity is 
simultaneously both existential and moral. 
 
 
5.2.2 Integrity, Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues 
 
             Integrity and phronesis are likely two sides of the same coin. The former is a 
moral virtue, the latter is an intellectual virtue, and each cannot exist without the other. 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, Aristotle believes that one cannot possess 
moral virtues without possessing phronesis and cannot possess phronesis without 
possessing moral virtues, as both are concerned with the right actions.74 More than just a 
moral virtue, however, integrity is rather a chief moral virtue or a master virtue. It is 
concerned not only with the right actions in a specific human circumstance, such as 
temperance in the context of controlling anger or courage in the context of facing danger, 
but with all the right actions in any context that phronesis is concerned with. As a result, 
integrity is also a manifestation of, and carries with it, a sense of the unity of the (moral) 
virtues.  
With regard to the unity of the virtues, it is usually noted that Aristotle does not 
follow Socrates who suggests that the unity of the virtues is a matter of identity, or 
                                                 
74 That is why Aristotle is so determined that the conclusion in his practical syllogism (which is operative in 
phronesis) is not merely judgment or decision but action. In fact, phronesis and moral virtue are not only 
concerned with the right actions but also the right feelings or feeling in the right way. I take the right 
actions (and decisions) as the main object of discussion because business and economic life deal primarily 
with decisions and actions.    
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simply a matter of the unity of virtue, according to which virtue is basically wisdom 
(sophia or knowledge) while the distinctions that we recognize as temperance, courage, 
justice, and so forth are merely particular manifestations of wisdom in different fields of 
application.75 Nor does Aristotle follow Plato who seems to construe the unity of the 
virtues in terms of the interlocking cooperative activities between all parts of the soul 
under the rule of reason in responding to, but irrespective of, whatever the particular 
circumstances that provoke the activities.76 For Aristotle, the individual’s possession of 
the virtues and, in consequence, the unity of the virtues depend not only on the internal 
activities of the soul that involve reason but also and simultaneously on the external 
activities as to how the individual habituates himself with behaviors in response to the 
particular circumstances that come up from time to time in his life. In short, for Aristotle, 
the unity of the virtues depends simultaneously on the excellence of the activities of 
reason (phronesis) and moral habituation. 
 
                                                 
75 It is widely believed that, in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, Socrates is committed to the identity thesis. 
Thus, virtue = wisdom (knowledge) = temperance = courage = justice = and so forth. See: Terry Penner, 
“The Unity of Virtue”, in Hugh H. Benson, ed., Essays in the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 162-184; John M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral 
Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 78-83. However, 
referring to Plato’s Laches and Euthyphro, it may still be possible to interpret Socrates as holding the bi-
conditional thesis in which moral virtues are thought of as coextensive dispositions that are tied together by 
wisdom and, as a result, whoever has one virtue must have them all. See: Gregory Vlastos, “The Unity of 
the Virtues in the Protagoras”, Review of Metaphysics 25 (1972), pp. 415-58. For the discussion of those 
two thesis and whether Socrates has a coherent position, see: Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. 
Smith, “Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues”, Journal of Ethics 1 (1997), pp. 311-24. In any case, wisdom 
is believed to have the sole decisive role in the individual’s possession of the virtues and in the unity of the 
virtues.        
76 For Plato, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice are four virtues that have special status. Wisdom is 
the virtue of the reason, the first part of the soul that issues orders and decisions. Courage is the virtue of 
the spirit, the second part of the soul that urges commitment to implement the decisions. Temperance is the 
virtue that makes each of the three parts of the soul (reason, spirit and appetitive desire) recognize and 
follow the orders of the reason, whereas justice is the virtue that ensures that each of the three parts of the 
soul gives its proper contribution to the whole function of the soul. It is clear that, for Plato, the activities of 
the three parts of the soul are interconnected and the four virtues are present in every virtuous action. See: 
John M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, ibid. p. 110-1.   
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It seems obvious that if we claim that the unity of the virtues depends only on the 
cognitive activities (reason), we tend to blur the fact that each virtue has its own distinct 
characteristics corresponding to its respective context, and that in some circumstances the 
value brought about by a particular virtue may come into conflict with the other value(s) 
brought about by the other virtue(s). On the other hand, it seems absurd to claim that the 
unity of the virtues is just a result of maintaining the dispositions in dealing with the 
various circumstances of human life without any reference to the excellence of the 
cognitive activities such as phronesis, because only through the reference to phronesis, 
which is one in number, can the numerous virtues be plausibly thought of as unified. 
Indeed, Aristotle admits that there can be no unity between what he calls natural virtues 
(natural dispositions),77 the exercise of which does not involve rational judgments over 
whether the object, the context and the degree of the exercise are right. For Aristotle, the 
unity of the virtues obtains only for the virtues in the strict sense,78 viz. the virtues that 
produce the right conduct, involving not only sensitivity to the facts about circumstances 
but also consideration of the facts about rights.79 However, it is important to emphasize 
that the unity of the virtues is not the result of the domination of one factor, phronesis or 
moral habituation, over the other. For, as Aristotle clearly said, if phronesis is a right rule, 
virtue which is a result of moral habituation “is not merely the state in accordance with 
                                                 
77 NE (VI.13.1144b.30-1145a.5) 
78 Ibid. 
79 John McDowell (1998) refers to NE 6.13 and takes right conduct as the basis to construe the unity of the 
virtues. See: John MacDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998), p. 53. Gary Watson (1984) calls this kind of view the due concern view, for one cannot have a virtue 
in excess precisely because virtue is defined as involving a due concern for feeling and acting in certain 
respects.  See: Gary Watson, “Virtue in Excess”, Philosophical Studies 46 (1984), pp. 57-74. 
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the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule”.80 As a 
consequence, we cannot interpret the unity of the virtues too strongly as a simple bi-
conditional thesis, which states that one can only have any virtue if one has all the 
virtues. A rather weak sense of the unity of the virtues is, I think, more appropriate, i.e. 
whoever has one virtue must have them all but not necessarily in the same ‘degree’. 
Three points of consideration will clarify this position. 
First, the ascription of a particular virtue to a particular person is usually 
associated with the paradigmatic activities whereby a certain image is shown and 
regarded by the society as a noble one. The images may vary between societies and may 
shift along with the history of the societies. Courage, for example, might be regarded by 
an ancient society as the noblest virtue in the war period and ascribed only to a person 
who reveals a reliable disposition to act courageously in battle, but nowadays courage 
may be regarded as less important than justice and can be ascribed to any person who 
reveals a reliable disposition to take the risks or face dangers properly in the other 
domains of human life. The implication is that the unity of the virtues may not look 
obvious, not because it is not clear that a person can have all the reliable dispositions to 
act rightly in the circumstances that call for the right acts, but because what the society 
appreciates and the way the virtues are ascribed do not only involve the consideration of 
whether the person has the reliable dispositions that lead him to do the right acts. Some 
additional criteria are imposed on the right acts and have to be met in order for the 
respective dispositions to be legitimized as virtues. Suppose a person has precisely the 
disposition to act rightly in every possible circumstance that calls for the right act, which 
                                                 
80 NE (VI.13.1144b.26-8). I take this position in contrast to John M. Cooper (1999) who writes that “the 
ethical virtues [and consequently the unity of the virtues] are crucially dependent on practical wisdom – not 
the other way about”. See: John M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, op. cit., p. 109.  
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is equivalent to saying that this person has the reliable dispositions demanded by all the 
virtues. The society may not ascribe him with all the virtues, but only with the virtue(s) 
whose right acts meet the criteria that the society regards as the noblest acts. He will not 
be said to be courageous, for example, because the society will ascribe ‘courage’ only to 
those who act courageously in battle while he never has any chance to go to battle in his 
life time. For this person, the unity of the virtues prevails, but not in accordance with the 
criteria of the virtue imposed by the society. Edward Halper (1999), in interpreting 
Aristotle’s definitions of virtue, distinguishes between ‘proper’ virtue and ‘psychic’ 
virtue;81 the former is the virtue whose right acts are considered by the society as the 
greatest and noblest, whereas the latter is the virtue whose right acts are just right. Using 
these terms as references, it seems right to say that the unity of the virtues must work but 
only for the virtues in the psychic forms, not for those in the proper forms. A virtuous 
person may have only one or two moral virtues in the proper forms, but he must have all 
the moral virtues in the psychic forms. However, although the unity of the virtues is 
limited to the psychic virtues, the virtue in its proper form must remain as a vital 
reference, because the psychic virtue is valuable only in the perspective of the nobleness 
of the proper virtue. 
Secondly, the rightness of the acts produced by a virtue must conform to the 
golden mean that is manifested as a mean between two vices – excess and deficiency – 
relative to the individual agent. How the agent-relativity of the right acts goes, with 
respect to the virtues and the unity of the virtues, has very much to do with the 
                                                 
81 Edward Halper, “The Unity of the Virtues in Aristotle”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17 (1999), 
pp. 115-143, p. 125. For Halper, Aristotle’s definition of virtue can be interpreted as “both a capacity for 
particular actions and a characteristic arrangement of parts of the soul “(p. 121). He refers to the former as 
‘proper’ virtue and the latter as ‘psychic’ virtue.  
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interpretation of Aristotle’s statement that virtue is concerned with a mean ‘relative to 
us’, viz.:  
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. 
the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by 
that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.82  
  
Stephen Leighton (1992, 1995) argues that what Aristotle was trying to say with the 
relativity of the mean is that it is not only that the mean is relative to the agent’s 
circumstances (circumstances relativity), but also that the mean is relative to the agent’s 
character (character relativity).83 For Leighton, it is essentially virtue that must be relative 
to the individual agent, and for this reason, virtue is relative to the agent’s capacities 
(some maybe innate), activities (the domain of life he is engaged), and stage of 
development.84 In contrast, Lesley Brown (1997) argues that what Aristotle meant by ‘the 
mean relative to us’ is not simply that ‘the mean is relative to us as individuals’ but rather 
normatively that ‘the mean is relative to us as human beings’, because the mean in 
question has to be determined by a rational principle by which the phronimos (the man of 
practical wisdom) would determine it.85 For Brown, the mean is not relative to the 
individual agent over and above being relative to the agent’s circumstances. As a 
consequence, for Brown, virtue is fixed (non-relative), referring to the phronimos whose 
action, passion and choices are circumstantially the best in accordance with the rational 
                                                 
82 NE (II.6.1106b.36-1107a.3) 
83 Stephen Leighton, “Relativizing Moral Excellence In Aristotle”, Apeiron 25.1 (March, 1992), pp. 49-66; 
Stephen Leighton, “The Mean Relative to Us”, Apeiron 28.4 (December, 1995), pp. 67-78.  
84 By appealing to these three boundaries (capacities, activities and stage of development), Leighton argues 
that Aristotle is not committed to some form of individual relativism. By appealing to these three 
boundaries, Leighton shows that Aristotle is rather committed to essentialism. See: Stephen Leighton, 
“Relativizing ….”, op. cit., p. 4.   
85 Lesley Brown, “What is “the mean relative to us” in Aristotle’s Ethics?”, Phronesis 42.1 (1997), pp. 77-
93, p. 78, 81. 
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principle and norms appropriate to human nature, needs and purposes.86 Between those 
two opposing interpretations, Edward Halper (1999) takes a combining view by 
associating Leighton’s and Brown’s notions of virtue with the psychic virtue and the 
proper virtue respectively.87 But Halper is not clear as to how such a combination should 
work without the danger of falling into either side. This seems to be true as he concedes 
that virtue is relative to the individual’s character (character relativity), viz. it differs for 
different people,88 while he rejects the point in Brown’s case (as he construes it) that any 
differences between individuals can be objectified as differences between circumstances 
of actions.89 If Halper’s thesis is followed through, it may create an accountability 
problem in the relationship between individuals, because one can take the best choice of 
action that is fully matched with his own character without necessarily considering 
whether he is ready to explain that his character is part of the reasons for taking up the 
choice.90 The best way to settle this problem is, I think, by referring to the basic concept 
that virtue is acquired through habituation with the right actions and to the basic 
assumption that whatever action we claim to be right we should be ready to objectify and 
make it explainable to others (who are concerned with the action). Instead of claiming 
that virtue is simply relative to the individual’s character, I rather claim that virtue is 
relative to the individual’s habituation with the right actions, albeit it is true that the 
                                                 
86 The role of the phronimos in the moral case is similar to the role of the expert in the non-moral case, for 
example, the trainer in gymnastics who can make judgment about the right amount of food to eat (the 
mean) for Milo and the beginner. According to Brown, while in gymnastics the reference is the trainer, not 
Milo or the beginner; in the moral case the reference is the phronimos, not the individuals. See: Ibid. p. 87.      
87 Edward Halper, “The Unity of the Virtues in Aristotle”, op. cit., p. 136. 
88 Ibid., p. 140. 
89 Ibid., p. 137. 
90 A virtuous agent should always be ready to explain the choice he takes and the reason why it is the best 
choice. The explanation can only be understood if all the factors that give rise to the choice, including the 
agent’s own character, are objectified as circumstances. This does not mean that the virtuous agent must 
know the best choice in whatever circumstances, for to habituate oneself in all possible circumstances in 
order to know the best choice in whatever circumstances is practically impossible. 
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effective progress of the habituation and the right actions that the individual takes may 
depend largely on the factors that define the character of the individual, namely 
capacities, domain of activities and stage of development. In other words, the reference of 
the agent-relativity is rather tied in with the circumstances of the habituation, with the 
‘external’ things that are explainable to the others.91   
Rather than using a dyadic comparison to draw the differences, I propose to use a 
triadic relation to give a clearer picture as to how virtue differs for different individuals. 
As I have illustrated in the previous section when I discussed friendship, the triadic 
relation is a relation between one, the others and the virtuous man who represents the 
ideal community of which one and the others are supposed to be members. The virtuous 
man is not a universalized ideal person that transcends all those individuals, but rather a 
representation of the ideal community to which the individuals with their particular 
differences have to refer in order to be virtuous. Individuals become virtuous, or the 
virtuous men come into reality, only in their particularities with respect to the realization 
of the ideal community as a reference. The ‘psychic’ virtues that are developed in the 
perspective of the communally legitimated ‘proper’ virtues are essentially developed for 
the realization  of  the  ideal  community,  because the values  promoted  by  those virtues 
  
 
                                                 
91 As a consequence, it is better to interpret ‘psychic’ virtue, not as a virtue that in some way depends on 
the structure of character of the individual, but rather as a virtue that depends on the individual’s 
habituation in taking the right actions whose consideration is partly the initial structure of character of the 
individual that is to be shaped in the perspective of the communally legitimated ‘proper’ virtue. For virtue 
is a certain state of character acquired through habituation with the right actions, the initial structure of 
character (as ‘the starting point’) is not necessarily essential to emphasize. The initial structure of character 
may to some extent be counted as an additional circumstance in defining the right actions, but it does not 
necessarily constitute the end to which the process of habituation leads. An initial structure of character 
that disposes the agent to commit a crime of violence, for example, should not in any extent be part of the 
end of the habituation process. 
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basically function to bind the individuals together in the community.92 Thus, using 
Halper’s terms, we can say that everyone ought to develop ‘psychic’ virtues in the 
perspective of the communally legitimated ‘proper’ virtues, by habituating him/herself to 
take the right decisions and actions that would contribute to the realization of the ideal 
community. The individuals’ particularities, originating from their capacities, field of 
activities and stage of development, should not limit them from becoming virtuous, 
because by habituation these particularities can be managed to function in a way that 
would make the individuals contribute to the realization of the ideal community. Nor 
should the particularities necessarily govern the extent to which the individuals possess 
virtues, for only through habituation would the individuals possess virtues. The 
importance of the habituation must have been clear. Individuals can be virtuous, having 
all the ‘psychic’ virtues, if they manage and develop their particularities for the 
habituation that makes them disposed to take the right actions that would contribute to the 
realization of the ideal community.  
Thus, for example, with respect to the limited field of activities, we cannot judge 
that a business woman is not virtuous merely based on the fact that, while she may 
always take the right decisions and actions in her businesses, she does not know how to 
give the right medical treatments to her mother who is seriously ill. Nor can we simply 
                                                 
92 Richard Sorabji (1980) rightly argues that ‘what is right’ in the exercise of any virtue depends partly on 
the claims of other virtues and on the good life that we should be aiming at. See: Richard Sorabji, “Aristotle 
on the Role of Intellect in Virtue”, in Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1980), pp. 201-219, p. 207. As the good life is essentially a life in the community, I 
shall imply that virtues must be developed for the goods that are celebrated by the individuals, viz. for the 
goods that make them remain in and as a community. Moreover, since the good life can only be realized in 
the perspective of the realization of the ideal community where the value of autonomy, friendship and 
justice are appreciated, virtues must be developed not only for the promotion of the values shared in the 
community but also, and essentially, for the realization of the ideal community. In virtue of the good life as 
the ultimate end, the promotion of the socially shared values has to be put in the context of the realization 
of the ideal community. 
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say that the business woman is virtuous only in the business world.93 For if she brings her 
mother to the right doctor, who is expert in treating the sick, and bears the cost of it, she 
may make the right decision and action that in some way contribute to the realization of 
the ideal family, the ideal economic community and the ideal larger whole community, 
and hence she shows a quality of a virtuous human being.94 However, if she avoids 
giving a rather simple treatment when she has many chances to extend her capacities for 
that treatment, merely for reasons that she has no capacity at hand (no character) for that 
treatment, then we must have some reasons to doubt whether she is really virtuous. This 
example is just to show that anyone, despite having limited capacities, field of activities 
and stage of development, can be virtuous, and can thus have the united (psychic) virtues. 
The virtues that are in the unity are not possessed in the same degree, partly because they 
are relative to us as individuals and as human beings. 
 
                                                 
93 In her critique of Aristotle’s conception of virtue, Neera K. Badhwar (1996) argues for the limited unity 
of virtue, in which the virtues are believed to be united only within the same domain of life and not 
globally. See: Neera K. Badhwar, “The Limited Unity of Virtue”, Nous 33:3 (1996), pp. 306-329. The force 
of her argument lies in her rejection of Aristotle’s claim that practical wisdom is a ‘single state’ (a unity) 
that can function globally, as she believes that no one can have substantial experiences in all areas of life 
(p. 315). But she seems to hold a much stricter sense of practical wisdom than Aristotle. For, if one is 
virtuous only in a certain domain of life, one can only be ‘happy’ in that limited area. In other words, he 
cannot be happy in the unqualified sense despite the fact that he is virtuous, which is indeed a serious 
departure from Aristotle’s eudaimonism. It is true that Aristotle recognizes different kinds of practical 
wisdom, i.e. legislative wisdom, political wisdom, ‘household management’, and practical wisdom in 
general (which is concerned with a man himself) [NE-VI.8.1141b.24-34]. Similarly, Aristotle recognizes 
different kinds of ‘good’, as many as there are many different kinds of ‘being’ [NE-1.6.1096a.23-25]. But, 
Aristotle believes that there is the same kind of the good in us as ‘human-beings’, in so far as we are human 
beings [NE-I.6.1096a.34-1096b.3], and similarly there must be the same kind of practical wisdom and 
happiness. Therefore, if we say that one ought to pursue happiness (in the unqualified sense, viz. in so far 
as one is a human being), we should advocate that one ought to have practical wisdom and be virtuous in 
all areas of life where one lives. As a matter of ascription, we may identify practical wisdom, moral virtues 
and the good in a certain domain of life, but we should not treat these identifications as a general normative 
case. As a matter of ascription, we may say that A is good (virtuous) in politics and B is good (virtuous) in 
family life, but we cannot simply infer that both of A and B are good (virtuous) in the unqualified sense.       
94 For the realization of the ideal family, intimate care between the members of the family has to be 
preserved; for the realization of the ideal economic community, the value of effectiveness and efficiency 
resulting from the division of labor has to be properly appreciated; and for the realization of the ideal larger 
whole community, the realization of the ideal smaller communities has to be maintained with proper 
appreciation to the values of friendship, justice and autonomy. 
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Third, in some circumstances where the values promoted by the virtues are in 
conflict, the virtues may appear incompatible with one another, such as, for example, the 
apparent incompatibilities between kindness and honesty, between prudence and courage, 
and between mercy and justice. But these appearances are not evidence that can prove the 
falsity of the unity of the virtues. Rather, they are an indication that there can be many 
possible ways to appreciate moral values, where the unity of the virtues can work without 
demanding that each of the virtues should manifest itself equally at the same time.95 
Insofar as the action that one has been disposed to take in each of those circumstances is 
right, for reasons that it is the best way to promote the values appreciated in the ideal 
community, and that it is the ‘mean’ relative to oneself as an individual human being, one 
should have exercised some virtues without committing any vice and without 
undermining the other virtues. Thus, the apparent incompatibility between virtues in 
those circumstances should not mislead us to a wrong conclusion. In fact, it is proper to 
construe that the virtues which one possesses might complement and mutually reinforce 
each other across circumstances.96 Since having any single moral virtue would likely 
provoke one to acquire the others, and one would not properly have a moral virtue until 
one has the others, we can conclude that moral virtues are closely connected.97 The most 
important reason for the close connection, however, is the fact that all the virtues are 
                                                 
95 Gary Watson, “Virtues in Excess”, op. cit., p. 65-6. Thus, one can take a different focus and emphasis 
with due concern for the relevant considerations. One can express kindness without expressing dishonesty 
or can express honesty without expressing unkindness. Gary Watson offers the so-called “modified due-
concern view of the unity of the virtues” in which the due concerns are believed to make sense only if they 
are exercised in the permissible ways (p. 68). But his view does not really add something new, since what 
is right must have already taken into account every possible point of view. 
96 Jonathan Jacobs and John Zeis, “The Unity of the Vices”, The Thomist (1990), pp. 641-53, p. 643.  
97 Elizabeth Telfer (1989) refers the first part of this reason to the Moral Improvement argument and refers 
the second part to the Security of the End argument. Different from J.L. Ackrill who argues for the unity of 
the virtues in terms of merely the harmony of emotional dispositions, Elizabeth Telfer argues that moral 
knowledge, implied in phronesis, is crucially involved in the process that leads one to have all the virtues. 
See: Elizabeth Telfer, “The Unity of The Moral Virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society (1989/90), pp. 35-48, esp. pp. 45-7. 
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oriented to the good life, a life that one should attain by exercising one’s disposition to do 
the right actions for their own sakes.98 It is precisely this reason that provides the 
explanation as to why the unity of the virtues does not demand equal manifestation of 
each of the virtues in every particular circumstance, i.e. for the sake of what is right each 
of the virtues does not necessarily need to manifest itself equally at the same time. 
In sum, the unity of the virtues holds despite the fact that personalities and 
situations may vary enormously. The unity of the virtues is compatible with the actual 
plurality of character and the actual plurality of the way of life. The bottom line of the 
matter is that the rightness of actions is indispensable in defining virtue and the unity of 
the virtues, while the rightness of actions itself depends on the socially shared values that 
function to maintain the individuals together in the community and on the right reason 
that the individuals apply to absorb the values and to find the ‘mean’ relative to them in 
the particular circumstances. The right reason that proceeds from phronesis, therefore, 
characterizes virtue and the unity of the virtues. But since moral virtue and phronesis can 
only emerge together through habituation, the moral virtues that individuals would 
possess are dependent on how individuals manage their particularities to undergo the 
process of habituation. And since phronesis that the individual would possess is 
                                                 
98 Aristotle clearly states that a person is virtuous, and acts virtuously only if (1) he knows what he is doing, 
(2) he choose it for its own sake, and (3) he does it from a firm and unchangeable character [NE-
II.4.1105a.30-35]. Since the motive is clearly for the sake of what is right, the problem that possibly comes 
from the conflicting motives should have been resolved. Lawrence B. Becker (1990) argues that an account 
of the unity of the virtues is inadequate if it solves only ‘the conflict problem’ that appears between the 
virtues but ignores ‘the coincidence problem’ that arises when two different motives, constitutive of two 
different virtues, provide the same guidance for conduct, such as, for example, prudential gift versus 
benevolent gift. In order to be able to solve both the conflict problem and the coincidence problem, Becker 
proposes an account of the ordinal unity of the virtues in which phronesis (practical wisdom) takes the role 
as a controlling virtue. See: Lawrence B. Becker, “Unity, Coincidence, and Conflict in the Virtues”, 
Philosophia 20:1-2 (1990), pp. 127-143.    
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numerically one,99 a moral virtue that comes all along with it from the process of 
habituation, a moral virtue that comes simply from habituating the right actions that 
promote the values shared in the ideal state of the community or a moral virtue that the 
exercise of which would contribute to the realization of the ideal community, should 
accommodate all the possible moral virtues and hence reflect the unity of the virtues. 
This special moral virtue is what I call the virtue of integrity.100 An individual who 
possesses integrity is thus an individual who with all his particularities has the reliable 
dispositions to promote the socially shared values and contribute to the realization of the 
ideal community.  
 
 
5.2.3 Individual Integrity in Economic Life 
 
In the case of economic life where there may be several communities of which the 
individual is a member, i.e. the corporation, the market community and the larger whole 
community respectively, while each community holds a different set of the socially 
shared values, a question may arise as to how the individual has to consider all the 
different sets of the socially shared values in order to achieve integrity. As mentioned 
earlier, the promotion of the values shared in the ideal state of the community and the 
                                                 
99 The interpretation that phronesis is numerically one is, I think, the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Ethics. It is based on the argument that phronesis must refer to the single ultimate end. Thus, the unity of 
the ultimate-end implies the unity of phronesis and, subsequently, the unity of phronesis implies the unity 
of the moral virtues. Historically, this line of interpretation is developed by the Averroist arts masters (in 
contrast to some theologians who claimed that only the cardinal virtues are unified). See: James J. Walsh, 
“Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1986), pp. 453-482, 
p. 456. 
100 For integrity reflects the unity of the virtues, we can see it as an underlying trait that generates, connects 
and regulates all of the virtues.  
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right reason that proceeds from phronesis are two factors that make the right act right. 
Because phronesis refers to the good life as the single ultimate end, while the good life 
can only be lived in the context of the larger whole community, the promotion of the 
values shared in the larger whole community has to be taken as the first consideration 
before the promotion of the values shared in the market community and the corporation. 
And because phronesis is essentially concerned with the ‘mean’ relative to the individual 
with all his particularities, the promotion of the values shared in the larger whole 
community has to be done relative to the particularities of the individual. As a result, the 
right act must essentially lie in the individual’s endeavor of managing his particularities 
for the promotion of the values shared in the larger whole community.101 The right act 
represents the best way to manage something particular for the sake of something that is 
more commonly shared with others. If the corporation and the market community where 
the individual spends most of his life-time are subsequently regarded as the individual’s 
particularities, the right act can be seen as an act that simultaneously makes the individual 
contribute to the values shared in the corporation, the corporation contribute to the values 
shared in the market community, and the market community contribute to the values 
shared in the larger whole community. In other words, the right act of integrity is one that 
contributes to the realization of the ideal state of all these communities. Through the right 
acts, the individual economic agent who possesses integrity obtains the good life from 
economic activities in the corporation and the market community. Through the right acts, 
he reveals himself as a good economic agent as well as a good man. 
                                                 
101 As I have mentioned earlier, included in the individual’s particularities are his capacities, his field of 
activities and his stage of development. Included in his capacities are his physical capacities, his 
psychological capacities and his natural skills (talents).  
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It is important to emphasize, however, that the promotion of the socially shared 
values, constitutive of the right act, does not subvert the vitality of the particularities. The 
vitality of the particularities can sometimes be very crucial to defend, because without the 
vitality of the particularities the promotion of the socially shared values may never 
proceed. In some cases, defending the particularities temporarily at the expense of some 
socially shared values can be part of the right act if by so doing the individual would 
ultimately bring the best promotion for the socially shared values. A good business 
executive, for example, may in the process have to defend at some social cost the 
existence of the corporation in the corrupt market community, while he is projecting the 
prospect as to how eventually the corporation can contribute to the improvement of the 
morality of the market community and the promotion of the values shared in the larger 
whole community. There is a sense of ‘urgency’ in defending the vitality of the 
particularities, but this vitality should never be treated as the only end constitutive of the 
right act. The ultimate end of the right act is the promotion of the values shared in the 
larger whole community. All the processes and elements that constitute the right act have 
to be placed in the framework of the promotion of the values shared in the larger whole 
community and the realization of the ideal state of the larger whole community.      
Since every individual has different particularities, there can be many possible 
right acts for each particular circumstance. Nevertheless, two considerations should 
prevent the individual from arbitrarily claiming that a certain act is right. These two 
considerations make any right act remain reasonable. First, though the right act is the 
‘mean’ relative to the individual with all his particularities, the individual must always be 
ready to objectify his particularities and make his choice, with regard to his 
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particularities, explainable to the others. As such, whoever has exactly the same 
particularities and takes the position of the individual in his particular circumstance 
would most likely make the same choice.102 Secondly, by taking the promotion of the 
values shared in the larger whole community as the ultimate end, the individual must 
always be ready to ensure that his choice would ultimately lead to the best promotion for 
the values shared in the larger whole community, though by his choice he should let the 
others who are more expert take a bigger role.103 With these two considerations, the 
individual cannot hide behind his particularities to shirk from a better chance to promote 
the socially shared values, nor can he use the promotion of the socially shared values as a 
reason to blur his particularities and to take advantage of it for himself. With regard to the 
realization of the ideal state of the communities of which the individual is a member, the 
individual cannot use his particularities as an excuse to defer his contribution when a 
chance comes up, nor can he take and control every role that he has no expertise for the 
sake of what he claims to be the realization of the ideal communities. An individual who 
possesses integrity would earnestly manage all his particularities in a way that would 
bring him to take the act that is just right for the realization of the ideal communities, 
because the ideal communities are, in a sense, parts of his expanded self. 
The following examples will show how individual integrity plays a role in 
economic life. In the corporate context, the individual who possesses integrity would put 
maximum efforts to serve the corporation he works for and thereby to contribute to 
maximizing the corporate value, if the way the corporation is conducting its business 
                                                 
102 The objectification of the particularities is thus an attempt to make the right act, an act that is the ‘mean’ 
relative to the individual with all his particularities, in some sense ‘universalizable’.  
103 There is a sense of ‘value maximization’ in ensuring that the choice being taken would lead to the best 
promotion of the values shared in the larger whole community. 
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meets the values shared in the larger whole community. If the business of the corporation 
is done unethically, he would try to contribute to a change in the conduct of the 
corporation’s business. Otherwise, if there is no possibility for a change, he would resign 
and seek employment in a more ethical organization. His thought is clear that he can only 
realize himself if he can contribute to the realization of the ideal corporation he wishes to 
work for, the ideal market community and the ideal larger whole community. A 
corporation is ideal if it aims at the ideal workings of the market community; the market 
community is ideal if it aims at the ideal workings of the larger whole community; and 
the larger whole community is ideal if its individual members can obtain the good life.104 
In order to realize the ideal communities, three social virtues and values are 
indispensable, namely autonomy, friendship and justice.105 By taking the good life as the 
ultimate end, the individual who possesses integrity holds all these three values very 
highly. If he is assigned to promote, publicize and advertise products, he would not 
deceive the consumers, nor would he persuade them by creating manipulative images that 
can erode their autonomy for making rational decisions. He treats competition as 
something healthy, something that can encourage the participants to produce better 
products and services. He would uphold fair competition and set the price of the products 
fairly based on the total costs incurred and the consumers’ valuation, where the profit to 
be gained will really reflect the appreciation of the consumers over all the efforts that 
make the products desired and available to them. He would not make a conspiracy with 
the competitors to fix the price of the products or to set a cartel that harms the 
                                                 
104 As I have described in the previous chapter, the ideal communities are communities that exist for their 
true purposes, viz. the purposes that are hierarchically defined with the good life as the ultimate end. 
105 As I have described in the previous chapter, without individual’s autonomy there is no real good life to 
be attained, and without friendship and justice there are no prospective ideal communities from which the 
good life is to be attained. 
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competition, for to do so would be unjust to the consumers.106 If he is a manager assigned 
to manage the production operation, he would care about the workers and ensure the 
availability of the safety system to protect them from potential accidents. He would not 
let the local community suffer from the operation of the corporation, and would seek 
mutual benefits to gain support from the surrounding people. If he is a financial manager, 
he would be prudent in selecting the sources of capital and in using the capital resources; 
he would not raise and utilize funds in speculative manners without consideration of the 
moral aspects. If he is a buyer or consumer, he would prefer not to select products 
produced by a company whose operation is ethically questionable. In any case, we can 
say that the individual economic agent who possesses integrity would bring the value of 
efficiency and effectiveness, which flows from his role in the corporation and the market 
community, in conformance with the values of autonomy, friendship and justice that are 
indispensable for the realization of the ideal larger whole community. 
A question may still arise as to how the individual has to respond when there is an 
unavoidable conflict between values, viz. (1) a conflict between the value of efficiency 
and effectiveness and the values of autonomy, friendship and justice, and (2) a conflict 
among the values of autonomy, friendship and justice. The first conflict represents a 
tension between the smaller communities (the corporation and the market community) 
and the larger whole community, and it is clear that in any case the consideration of the 
                                                 
106 One of the purposes of market competition is to provide a condition under which no party would get too 
much bargaining power as compared to the others, because injustice can easily occur between two parties 
when a wide gap of bargaining power exists. Although a gap of bargaining power cannot be eliminated in 
the real market (mostly because of inequality in the private property ownership) and therefore the threat of 
injustice may still potentially exist, the well-functioning of market competition is the first step to reduce the 
excessive bargaining power. Of course, to increase the bargaining power is not necessarily unjust, if the 
increased power is used to balance with the power of the other party in the bargaining process so that a just 
result can be reached. For example, several industrial corporations may establish cooperation, with the 
purpose to increase their bargaining power, in negotiating the terms of contract with the State Electricity 
Corporation that holds the exclusive right of (natural) monopoly. 
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larger whole community has to be prioritized over that of the smaller communities. But if 
the resolution of the conflict can only be made by subverting the value of efficiency and 
effectiveness, which is partially definitive of what it means to be in a business or an 
economic action generally, the affair must be properly addressed rather as a moral action 
than as an economic action. Of course, the individual and the corporation, as an 
individual and as a community respectively, may occasionally have to undertake some 
purely moral actions, such as charity or helping the victims of disaster, but they cannot do 
these actions in the name of business, nor can they do these actions exclusively insofar as 
they wish to stay as an economic agent or institution. The second conflict is more 
complicated, since it involves the basic values while there is no universal standard of 
appeal available to decide which value should be given priority over the others. Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1984) calls this kind of conflict “the tragic confrontation of good with 
good”.107 MacIntyre argues that the individual may choose any alternative course of 
action that corresponds to some of the values in conflict, because each of the alternatives 
leads anyway to some substantial good and to choose one does not mean to diminish the 
claims of the others.108 For example, the individual faces a difficult situation where he 
has to promote one of two employees whose capabilities show they equally deserve the 
managerial position, but in financial terms the older employee seems to need the position 
more than the younger employee, and yet in terms of the sales-track-records the younger 
employee is the better one. Although there appears to be a conflict in choosing between 
the act of friendship (promoting the older employee) and the act of justice (promoting the 
younger one), the individual may take either action without necessarily undermining the 
                                                 
107 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 224. 
108 Ibid. 
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other. However, more than just allowing the individual to choose either action, I contend 
that among the alternatives the best and right action can still be identified for the 
individual to take, namely, the one that best fits him, considering all his particularities.109 
Not only does the best and right action constitute the good life that he wishes to attain, it 
also positively supports him in the subsequent process of managing his particularities for 
the promotion of the socially shared values and the realization of the ideal communities. 
Thus, the way the individual responds and solves the apparent conflict between values 
remains to reflect his integrity. 
 
 
5.2.4 The Realization of the Ideal Communities as the Main Motive 
 
It is now clear that integrity, as here construed, is strongly concerned with the 
process as to how the individual manages his or her particularities for the right actions 
that would promote the socially shared values and the realization of the ideal 
communities. The socially shared values and the realization of the ideal communities 
emerge as the primary concerns and motives that underlie the acts flowing from the virtue 
of integrity. This account of integrity differs in significant respects from the other 
Aristotelian account of integrity, such as that developed by Damian Cox et al.(2003),110 
that places the state of the individual’s particularities as the primary concern. Arguing for 
integrity as ‘a complex and thick virtue’, Cox et al. say that integrity stands simply as a 
                                                 
109 At this level of consideration, the individual in the promotion case may favor to choose the one (say X) 
who is able to build a better personal relation and cooperation with him. This does not mean that he 
practises favoritism or nepotism, because what makes him favor X is not the main criterion that he uses for 
the selection, and what matters most for him is still the realization of the ideal communities.  
110 Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze and Michael P. Levine, Integrity and the Fragile Self (Aldershot, 
Hants, England; Burlington, VT-USA: Ashgate, 2003). 
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mean between various excesses and deficiencies of character that constitute two sets of 
opposing vices and, therefore, the persons of integrity should set themselves in the 
balance between these two sets of opposing vices.111 For Cox et al., the target of integrity 
development consists in the mean states of character or a set of qualities that make up the 
overall goodness of a character. The community and the values shared in it feature only 
as a background in defining the goodness of the character, but the community’s own state 
does not determine how the goodness of character is defined. The goodness of character 
is defined with reference to the whole character that is itself described in virtue terms.112  
Cox et al.’s account of integrity provides insufficient argument to dissolve the charge that 
the pursuit of integrity is a kind of self-indulgence, because, according to their account, 
the target of the individuals or what the individuals are concerned with when they act 
with integrity is their own character.113 In the account of integrity that I have developed, 
such problems should not appear seriously because what the persons of integrity are 
                                                 
111 Ibid., pp. 2, 15, 41, 71-2. Cox et al. call the two opposing vices the defeaters of integrity. The excesses 
are conformity, arrogance, dogmatism, fanaticism, manomania, preciousness, sanctimoniousness, and 
rigidity. The deficiencies are capriciousness, wantonness, triviality, disintegration, irresponsibility, 
weakness of will, self-deception, self-ignorance, mendacity, hypocrisy, and indifference.    
112 Ibid., p. 69-70. It is interesting to note that Cox et al. believe in the unity of the virtues but do not regard 
phronesis as having a crucial role in unifying the virtues. According to them, a set of exemplified qualities 
can be regarded as a virtue only if it contributes to the goodness of the whole character that is itself 
described in virtue terms. This sounds like a circular statement, but one may argue that there is nothing 
circular in the statement because the virtue of the qualities depends on that of the whole character. But if 
the goodness of the whole character is taken as a basis, many questions are still unanswered clearly in 
relation to the unity of the virtues, such as: how one should explain some circumstances where the values 
promoted by the virtues are in conflict and how the agent relativity is inrtegrated into the account of the 
unity of the virtues.  
113 Indeed, Cox et al. (2003) do try to defend the position that the pursuit of integrity is not self indulgent, 
by citing Gabriele Taylor’s argument that acting with integrity is rather acting out of self respect and 
Jeffrey Blustein’s argument that acting with integrity does not necessarily elevate one’s integrity to the 
status of ‘an autonomous ideal in itself’. While celebrating the conclusion of the arguments, Cox et al. 
reject the idea that acting with integrity is perfectly explainable in terms of acting out of self-respect and 
the idea that, by acting with integrity, one’s integrity should not be maintained as an autonomous ideal in 
itself. After all, however, if integrity itself is defined in terms of the goodness of the whole character, 
something the individuals wish to have for their own, there is always a way to pursue a legitimate charge 
that the pursuit of integrity is self-indulgent. See: Ibid., pp. 139-143. See also: Gabriel Taylor, Pride, Shame 
and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Clarendon Press; NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 
136-7; Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment: Taking the Personal Point of View (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 82-9. 
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mostly concerned with is not their own character but rather the right act that promotes the 
realization of the ideal communities, and when they take the right act they take it for its 
own sake.  
Furthermore, because integrity is tied up with the unity of the virtues, the account 
of integrity that I have developed stands also in contrast with the account developed by 
the leading Aristotelian business ethicist Robert C. Solomon (1992), who does not 
believe in the unity of the virtues and defines integrity simply as “a complex of virtues, 
the virtues working together to form a coherent character, an identifiable and trustworthy 
personality”.114 For Solomon, integrity is a very complex virtue that involves many 
virtues and features in opposition, such as honesty, moral courage, trustworthiness, 
generosity, kindness, autonomy (i.e. refusing the authority’s orders that are ethically 
questionable) and yet also loyalty (i.e. obedience to the rules and practices that define the 
job in the organization), being steadfast and committed to the principles and yet also 
being open to others and ready to compromise.115 Without referring to the unity of the 
virtues, it seems difficult to place those virtues and features within the virtue of integrity 
or to interpret and articulate integrity in a comprehensive way in terms of those virtues 
and features. It is likely that the difficulty in providing a clear picture of integrity leads to 
the problem in the ascription of integrity as I have shown in chapter 2. I will show that a 
comprehensive interpretation and articulation can be done more easily with the account 
of integrity that, as here developed, ties integrity with the unity of the virtues. 
Integrity indeed involves the wholeness and unity of the self, but the wholeness 
and unity of the self can only be manifested in the right actions. For the self is an 
                                                 
114 Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 166-7, 168.  
115 Ibid., pp. 168-174. 
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expanded self that in a sense includes the ideal state of the communities of which the 
individual is a member, the right actions are actions that contribute to the realization of 
the ideal communities. A person of integrity is thus a person who, by managing all his 
particularities, has come to possess the reliable dispositions to contribute to the 
realization of the ideal communities. When integrity is interpreted as ‘being true to one’s 
self’, it connotes a message that a person of integrity would show, not simply the fact that 
he truly possesses all his particularities, but how the performance of his particularities 
contributes to the realization of the ideal communities. He would show his obedience and 
loyalty to the rules and practices that define his job (profession) in the corporation, 
because he thinks that those rules and practices are parts of the way the ideal corporation 
should work. He might refuse the unethical orders of his erring superior because such 
orders hinder the realization of the ideal corporation, the ideal market community and the 
ideal larger whole community. Though he is steadfast and committed to some principles, 
he is ready to reassess his commitments when demanded by the realization of the ideal 
communities or to make a compromise when compromises are parts of the way the ideal 
communities are to be realized. Honesty and openness are crucial components of his 
integrity, because without both, he might mislead other people and undermine their 
autonomy for making the right actions and therefore hinder the realization of the ideal 
communities. Yet, lying or refusing to disclose the requested information is not 
something impossible for him to do, and in some cases is even obligatory,116 if it is 
gravely demanded to secure the only chance for the realization of the ideal communities. 
                                                 
116 By confidentiality rules, auditors are prohibited from disclosing information about their clients beyond 
those required by the generally accepted accounting and auditing standards. Revealing the confidential 
information to their relatives, friends, family, etc., for example, may inflict an unfair competition in the 
stock market, and hence can be considered as a serious breach of integrity. 
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His persistence in pursuing the right decisions and actions indicates that he has a 
reflective character, but it is immediately clear that he is also affectionate, compassionate 
and generous in his emotional relationship with other people because these traits go along 
with friendship that is indispensable for the realization of the ideal communities. 
Sincerity is also part of his character, for when he chooses the right action, he chooses it 
only for its own sake. Since he is concerned with the performance of his own 
particularities for the promotion of the values commonly shared with other people in the 
ideal state of the communities, his character is in stark contrast to the ‘chameleon’ and 
the opportunist; the former tends to blur his own particularities by changing his ‘color’ 
merely in order to match the situation, and the latter always tries to use the situation and 
take the benefits only for himself. He is certainly not a hypocrite who uses his 
particularities to deceive not only other people but also himself. By nature, he has 
courage to strive for the realization of the ideal communities, since the ideal communities 
are parts of his expanded self. A person of integrity has indeed the reliable dispositions to 
promote the values commonly shared with other people and to contribute to the 
realization of the ideal communities, and for this reason, he is really a trustworthy person. 
Because the realization of the ideal communities is the main motive of the person 
of integrity when taking his decisions and actions, we can infer that the integrity of the 
individual person must have already presupposed the integrity of the communities of 
which he is a member. It is true that the integrity of the individual person does not depend 
on whether the communities of which he is a member possesses integrity, but he cannot 
possess integrity without presupposing the ideal communities which he wishes to realize. 
The ideal communities should be, in a sense, deeply embedded as parts of his expanded 
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self. He should internalize the ideal relationships in the communities of which he is a 
member and should strive to realize them if he is to possess integrity. In other words, he 
should strive to contribute to the integrity of the communities of which he is a member if 
he is to possess integrity. The problem of the integrity of the communities brings us to the 
idea of institutional integrity, e.g. corporate integrity and market integrity, which I will 
discuss shortly in the following section. 
 
 
5.3 Institutional Integrity 
 
           Defining institutional integrity with reference to the integrity of the community or 
interpreting it as a reflection of the ideal community has at least two important 
implications. First, institutional integrity cannot be simply attributed to an entity that has 
the framework of relationships, rules, systems and processes by which the performances 
of individuals are valued only in terms of satisfying its preset objectives. This applies to 
the case of the corporation and the market too. For as a community, the corporation and 
the market are neither a machinelike entity nor an organic unity rigorously built by 
subverting individuals for the sake of the achievement of certain objectives, whatever the 
objectives are. Secondly, since the community does not subvert its individual members,117 
institutional integrity has to be seen as being simultaneously concerned with two 
inseparable constituents of community, namely (1) the individual members and (2) their 
                                                 
117 It is perhaps clearer to illustrate what it means by ‘community’ by using the Aristotelian conception of 
the expanded self. A community is not like a ‘room’ that is bigger than the sum of the space of all the 
people who are living within it, nor is it like a ‘space’ equal to the sum of the space of all the people who 
accidentally have the same goal to pursue, but is rather like ‘the biggest space’ that comes from the 
intersection of the expanded space brought by the individual members. 
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relationships, common goals and values that bring them together and make them behave 
in certain manners. Referring to my earlier argument in chapter 2 that a thing of integrity 
performs both internal self-governance and external participation to manifest the 
integrity of the whole of which it is a part, and to my argument in chapter 3 that the 
corporation (similarly the market, as we may draw its boundary) is not likely a moral 
person but should be treated as a moral agent, I shall come to the argument that what 
matters most in corporate integrity and market integrity is that the individuals should treat 
the corporation and the market of which they are members as moral entities and make 
them participate in the realization of the ideal state of the larger whole community. The 
concern is not only whether the actions attributed to the corporation and the market are 
right, but also and mainly how the individual members rightly participate in the project of 
the right actions. The individual members are the sources of the right actions and are the 
ones who would define and benefit from the end of the right actions (the good life). That 
is, in other words, to say that the integrity of the corporation and the integrity of the 
market depend largely on the integrity of their members. Accordingly, in order to possess 
integrity, the corporation and the market should enable the individual members to 
develop and exercise virtues (the virtue of integrity) and thereby to obtain the good life. 
 
 
5.3.1 Corporate Integrity 
 
            The issue of corporate integrity has been receiving greater attention after many 
corporate scandals were uncovered at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Some 
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prominent corporations, previously known for their activities in promoting corporate 
social responsibility and ethics in business, were found committing irresponsible 
financial dealings which their stakeholders had never expected.118 The scandals raise 
questions about the effective workings of corporate governance mechanisms and controls 
and the methods as to how social responsibility and ethics are integrated into the 
operation of the corporations.119 One may argue that stricter laws, rules and codes of 
conduct have to be developed and imposed in order to encourage ethical behavior. 
However, as Lynn Sharp Paine (1994) has eloquently argued,120 the compliance-based 
approach seems to be inadequate, because its model tends rather to overemphasize the 
threat of detection and punishment to deter the wrong doers than to promote voluntary 
commitment to the right conduct. Furthermore, there is no concern about the motives that 
people have for their compliance decisions, and there is always a way for them to get 
around the wording of the laws, rules and codes of conduct. Lynn Sharp Paine suggests 
the implementation of the integrity-based approach, in which the principle of self-
governance requires the management “to define and give life to an organization’s guiding 
                                                 
118 George G. Brenkert, “The Need for Corporate Integrity”, in George G. Brenkert, ed., Corporate 
Integrity and Accountability (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 1-10, p. 2.  The 
accounting scandal involving the US energy company Enron Corporation and the accounting firm Arthur 
Anderson has sparked off the attention of the public in late 2001. After then, many other scandals were 
revealed, including those of WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing, etc. 
119 The separation of the stockholders and the stakeholders from the control of the modern corporations 
requires a system of so-called ‘corporate governance’, by which the individuals who are in charge of the 
operation of the corporations are required to align their behaviors with the values that the stockholders and 
the stakeholders are expecting, and to submit reliable reports on the performances of the corporations. 
Corporate governance is developed according to the principles and codes acceptable in the respective 
society. Its models may differ from one country to another but they always hold some basic principles, such 
as trust, honesty, transparency, responsibility, accountability, and commitment to the corporation. At the 
international level, concerns over the quality of corporate governance have attracted the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to issue “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” 
in 1999 and its revised version in 2004. See: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. For 
discussion of the various different models of corporate governance, see for example: Andrew Kakabadse 
and Nada Kakabadse, The Geopolitics of Governance: The Impact of Contrasting Philosophies (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), pp. 35-60. 
120 Lynn Sharp Paine, “Managing for Organizational Integrity”, Harvard Business Review (March-April 
1984) pp. 106-117.  
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values, to create an environment that supports ethically sound behavior, and to instill a 
sense of shared responsibility among employees”.121 While some structural features of 
the compliance-based approach, like the codes of conduct, may still be relevant, the 
integrity-based approach demands more features, in particular, a supportive corporate 
culture.  
            The corporations that implement the integrity-based approach are more flexible 
than those implementing the compliance-based approach in building reputation and 
gaining success in the variously different business environments. Donna Kennedy-Glands 
and Bob Schulz (2005) show that, in the fast changing and dilemmatic situation,122 
corporations do need to go beyond strict compliance with the rules and regulations, such 
as, for example, when they are to do business with institutions that have unethical or 
different ethical backgrounds. While the compliance-based approach may simply call for 
no tolerance in dealing with the corrupt regime, the integrity-based approach still allows 
the corporations to set up business in the corrupt environment with a view to participating 
in the efforts for moral improvement and solution. Lynn Sharp Paine (1997) summarizes 
three areas the corporations can benefit from integrating ethics into the daily operation, 
namely, a well functioning of the organization, a good relationship and reputation in the 
market place, and a good social standing.123 Neither Lynn Sharp Paine nor Donna 
Kennedy-Glands and Bob Schulz justify their integrity-based approaches beyond 
strategic reasons. 
                                                 
121 Ibid., p. 111. 
122 Donna Kennedy-Glans and Bob Schulz, Corporate Integrity: A Toolkit For Managing Beyond 
Compliance (Mississauga, Ontario: John Wiley & Sons, 2005). Six integrity dilemmas are of interest to the 
management of the corporation, i.e. corporate conflict of interest, balancing stakeholder expectations, 
operating in legal vacuums, allocation or sharing of benefits of investment, dual (legal) standards, corporate 
complicity (dealing with the unethical parties) (pp. 42-56).  
123 Lynn Sharp Paine, Cases in Leadership, Ethics, and Organizational Integrity: A Strategic Perspective 
(Chicago: Irwin, 1997), pp. 2-9.    
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            Another way to justify the integrity-based approach is offered by Marvin T. 
Brown (2005) who explores the issue of corporate integrity from a civic perspective and 
appeals to Aristotle’s ethics for justification.124 Different from the business perspective 
that relies on the strategic reasons, the civic perspective relies largely on the theory of 
corporate citizenship in which corporations are seen as members belonging to the civil 
society, and thus having relationships with the other civic agencies and sharing the 
common civic values.125 For Brown, corporate integrity has to be understood in terms of 
integrating multiple relationships, in the sense that individuals are seen as parts of the 
relationships constitutive of the corporation, while the corporation is seen as part of the 
relationships which constitute the larger civic and natural communities.126 The challenge 
is then to develop the right relationships that make one part fit with the other parts, by 
analyzing, evaluating and designing the communication patterns (verbal and nonverbal) 
                                                 
124 Marvin T. Brown, Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and Leadership (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
125 Basically, the theory of corporate citizenship deals with the issue of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Jeanne M. Logsdon and Donna J. Wood (2002) argue that the concept of corporate citizenship, 
emerging likely as a transformation of the concept of corporate social responsibility, fits comfortably 
within the communitarian perspective. But they argue further that the concept of ‘business citizenship’ is 
more appropriate to propose, because it can go beyond the limited case of corporations within local or 
national communities. The concept of business citizenship covers the case of multicultural society and its 
process of globalization where products, capital, labor and knowledge are fluid moving from one state to 
another. Nowadays, the term ‘corporate global citizenship’ is more fashionable to use. In any case, the idea 
that citizenship can be attributed to corporations entails an acceptance that corporations have rights and 
duties in and for the community. They have to behave in socially responsible ways and bear responsibilities 
to do good (such as charity and voluntarism), similar to the responsibilities of individual citizens. When 
operating internationally, they have the responsibilities to respect human-rights and the values that are 
shared widely in the global community. Charles J. Fombrun (1997) claims that the rationale of corporate 
citizenship consists in three arguments, i.e. (1) it is ethical (encouraging an act in morally defensible 
directions), (2) it is socially beneficial (encouraging social integration), and (3) it is profitable (encouraging 
a long term view of economic returns). Nevertheless, however, the idea of corporate citizenship always 
raises questions over whether and under which conditions citizenship can really be attributed to 
corporations. See: Jeanne M. Logdon and Donna J. Woods, “Business Citizenship: From Domestic to 
Global Level of Analysis”, Business Ethics Quarterly 12:2 (2002), pp. 155-87; Charles J. Fombrun, “Three 
Pillars of Corporate Citezenship”, in Noel M. Tichy, Andrew R. McGill and Lynda St. Clair, eds., 
Corporate Global Citizenship: Doing Business in the Public Eye (San Francisco: New Lexington Press, 
1997), pp. 27-42. For criticism of the concept of corporate citizenship, see: Jeremy Moon, Andrew Crane 
and Dirk Matten, “Can Corporations be Citizens?: Corporate Citizenship as a Metaphor for Business 
Participation in Society”, Business Ethics Quarterly 15:3 (2005), pp. 429-53. 
126 Marvin T. Brown, op. cit., pp. ix, 4, 6, 30, 32. 
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between those parts, in respect to each of the five dimensions of corporate life: 
interpersonal, organizational, social (civic), cultural, and environmental.127 Indeed, 
Brown’s justification for the integrity-based approach is wider and deeper than the 
strategic reasons whose concern is only with the organizational dimension of corporate 
life. But Brown’s emphasis on the relationships inside and outside of the corporation, 
reducing individuals into something explainable in terms of relationships, seems to ignore 
or deprive individuals of their essential roles in the communities. He overlooks the fact 
that a community is constituted of both the individual members and the relationships that 
they construct and reconstruct, viz. not only the relationships which, as he believes, the 
individual members must ‘belong to’.128 I therefore argue that his concept and 
justification for the integrity-based approach, though more attractive than the strategic 
reasons justification, is still inadequate.129 
           Ignoring individuals while emphasizing too strongly the civic relationships in the 
pursuit of corporate integrity can lead to at least two problems, the solutions of which can 
only make sense if individuals are recognized as having the autonomy to make the right 
                                                 
127 Ibid., p. 35-6. With respect to the interpersonal, organizational, social (civic), cultural, and 
environmental dimensions, the challenge is to design ‘corporate conversations’ that can promote, 
respectively, reciprocal participation, worthwhile corporate purposes, cooperation with other civic agents, 
openness to differences and disagreement, and natural prosperity.       
128 Using a ‘bus’ as an analogy, Brown says: “Creating corporate integrity today is about redesigning the 
bus. How should we arrange the seats? Should we have seats? What kind of relationships should the bus 
design promote? What kind of bus fits with the civic and natural environment? Who should have a say in 
the bus’s design? The right bus, at least from a civic perspective, is just as important as the right people. If 
the bus has integrity, then it will be appropriate for citizens to ride and safe to travel in our civic and natural 
environment” (Ibid).  
129 A quite similar justification with an appeal to the social contract theory of corporations is offered by 
Muel Kaptein and Johan Wempe (2002). See: Muel Kaptein and Johan Wempe, The Balanced Company: A 
Theory of Corporate Integrity (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002). According to Kaptein and 
Wempe, integrity requires the fulfillment of three conditions: (1) internal coherence between values, norms 
and ideals that motivate actions, (2) internal integration between words and deeds, and (3) external 
integration with the social environment (pp. 90, 97). The social contract that constitutes the corporation 
accommodates the relationship and absorbs the conflict between values, norms, and ideals, translates the 
values into concrete behaviors of the corporation, and facilitates the integration with the environment via 
individual contracts with the stakeholders (p. 217).  Accordingly, corporate integrity actualizes the social 
contract and entails weighing the different stakeholder interests (p. 229).   
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decisions and actions. First, the pressure arising from the civic relationships can lead to 
the omission of the goal of business (making a profit) in favor of the goal of the civic 
activities, such as public education, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other 
philanthropic activities. This kind of omission impairs the vitality of the corporations and 
the vitality of the market system, and thus can end up with a state that is contradictory to 
the common notion of a thing possessing integrity.130 In order to avoid such an omission, 
I argue, the goal of business and the goals of the civic activities have to appeal to the 
good life (happiness) as the ultimate end, for then the making of a profit can remain the 
defining characteristics of business.131 However, since the good life consists in the right 
actions of individuals, which are essentially the means ‘relative to them’, there will be no 
way to obtain the good life unless individuals have the autonomy to make the right 
decisions and actions. Therefore, individuals and their autonomy are indispensable in the 
pursuit of and to the notion of corporate integrity. Secondly, if corporate integrity is 
reduced to the integration of relationships, there is no ideal state at which the corporation 
should aim, except that which is defined and designed collectively by the community or 
by those who represent, or pretend to represent, the community. Suppose the actual 
community is totally corrupt. It seems hard to accept the claim that the corporations 
whose activities consistently follow the widespread habit of corruption possess integrity. 
In such a community, integrity should only be ascribed to the corporation which takes 
                                                 
130 Indeed, it seems commonly acceptable that part of the definition of institutional integrity is faithful to 
the functions, values and principles that define the institution’s distinctive competence. See, for example: 
Larry D. Terry, Leadership of Public Bureaucracies: The Administrator as Conservator 2nd (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 43.  
131 Thus, the goal of philanthropic activities is not part of the defining characteristic of business, though in 
doing its business the corporation may need to contribute to the philanthropic activities for the sake of the 
right action. This does not mean that the corporation has no sincerity at all in its contribution, for if the 
ultimate end is really the good life, the corporation would exercise the right action (including its 
contribution to the philanthropic and paternalistic activities) for its own sake. 
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every opportunity, without ruining its nature as a business institution, to improve the 
corrupt society. The improvement is only possible if individuals can exert their autonomy 
to raise questions and disagreements, to make the right judgments and decisions, and to 
take the right actions.  
            Thus, defining and developing corporate integrity seems to make sense only if it 
appeals to the good life as the ultimate end. Since the good life, which consists in the 
individuals’ right decisions and actions, can only be lived in the context of the larger 
whole community, corporate integrity must be concerned with the activities that would 
contribute ultimately to the realization of the ideal state of the larger whole 
community.132 We can say that corporate integrity is a corporate virtue manifested in the 
disposition of the corporation which possesses it to produce the right corporate activities 
that ultimately lead individuals, outside and inside the corporation, to make the right 
decisions and actions. In effect, though it is true that good corporate structures and 
culture, or good ‘communication patterns’ in Brown’s words, are essential for bringing 
corporate activities into the right path, corporate activities can only be said to be right, 
with respect to corporate integrity, if they come out of the right judgments, decisions and 
actions that individuals make in the corporation. The disposition of the corporation to 
produce the right corporate activities is therefore a result of the dispositions of the 
                                                 
132 It is important to note that the contribution of the corporation to the realization of the ideal state of the 
larger whole community has to go through its contribution to the realization of the ideal market community. 
However, the term ‘market’ has to be interpreted in a broad sense. It includes the capital market where the 
allocation of resources in one corporation competes with the alternative, profitable allocations. Therefore, it 
should be difficult to say that a corporation contributes to the realization of the ideal market community, 
unless it responsibly makes an attractive profit. Moreover, if the corporation does not seek to make an 
attractive profit, the immediate question arises as to whether the corporation really facilitates the 
stockholders (the investors) to make the right decisions and actions and, for that matter, really appeals to 
the good life as the ultimate end. One may argue that the ‘contract’ between the corporation and the 
investors has to be respected all the time, but, from the Aristotelian perspective, respecting this sort of 
contract is only part of the way those who are in charge in the operation of the corporation make the right 
decisions and actions.  
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individuals who are in charge in the operation of the corporation. Accordingly, we can 
say that a corporate structure and culture is not good enough if it cannot support the 
development of the individuals who live in it and give them a positive motivational 
influence to make the right decisions and actions. But conversely, it is also not good for 
an individual to work in a certain corporation whose ongoing corporate structure and 
culture and its transformation are not ones within which he can live and make his 
contribution, even though that corporate structure and culture are likely to promote the 
right corporate activities. There should be an interplay between the development of good 
individuals and the transformation of the good corporate structure and culture, the result 
of which is expected to engender both the corporation of integrity and the persons of 
integrity living in it.133 Three values are indispensable in the process of the interplay and, 
therefore, should constitute the essential elements of the good corporate culture, and 
should light up the development of the good corporate structure, namely autonomy, 
friendship and justice. For, as I have argued earlier in chapter 4, without autonomy 
individuals cannot make the right decisions and actions and obtain the good life, while 
without friendship and justice there is no community from which the good life is to be 
obtained. The interplay has to be taken into account when we design the good corporate 
structure and culture for developing corporate integrity. 
                                                 
133 It might be useful to see the process of the interplay by referring to the terms used by Alan Hamlin 
(1999) who identifies two distinct roles of institutions in contributing to the creation of social values, viz. 
the direct role and the feedback role. In the direct role the institution aggregates, structures or otherwise 
mediates the characteristics of a group of individuals who live in it, whereas in the feedback role the 
institution influences the characteristics of those individuals. Borrowing his terms, I argue that the matter 
rests ultimately on the individuals as to how they want these two roles to function for them. With respect to 
the direct role, the individuals can either simply let the institution ‘structuralize’ (‘economise’ for Hamlin) 
them altogether, or make the institution function to mediate them obtaining the good life. With respect to 
the feedback role, the individuals can develop the institutional structure and culture that, at the end of the 
day, would either promote or undermine their own integrity.  See: Alan Hamlin, “Promoting integrity and 
virtue: The institutional dimension”, in Alan Montefiore and David Vines, eds., Integrity in the Public and 
Private Domains (London and NY: Routledge, 1999), pp. 269-79, p. 271-2. 
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            Another sort of interplay should also prevail between the transformation of the 
good corporate structure and culture and the structure and culture outside of the 
corporation. This external kind of interplay should ensure that the right corporate 
activities brought under the good corporate structure and culture truly encourage 
individuals outside of the corporation, those who are directly and indirectly affected by 
the operation of the corporation, to make the right decisions and actions. Together with 
the internal kind of interplay described earlier, the external interplay paves the way for 
the corporation to establish its corporate identity and character that is potentially 
acceptable and commendable in the public view, without necessarily confounding the 
status of the corporation as a private institution with public institutions. We can then say 
that corporate integrity is an expression of the good corporate identity and character. 
Following the working conceptualization of integrity proposed by Suresh Srivastva and 
David L. Cooperrider (1988), we can describe the process of development of corporate 
integrity in terms of four aspects, namely, interactional, dialogical, directional and 
consequential.134 It involves the interaction between one individual and the others in a 
community and between one community and the other communities within the larger 
whole community, transforms the interaction into emphatic communication and 
participation in the direction of the larger whole community, and creates harmony, 
solidarity and coordinated unity among different units. With regard to the good corporate 
identity and character, corporate integrity that expresses it reflects the corporation’s best 
competency in serving the market and subsequently in contributing to the realization of 
the ideal state of the larger whole community. Similar to the case in which the right 
                                                 
134 Suresh Sivastva and David L. Cooperrider, “Introduction: The Urgency for Executive Integrity”, in 
Suresh Sivastva and Associates, Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational 
Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988), pp. 1-28, pp. 6-8. 
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action of the individual is the mean relative to the individual and his process of 
habituation, the right corporate activity is the mean relative to the best competency of the 
corporation. Accordingly, the corporation that avoids establishing its best competency or, 
for profit reason, denies its best competency in its own activities would likely lack 
integrity.135 In practice, establishing the best competency of corporation and thereby 
developing corporate integrity are not a matter of following a single method that is 
applicable for every corporation, because many particularities that a corporation has in its 
possession may have to be considered.136 In any case, when developing corporate 
integrity, we should appeal to the good life as the ultimate end, and take into account the 
internal and external interplay in the process. 
 
 
5.3.2 Market Integrity 
 
Market integrity should also be defined and developed with an appeal to the good 
life as the ultimate end. In the context of financial markets, especially the Securities-
Exchange (the capital market),137 market integrity is usually associated with the ability of 
                                                 
135 During the Asian financial crisis 1997-98, several Indonesian companies, which were engaged in the 
production of goods and services, converted their production capitals for currency speculation. With such a 
response to the crisis, these companies worsened the value of the domestic currency held by most people in 
the country. They also contributed to cause the undesirable inflation, as they reduced the supply of goods 
and services in the market. The integrity of these companies is really questionable.        
136 Lynn Sharp Paine (1994) insists that there is no single integrity strategy that is right for every 
corporation. In order to have an effective integrity strategy, many factors may have to be considered, such 
as the personalities of the individuals who manage the company, the company history, the background 
culture, the line of business, and the industry regulation. See: Lynn Sharp Paine, “Managing for 
Organizational Integrity”, op. cit., p. 112.  
137 As a form of market organization, the financial market facilitates the trade of financial instruments. 
Included in the category of financial markets are the capital market (stock market and bond market), money 
market, foreign-exchange market, and derivative market (futures, swaps and options). See: Shelagh 
Heffernan, “Financial Market, international”, in Malcolm Warner, ed., International Encyclopedia of 
Business and Management 2nd edition (London: Thomson Learning, 2002), pp. 1957-67. 
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investors to make well-informed investment decisions in a fair, transparent and efficient 
market.138 Trust and confidence are thought to be very crucial to the integrity of the 
financial market. Undermining trust and confidence by so called ‘market abuse’, in the 
form of insider dealing and market manipulation,139 would impair the mechanism of the 
financial market and thereby ruin its integrity.140 The investors in the financial market 
where market-abuse is practised would not be well-informed and, consequently, cannot 
make the right investment decisions. To put the matter simply, it seems right to say that 
when investors are intentionally hindered from making the right investment decisions, the 
financial market where they are engaged does not promote the good life and hence lacks 
integrity. But it is important to note that well-informed investment decisions are not 
                                                 
138 See, for example: James Rydge and Carole Comerton-Forde, “The Importance of Market Integrity: An 
Analysis of ASX Self-Regulation”, SIRCA – Research Paper, 1 September 2004, http://www.asx.com.au/  
about/pdf/The_Importance_of_Market _Integrity_-_September_2004.pdf; George Gunn, “Market Integrity: 
Manipulation and MICA”, Seminar Paper, Regional Seminar on Supervision of Market Intermediaries and 
Risk Management, July/August 2002, http://www.adb.org/Projects/APEC/Market_Intermediaries/Market_ 
Integrity_PPT.pdf. 
139 Market abuse is generally divided into two categories: insider dealing and market manipulation. Insider 
dealing involves the use of price-sensitive information, which is not publicly available, for the benefit of 
the privileged parties (inner circle). Market manipulation involves the dissemination of false/misleading 
information, or the distortion of a price-setting mechanism, for the purpose of controlling the free market to 
the disadvantage of the other parties. See: The European Union, “Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market 
abuse)”, Official Journal of the European Union L96 (12.4.2003), pp. 16-25, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_096/; The Forum of European Securities Commissions, “A European Regime 
Against Market Abuse”, Fesco/00-0961 Paper (29th June 2000),  http://www.cnmv.es/ 
Delfos/autoridades/fesco/99-096l.pdf. 
140 In parallel to the issue of corporate integrity, market integrity has become a major issue recently, in 
particular when the revelation of many corporate accounting scandals at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is thought to have jeopardized the trust of the investors in the stock-exchange markets and the 
capital markets in general. It is thought that when the investors’ trust is undermined, they would withdraw 
their funds and become highly risk averse, resulting in the lost value of the traded equities and the reduced 
availability and fluidity of the capitals. Subsequently, the cost of capital would increase and the confidence 
of both the corporations (as the issuers of the financial instruments) and the investors (as the buyers of the 
financial instruments) would decline. The mechanism of the capital market can indeed be in danger of 
failing to facilitate capital formation that is necessary for the growth of the economy. Since the effect of the 
scandals can be so extensive, the governments of the developed countries and the leaders of the 
international institutions urge necessary steps to ensure the integrity of the capital markets. See: U.S. 
Department of State, “G-8 Leaders Call for Enhanced Market Integrity”, Washington File (2 June 2003), 
http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2003/030602/publog1.htm; Bill Witherell, “Corporate Governance and Market 
Integrity”, The OECD Observer 234 (Oct. 2002), pp. 7-9; Bill Witherell, “Corporate Governance: Stronger 
Principles for Better Market Integrity”, The OECD Observer 243 (May 2004), pp. 41-3. 
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necessarily right decisions. When the Securities Exchange employs regulatory rules, an 
oversight system and enforcement program, designed to foster fair and transparent 
trading of securities, monitor the compliance, and sanction the violators of the rules, the 
investors may be protected from market abuse, but other people in the economy, those 
who are not involved in the trading of securities, are not necessarily protected from the 
possible negative effects of even the well-informed investment decisions. For, if the 
Securities Exchange is understood only as a place for speculation, for pursuing capital 
gains as the ultimate end, the investments would likely circulate around just to boost the 
prices of the securities and create economic instability (bubbles and crashes), the threat of 
which may hinder people in the economy making the right decisions and taking the right 
actions. In order to prevent the negative effects, the Securities Exchange has to function 
properly, not as an independent institution, but as a part of the whole economy, 
promoting the capital formation that is necessary for sustaining the growth of the real, 
productive economy.141 At the end, any financial market community is part of the larger 
whole community and therefore should promote the realization of the ideal state of the 
larger whole community. The integrity of the financial market is concerned not only with 
whether the market participants, those individuals who are engaged in it, can make well-
informed investment decisions but also whether the investment decisions of the market 
participants can, to some extent, facilitate individuals outside of the market to make the 
right decisions and take the right actions. Similar to the integrity of the corporation, the 
integrity of the financial market depends largely on the participation or the integrity of 
the market participants. 
                                                 
141 There are two ways of promoting capital formation in the real productive economy, i.e. directly through 
initial-offering and reoffering of the securities, and indirectly through inducing the confidence of the 
corporate issuers to invest more, after learning the true value of their securities in the markets.       
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Some financial markets like the Securities Exchanges, however, are rather 
specific as compared to the market in general, because they are actually organized 
markets that are not only managed to facilitate the transactions but also to make a 
profit.142 In the Securities Exchanges, the market participants and their transactions have 
to go through the standard processes and procedures, governed by the preset regulatory 
rules and monitored by the overseeing body for the compliances. In an open (free) 
market, the participants set the rules of the trades for themselves and monitor the 
compliances without involving any separate oversight body. Theoretically, there is no 
organizer guiding the operation of the free market and yet self-organization emerges in 
line with the working of pricing mechanisms where the quantities of the goods supplied 
and demanded, the subjective judgments of the participants in the value of the goods, and 
the competition among them are involved. The free market operates purely out of private 
initiatives of the participants, and how good the performance of the market is would 
depend largely on the participants themselves. Accordingly, the integrity of the market is 
essentially built upon the integrity of the participants that are engaged in it. 
Since integrity is defined with an appeal to the good life as the ultimate end, a life 
that is to be lived in the perspective of the realization of the ideal state of the larger whole 
community, the market participants are encouraged to intentionally pursue some values 
that are socially shared with others in the promotion of the ideal community. This marks 
a contrast to the conception of the free market commonly ascribed to modern economists, 
                                                 
142 This raises a debate on its own over whether the Securities Exchanges have the incentive to regulate the 
behaviors of their market participants for promoting market integrity. The debate circulates around the 
strategic reasons of self-regulation. Some argue that the Exchanges have the incentive to self-regulate 
effectively. The others argue that, because of the possible conflict with the profit-maximizing objective, the 
Exchanges may not have the incentive, therefore, the regulatory and oversight functions have to be given to 
an independent institution. See: James Rydge and Carole Comerton-Forde, op. cit., p. 12.   
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in particular the Neo-classical economists, who believe that the mechanism under which 
the free market operates is led by what the classical economist Adam Smith (1723-90) 
called an ‘invisible hand’. Briefly put, Smith argues that if every individual intends only 
to pursue his own interest, he is in the guidance of an invisible hand to promote the 
interest of the society, the socially shared goods, which was no part of his intention.143 
But taking Smith’s invisible hand as part of the free market mechanism seems to be far 
too much diversion from what Smith originally means by the invisible hand. Heinz 
Lubasz (1992, 1995) shows that Smith’s invisible hand is the hand of nature, not the hand 
of the market.144 In Lubasz’s view, Smith’s invisible hand has to be understood in the 
context of capital investments made with reference to ‘the wisdom of nature’, in which 
every individual human action, as long as it comes out of his natural inclinations, would 
be guided towards a beneficent outcome despite the fact that he does not intend to pursue 
it. For Smith, according to Lubasz, the individuals’ natural interest is, more than the 
interest in gain, to include also the interest in security and ease and the passion for 
independence, whereas the interest of the society is concerned with the country’s 
                                                 
143 In his “Wealth of Nations”, Smith wrote: “As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can 
both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce 
may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the 
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows 
how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no 
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than 
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade 
for the public good”. (Italics is added emphasis). See: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press; NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), Volume I, Book IV, Chapter II, paragraph 9, p. 456.  
144 Heinz Lubasz, “Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand – of the Market?”, in Roy Dilley, ed., Contesting 
Markets: Analyses of Ideology, Discourse and Practice (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1992), pp. 
37-56; Heinz Lubasz, “Adam Smith and the ‘free market’”, in Stephen Copley and Kathryn Sutherland, 
eds., Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: New interdisciplinary essays (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1995), pp. 45-69.  
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productive labors and with the increase of products from the use of the land and labors of 
the country. Given equal profits or even somewhat less than equal profits, the individuals 
who let their natural inclinations direct them to pursue their own interest in gain, security, 
ease and independence would likely prefer their capitals to be invested rather in the 
domestic than foreign industry, thereby promoting the interest of the society without 
consciously intending to do so. By the invisible hand of nature, the self-interest 
maximization is led to the maximization of the domestic production and employment 
and, following from it, the maximal distribution of income to the workers who have no 
source of income other than from employing their labor in the production.145 If Lubasz is 
right, we can conclude that, by mentioning the metaphoric invisible hand, Smith’s 
concern is not just the working of the market as the modern economists see it, but the 
working of the wisdom of nature that brings individuals to the promotion of the interest 
of the society. The self-interest maximization has to be put in the context of the 
promotion of the socially shared goods, exercised through the production activities.  
The adoption of integrity, as here defined, into the practice of market economy 
will give different character to the market participants and bring the economy to the same 
result as that which Adam Smith seems to expect with the working of the wisdom of 
nature. With an appeal to the good life as the ultimate end, the market participants will 
                                                 
145 Through the invisible hand of nature, the role of production in the distribution of income seems to be 
clear and confirmed, as it is shown in Smith’s earlier book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”: “The 
produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of 
maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little 
more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own 
conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they 
employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce 
of all their improvements. They led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all 
its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and 
afford means to the multiplication of the species”. (Italics is added emphasis). See: Adam Smith, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press; NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), Part IV, Chapter I, Paragraph 10, pp. 184-5.   
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consider market transactions as part of a grand economic production enterprise, or of a 
‘practice’ in MacIntyre’s term, within which they can contribute to bring about the right 
direction by making the right decisions and performing the right actions on their part. The 
good life, as their motivation, underlies their subjective judgments in the value of the 
transacted goods and plays an important part in the way they compete with each other in 
the market place. The pricing mechanisms and the free market will work perfectly well, 
but not as it is driven merely by the interest in gain, as the modern economists would 
suggest. However, different from Smith’s suggestion that relies on the wisdom of nature 
to guide men with several natural interests, the appeal to the good life relies just on the 
fact that, by nature, men are rational and social beings who are and should be in pursuit 
of the good life as the ultimate end. In their pursuit of the good life, the market 
participants will make economic decisions and take actions that would ultimately 
contribute to the realization of the ideal state of the larger whole community, whereby the 
opportunities of all the concerned parties (not only the other market participants who are 
involved directly in the transactions, but also the individuals outside of the transactions) 
in making the right decisions and actions would be enhanced or at least preserved. If all 
the market participants possess integrity, the market would be an effective place to 
facilitate fair transactions, foster the production activities and subsequently promote the 
growth of the whole economy. 
When market integrity comes to the forefront, healthy competition prevails, where 
the market participants, as they orientate their decisions and actions in the perspective of 
a grand economic production enterprise, would compete rather in terms of performance 
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than by using economic power at their disposal.146 Recognizing the difference between 
performance-based competition and power-based competition is important for 
understanding the way the market that has integrity operates. Generally defined, 
economic power is the ability of the market participant to produce intended economic 
effects on others.147 When the power is exercised to influence market price and to 
exclude competitors, it is usually characterized as market power.148 In practice, the 
exercise of economic power is less conspicuous than the exercise of public power (held 
by the public institutions) and, as a result, economic power can be easily used rather to 
limit than to enhance the choice for individuals.149 The motivation that can easily emerge 
in the exercise of economic power is inward direction, in the sense that it turns the market 
as an economic institution into something that serves the interest of the holder of the 
power. The extensive and intensive exercise of economic power, therefore, can 
undermine the vitality of the market and the economy as a whole. Although the power 
being exercised is built on the good reputation in performing repeated transactions, it can 
create barriers to the newcomers who are possibly more efficient and earnestly eager to 
participate in the market.150 The reckless use of economic power by the Hedge Funds, the 
imperial conglomerates and the giant multinational corporations can generate global 
financial instability and deindustrialization that, at the end, results in the increase of 
                                                 
146 Along the way, the market participants certainly can gain economic power from improving the 
performances they deliver to the market, i.e. from producing better products and services or producing the 
same products and services more efficiently. However, if they really compete in terms of performance, they 
would rather not rely on the power, which they have accumulated, just to increase their revenues and profits 
(their own performance). 
147 Douglas F. Greer, “The Concentration of Economic Power”, in Wallace C. Peterson, ed., Market Power 
and the Economy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 53-81, p. 54. 
148 Ibid., p. 53; Rodney Peterson, “Industrial Power: Meaning and Measurement”, in Wallace C. Peterson, 
ed., Market Power and the Economy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 1-25, p. 20. 
149 William M. Dugger, “Corporate Power and Economic Performance”, in Wallace C. Peterson, ed., 
Market Power and the Economy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 83-108, p. 83. 
150 Donald Hay, “Do markets need a moral framework?”, in Alan Montefiore and David Vines, ed., 
Integrity in the Public and Private Domains (London and NY: Routledge, 1999), pp. 258-68, p. 263. 
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unemployment and the plight of many people who have no idea how to anticipate the 
situation.151 By contrast, in performance-based competition the participants would 
encourage betterment, innovation, enhancement of individual choice and fair 
transactions. The big retail outlet, for example, would not drive out the adjacent small 
retail outlets, but rather support them to serve the market in a more specific niche. 
Employee recruitments and inter-company contracts are negotiated mainly with respect to 
competence and value, not to the negotiating power each party has during the 
negotiations. In short, with the working of the performance-based competition, the 
market that has integrity promotes fair transactions and spurs increasing employment 
opportunities in the economy. 
Finally, it is relevant to discuss briefly the nature and significance of the 
regulatory rules and policies in supporting the integrity of the market. Like the case of the 
corporation where the corporate structure can support the development of corporate 
integrity, the regulatory rules and policies can also be supportive of the establishment of 
market integrity. However, it is important to note that simply imposing the rules and 
policies would not be sufficient to generate market integrity. Integrity cannot be imposed 
from outside, but rather has to be developed from the members or the parts of the thing 
that would possess it. Market integrity would thus only emerge from the integrity of the 
people who are engaged in the market. It is generally a mistake to say that market 
integrity depends only on the nature and enforcement of the rules and policies governing 
the performances of the people in the market. Market integrity requires long-term 
                                                 
151 William M. Dugger (1988) argues that the exercise of the imperial conglomerate’s power through a hit 
and run strategy (acquiring and reselling free-standing corporations, unrestrained price-setting, etc) is partly 
responsible for the three major trends in the United States in the closing of the twentieth century, namely: 
deindustrialization, import penetration and income disintegration. See: William M. Dugger, “Corporate 
Power and Economic Performance”, op. cit., pp. 104-5. 
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stability of performances, and the stability can prevail only if voluntary adherence to the 
rules and policies brings up the relevant character of the people and becomes part of their 
ways of making the right decisions and acting rightly. With respect to the debate over 
government intervention and regulation in the market economy, I would suggest that we 
view the need for the regulatory rules and policies more as practical requirement than as 
essential requirement.152,153 In this view, the rules and policies can theoretically be 
dismissed if all market participants do already possess integrity; but since not all market 
participants  possess  integrity,   while  the  exercise  of  their  power  can  undermine  the 
autonomy of some people in taking the right decisions and actions, the rules and policies 
are practically required for the operation of the market.154  
It is important to note that, different from the case of corporate integrity, where 
one can preserve one’s autonomy by refusing to join the integrity-less corporation that 
threatens the autonomy of its members, in the case of market integrity almost everyone 
has no alternative other than to associate himself with the ongoing market whether or not 
                                                 
152 The practicality of the requirement is in line with the possible fact that not all regulatory rules and 
policies enacted by the government are conducive to market integrity; the rules and policies that do not 
facilitate the people in the market to make the right decisions and actions can even be inimical to the 
integrity of the market. Since the requirement is practical, it must originate from the particular conditions in 
the market and in the society as a whole. And, since the particular conditions may change over time, some 
aspects of the market may have to be regulated at one time and deregulated at another time. Thus, this view 
differs significantly from the positions of those who either argue for or argue against government regulation 
of business, considered as essential requirement. For the summary of the arguments for government 
regulation of business and the counter-argument against it, see for example: Tibor R. Machan, “Should 
Business be regulated?”, in Tom Regan, ed., Just Business: New Introductory Essays in Business Ethics 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), pp. 202-234.     
153 It is interesting to note that the practice of government intervention in the market economy has been 
done anyway since the first introduction of the government issued money whose intrinsic value is much 
less than the printed value. The result of the debasement of money is inflation, the anticipation of which 
requires the government to control the money supply. See: Philip Judge, “The Free Market Money Report”, 
in The Anglo Far-East Research Library Articles, www.anglofareast.com, 2004.  
154 For example, when some market participants, such as the Hedge Funds, can hold excessive powers, the 
exercise of which can potentially destabilize the economy and threaten the autonomy of many people, we 
seem to need a regulatory rule to prevent the reckless exercise of the powers. When the consumers of a 
certain kind of products have reasonable doubt as to the quality of the variously offered products in the 
market, a product standardization policy can be practically required to break the customers’ psychological 
barriers and hence to stimulate the operation of the market. 
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it has integrity; hence, everyone is potentially under the threat of losing his autonomy in 
the market economy. Almost everyone in the society is concerned with the integrity of 
the market. Since to support its integrity the market practically needs, but cannot by itself 
produce and enforce, the rules and policies, it has to rely on the fragile power of the 
government for producing and enforcing them. As a result, a reliable method of check 
and balance should be sought in order to ensure that the power of the government is 
exercised correctly. Interestingly, when the market is enlarging and the so-called ‘civil 
society’ emerges, three basic institutions of society, viz. the market, the state and the civil 
society, are entangled with one another, blurring their boundaries.155 Private institutions 
(the market), public institutions (the state) and semipublic representatives (the civil 
society) make up a sort of ‘partnership’ to deal with the problem of preserving and 
fostering the common good.156 Within the framework of these three basic institutions of 
society, I think, the best method of check and balance is one that involves all the 
concerned agencies of the three basic institutions, such as the industry associations (the 
market), the labor unions (the market), the non-governmental organizations (the civil 
society), and the government agencies (the state), in the process of creating the rules and 
policies and monitoring their application. With the best method of check and balance, we 
can expect that the applied regulatory rules and policies would not hinder but rather 
                                                 
155 In speaking of the blurring boundaries, Henk van Huijk (2004) describes the characteristics of these 
three basic institutions of society as follows: “The market is meant to manage property in view of the 
safeguarding and growth of prosperity and well being of its participants…; the civil society is meant to 
manage knowledge and expertise in view of the fostering of democratic citizenship…; and the state or 
government is meant to manage power in view of maintenance and growth of the common good”. The civil 
society consists of many legally protected non-governmental institutions that are self-organizing, self-
reflexive and permanently in a dynamic tension with each other and with the state institutions. See: Henk 
van Luijk, “Integrity in the Private, the Public, and the Corporate Domain”, in George G. Brenkert, ed., 
Corporate Integrity & Accountability (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 38-54, p. 51. 
156 Indeed, in the enlarging market, the market participants, though remaining as private institutions, are 
more and more challenged by the problem of preserving and fostering the common good in addition to the 
problem of pursuing their own interests. 
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facilitate the people in the market to take the right decisions and actions and thus to 
obtain the good life.  
To sum up, though the corporation and the market, seen as communities, are not 
the sum of their individual members, the integrity of the corporation and the integrity of 
the market depend largely on the integrity of their individual members. But individuals 
can only possess integrity if, in their decisions and actions, they consistently take into 
account the realization of the ideal state of the communities of which they are members, 
viz. they consistently take into account the way they can contribute to realizing the 
integrity of the corporation where they work, and subsequently the integrity of the market 
in which the corporation participates. This is true because all levels of integrity, 
individual and institutional, appeal to the good life as the ultimate end, a life to be lived 
in the context of the realization of the ideal state of the larger whole community. Their 
decisions and actions, constitutive of the good life, should contribute ultimately to the 
realization of the ideal state of the larger whole community.  
Thus, the burden of realizing institutional integrity rests on individuals, but they 
have and should have the motivation for realizing it since, as rational and social beings, 
they are and should be in pursuit of the good life as the ultimate end. Their motivation is 
drawn from the sense of their expanded self that they develop along with their pursuit of 
the good life, according to which their self-realization can only be appreciated in the light 
of a co-realization with the ideal state of the communities of which they are members. 
Under the sense of their expanded self and the light of the co-realization, their right 
decisions and actions represent the best way of managing and expressing their own 
particularities and uniqueness to promote the realization of the ideal communities. Since 
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the realization of the ideal communities involves the promotion of the socially shared 
values, integrity can then be interpreted as a virtue that disposes the individual possessors 
to take the right decisions and actions that would promote the common goods without 
denying their self-identity. Not only is it not a self-denying virtue, integrity is even a 
virtue that would elegantly express the uniqueness, partially definitive of self-identity, 
through its contribution to the promotion of the goods commonly shared with others. This 
understanding will bring us to the issue of individual’s interest vis a vis the common 





INTEGRITY AND CORRUPTION 
 
 
In this chapter, I shall look at integrity in contrast with the vicious characters that 
give rise to the incidents of corruption. Through the contrast, I hope to present not only a 
clearer picture of integrity but also a better understanding of corruption. In the first part 
of this chapter, I will discuss the nature of corruption and show how its opposing relation 
to integrity may shed light on the way we can meaningfully grasp its proper definition. 
While we can construe integrity as a virtue the possession of which would dispose the 
possessors to manage and express their particularities in the best possible ways to 
promote the common goods, we can think of corruption as an expression of a vicious 
character that disposes its possessors to abuse power by manipulating or exploiting the 
common goods for some particular interest. In this understanding of corruption, I 
consider that power entails a sense of responsibility and that the common goods are 
socially shared goods that sustain the group of people as a community and as a 
community of a particular kind. Since corruption involves the diversion and degradation 
of the common goods, it essentially connotes a serious betrayal of trust, and therefore is 
distinctly and inherently immoral. Such an understanding of corruption covers all 
possible kinds of corruption in any possible sphere of life, for the term ‘power’ is thought 
to refer to any kind of power that emerges in any context of life. It may extend our 
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concern to the abuse of economic power that, in the era of globalization, can be no less 
destructive than the abuse of political power. 
            The second part of this chapter deals with the nature of corruption in economic 
life. Apart from the popular distinction between corruption committed by individuals 
within an institution (individual corruption), corruption committed on behalf of an 
institution (institutional corruption), and corruption that emerges from the erosion of 
morality across institutions (systemic corruption), I shall draw the distinction between 
economic corruption involving public officials, economic corruption without the 
involvement of public officials, and special cases of corruption which emerge mainly 
from the corrupt attitude of the agent. In the special cases of corruption, I will show and 
discuss the so called ‘noble cause corruption’ where the rationalization of corruption is 
taken by recourse to a good end. With regard to the virtue of integrity, I will also show 
that, though corruption is inherently immoral, a single corrupt act can be ethically 
justified, particularly when one has no better tactical choice than to engage in the single 
particular corrupt act in order to maintain the prospective realization of the ideal 
community.   
            As integrity is directly opposed to corruption, I shall argue in the third part of this 
chapter that integrity is indispensable for any reliable endeavor to curb corruption. I shall 
discuss three basic principles that must serve as the ground for developing integrity, 
before putting forward a concrete proposal. Instead of relying merely on the mechanism 
of ‘power-play’, which is expressive in most anti-corruption systems, I shall argue that 
the power-play mechanism is inherently still vulnerable to corruption. An anti-corruption 
system will only be reliable if it is placed on integrity as its foundation. At the end of this 
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chapter, I will note that although the integrity-based definition of corruption may not be 
institutionally operational, it can provide a normative foundation for evaluating any 




6.1 The Nature of Corruption and Its Vices 
 
            Aristotle uses the term ‘corruption’ as the opposite of the term ‘generation’ in his 
philosophy of change. His treatise Peri Geneseos kai Phthoras is traditionally translated 
into Latin as De Generatione et Corruptione and into English as On Generation and 
Corruption.1 Briefly put, generation and corruption refer to changes with respect to 
substance (substantial changes), viz. generation is concerned with something coming-to-
be and corruption is concerned with something ceasing-to-be (perishing).2 Corruption is 
associated with a process of decay and degeneration of a thing that fails to remain as that 
thing. If the thing in question is a particular physical thing, corruption results in the 
degeneration of that physical thing.3 Whereas, if the thing is a particular human being, we 
can say that corruption involves the aberration of his behavioral dispositions, departing 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, translated by C.J.F. Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 
see Williams’s “Introduction” p. ix; Aristotle, “De Generatione et Corruptione”, The Works of Aristotle, 
translated by Harold. H. Joachim, edited by W.D. Ross, 1st edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). 
2 Aristotle identifies three kinds of change, i.e. change from subject to subject (motion), change from non-
subject to subject (coming to be) and change from subject to non-subject (perishing). The last two kinds 
can be categorized as substantial change. See: Aristotle, Physica, translated by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, 
edited by W.D. Ross, 1st edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), [V.1.225a.1-225b.5].   
3 The destruction of a certain physical body would obviously lead to the generation of another sort of 
physical body, except its mass is by the destruction totally converted into energy in that an ‘unusual sort’ of 
physical body may then need to be introduced. Indeed, generation and corruption are directly opposite each 
other, and the form of change manifested as a series of corruption and generation is necessarily ceaseless. 
See: Aristotle, “De Generatione et Corruptione”, The Works of …, op. cit., [I.3. 318a.25-35].  
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from what should be regarded as the appropriate behavior of a human being qua human 
being. Relying on Aristotle’s view in the ethics that the appropriate human behavior is an 
expression of virtue, we can further say that corruption is a departure from virtue, or is a 
process that results in the loss of virtue. The badness or wrongness of corruption is seen 
from the vantage point of the fact that something or someone is corrupted. I shall call this 
understanding of corruption ‘the corrupted-unit understanding of corruption’.   
             The application of the corrupted-unit understanding of corruption in politics will 
show that – if the thing in question is a political community – corruption brings about 
degeneration, disintegration, and destruction of the polity. Indeed, Aristotle can be 
interpreted as being concerned with corruption in this kind of understanding when he 
discussed the threat of factionalism and political revolution that, as he thought, may 
destroy the constitution of the state.4 A further development of its application in politics 
can be found in the republican understanding of political corruption. In the republican 
political theory, corruption is viewed as an antithesis of a healthy polity, or as a disease 
and decay of the body politic.5 Factionalism is considered an important vestige of 
corruption, because the practice in the factions undermines civic virtue, encourages each 
faction to exert its power and impose its views on the whole polity, and ultimately 
                                                 
4 See: P [V.2.1302a.16-1302b.4]; P [V.9.1309a.33-1310a.38]. Bruce Buchanan (2004) interprets Aristotle 
this way. See: Bruce Buchanan, “The Moral Physics of the Body Politic: Changing Contours of Corruption 
in Western Political Thought”, Proceedings of the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
University of Adelaide, September – October 2004, available at: http://www.adelaide.edu.au/apsa/papers/. 
5 J. Peter Euben, “Corruption”, in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, edited by Terence Ball, 
James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge; NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), pp.220-46, p.226-7; 
S.M. Shumer, “Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption”, Political Theory 7:1 (1979), pp.5-34, 
p. 8. See also: Bruce Buchanan, op. cit., pp.19-20. By tracing the history of the western political thought of 
corruption, in particular during the medieval period and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Bruce 
Buchanan claims that the narrowly contemporary definitions of corruption have been prefigured in the 
broader notions of corruption as the moral decay of the body politic.   
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fragments and disintegrates the polity.6 Thus, corruption is associated more with systemic 
and systematic degeneration of the practices and commitments that build up the whole 
polity, or with a loss of civic virtue, than with individual wrongful conduct. Judging that 
a leader or someone is corrupt is only possible by referring to the fact that his conduct is 
part of the pattern of decay from which the polity is said to be corrupted. According to 
the republican understanding, the burden of building a healthy polity and of combating 
corruption lies collectively on all members of the political community. In order to build a 
healthy polity, permanent structural inequality has to be removed and citizens are 
required to build civic virtue by developing loyalty and commitments to the common 
welfare.7 Citizens have to give substantive participation in political life and to 
subordinate their private interests to the common good.8   
Although the application of the corrupted-unit understanding of corruption in 
social life can explain many aspects of systemic corruption, it has at least three obvious 
shortcomings. First, it does not provide a clear distinction between a process of 
disintegration that is created by outsiders and a disintegration process that is caused by 
the citizens themselves. It is quite counterintuitive to say that a subversive act of foreign 
spies is also a part of corruption.9 Secondly, it overlooks the fact that a pattern of 
degenerative practices and commitments may originate from a single wrongful conduct 
                                                 
6 J. Patrick Dobel, “The Corruption of a State”, The American Political Science Review 72:3 (1978), pp. 
958-84. 
7 Ibid., p.961, 970. 
8 Ibid., p.958, 964: Without significant and guaranteed participation of the citizenry, people’s perception of 
inequality will persist to undermine loyalty, even though those in power can perform well. J. Peter Euben, 
op. cit., pp.227: For a healthy polity, all commercial transactions are subject to the moral purposes of the 
community; the common good is valued over private interests. S.M. Shumer, op. cit., p. 8: In a healthy 
politics, political actors subordinate their own advantage to the common good.   
9 Rogow and Lasswell distinguish between a corrupt act and a subversive act. A corrupt act is a violation of 
responsibility towards at least one system of public or civic order the effect of which is destructive of any 
such system, whereas a subversive act is a violation of responsibility toward one system of public or civic 
order on behalf of another one. See: Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell, Power, Corruption, and 
Rectitude (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 132. 
 218
and the fact that a single major wrongful act can be as destructive as the degenerative 
pattern of smaller actions. When politics is conceived of as an autonomous realm, and 
public office is conceptualized as a representative receiving the public trust for 
disinterestedly governing the practices of the community, a single individual act that 
betrays the public trust may initiate a widespread moral decay, but the community might 
be too late to realize this as it is yet unproven that the act can develop to become systemic 
and destructive to the community. Third, it carries a bit too much fear of the proliferation 
and consolidation of individual private interests. With regard to the ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
distinction, it tends to elevate the public sphere and to suggest an extensive public-office 
intervention into the private sphere of individuals for the purpose of maintaining a 
healthy polity. Corruption is merely thought of as if it were driven by the uncontrollable 
private sphere of individuals. 
           The corrupted-unit understanding of corruption is contested by an alternative 
understanding of corruption whose principles are derived from the vantage point of the 
fact that someone (or more than one person) is corrupting. Its foundational roots can be 
traced back to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes,10 while its characteristics typically 
appear in the liberal and neo-liberal understanding of corruption. I shall call this 
alternative understanding ‘the corrupting-unit understanding of corruption’. It is clear at 
the beginning that Hobbes completely rejects Aristotle’s teleology. For him, there is no 
inherent common good to be shared among citizens, except a nature that fragments them 
into egoistic self-enclosed individuals, each with his/her own interests. Corruption is thus 
not seen as a matter of subordinating the common good to self-interests. When someone 
judges that a regime is corrupt, he is simply projecting his own preferences and interests 
                                                 
10 J. Peter Euben, op. cit., pp. 230. 
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with a motive of gaining power.11 Politics cannot be excluded from the understanding of 
corruption; both are spoken of in terms of conflicts of interests and power struggle. In 
other words, conflict is necessary in the understanding of corruption. When there is no 
conflict, there is no corruption. An autocrat who wields a truly absolute power cannot be 
corrupt, until the people who might have different interests raise objections and impose 
limitations and legitimacy-constraints on his power.12 Typically, legitimacy of a political 
structure manifests in either a shared belief or an agreement that those in authority have 
rights to exercise their powers according to some standards.13 In order to reassure that the 
exercise of power is in line with the standards, a power-limiting mechanism is usually put 
in place, such as a check-and-balance mechanism in liberal democratic states. It is 
expected that by building a legitimate political structure and by exercising a check-and-
balance mechanism, people can resolve their conflicts and create stability and peace.14 
The term ‘corruption’ is then used to denote the action of those in authority who exercise 
their powers not in accordance with the standards. But since interpretation over what the 
standards should consist of, whose standards should be referred to, and how the standards 
are to be set up, can vary, it is often difficult to make a clear line of distinction between 
                                                 
11 Ibid.., pp. 230-1. 
12 Michael Johnston (1996) says that “[a]n absolute autocrat cannot be corrupt, in the modern sense of the 
concept, until some limitations are placed on his power”. I think Johnston’s statement is right, on the 
condition that the limitations are brought further up to, or are accompanied with, a sort of legitimacy. 
Corruption is therefore a kind of illegitimate exercise of power. See: Michael Johnston, “The Search for 
definitions: the vitality of politics and the issue of corruption”, International Social Science Journal 149 
(1996), pp.321-35, p.327. 
13 Legitimacy can be seen as people’s (citizens) acceptance, supported by proper justification, that the 
legitimated thing is right, or has rights. Authority is usually spoken of in the context of an institution or a 
hierarchical structure of institutions, to denote those in power as having legitimacy. The shared-belief type 
of legitimacy is expressed, for example, in a monarch state whose king is believed to be a Son of Heaven 
(God). The agreement type of legitimacy can be recognized widely in many different institutions, 
especially those institutions that grow up under the influence of liberal politics.  
14 It has to be noted that Hobbes himself does not advocate a check-and-balance mechanism, as he believes 
that the sovereign would do whatever it takes to maintain the conditions of peace.  
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corrupt and non-corrupt actions. The corrupting-unit understanding of corruption seems 
to encounter problems in setting up a firm definition of corruption. 
            Living in a relatively liberal and democratic society today, where the distinction 
between the public sphere and the private sphere is assumed to be unambiguous, we can 
find various definitions of corruption at contention in social sciences. Arnold J. 
Heidenheimer (1970) classifies these various definitions into three categories, namely 
public-office-centered, market-centered, and public-interest-centered definitions.15 In the 
first category, corruption is defined as a violation of the formal duties of a public role, 
committed as a result of private-regarding considerations. The second category addresses 
an economic kind of exchange that occurs whenever public officials use their public role 
for private gains. And the third category underlines the harmful consequences of the 
behavior of the public officials who sacrifice the interests of the public for private 
benefits. Each category uses different kinds of standard to characterize the nature of 
corruption, i.e. the public duties that are violated, the public property that is treated as 
part of a private business and the public interests that are harmed, respectively. Apart 
from the contention over which kind of standard to use, questions may still arise as to 
whether the standard has to be legal or can be a mere outcome of public opinion, and 
whether the criteria for evaluating the standard have to come from a public consensus, or 
can be left to the elites to decide. Under a seemingly endless debate at the definitional 
level, the World Bank (1997) asserts a simple practical definition, which is that 
corruption is “the abuse of public power for private gain”.16 This definition explicates in 
                                                 
15 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (NY: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1970), p. 4-6. 
16 World Bank, World Development Report: The State in a Changing Society (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1997), p. 102. 
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a brief fashion the liberal understanding of corruption, or the corrupting-unit 
understanding of corruption in general. Because seeking private gain is considered 
‘natural’ for the egoistic self-enclosed individuals, the definition can be seen as implying 
a suspicious attitude towards public officials for their natural tendencies to corrupt. It 
supports in some way the Actonian principle that ‘all power tends to corrupt, absolute 
power [corrupts] absolutely’.17 Corruption is thought of as if it were driven by the 
uncontrollable public sphere in the hands of some individuals. 
           Compared to the former understanding of corruption (the corrupted-unit 
understanding of corruption), the corrupting-unit understanding of corruption suffers also 
some serious shortcomings. First, the over-reliance on the conflicts of (private) interests 
and power struggle provokes a sense that moral and ethical matters are contingent rather 
than necessary in the understanding of corruption. The common reference to what 
amounts to public office, where public power is believed to reside, is the ‘ideal type’ 
bureaucracy articulated by the sociologist Max Weber as an impersonal and efficient 
organization that is to function under legal-rational domination. Intrusion of personal 
interests into the working of the supposedly impersonal bureaucracy can thus be labeled 
as corruption.18 But the Weberian bureaucratic model of public office is not large enough 
to contain all activities that involve public power. In respect to the Montesquieuian 
                                                 
17 The Actonian principle has to be understood in the context that those in power have been granted 
legitimacy; therefore, it is said that absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. We cannot place the liberal 
support for the Actonian principle in contradiction with the earlier statement that, when legitimacy has not 
been granted, an absolute autocrat cannot be corrupt.  
18 Reference to the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy may create a Western bias if it is rigorously used to 
analyze corruption in the developing non-Western countries, where moral codes and cultures are 
substantially different from the Western-modern countries. For example, concluding that Asian societies 
tend to condone corruption for a reason that public and private spheres are not clearly distinguished cannot 
be right, because concerns about corruption had been seriously raised by many ancient scholars in the 
Asian societies. See: Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption and the Destiny of Asia (Selangor; Singapore: 
Prentice-Hall; Simon & Schuster, 1999).      
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division of political power (trias politica), the model may look right on the executive and 
the judiciary offices, but not equally so on the legislative office. For, although the 
legislative power must appeal to the ‘impersonal’ public-standards for justification, the 
legislative members can only achieve and exercise power if they effectively play their 
role in accommodating and projecting the private interests of their constituents into 
acceptable public standards. The impersonal and impartial demands of the Weberian 
public-office are here transmuted into agreeable standards and left to the political process 
to define. As a result, corruption is in a sense more political than ethical; its definition 
and its problems depend largely on the political settlements. If politics is understood as a 
way to turn conflicts into a system of public order, democratic or otherwise, corruption is 
defined and perceived as bad and wrong because it empirically undermines the ability of 
politics to create such an order.19 An act may be corrupt because of violating a reasonable 
standard of fairness of competition, but another act may be judged corrupt simply 
because it violates a certain political agreement, regardless of whether the agreement is or 
is not ethically defensible.  
           Second, the emphasis on the individual wrongful conduct (‘a rotten apple’) in 
understanding corruption typically creates difficulties in capturing the moral problem of 
systemic corruption. It is important here to note that egoism may not be the sole cause of 
incidences of corruption. Some incidents are often caused mainly by the corrupt cultures 
and organizational structures, in a way that for example a manager pays a bribe merely to 
                                                 
19 This is, I think, the most generalized position derivable from the corrupting-unit understanding of 
corruption, when corruption is perceived more than that is simply defined by the World Bank as the abuse 
of public power for private gain. This can be checked and compared with the definitions offered in: Mark 
Philp, “Defining Political Corruption”, Political Studies XLV (1997), pp.436-62, p.456; Michael Johnston, 
“The Search for definitions: the vitality of politics and the issue of corruption”, op. cit., p.331; Arnold A. 
Rogow and H.D. Lasswell, Power, Corruption, and Rectitude (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1963), p.132.      
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further the aim of the corporation, or pays it for a reason that it is the only choice to 
rescue the corporation from its doldrums. Indeed, when some incidences of corruption are 
left without sufficient objections, many other incidences follow to corrupt the 
organizational cultures and structures, and ultimately corruption becomes 
institutionalized, viz. it is rather perceived as a norm or a way of life than an exception. It 
corrodes the intra-organizational and inter-organizational systems, as the lower officials 
tend to maintain it and depend on the illicit earnings that come from it, while the higher 
officials enjoy some part of those earnings and minimize the risks of detection by 
colluding with the officials of the other organizations. When corruption is systemic, it 
will occur persistently and ubiquitously; it tends to be defended systematically by 
manipulating legal procedures, seeking ambiguous cultural backings, and fabricating 
economic justification. Under such systemic corruption, the application of the corrupting-
unit understanding of corruption will lose its sharpness, because the conduct may be 
legal, according to the cultural norms, and promoting material-welfare, as if there is no 
real victim in every incidence of corruption.20 If the framework of the corrupting-unit 
understanding of corruption is used to analyze systemic corruption, it will portray 
corruption merely as another kind of political process.21    
           Third, the over-suspicion that corruption is naturally committed by public officials 
tends to overlook the fact that private parties can also commit corruption whose 
consequence is often not less destructive than that resulting from public corruption. The 
                                                 
20 When corruption spreads widely, mutual acceptance would likely emerge, i.e. petty immorality is 
tolerated by the elites and higher immorality is accepted by the non-elites. Small corruption and big 
corruption are perceived as symbolically equal by all groups, and as a result, the victims of corruption 
disappear. See: Vincenzo Ruggiero, Crime and Markets: Essays in Anti-criminology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 120-2.     
21 In analyzing systemic corruption, Robert Harris (2003) argues that corruption must be viewed as an 
unacceptable extension of normal political behavior, rather than as a violation of a norm. See: Robert 
Harris, Political Corruption: In and Beyond the Nation State (London; NY: Routledge, 2003), pp.20, 29. 
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usual policy prescription in support of such suspicion is reflected in the tendency to 
redistribute power through separation of power, democratization, decentralization 
programs, liberalization of the economy, and institutionalization of checks-and-balances. 
This is true especially for the neo-liberalists who promote the policy based on the belief 
that free-market mechanism is and should be an end in itself. The neo-liberal movement 
aggressively advocates the expansion of the market into the public area where 
government holds the legitimate power to manage public resources. The idea of the 
movement is that by reducing the power of the state through privatization, market 
deregulation and anti-government intervention, corruption is expected to recede 
drastically. The result, however, does not seem to match the expectation. The 1990s 
Indonesian neo-liberal reform that is exercised in the spirit of decentralization and 
privatization, for example, has failed to cut off corruption, and has even stimulated 
instead the decentralization of corruption.22 When power shifts from the state to the 
private parties, the temptation of using power selfishly at the expense of the public at 
large seems to shift also accordingly. Corruption remains regardless of whether or not 
public officials are involved. Consider banking corruption scandals that involve the 
problem of moral hazard, in which the bankers misuse their discretionary power by 
lending the depositors’ money for risky investments on the grounds that, if the 
investments  prosper, they  will  prosper  too, but  if  the  investments  fail  and  the banks 
                                                 
22 Vedi R. Hadiz, “Corruption and Neo-liberal Reform: Markets and Predatory Power in Indonesia and 
Southeast Asia”, in Richard Robison, ed., The Neo-Liberal Revolution: Forging the Market State (NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.79-97. 
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collapse, the government would clean up the problem.23 Consider also the corporate 
scandals that have rocked the market economy at the beginning of the 21st century, 
involving many prestigious business leaders who corrupted the fair and honest dealings in 
the Stock Exchanges. These scandals are only examples to show that those who wield 
private power may corrupt. Indeed, the scope and opportunities for corruption have even 
grown larger following the recent trend of deregulation and globalization that seemingly 
strengthen the role and power of the private parties.24 It is therefore understandable why 
recently there is a serious demand for broadening the definition of corruption to include 
corruption committed by private parties.25   
            To overcome the problems that appear differently in the corrupted-unit and the 
corrupting-unit understandings of corruption, I will present the third alternative 
understanding of corruption based on its contrast with integrity. Through the contrast, I 
expect to present not only a better understanding of corruption but also a clearer picture 
of integrity. I shall call this third alternative ‘the integrity-based understanding of 
                                                 
23 This is the typical problem of moral hazard in the banking industry where the bankers make the decisions 
that involve risks while the public (via the government) shall bear the costs if things go badly. Although 
many government regulations may have been imposed to limit the extent of the problem, some degree of 
the problem remains, and is difficult to be completely eliminated. See: Paul Krugman, The Return of 
Depression Economics (London: Penguin, 2000), pp.66-69. As a result of the banking practices that 
involved the problem of moral hazard during and immediately after the Asian financial crisis 1997, Bank of 
Indonesia had to channel more than USD 17.6 billion (Rp. 158.9 trillion) in liquidity credits to bail out 48 
banks (Antara, “BLBI debtors must undergo due processes of law, says ICW”, Antara, February 21, 2006, 
http://www.antara.co.id/en/seenws/?id=9217). For the recovery of the banking sector, the government of 
Indonesia had to compensate the losses of several banks every year until the banks complied with the 
standard minimum capital adequacy requirement. In 2002 alone, the government of Indonesia had to spend 
more than USD 4 billion (Rp. 37,627,850 million) to compensate the losses of ten sick banks (Kwik Kian 
Gie, Eradication of Corruption 2nd edition-revised, Jakarta, November 2003 - unpublished).     
24 Cris Shore and Dieter Haller, “Introduction – Sharp Practice: Anthropology and the Study of 
Corruption”, in Dieter Haller and Cris Shore, ed., Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives (London; Ann 
Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), pp.1-26, p.8. 
25 The leading anti-corruption organization Transparency International (TI) has now broadened its working 
definition of corruption to ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. See: Steven Sampson, “Integrity 
Warriors: Global Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the Balkans”, in Dieter Haller and Cris 
Shore, ed., Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), pp.103-
130, p.121.  
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corruption’. It differs from the corrupted-unit understanding which sees corruption 
simply as a movement away from the ideal de-facto polity (community), and from the 
corrupting-unit understanding which holds no sense of ideal community. In the integrity-
based understanding of corruption, the individual is decisive in the process of defining 
corruption, but he can define it under the condition that he defines himself in such a way 
that the ideal community is in a sense a constitutive part of his self. As a result, the 
integrity-based understanding should be able to explain corruption as a single action 
phenomenon and as a systemic phenomenon as well. The integrity-based understanding 
of corruption is built upon three underlying propositions, namely (1) that a strict public – 
private distinction is not necessarily required for identifying corruption (corruption as a 
non-segregating concept); (2) that corruption is necessarily a moral problem (corruption 
as a moral concept); and (3) that corruption necessarily involves an event in which 
someone is corrupting, and he himself and or an institution or institutions of which he is a 
member are corrupted (corruption as a causal concept).26 
 
 
6.1.1 Corruption as a Non-segregating Concept 
 
Understanding corruption as a non-segregating concept does not support the 
common belief that corruption necessarily involves blurring the boundary between public 
                                                 
26 The idea of corruption as both moral and causal concepts has appeared in the work of Seumas Miller, 
Peter Roberts and Edward Spence (2005). I develop these two concepts within the framework of my 
Aristotelian approach. See: Seumas Miller, Peter Roberts and Edward Spence, Corruption and Ant-
Corruption: An Applied Philosophical Approach (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/ Prentice Hall, 2005), 
p.4. See also: Seumas Miller, “Corruption”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available on line at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/corruption/, 2005.     
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and private spheres.27 It also does not support either the belief in the primacy of the 
public over the private sphere (the corrupted-unit understanding), or the belief in the 
primacy of the private over the public sphere (the corrupting-unit understanding), for 
both beliefs are false in that if one sphere is considered primary, the other tends to be 
eliminated and as a consequence there should be nothing further to say in respect to both 
terms. I use the term “primacy” in the sense of superiority with respect to the legitimacy 
of claim that when one sphere is excessively legitimized, the other sphere tends to be 
delegitimized.28 In the modern world, the public – private dichotomy tends to be drawn 
too far, in which the term ‘public’ is associated with the sphere of life where the citizen is 
expected to be involved disinterestedly in the civic or community affairs, whereas the 
term ‘private’ refers plainly to the pursuit of what one feels one is interested in.29 But 
public and private should not necessarily be mutually exclusive spheres, because one can 
                                                 
27 Gerald E. Caiden and O.P. Dwivedi (2001) refer to the blurring between public organizations and private 
organizations, between public sector and private sector, and between public behavior and private behavior. 
Arvind K. Jain (2001) explains it in terms of intersection between wealth (private) and power (public). 
Robert Harris (2003) uses the term ‘interstices’ (an interstitial activity) to describe how the roles of 
different actors in corruption are becoming difficult to distinguish. See: Gerald E. Caiden and O.P. 
Dwivedi, “Official Ethics and Corruption”, in Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi and J. Jabbra, eds., Where 
Corruption Lives (Bloomfield, Conn..: Kumarian Press, 2001), p.245-55, p.245; Arvind K. Jain, “Power, 
politics, and corruption”, in Arvind K. Jain, ed., The Political Economy of Corruption (NY: Routledge, 
2001), pp.3-10, p.5; Robert Harris, op. cit., p.22.      
28 Naturally, the belief in the primacy of either sphere produces policies that would create a blurred 
distinction between both spheres. Therefore, those who believe that corruption necessarily involves the 
blurring boundary between public and private spheres often criticize the anti-corruption programs of either 
side as creating an even larger potentiality for corruption. See the criticism of the blurring boundary caused 
by the elimination process of the private sphere in the communist state: Antoni Z. Kaminski, An 
Institutional Theory of Communist Regime: Design, Function, and Breakdown (San Francisco, Calif.: ICS 
Press, 1992), p.135. See the criticism of the blurring boundary caused by the elimination process of the 
public sphere which is implied in the neo-liberal policies: Paul Heywood, “Political Corruption: Problems 
and Perspectives”, in Paul Heywood, ed., Political Corruption (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), pp.1-19, 
p.13; Yves Meny, “’Fin de siecle’ corruption: change, crisis and shifting values”, International Social 
Science Journal 149 (1996), pp.309-20, p.315.    
29 It has to be noted that if the public – private dichotomy were placed in the context of the Ancient Greek, 
the meaning of the terms must be different; the public life could mean a life of active involvements in the 
polis (vita activa), whereas the private life referred to a withdrawal from the public life for the purpose of 
undertaking the contemplative life (vita contemplativa). See: Albert O. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: 
Private Interest and Public Action, 20th-anniversary edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 
pp.6-7; Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp.12-7. 
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be interested and should be involved to some extent in community affairs, while 
community affairs can promote and should deal with the interests of the citizens. Instead 
of following the thought that private interests and community affairs are always in 
confrontation, which might ultimately result in favoring one or the other, I shall argue 
that both should be thought of as complementing each other and that the concept of 
corruption should go beyond a strict distinction between public and private spheres. The 
weight of the argument lies in the conception of the expanded self. For when I develop 
my expanded-self to include the ideal state of the community of which I am a member, I 
am aware that I can only realize myself in the framework of a co-realization with the 
ideal community and, therefore, my self-interests must be compatible with community 
affairs that would reflect the workings of the ideal community. I can realize myself and 
become a person of integrity, if in pursuing any particular interest, I am disposed to 
manage anything available in my control in the best possible way for the realization of 
the ideal community. I must never use anything available in my control to ruin the 
realization of the ideal community. If for any particular interest I use something available 
in my control to manipulate or exploit anything that is necessary for the realization of the 
ideal community, then I am really corrupt. Corruption is thus in direct opposition to 
integrity, viz. while integrity denotes the expression of the particularities for the sake of 
the ideal community, corruption is an exploitation of the fabric of the ideal community 
for the sake of the particularities. The public – private dichotomy does not necessarily 
come into the picture, because there is no sharp dichotomy as the ideal community 
representing the term ‘public’ is in a sense a constitutive part of each individual’s 
expanded self. 
 229
           A person of integrity will seek to manage the things available in his control in the 
best possible way for the realization of the ideal community. If the things available in his 
control can reasonably be characterized as resources the employment of which would 
generate power, then it is reasonable to say that a person of integrity will seek to manage 
his power in the best possible way for the realization of the ideal community. Thus, 
considering this character of a person of integrity, we can portray corruption, in its 
opposing relation to integrity, as an abuse of power that would ruin the realization of the 
ideal community. Indeed, characterizing the things available in each individual’s control 
in terms of power is crucial, because power is a necessary condition for any human 
action. This way of attributing power, however, implies a claim that power is neutral in 
that its uses can be either constructive or destructive. It does not suggest that power tends 
to be destructive or to corrupt.30 On the contrary, it suggests that each individual who 
wields power has to bear moral responsibility to promote the realization of the ideal 
community.31 
             Power is basically understood as the capacity to produce a change or to prevent 
an inevitable change. It can be manifested in many different forms, depending on the 
                                                 
30 Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell (1963) lengthily argue that Lord Acton’s claim that “power 
tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely” is merely based on broad and unstated sentiments, and 
hence is not scientifically defensible. They make empirical examinations to demonstrate that the principle 
is really an oversimplification. For them, there is no necessary impact of power either upon corruption or 
upon rectitude; the impact depends on the contextual factors. See: Arnold A. Rogow and H.D. Lasswell, 
Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, op. cit., ch.1, ch.2, p.130.   
31 In the next section, I will describe in more detailed the moral context in which power should operate. By 
connecting power to moral responsibility, I wish to emphasize that each individual who possesses power is 
held responsible to produce a proper change, beside that he is held responsible for the change caused by the 
exercise of his power. The second sense of responsibility has been largely explored in relation to power. 
William E. Connolly (1993), for example, argues that, when A has power over B, A is properly held 
responsible to some degree for B’s conduct (or situation), if the exercise of A’s power imposes limitation 
on B’s choice and there is some reason to justify the limitation. Similarly, Steven Lukes (2005) also argues 
for the connection between power and moral responsibility in the second sense. See: William E. Connolly, 
The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), pp.93-101; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical 
View 2nd edition (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.66-7.            
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locus, the context and the way in which it is exercised. We can find power in individuals, 
corporations, states, social interactions, structural relations and so on; we can classify it 
into expert power, referent power, legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, and 
so on;32 and we can characterize it in terms of ‘power over’ others in which the change is 
produced through the conduct of the others, or simply in terms of ‘power to’ produce a 
change. In order to comprehend the different forms of power in a single picture, it is 
useful to take as reference the phenomenological model of power developed by the 
sociologist Franco Crespi (1992), in which power is said to have three dimensions, 
namely the subjective-inner dimension, the intersubjective-outer dimension and the 
objective-structural dimension.33 In each dimension, power deals with the specific 
contradiction of the relation between ‘determinacy’ and ‘indeterminacy’.34 The first 
dimension, the subjective inner power, denotes the capacity that an individual has in 
dealing with two opposing requirements, the requirement of being socially determined in 
order to be accepted by others, and the requirement of maintaining his autonomy in order 
to avoid being carried away by his social image.35 The second dimension, the 
intersubjective-outer power, refers to the capacity attributed to an individual (or 
                                                 
32 John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power”, in Michael T. Matteson and J.M. 
Ivancevich, eds., Management and Organizational Behavior Classics 5th edition (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 
1993), pp. 303-319. 
33 Franco Crespi, Social Action and Power (Oxford-UK; Cambridge-USA: Blackwell, 1992), pp.99-118. 
Notice that Crespi’s three-dimensional view is different from Lukes’s three-dimensional view, in which the 
working of power is explained in three ways, namely, how power influences the decision making process, 
how power influences the selection of the agenda in the actual decision making process, and how power 
residing in the social structure and culture shapes the desires or interests of the people. See: Steven Lukes, 
op. cit., pp.14-59. While Lukes’s third dimension may correspond to Crespi’s third dimension, Lukes’s first 
and second dimensions may be explained in some way in terms of Crespi’s second dimension.     
34 Franco Crespi, ibid., p.99. 
35 Crespi associates this inner power with the dynamic tension between ego and superego (in Sigmund 
Freud’s psycho-analysis) and between “I” and “me” (in George Herbert Mead’s conception of self). See: 
Franco Crespi, ibid., pp.102-3. With regard to the conception of the expanded self, the inner power can be 
associated with the tension that arises as a result of the everlasting expansion of the self, through which the 
individual preserves the ability to make a distance from the community of which he is a member.   
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individuals) in virtue of his (or their) being in social relations and being in connections 
with material conditions and institutional structures, with the consequence that he (or 
they) would be dealing with two opposing challenges, the challenge to keep up with, and 
the challenge to transgress the prevailing social order. The third dimension, the objective 
structural power, is associated with the capacity attached to the social-structural 
conditions in shaping the behavior of individuals, in which the requirement to maintain 
the symbolic social order and the challenge to adjust it appear to be objective. In using 
Crespi’s three-dimensional view, it seems instructive to plot the exercise of power in 
terms of interplay between the first, the second and the third dimensions. Notice that the 
inequality of power between individuals, which may justify the exercise of power over 
others, does not depend only on the distribution of status roles by the prevailing social 
order, but also on how individuals perceive that order and build their subjective-inner 
power. The exercise of power over others would be less meaningful if it leads either to 
pure coercion in which the others totally abandon their autonomy, or to violence where 
the others totally reject the prevailing social order. It would also be less meaningful if in 
specific situations, where modifying some of the rules of the social order is required, the 
exerciser of the power follows the rules only to avoid the risks of being particularly 
responsible or, on the contrary, if he arbitrarily ignores the rules without giving legitimate 
reasons. The interplay between the first, the second and the third dimensions of power 
suggests that every individual, no matter how high or low his status role in the social 
order, has some degree of power and as a consequence he should exercise it in a way that 
expresses his nature as a human being. Every individual bears some sense of moral 
responsibility for necessarily holding some degree of power. Those who are usually said 
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to be in power over others are those who structurally hold higher power than the others 
and therefore bear a stringent moral responsibility, but this does not mean that the others 
may free themselves from any sense of moral responsibility.  
 
 
6.1.2 Corruption as a Moral Concept            
 
            Since corruption is in direct opposition to integrity, it is necessarily a moral 
concept. Indeed, corruption is inherently a moral problem because it blocks the paths to 
the realization of the ideal community and the attainment of the good life, the telos of 
human beings. While integrity suggests the promotion of the common good necessarily 
required for the realization of the ideal community, corruption manipulates the common 
good for some particular interest. In what follows, I shall clarify the concept of the 
common good and its relation to the individual interests (private goods) in order to give a 
clearer picture of the contrast between integrity and corruption, with respect to morality. 
           It is first of all important to note that, for Aristotle, unlike Plato, the good of beings 
is to be found in particular beings and inherent in their nature. The good of human beings 
is therefore not to be thought of as something separate, apart from particular human 
beings. It follows that the good of particular human beings consists in their own 
happiness, which is actualized in virtuous actions in the community, for virtuous actions 
express their nature as rational and social beings. From this perspective, it is clear that the 
good of particular human beings is essentially a common good, in the sense that it is 
actualized only in their disposition to live in common in the community. Since the good 
 233
of the community itself, viz. the common good, consists in the final end to which the 
community tends, which is the happiness of all its members, there is indeed no need to 
place the good of particular human beings in opposition to the common good.36 The 
actualization of the good of particular human beings contributes in some way to the 
actualization of the common good.    
           But the way it contributes to the actualization of the common good is not like an 
addition up to the pool of the good, as if the common good is simply the sum total of all 
the private goods of the individual members of the community.37 Nor is it like a 
participation in grasping and unfolding the good from the pool of the preexisting good as 
if the common good is ‘divine’ and is to be grasped and unfolded only by certain virtuous 
actions.38 For in the first case, the common good is vulnerable to being reduced to an 
artificial good and treated as a mere means to promote the private goods; while in the 
second case, the individual members are vulnerable to totalitarianism, with respect to the 
interpretation of the virtuous actions that would actualize the common good.39 The 
contribution to the actualization of the common good is, I argue, a kind of co-realization 
in which whenever the good of the particular human beings is actualized, the common 
good is also actualized. In the framework of co-realization, the happiness of a particular 
                                                 
36 Aristotle never puts the good of individuals in opposition to the good of the community, as he states that 
happiness is the chief end of both the individuals and the states. See: NE (I.2-1094.b.7-8); P (III.6-
1278b.23-24).     
37 The interpretation that the common good is simply the sum total of all the private goods of the individual 
members of the society is typically utilitarian. Using Thomas Aquinas’s categories, the utilitarian kind of 
common good may be referred to as ‘the common good according to the community of predication’. See: 
Michael A. Smith, Human Dignity and the Common Good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition 
(Lewiston, NY: Mellen Univ. Press, 1995), pp.73-5.     
38 By extending Aristotle’s view of the common good (common-advantage), Thomas Aquinas develops an 
interpretation that suggests the “divine” kind of common good. Using his own categories, the “divine” kind 
of common good can be referred to as ‘the common good according to final causality’. See: ibid., pp.59, 
75, 81.   
39 By rejecting the common good as a divine good, I shall not necessarily subscribe to the view that the 
Aristotelian worldly framework is incompatible with religion. I think there is some way to link the worldly 
common good to the divine good, other than equating the common good with the divine good.      
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human being is not separate from – and is not possible of being added to – the happiness 
of others, because its very presence is only to be shared with others. Virtuous actions, 
which constitute happiness, are also not a means to another end because they are already 
ends in themselves. This co-realization is comprehensible only with reference to the 
understanding that the individual-self is an expanded self that is, in a sense, constituted of 
the community in its ideal state. 
           Thus, everyone – whether he is in position to govern or to be governed – should 
seek his own happiness by actualizing the common good. Everyone should be responsible 
for his own happiness in the way in which all parties involved could share the advantages 
when he takes the right actions and obtains his happiness. This may explain why the term 
‘common advantage’ (or common interest) appears more often than the term ‘common 
good’ in the Ethics;40 the former seems to need an active participation whereas the latter 
seems not. This may also explain why we can interpret Aristotle as having no preference 
for a particular form of government, be it monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy. As long as 
the ruler governs with a view to the common advantage, and the ruled can participate in 
the common advantage, any form of government will do.41 By virtue of possessing a 
power, whether public or private, everyone ought to participate in the common 
advantage. Without the common advantage, which defines the end of the community and 
how the ultimate end of the community is to be obtained, the community would perish. It 
is precisely this neglect of the common advantage that ruins the community and, 
therefore, defines the nature of corruption. Perhaps, it is useful to associate corruption 
                                                 
40 The term “common interest” (translation from Benjamin Jowett) appears more often than the term 
“common good”. Both terms sometimes appears in the same book and chapter. See, for example: P 
(III.6.1278b.23 and 1278b.39). In interpreting Aristotle, Michael A. Smith uses the term “common 
advantage” instead of the term “common interest”. See: Michael A. Smith, op. cit., p. 62. 
41 P (III.7.1279a.23-39) 
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with Aristotle’s imaginative illustration in which a man is said to always seek a ruling 
office because he would only be kept in good health if he remains in the office.42 For 
health is a private good that belongs only to the possessor; using it as the motivation for 
holding an official position that actually should deliver the common advantage is indeed 
a kind of perversion. Not only does such a motivation divert him from the right actions 
and thus misplace his happiness, but it also prevents others from taking the right actions 
and obtaining happiness. Corruption can thus be defined, in contrast to integrity, as an 
abuse of power by manipulating or exploiting the common good (common advantage) for 
private interest. Corruption is inherently immoral as it involves the degradation of the 
good of human beings. However, not all forms of immorality are corruption, for 
corruption is just a species of immorality. The immoral specificity of corruption will be 
clear if it is also seen as a causal concept. 
 
 
6.1.3 Corruption as a Causal Concept    
     
             Since corruption is in direct opposition to integrity, it presupposes the ideal 
workings of the community – in the sense that, while integrity aims at the realization of 
the ideal community, corruption undermines the prospective realization of the ideal state 
of the community. The implication is that corruption necessarily involves someone who 
is corrupting and the community (of which he is a member) that is corrupted. Of course, 
corruption may corrupt the character of the corruptor himself, but that character is always 
associated with the way he is supposed to live in the community. Since the framework of 
                                                 
42 P (III.6.1179a.15-18) 
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integrity is applied, in which everyone is expected to have a character that disposes him 
to actualize the ideal state of the community of which he is a member, taking the 
community as the corrupted unit is quite representative for analyzing corruption. In the 
framework of integrity, the corruptor is supposed to be corrupted whenever the 
community is corrupted, for the ideal state of the community is, in a sense, part of his 
expanded self. It is, however, important to notice that the corruptor(s) must be a person, 
persons, or a subset of the community (an institution) whose members are persons; all of 
them are the members of the whole community. The corruptor cannot be some non-
personal thing that possibly, with similar effects, can harm the community.43 Thus, the 
declining state budget, for example, cannot be addressed as a corruptor of the state. 
However, a foreign spy who bribes public officials of the state can be addressed as a 
corruptor, not in virtue of being a member of the state (which in fact he is not), but in 
virtue of being a member of the whole global community of which the state is a 
member.44 This condition is in line with the basic framework of integrity, which I have 
discussed in Chapter-2, that the integrity of a thing is determined by the parts of that 
thing, and if persons are members of that thing, the presence of persons will determine 
the evaluative character of the integrity of that thing. 
                                                 
43 Seumas Miller preferred to call ‘institutional corrosion’ for the deterioration of an institution by non-
personal things. See: Seumas Miller, “Corruption”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op. cit., sect. 2.1.  
44 The condition that the corruptor of a community must be a member of that community is crucial, and has 
to remain valid. Suppose a foreign spy initiates an action that provokes some citizens of a state to violate 
the state’s norms and practices. If the violation of the norms brings the degeneration of the state, those 
citizens are definitely corruptors in virtue of the fact that the state is corrupted. The foreign spy is not 
necessarily a corruptor in virtue of the fact that the state is corrupted (degenerated). Only if the state’s 
norms are moral norms, and thus are norms that are accepted in the global community, then the foreign spy 
is a corruptor, in virtue of the fact that the global community of which the state is a member is corrupted. If 
the state’s norms are not morally defensible, and thus are not moral norms, then the foreign spy is not a 
corruptor, because he does not corrupt the community of which he is a member. However, because 
corruption (what we are talking about here) is inherently immoral, we shall assume that the state’s norms 
are moral norms. Thus, the foreign spy must be a corruptor.         
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            Since the corruptor can be a member of many communities, ordered successively 
from the smallest one up to the largest, such as for example in the context of economic 
life where he may be a member of the corporate community, the market community and 
the larger whole community, his actions can corrupt any one or more of all these 
communities through the process of manipulation or exploitation of their common goods. 
In any community, the common good is a socially shared good that sustains the group of 
people as a community and as a community of a particular kind. Considering that 
happiness, as the ultimate end of communities, can only be realized in the context of the 
larger whole community, happiness is the common good of the larger whole community. 
All the common goods of the lower communities are defined with respect and reference 
to happiness or to the common good of the larger whole community. As a consequence, 
when a member of the lower community manipulates its common goods, the other 
members and the outside parties who have stakes in the workings of that community 
would probably be prevented from making the right decisions, taking the right actions, 
and obtaining happiness. And since the other members and the outside parties were not 
expecting the manipulation, corruption is essentially a serious betrayal of trust and 
therefore is distinctly immoral. 
             Interestingly, since the common goods of the lower communities can manifest in 
many different tangible and intangible forms, such as the agreed ownership of resources, 
the agreed rules and procedures, laws and orders, fair competition, and so on, corruption 
can take many forms that vary from immoral conduct that can visibly be identified, like 
fraudulent use of funds (embezzlement) and bribery, to immoral conduct that is more 
difficult to identify, like manipulation of information and nepotism. Almost every form of 
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immorality can become a part of the incidence of corruption. But what makes corruption 
a distinctive immorality is that it causes the lower communities or the institutions within 
the whole larger community to fall into a state of being corrupted, deprived and 
degenerated. Accordingly, we can say that a moral offence is corruption only if it 
undermines the ideal workings of the lower community or subverts the institutional 
purpose and process.45 Indeed, some moral offences, like adultery, murder and genocide, 
are not corruption in the proper sense of the word, though they are certainly corrupting 
and depriving the ideal workings of the larger whole community (the whole community 
of human beings). We may say that moral offence or immorality in general corrupts the 
whole community of human beings, but does not necessarily corrupt any specific 
institution within it. 
 
 
6.1.4 On the Vice of Corruption 
 
            It is often suggested that corruption is not always driven by private interest. A 
corporate sales agent, for example, may bribe procurement officials not for reasons of 
some private gain, but rather for the benefit of the corporation. It is also possible to find a 
case where the corruptor committed the offence, like embezzling state funds, out of an 
altruistic motive to help friends or even to help the needy. When an overeager police 
                                                 
45 Seumas Miller, “Corruption”, op. cit., section 2.1(second hypothesis: The causal character of corruption). 
Seumas Miller argues that an action is corrupt only if it undermines an institutional process or subverts an 
institutional purpose or despoils the character of some role occupant qua role occupant. As I have argued 
earlier, the framework of integrity will allow me to take only the community (the institution) as the 
corrupted unit for analyzing corruption. With respect to the institutional purpose and the institutional 
process, I argue that these two institutional elements are and should be inseparably related as they should 
be both set with respect to the ultimate end of happiness.   
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officer fabricated evidence to secure conviction of terrorists, for example, we can charge 
him with corruption despite the fact that he did it for a noble purpose.46 At any rate, 
however, though corruption may not be motivated by private interest, it is clearly 
motivated by a particular interest that cannot be reasonably shared with all the members 
of the larger whole community. Instead of managing the particular goods to promote the 
common good of the larger whole community, the corruptor exploits the prospective 
common-good of the larger whole community for some particular interest (some 
particular good). Though what the corruptor is doing is for the good of the corporation 
(the maximization of profit), for example, the good of the corporation is no longer a 
common good but rather is a particular good, because any common good of the lower 
community has to be defined and actualized with respect to the actualization of the 
common good of the larger whole community. Accordingly, we can refine the earlier 
definition of corruption to include the various possible motivations, i.e. corruption is an 
abuse of power by manipulating or exploiting the common goods for some particular 
(particularistic) interest. This broad kind of definition of corruption may not be 
institutionally operational, but it has a basic normative appeal as it points out the 
directional motivation behind any incidence of corruption, which is to turn something 
that should be common (can largely be shared with others) into another thing that is 
particular (cannot largely be shared with others). As I will note in the end of this chapter, 
this definition can provide a foundation for evaluating and improving the application of 
the institutionally operational definitions. 
                                                 
46 Seumas Miller et al. (2005) call this kind of corruption ‘noble cause corruption’. See: Seumas Miller et 
al., Corruption and Anti-Corruption, op. cit., p. 83. I will specifically discuss the phenomenon of noble 
cause corruption in the next section. 
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            But if corruption is portrayed as relegating the common good in favor of some 
particular goods, while integrity involves the production of particular goods in order to 
promote the common good, some clarification needs to be addressed with respect to the 
Aristotelian understanding that, as a virtue, integrity is concerned with a mean between 
two extremes, an excess and a defect. First of all, I shall recall that in the Aristotelian 
conception of integrity I have described so far, the particular good and the common good 
are co-realized; the particular good remains as a particular good of a certain kind despite 
the fact that its actualization contributes to the actualization of the common good. On the 
contrary, where there is corruption, the common good is not achieved whenever the 
particular good is realized. But besides integrity and corruption, we can still meet another 
possible attitudinal orientation, which I prefer to call ‘self-abnegation’, in which the 
particular good fails as a particular good of the kind whenever it contributes to the 
actualization of the common good. Using these three possible orientations, we can show 
that integrity is committed to the mean between an excess and a defect with respect to the 
way we promote the common good. Integrity is about the mean, for it is just the right way 
through which individuals promote the common good by actualizing their own particular 
goods. Self-abnegation is the excess and thus a vice, for it promotes the common good by 
sacrificing the particular goods, as if the common good with its overwhelming superiority 
trumps any particular good.47 Corruption is the defect and thus another vice, for it 
promotes the particular goods rather than the common good, as if the common good is 
simply the sum total of the particular goods, and can only be promoted by producing the 
                                                 
47 The attitude of self-abnegation seems to be associated with the totalitarian conception of the common 
good. The use of the word ‘totalitarian’ does not mean that those who hold the totalitarian conception of the 
common good tend to build a totalitarian regime that demands everyone to sacrifice. Rather, it means that a 
typically totalitarian regime can only have the totalitarian conception of the common good to justify its 
decisions and actions. 
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particular goods to the maximum extent.48 Since the particular goods define in some way 
the self-identity of the individuals, we can say that integrity is a virtue that disposes the 
individual possessors to promote the common goods without denying their identity. Far 
from denying their identity, they actually should express their identity in promoting the 
common goods. Their moral expression is indeed authentic. Any temptation to commit 
either self-abnegation or corruption can be a threat to their moral authenticity, because 
self-abnegation removes the sense of authenticity in their moral actions, whereas 
corruption does not offer any moral sense at all.             
             Since, according to the integrity-based understanding, corruption is not only 
committed by the officials who hold public power, but arguably by anyone holding any 
degree of power in any sphere of life, we may have to be more aware of its possible 
occurrences. In the era of globalization, the misuse of economic power (a private power) 
for some particularistic interest, the consequence of which can be really damaging to 
society at large, is increasing more than ever before. While the enthusiastic supporters of 
globalization, such as those who are involved in the neo-liberal movement, confidently 
encourage democracy as a way to redistribute public power for the prevention of public 
corruption, they offer no way to redistribute economic power for the prevention of private 
corruption. In virtue of being private, economic power is not subject to social control in 
the same way as it is with public power, though their vices are quite the same. To be sure, 
                                                 
48 Corruption seems to be associated with the utilitarian conception of the common good. It does not mean 
that those who hold the utilitarian conception of the common good tend to be corrupt. Rather, it means that 
corruption is typically justified by appealing to the utilitarian conception of the common good. Indeed, 
some social scientists like Samuel P. Huntington and Nathaniel H. Leff (usually referred to as the 
‘Revisionists’) have deliberately tried to justify corruption by arguing that corruption can ease the path to 
modernization and capital formation, and thus to a greater social welfare. For them, corruption is functional 
to economic development, for it can bypass cumbersome bureaucratic processes and overcome inefficient 
regulations. This kind of justification supports what Syed Hussein Alatas (1990) called ‘the ideology of 
corruption’. See the discussion of the ideology of corruption in: Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its 
Nature, Causes and Functions (Aldershot; Brookfield, Vt. USA: Avebury, 1990), pp. 155-190.          
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according to the integrity-based understanding, power or, for that matter economic 
power, does not necessarily tend to corrupt, because it can be and should be used to 
promote the common goods and the realization of the ideal community. But now people 
start to worry about the effects of corruption committed or initiated by those who hold 
substantial economic powers. In the following section, I will describe the nature of 
corruption in economic life in order to give a better sense of corruption and a clearer 
picture as to why integrity is important in economic life. 
 
 
6.2 The Nature of Corruption in Economic Life     
 
           Corruption in economic life is generally the abuse of economic power. Though it 
is possible to find a case where an economic institution, like the market, is corrupted by 
political power or by military power, I am only concerned with the abuse of economic 
power for reasons that, when the other kinds of power are abused in economic life, their 
exercises are typically driven by economic motives and therefore analyzable in terms of 
economic power. By economic power, I mean a power that emerges from the possession 
of scarce resources and a system of relations of production that is backed up by laws, 
public opinion, political power and military power. When money is largely used to 
measure the value of the scarce resources (lands, goods, skills, information and time) and 
to mediate the exchanges of the scarce resources, economic power can then be associated 
with the power of money. Karl Marx (1971), however, argues that the system of relations 
of production is more fundamental than the power of money, because the development of 
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the contradictions and antitheses that characterize the system of relations of production 
would create the power of money – rather than the other way around.49 On the contrary, 
Bertrand Russell (1992) argues that the possession of scarce resources is rather more 
fundamental,50 and that, for him, economic power is the result of monopoly of scarce 
resources rather than anything else.51 I shall argue that both factors are equally 
indispensable because economic power is not sustainable without either the monopoly of 
scarce resources or the system of relations of production.52 Following Crespi’s 
phenomenological model of power, these two factors (the monopoly of scarce resources 
and the system of relations of production) correspond to the second and the third 
dimensions of power, i.e. the intersubjective-outer dimension and the objective-structural 
dimension respectively. As these two dimensions are the outer dimensions of power, we 
can say that the power of money and economic power generally are an outer power, an 
external property of human power, or simply an extended ability of mankind.53 The 
acquisition of money or scarce resources by private parties (persons and institutions) will 
thus mean that economic power becomes the private power of the private parties.               
                                                 
49 The system of relations of production shapes the way in which the producers become increasingly 
dependent on the exchange value of the commodities they produced. The exchange relations become 
increasingly independent of the producers, and money becomes increasingly independent of the products it 
measures. Thus, the power of money can only be found as a result of the development of the system of 
relations of production. See: Karl Marx, Marx’s Grundrisse, edited and translated by David McLellan 
(London: Macmillan, 1971), p.60-1; See also: Suzanne de Brunhoff, Marx on Money (New York: Urizen 
Books, 1976), p. 47.  
50 Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 89.  
51 Bertrand Russell, Freedom and Organization 1814 – 1914 (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1934), pp. 
239-241. 
52 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a small country like Singapore that possesses a large amount of 
financial resources can maintain a relatively strong economic power in the Southeast Asian region without 
the capitalist system of relations of production. 
53 Karl Marx (1970) writes:  “[money] is the alienated ability of mankind. That which I am unable to do as a 
man, and of which therefore all my individual essential powers are incapable, I am able to do by means of 
money. Money thus turns each of these powers into something which in itself it is not – turns it, that is, into 
its contrary.” See: Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, translated by Martin 
Milligan and edited by Dirk J. Struik (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p.168.  
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            Following the three dimensions of power (objective-structural, intersubjective-
outer and subjective-inner dimensions), we may accordingly plot the discussion of 
corruption in economic life in three distinct areas. The first area is associated with the 
system of economic relations in which the corruptors may take opportunities to exploit its 
features and its implementation in a way that would increase their own advantages. 
Corruption in the first area typically involves public officials who deal with laws, rules, 
regulations and policies that govern economic activities. The second area is concerned 
with the behavior of the corruptors under the prevailing system where they can exploit 
their opportunities to acquire, hoard and monopolize the scarce resources in one way or 
another. And the third area is about the inner attitude of the corruptors with regard to the 
economic power in their possession and the moral view of the way the power is to be 
exercised. Included in the third area of corruption is economic corruption committed for a 
noble cause. I will discuss these three areas of corruption in turn, as follows. 
 
 
6.2.1 Economic Corruption with the Involvement of Public Officials 
 
            Economic corruption in the first area seems to be what Karl Marx was most 
concerned about. It appears in the activities of those who possess substantial economic 
powers when they try to sabotage and steer the enactment and implementation of the 
laws, rules, regulations, and policies in a way that would bring them the most advantages. 
In a sense, it is a systemic corruption, as they are just following what is claimed to be 
legitimate according to the system of economic relations that they themselves strive to 
establish and reestablish. Because the enactment and implementation of the laws, rules, 
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regulations and policies fall under the authority of public office, the corruption 
constitutes one of the outcomes of interactions between public and private spheres. It 
sneaks into the grey area of legitimacy of both the private activities and the activities of 
the public authority. If not simply a result of a deliberate collaboration between private 
parties and public officials, the corruption must be an expression of how economic power 
is so significant that it exerts political influences and possibly even dictates the agenda of 
political and moral discussions in the society.54 
At the international level, the increasing power of large multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) in the last quarter of the twentieth century created a worrying 
precedent of possible economic corruption world-wide. Many top corporate executives, 
by putting aside their competitive rivalries, systematically established coalitions and 
alliances with the purpose of pressurizing governments and international policy makers 
(like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to advance corporate interests 
over other interests.55 The emergence of the World Economic Forum (WEF) might 
explain how the coalitions grew larger naturally to include many political leaders, 
intellectuals, journalists and members of international institutions, those who can be 
labeled as pro-business and pro-market. The idea behind the coalitions was clear: 
governments should promote and protect business activities and the market against any 
restrictions. Lately, it has developed into a policy manifesto of the so-called ‘Washington 
                                                 
54 On the contrary, of course, when the political power of public officials is stronger than the economic 
power of private parties, extortion may be the outcome of the public – private interactions. But the 
extortion committed by public officials is rather a form of political or bureaucratic corruption, though it 
may be motivated by economic motives. For the sake of clarity, I am here discussing only the problem of 
economic corruption.   
55 The establishment is systematic, as it is supported by a system of ‘inter-corporate networks of ownership 
and interlocking directorates’ where each corporate owner can be the partial owner of several corporations 
and each corporate executive can occupy positions on the boards of several corporations. See: Sharon 
Beder, Suiting Themselves: How Corporations Drive the Global Agenda (Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2006), 
pp.1-5.    
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Consensus’, in which liberalization of markets is one of the central propositions.56 Here, I 
shall not conclude that the increasing dominance of economic power would lead those 
who are pro-business and pro-market to have a tendency to be corrupt.57 But if the market 
is treated as an end in itself, then it itself is corrupted already; and those who treat it as 
such and behave accordingly are – I am inclined to say – corruptors. Let me note two 
things. First, when the market is treated as an end in itself, society that is supposed to be 
served by the market must serve the imperatives of the free-market.58 The market as a 
community is likely to replace the larger whole human community. The market 
community that is a ‘particularity’ in nature is claimed to be a ‘common ideal’ shared by 
all members of the larger whole human community. Comparing market fundamentalism 
with other fundamentalisms such as religious fundamentalisms, what is then the essential 
difference that justifies us in believing in one as a common ideal while denying the 
others? Clearly, treating the market as an end in itself is in direct opposition to integrity 
that denotes the expression of the particularities for the sake of a common ideal (the ideal 
community). Second, when the market is treated as an end in itself, free competition is 
the rule and cooperation is considered only for the sake of competition. Proper conditions 
for fair wages, healthy working environment and sustainable natural environment can be 
subverted in the name of competitiveness in the global market. Morality is thinkable only 
                                                 
56 The consensus was situated in the belief of the economists that a set of right economic policies is more 
supportive to rapid economic development than both the availability of natural resources and the strength of 
human capital. John Williamson (2000) summarized the consensus in 10 propositions, namely (1) fiscal 
discipline; (2) public expenditure priorities for both high economic growth and better income distribution; 
(3) tax reform; (4) interest rate liberalization; (5) competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) 
liberalization of foreign direct investment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry 
and exit); and (10) secure property right. Williamson noted further that the meaning of the term 
‘Washington Consensus’ has been shifted much closer to that of ‘market fundamentalism’ or 
‘neoliberalism’. See: John Williamson, “What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington 
Consensus”, The World Bank Research Observer 15(2) (August 2000), pp.251-64.     
57 This seems to be true, since the World Economic Forum (WEF) itself is also arranging initiatives in the 
projects that involve disaster relief and anti-corruption. See: http://www.weforum.org/en/about/index.htm.   
58 Sharon Beder, op. cit., p.221.  
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after and beyond the operation of the market. What is then the essential difference 
between the free-market operation and the Mafioso operation?            
            At the national levels, economic corruption that emerges from the interface 
between economic and political life can appear crudely during both the formulation and 
the implementation stages of the laws, rules, regulations and policies. It is often situated 
under secretive alliances between corporate executives, politicians, bureaucrats, military 
leaders and even gangsters. Some scholars identify such alliances as ‘an elite class’ that 
has exclusive practices, norms and culture, the manifestation of which can be harmful to 
the rest of the society.59 The alliances may be quite complex, but they are nevertheless a 
form of collusion that is not so different from the patronage system in traditional 
societies.60 Politicians need large funds to finance political campaigns; bureaucrats are 
interested in the contribution of corporations to the economic and social development of 
the country; military leaders are concerned with the potential unrest if corporations fail to 
provide adequate jobs to the people; whereas corporate executives are interested in 
investing and building corporations only if the laws, rules, regulations and policies are 
supportive for them to maximize profit.61 Gangsters may likely join the collusion when, 
                                                 
59 Among others, C. Wright Mills, William Domhoff and Ralph Nader are three prominent scholars who 
studied the emergence and characteristics of the elite class in the American economic and political life. See 
the discussion of their studies with respect to corruption in: Carol MacLennan, “Corruption in Corporate 
America: Enron – Before and After”, in Dieter Haller and Cris Shore, ed., Corruption: Anthropological 
Perspectives (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), pp.156-170, p.159-165.    
60 John Girling, Corruption, capitalism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 1997), p.155.  
61 In Japan, the collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen is notoriously called ‘dango’. 
When used in the bidding context, it usually means a bid rigging conspiracy, in which the firms rotate the 
winner of the bidding. The dango practice clearly manipulates the market; it is inefficient and harmful to 
the society. The bid rigging practice was suspected as one of the key factors that contributed to the delay of 
the Japanese economic recovery after the bursting of the twin real estate and stock bubbles in 1990. See: 
William K. Black, “The Dango Tango: Why Corruption Blocks Real reform in Japan”, Business Ethics 
Quarterly 14(4) (2004), pp.603-23. In Indonesia, the collusion could include military leaders, since the 
military was not barred from pursuing its own business interests. But the situation is likely to change 
following the reformation era (after 1998). The Indonesian 2004 law requires the military to withdraw 
completely from business activities by 2009.    
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in order to maintain the secrecy of the ‘dirty’ collusion, the parties in some way want to 
clean their hands and protect themselves from being exposed. Apart from the 
involvement of gangsters, politicians and especially corporate executives seem to have 
institutional reasons to corrupt. In the name of profit maximization, the corporate 
executives may rationalize themselves to exert pressure on the state through the threat of 
transferring their corporate activities abroad in order to get privileges. Ironically, by 
asking for privileges, the corporate executives are essentially seeking rents, viz. they 
unfairly limit competition and, therefore, corrupt the market through influencing public 
policy outcome.62 The more economic power the corporations possess, the more potential 
damage the state would likely suffer from possible economic corruption.63 When, for 
example, the corrupt corporations are transnational corporations whose revenue makes a 
significant contribution to the state’s gross domestic product and provide employment to 
several hundred thousands of persons in the country, the state is indeed in a very difficult 
position. Globalization of capital helps to shift the trend of corruption from state-driven 
corruption to capitalist-driven corruption.64 As a result, the integrity of the parties 
possessing economic power becomes increasingly crucial. Indeed, when economic 
activities champion the way people interact with one another, the integrity of those who 
possess power that makes them happen is really at stake. This is also true in situations 
where corruption occurs without the involvement of public officials. 
                                                 
62 John Mukum Mbaku, “Corruption and Rent-Seeking”, in Silvio Borner and Martin Paldam, eds., The 
Political Dimension of Economic Growth: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in San Jose, Costa Rica 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp.193-211, p.195.   
63 The damage that the state suffers can be interpreted as a situation where a viable market that is supposed 
to serve society is destroyed by corruption. 
64 It is important to note that the current driving force of globalization is rather the capital flow than the 
commercial trade. In the 15 years to 2000, the increasing rate of the volume of the cross-border bank 
lending was more than twice of that of the cross-border trade. See: John Plender, Going off the Rails: 
Global Capital and the Crisis of Legitimacy (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2003), p.9.  
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6.2.2 Economic Corruption without the Involvement of Public Officials 
 
             Without involving public officials, private corruptors use their power to exploit 
the common goods that consist in the original purpose of the laws, rules, regulations and 
policies for some particular interest. In this area, corruptions can be classified into two 
basic categories, namely those that are committed for the corporation, and those that are 
committed against the objective of the corporation. Typically, corruption in the first 
category may just undermine the ideal working of the market, but the effects can be very 
destructive to the whole economy. When some corporations condone, tolerate and even 
facilitate their sales-forces to bribe employees of other corporations for contracts or for 
profit maximizing reasons, they provoke the other corporations to do the same; 
corruption can then become systemic and the economy can suffer from inefficiency as the 
inflated prices do not reflect the real values of the products and services. The executives 
of the corrupt corporations may feel better to use outsiders as their agents, but it does not 
reduce the damage as it may even attract some people to build corporations specializing 
in expediting corruption.65 There can be many ways for powerful corporations to evade 
regulatory constraints if they are keen to pursue only profit-maximization. They can hire 
people to provide inside information about competitors, or conversely collaborate with 
competitors to control competition and prices. In the context of the capital market, the 
global investment banks and mutual funds can affect the volatility of the capital flows in 
the emerging market economy and take the benefit from it, irrespective of the fact that a 
sudden capital flow reversal may hurt the real sector of the economy on which many jobs 
                                                 
65 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academy Press, 1978), 
p.193. 
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and lives depend.66 It is thus possible that the abuse of economic power as a result of the 
monopoly of scarce resources in the market is not less destructive than the abuse of 
political power. Indeed, as Max Weber (1968) noted, a domination that originates in the 
market can even be felt much more oppressive than the domination usually understood in 
the context of the relation between the ruler and the ruled.67 
            Corruptions that are committed against the objective of the corporation, those of 
the second category, are straightforward. The corporate directors, managers, or 
employees, who commit corruption, reap the benefits at the expense of the corporation. 
The corruption may take one or more of the various forms, e.g. embezzlement, fraud, 
competing with the corporation, usurping corporate opportunity, conflicting with the 
interest of the corporation, oppressing the minority shareholders, insider trading, sale of 
control, and so on.68 It seems natural to expect that the incentive for corruption will be 
higher when the position of the executive is higher. The economist Susan Rose-
Ackerman (1978) shows that the incentive for the corporate directors to be corrupt is 
high, because what can deter them from corruption may be only the possible fall of the 
market value of the firm, followed by a possible takeover by other investors and 
                                                 
66 John Plender (2003) argues that the giant investment banks are too big to deal with the emerging 
markets. According to his record, the top three investment banks, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs, together managed $2.7 trillion of people’s money at the end of December 2000, a value 
that was already twice the combined value of the stock markets of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, 
China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and India. It is thus easy to imagine that the big players 
like them will not likely take an interest in the emerging markets without destabilizing them. See: John 
Plender, op. cit., p.48-9.   
67 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich vol. III (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p.946; the excerpt under the title of 
“Domination by Economic Power and by Authority” is available in Steven Lukes, ed., Power (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp.28-36, p.33. 
68 The last six forms are those that Harry G. Henn (1970) describes as the six traditional ways by which the 
executives violate the fiduciary duties that they owe to the corporation. See: Harry G. Henn, Handbook of 
the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 2nd edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 
1970), pp. 457-82. 
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corporate restructuring.69 The shareholders may simply prefer to sell their shares quickly 
when they sense something wrong, rather than to exercise control over the conduct of the 
corporate directors. It is therefore possible that, if the control over the operation of the 
corporation is ineffective, all the executives (high and low) collude for their mutual 
benefits at the expense of the corporation.70 
            It is perhaps useful to summarize the case of corruption in this area by referring to 
the economist Robert Klitgaard (1988, 1998), who presents a simple formula in which 
corruption (C) is said to be equal to monopoly (M) plus discretion (D) minus 
accountability (A), viz. C = M+D-A.71 Of course, the formula can be misleading because 
those who have both monopoly and discretion and have no immediate request for 
accountability are not necessarily corrupt. The formula is useful only to explain, as is 
generally the main interest of the economists, the incentive for corruption, or the supply 
side of corruption. Thus, we can say that the incentive for corruption is equal to the 
incentive that is contributed positively by the degree of monopoly and the degree of 
discretion, and negatively by the degree of accountability. It is however important to note 
that, in the system of private property rights, a full-fledged accountability mechanism that 
is fairly applicable to all private parties is difficult, if not impossible, to install. It seems 
to be true that, when a party holds some degree of monopoly over some resources and 
some degree of discretion in using them, a strict accountability mechanism may 
undermine the idea that the party truly has the property rights over the resources. 
Furthermore, the market can work only if the sellers can see some profit to be 
                                                 
69 Susan Rose-Ackerman, op. cit., p.198. 
70 Ibid., p.200. 
71 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.75, 87-90; 
Robert Klitgaard, “International Cooperation against Corruption”, Finance and Development 35:1 (March 
1998), pp.3-6., p.4.  
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appropriated, but profit is only available under the condition that the sellers possess some 
degree of monopoly over their products.72 As a result, I shall argue, M+D-A or the total 
incentive for corruption must always be positive in order for the market to run and for the 
idea of property rights to have any sense at all. But this does not mean that corruption is 
necessarily unavoidable and that we can never have a better measure to deter corruption. 
Rather, it means that there is something that we must look for beyond the supply side of 
corruption, something that is concerned with the demand side of corruption, or the 
attitude of the private parties when they encounter the incentive for corruption.               
 
 
6.2.3 Noble Cause Corruption and Morally Justified Corruption 
 
            When a person realizes that he has some degree of inner power or autonomy over 
what he is going to decide and do, he typically shows a certain attitude towards how he 
would use the outer power that he derives from his material conditions, his social 
relations, and the prevailing social structures. He may show a corrupt attitude, by which 
he is inclined to use his outer power to exploit the common good for the sake of 
increasing or maintaining his material conditions, his social relations, and the prevailing 
social structures. On the other hand, he may show an attitude of self-abnegation, by 
which he is inclined to promote the common good without properly considering the 
particularities of his material conditions, his social relations and the prevailing social 
                                                 
72 There are many possible ways for the sellers to gain a degree of monopoly in the market. The legal way 
is (1) to produce innovative products and obtain patent protection, and (2) to make the consumers prefer 
their products rather than the others through product-differentiation, packaging, advertising and promotion. 
The illegal ways are, for example, unfair elimination of competitors, collusion with competitors 
(establishing a cartel), hoarding the scarce products, and so on.     
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structures that make the promotion of the common good possible. The third possible 
attitude that he may show is associated with integrity, by which he is inclined to use his 
outer power to promote the common good. I will discuss noble cause corruption in 
relation to the corrupt attitude and the attitude of self-abnegation, before pointing out a 
case in which an instance of corruption can be morally justified by reference to integrity.  
           Noble cause corruption is corruption of a specific kind as it is exercised not for the 
sake of self-interests (or collective self-interests), but for the sake of a good end. After 
introducing this notion, Seumas Miller et. al.(2005) insist that noble cause corruption is 
not morally justified because it fails to meet three conditions, i.e. (1) whether the action is 
in compliance with some objective moral principle(s); (2) whether the action is lawful; 
and (3) whether the action is in accordance with the consent of the community.73 An 
example of noble cause corruption would be the case when a police officer tortures a 
killer into revealing the key evidence, or when he exaggerates the evidence and commits 
perjury in order to secure the conviction. In the context of economic life, noble cause 
corruption may be attributed, for example, to the action of a corporate executive who 
steals money from the corporation to support humanitarian causes. In a more subtle case, 
the executive may not blatantly steal money, but rather deploy some of the resources and 
sacrifice the efficiency and profitability of the corporation to pursue what he believes to 
be morally good. In both cases, the executive cheats and corrupts the corporation for 
noble causes. He disregards the fact that his power, which enables him to express the 
‘nobility’, is substantially coming from the corporation and the fact that, because of 
losing the money or the efficiency and profitability that he cheated, the corporation may 
lose its capacity to provide him with power. From the perspective that what he believes to 
                                                 
73 Seumas Miller, Peter Roberts and Edward Spence, Corruption and Ant-Corruption, op. cit., pp. 84-5.   
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be morally good is the common good, the action of the executive exemplifies in some 
sense an attitude of self-abnegation. 
           But the action of the executive can also be seen from another perspective. 
Consider that what he believes to be morally good may not be the real common good. 
Indeed, the action is not fair to the shareholders and the employees who may not expect it 
and thus fail to obtain happiness that they deserve. Even though they may expect it, i.e. 
the corporation as a whole sacrifices its efficiency and profitability for the noble causes, 
the market system fails to facilitate efficient allocation of resources and thus loses some 
part of its capacity to serve all members of the larger whole community to obtain 
happiness. In other words, what he believes to be morally good is in fact a particular or 
private good that cannot be shared by all members of the larger whole community. The 
action of the executive, though not directly motivated by private interest, is indirectly 
connected with private interest.74 The executive is exploiting the common good that is 
supposed to be shared with all members of the larger whole community for a particular 
interest. Hence, from this perspective, the action of the executive is representing a corrupt 
attitude. 
           In sum, noble cause corruption can be seen as representing either an attitude of 
self-abnegation or a corrupt attitude. Both attitudes are vices. But noble-cause corruption 
is a corruption anyway, for what the agent believes to be morally good is in fact a 
‘misplaced’ sense of the common good.75 The true sense of the common good is one that 
refers to the good that is to be shared by all members of the larger whole community, for 
                                                 
74 At the end, Seumas Miller et.al.(2005) conclude that the acts of noble cause corruption, though – by 
definition – not motivated by individual self-interest, is likely linked to self-interest. See: ibid, p.90.  
75 For the case of the police officers who commit noble cause corruption, Seumas Miller et.al.(2005) say 
that they are motivated by a misplaced sense of justice. See: ibid, p.9. 
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happiness can only be actualized in the context of the ideal state of the larger whole 
community. By referring to the ideal larger whole community, we can clearly 
comprehend the vice of noble cause corruption.  
Moreover, by referring to the ideal larger whole community, we can develop a 
proper response to the problem of what Seumas Miller et. al. (2005) called ‘trans-cultural 
corruption’ in which its seductive rationalization is notoriously put as “When in Rome do 
as the Romans do”.76 For, if we refer to the ideal larger whole community, we should not 
fall into relativism, opportunism and absolutism (totalitarianism). When the corporation 
in which we are working is to make investment in a country that allows bribery but 
forbids pornography, for example, we should not be carried away by the habit of using 
bribery to settle problems – or even be provoked to develop a sophisticated method of 
bribery for the purpose of maximizing profit. Nor should we, on the contrary, clean our 
hand by preventing the investment for a simple reason that the host culture is different 
from ours. Nor should we threaten the people in the host country rather to disallow 
bribery than pornography in order to make us comfortable. In the ideal state of the larger 
whole community, the autonomy of each party is respected, but each party should 
exercise justice and friendship with one another in order to obtain and maintain the ideal 
workings of the community. Moral reforms should apply only to each party, by each 
party and for each party. In the process of moral reforms, interim agreements and 
transitional institutional-structures may help to bring all parties into sharing a common 
structure of social norms, by which each party would be able to take the right decisions 
and actions, and thereby to obtain happiness. But the key point is that, by aiming at the 
ideal larger whole community, each party contributes in facilitating moral reforms and 
                                                 
76 Ibid, p. 83, 90-100. 
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obtains happiness. At the end, I believe, each party would in some way disallow bribery 
as well as pornography. 
Integrity is the only attitude that refers to and aims at the realization of the ideal 
larger whole community. Through the understanding of integrity, we can comprehend all 
the instances of corruption, either those that exemplify an attitude of self-abnegation or 
those that simply represent a corrupt attitude. Especially in the grey area where many 
activities are questionable, integrity can shed light for drawing clear-lines between 
corrupt acts and non-corrupt acts, and between corrupt acts that are still morally 
acceptable and those that are not. Consider, for example, the case of using the office 
telephone, leaving work early, or accepting gifts from the subordinates and suppliers. The 
office telephone, the official time-slots and the official relationships can only be 
legitimately used for the purpose of the office, which is the common good shared by all 
members of the office community. Using them for private purpose is simply illegitimate, 
and therefore may be claimed as an instance of corruption. But applying a zero-tolerance 
anti-corruption policy based on such a clear-cut identification can generate negative 
effects. For, in pursuing the common good, we need vitality and must consider it properly 
if we are not to fall into a kind of self-abnegation, which amounts to another kind of 
corruption. In the perspective of integrity, the occasional use of the office telephone for 
maintaining the vitality that eventually results in a greater contribution to the realization 
of the common good is a sign of integrity rather than corruption.  
Thus, we should not be accused of corruption when we occasionally use the office 
telephone to check our family at home or when we leave the office earlier to see the 
doctor for treatment. It is also improper to charge corruption against a manager who 
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receives from his subordinate the gift that is no more than just a token of friendship. 
Obviously, however, only the parties involved know exactly whether or not they are 
behaving corruptly. But it does not mean that integrity is not compatible with the need for 
setting up the objective standards of corruption. In the perspective of integrity, the 
objective standards of corruption are required, not only for educational purpose, but also 
for the purpose of avoiding the unnecessary misunderstandings that would prevent the 
parties from taking the right decisions and actions and contributing to the realization of 
the common good.  
It is possible that an act is corrupt according to the objective standard but not 
corrupt if we refer to the integrity conditions of the parties. For example, the law forbids 
giving extra payment for any government service, but a businessman may have no better 
choice than to proceed with the payment to the corrupt official, as requested, because 
otherwise the official would make him (the businessman) incapable of delivering further 
contribution to the realization of the common good. In such an extortion case, though the 
circumstances are crucial in shaping his judgment and decision, the businessman by no 
means resigns himself to the circumstances. As long as he makes himself readily 
transparent and accountable for what he did, his corruption seems to be morally 
acceptable. Three considerations may support the acceptability of his corruption. First, 
his decision of proceeding with the payment  should not be treated simply as a ‘means’ 
justified by an end, which is the prospective realization of the common good, because his 
decision is right considering the circumstances and the options available to him. It is just 
a right decision that can even be considered as part of the end or part of the process by 
which he contributes to the realization of the common good. Second, though he could not 
 258
proceed with the payment in a transparent way and he might have to protect the non-
transparency of the payment for some time, he is ready to make ‘what he did’ transparent 
when the subsequent circumstances allow him to do it for the realization of the common 
good. In other words, he will act as a whistle blower, exposing the practice of illegal 
payments, whenever the circumstances are right to expose it for the sake of realizing the 
common good. Third, if he has to pay the cost of proceeding with the payment and 
subsequently making the matter transparent, he will not hesitate to pay it for the sake of 
realizing the common good. In short, we can say that for reasons of integrity, an instance 
of corruption can be morally justified. 
 
 
6.3 Building Integrity to Curb Corruption 
 
As integrity is the only right attitude towards the way power is to be exercised, it 
constitutes the only effective measure for curbing corruption in the first place. No matter 
how great or small economic power (an outer power) a man has, he cannot (except by 
accident) deter and prevent corruption without integrity. The system of relations of 
production and the constellation of the monopoly of resources may provide people with a 
certain distribution of economic power, but it does not necessarily imply that the level of 
economic corruption would either increase or decrease without qualifying the level of 
integrity, because the level of integrity determines the way the power is to be exercised. It 
is the inner attitude of man that would make the exercise of power effective in one way or 
another. This signifies the indispensability of integrity in any effective strategy to curb 
corruption. But how should we develop the inner attitude that would lead us to integrity? 
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6.3.1 Three Basic Principles 
 
Before presenting a concrete proposal, I shall emphasize three basic principles 
that must serve as the ground for developing the virtue of integrity and curbing 
corruption. First, the ultimate reference for all efforts pertaining to the development of 
integrity has to be the exercise of integrity, rather than the potentialities that may lead to 
that exercise. In other words, happiness, which consists in virtuous actions, has to be the 
ultimate end of all the efforts. If, for technical reasons, the exercise of integrity can be 
portrayed using the term ‘performance’, while its potentialities are illustrated using the 
term ‘power’, the discussion that follows may be more situated in a concrete case. As I 
have argued in the previous chapter, the market players who possess integrity tend to 
compete with one another by offering performance rather than using power. The good 
performance that the market players offer would mean that they contribute to the 
realization of the ideal larger whole community in the process of making a profit. The 
good performance satisfies the requirements of justice, expresses the friendship relations, 
and respects the autonomy of those who want to be involved and have been involved in 
it. On the contrary, the market players who merely use power to win the competition tend 
to manipulate justice and friendship, and seek to reduce the autonomy of the parties who 
want to deal with them, in order to maximize profit and thereby increase their own 
power. The market players who merely accumulate and use power to win the competition 
are prone to corruption. In short, we can conclude that, in order to develop integrity and 
curb corruption, we have to urge everyone to be productive and to perform well, rather 
than to accumulate power (the potentialities) for its own sake. The principle does not only 
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restrain the greedy character of the powerful, but it also encourages the powerless to 
refrain from idleness and indolence.   
Second, integrity can only be developed in a process of interplay between the 
individuals and the community of which they are members and, as a consequence, each 
individual has to bear the responsibility for preparing his or her own conditions and the 
conditions of the community for the success of the interplay. One cannot expect to have 
integrity without undertaking social interactions with others in the community. In the 
social interactions, the social culture and structure, such as that manifested in the social 
conventions, social norms and institutional structures, may encourage, support, or 
conversely impede the development of integrity. A supportive and encouraging social 
culture and structure, however, does not necessarily produce integrity, because integrity 
can only emerge through the active participation of the individual who wishes to have it. 
The systemic problem is present if the social culture and structure is unsupportive or even 
damaging to the development of integrity. We can say that the systemic problem is a 
collective problem that calls for a collective moral responsibility to rectify. From the 
individualist perspective, as is described by Seumas Miller et al. (2005), a collective 
moral responsibility is a joint responsibility where each individual is individually morally 
responsible for realizing the collective end, but under the condition that the others are 
individually morally responsible for realizing it as well.77 The collective moral 
responsibility, however, may not be adequate to rely on, because a collective action can 
fail to emerge as each individual may be just waiting for one another to initiate the action. 
In particular, when the individuals in the higher positions do not initiate the action, those 
in the lower positions are very unlikely to do it. The result will be different, if each 
                                                 
77 Ibid, p.115 
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individual is also to some extent, without qualification, morally responsible to rectify the 
problem. From the Aristotelian perspective, I argue, each individual is individually 
morally responsible for realizing the end (happiness) that is both collective and individual 
in nature; and consequently, each individual is morally responsible for preparing all the 
required conditions, including those that need a collective action to prepare. This is 
comprehensible only in the framework of the conception that the individual-self is an 
expanded self that is in a sense constituted of the ideal community of which all the 
required conditions for happiness prevail.  When the required conditions are parts of his 
or her expanded self, the individual must feel responsible to realize them as part of 
his/her self-realization. Thus, in order to develop the virtue of integrity, everyone has to 
be encouraged to expand his/her sense of self to include the ideal state of the community 
of which he/she is a member, and thereby be encouraged to contribute to the realization 
of the ideal community and all its social conventions, social norms, and institutional 
structures that support it. The principle does not only solve the free-rider problem and the 
bystander problem, but also it rules out participations that carry the problem of moral 
hazard.78  
Third, for the purpose of realizing the ideal community, to which the virtue of 
integrity refers, individuals have to share a distribution of power such that, if power is not 
equally distributed, through a process of accountability and transparency, each individual 
will always have sufficient autonomy to make the right decisions and actions that can 
                                                 
78 The free-rider problem is a problem of free riding where the actor gives an unfair amount of 
participation, viz. he consumes more, or bears the costs less, than what he fairly deserves. The bystander 
problem is a problem of non-participation where the actor avoids getting involved in a social action even 
though the action is urgently needed, such as when someone gets injured and asks for help. The problem of 
moral hazard is a problem where the participation of the actor typically involves the risks of hurting the 
others who do not get involved in the affair.        
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work in some way to balance the unequal distribution of power. Considering that power 
differential exists naturally in every sphere of life (including economic life), it seems not 
quite right to insist that perfect equality in the distribution of power is a precondition that 
we have to prepare before developing integrity. Power is not necessarily corrupt, and 
equal distribution of power does not guarantee that corruption will not occur. This 
position differs in some respect from John Stuart Mill’s in The Subjection of Women that, 
as interpreted by Maria Morales (1997), perfect equality is an essential element of human 
good or is a virtue, and inequality is a vice.79 While I agree that a certain degree of 
equality is good as it is necessarily required by each individual to get sufficient autonomy 
to make the right decisions and actions, I am rather inclined to say that inequality is not 
necessarily a vice, provided that there is an accountability and transparency process that 
makes it possible for each individual to secure his/her autonomy and to balance in some 
way the unequal distribution of power by making the right decisions and actions. The 
process of accountability and transparency should ensure that a high degree of equality 
(or perfect equality if we like) is in a sense achievable if everyone is productive and 
performing well, making the right decisions and actions according to the roles that he/she 
holds and the human capabilities that he/she has. This is, I think, the principle that 
underlies and should underlie the idea of good governance. It requires no less degree of 
moral reform or moral revolution in everyone’s sentiments and habits than that which 
Mill suggested with the ethic of prefect equality.80 In particular, the powerful should give 
space for the powerless to gain the required degree of autonomy according to the roles 
                                                 
79 Maria Morales, “The Corrupting Influence of Power”, in Laura Duhan Kaplan and Laurence F. Bove, 
eds., Philosophical Perspectives on Power and Domination: Theories and Practices (Amsterdam; Atlanta, 
GA: Rodopi, 1997), pp.41-53, p.43, 45, 50.    
80 Ibid, p.43, 51. The ethic of perfect equality, which Mill suggested, is to challenge the ethic of command 
and obedience that naturally sustains the power deferential. 
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that he/she holds and the human capabilities that he/she has. The powerless should 
develop his/her own capabilities, gain the benefit from the process of accountability and 
transparency to secure and increase his/her autonomy by making the right decisions and 
actions. I must follow the moral message of Mill’s substantive vision of egalitarian 
human relations in order to conclude that the benefit of holding the principle does not 
only apply to the powerless, but also to the powerful and the community as a whole. It is 
indeed true that when the ideal community is realized, where everyone has sufficient 
autonomy to perform well, everyone comes into self-realization and obtains happiness. In 
sum, we can conclude that, in order to develop the virtue of integrity, we have to urge 
everyone to proceed with the process of accountability and transparency wherever and 
whenever required to ensure that everyone has sufficient autonomy to perform well. The 
principle does not unnecessarily decry inequality, nor does it insist on perfect equality; it 




6.3.2 The Proposal 
 
With the above three principles, I shall now present a concrete proposal to support 
efforts in developing the virtue of integrity and curbing corruption. Let’s begin with the 
capitalist system of relations of production that Karl Marx was mostly concerned about. 
Marx would most likely suggest that, in order to curb corruption, the system of relations 
of production, where the producing class (the workers) is (as he believed) exploited by 
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the appropriating class (the capitalists), has to break down first before the emergence of 
what he aspired to as a working class government. Marx construed the history of all 
society as driven by class struggles,81 and predicted that a working class government 
would be the ultimate result. But Marx was mostly wrong in his prediction. Against 
Marx, I shall argue that the capitalist system of relations of production does not 
necessarily produce class struggle. When the capitalists (with their invested capital) and 
the workers (with their skills) are both performing well, contributing to the realization of 
the ideal community as the first principle suggests, there is little sense in suggesting that 
the capitalists and the workers belong to two different and hard-headed conflicting 
classes. By putting good performance as a reference, the capitalists and the workers 
should be able to make the capitalist system of relations of production facilitate human 
flourishing, harmony and mutual benefit. Profit is not necessarily something that the 
capitalist earns unjustly from the exploitation of the workers, but is and should be rather a 
result of a just system of exchange between the performance of the capitalist and the 
performance of the workers. Thus, it is not necessary to wait for the capitalist system of 
relations of production to break down for curbing corruption, but it is necessary to 
encourage both the capitalists and the workers to perform well. 
In order to promote the good performances of the capitalists and the workers, an 
effective economic policy that discourages them to go on a ‘strike’, or to use power for 
its own sake, has to be developed and instituted. The policy should push capitals and 
skills to be productive and to perform well, not to halt and falter for power’s sake. The 
policy is indeed badly required for the case of capitals in particular, because, in terms of 
                                                 
81 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, with an introduction by A.J.P. Taylor (New 
York: Penguin, 1967), pp.79-94.  
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power, capitals are more easily accumulated and halted, with less risk, than skills 
(labors).82 Moreover, there are many sophisticated ways for capitals to halt and falter for 
power’s sake; these include irresponsible economic activities that involve capital 
hoarding (idle funds), capital speculation (currency exchanges, stocks and derivatives), 
foreign factory reallocation and capital flight.83 Using economic sanctions and fiscal 
instruments, like a scheme of tax prepayment on the idle capitals and the displacing 
capitals, may work in some situations.84 Here, I shall not go into the details of the policy, 
which necessarily requires a thoroughgoing research on the effects of instituting a 
specific measure in the economy, but suffice it to say that the policy has to guide step by 
step, without sacrificing the autonomy of any party, a reform that at the end ensures a 
condition in which profit is rather a result of commitment to good performance than a 
result of capital displacement. The success of the policy can be gauged simultaneously by 
the increase of productive investment, the decrease of capital displacement, and the 
decrease of unemployment. This is indeed an uphill task, considering the recent fact that 
the productive fields tend to be subordinated to the global financial fields,85 and that the 
mobility of global financial capital is very high and driven only to serve short-term 
                                                 
82 While the individual capitalist can accumulate and exercise power singly, the workers must organize 
collectively if they are to offset the power of the capitalist. Essentially, when acting as an individual, the 
individual capitalist acts ‘collectively’. See: Phillip Hansen, “The Communist Manifesto and the Power of 
Capital”, in Douglas Moggach and Paul Leduc Browne, eds., The Social Question and the Democratic 
Revolution: Marx and the Legacy of 1848 (Ottawa, Ont.: University of Ottawa Press, 2000), pp.167-185, 
p.177.     
83 Capital speculation and capital flight are a form of a ‘strike’ on the side of the capitalists, because, from 
the perspective of the local economy, they are essentially an act of holding the capitals from being available 
to the demand of the economy. 
84 By a scheme of tax prepayment, I mean a scheme in which the capitalists are obliged to pay tax in 
advance for the capitals they hold in idle or in transition. The scheme may be more attractive to the 
capitalists than the idea of negative interest-rate that Silvio Gesell (1958) thought appropriate to make the 
idle monies go to work serving the needs of trades and real investments (factories, ships, shops, railways, 
etc). See: Silvio Gesell, The Natural Economic Order, transalated by Philip Pye M.A. (London: Peter 
Owen Ltd., 1958), pp.405-6.     
85 Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, translated by Chris Turner (Oxford: Polity, 
2005), p. 229.   
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economic interest (short-term profit),86 while on the other hand, the national authorities 
are in the position of not being in control, but rather of being subject to the speculative 
forces of the financial market.87 The uphill task signifies the critical need for the moral 
revolution in everyone’s attitudes, in parallel to the economic reform that is to be brought 
up. 
If the capitalist system of relations of production is to be maintained, adjusted 
with the policy of promoting the commitment to performances, we still need a process of 
accountability and transparency, which the third principle suggests, to prevent some 
economic agents from monopolizing resources which may lead to the deprivation of the 
autonomy of the others to perform well. As I mentioned earlier, the principle underlies 
the idea of good governance to ensure that everyone has sufficient autonomy to perform 
well. Good governance is not a novel idea, and has been largely employed and constantly 
requested to be employed in public or private institutions. As part of good governance, 
the formal process of accountability and transparency usually includes the policies and 
procedures for appointing personnel to the key positions in the organizational structure, 
the guidelines and standards for monitoring and reporting the operation of the 
organization, and the procedures and standards for internal and external audits. I shall not 
go into the detail of the process, which is widely available elsewhere, and which varies 
largely depending on the nature of the business and the size of the institution. What I am 
most concerned about is the trend that good governance and the associated process of 
accountability and transparency is treated only as a matter of how power is to be 
                                                 
86 Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 39-
40; Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of our Time, translated by Richard Nice 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p.68. 
87 Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance, ibid., p.39-41.  
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distributed and displayed for its own sake or what I prefer to call a ‘power-play’, rather 
than as a way to ensure that everyone has the opportunity and ability to perform well.88 
The trend seems to come out of the overwhelming belief that power and the constellation 
of power will solve all the problems. It places power as an end in itself, departing from 
what the first principle suggests. 
At the international level, for example, Pierre Bourdieu (1998) suggests two 
forms of action – the mobilization of people and the promotion of a transnational social 
state – to give pressures against the power of global financial capitals, in order to pave 
the way for what he calls ‘a new internationalism’ by which general social interests will 
contest against narrow capital interests.89 The emergence of the World Social Forum 
(WSF) in opposition to the World Economic Forum (WEF) is a sign of how the social 
pressures develop against the power of global capitals.90 At the national level, the power-
play operates between the representatives of the three institutions, viz. the government, 
the market and the civil society, in setting up the policies that affects people’s lives. At 
the corporate level, the power-play works among the managers, the labor union, the 
shareholder proxies, the consumer groups, the suppliers, the banks, and the other 
stakeholder representatives. On the basis of the power-play, the process of accountability 
and transparency merely works out of a situation of fear, in which each party is afraid of 
losing the power relationship from which its own interests are to be derived; each party 
                                                 
88 The term ‘governance’ itself connotes the ‘steering’ of divergent elements into a specific form of 
process. It involves a bottom-up approach to encourage the participation of the elements in the process. It is 
usually contrasted to the term ‘government’ that involves a top-down approach to drive or control the 
divergent elements. It differs from ‘politics’ that, on the contrary, involves a process by which the divergent 
elements produce a power-structure as the end result. Its notion is more dynamic than the notion of 
‘institution’, because it focuses on the problem of adaptivity rather than the problem of narrowing options 
[see: Josef Wieland, “The Ethics of Governance”, Business Ethics Quarterly 11:1 (January, 2001), pp.73-
87, p.76].                 
89 Ibid., pp.65-8. 
90 See: http://www.wsfindia.org/?q=node/2 
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cares more for its own interests than the purpose of the process. That is to say that each 
party is only eager to maintain the process when the benefit is guaranteed; whenever the 
power relation shifts to its favor, the party would maximize its own advantages 
disregarding whether the other parties will adversely pay the costs as a result of the shift. 
The irony of the power-play appears quite unfortunate in the horrendous anti 
corruption movement, following the likely emergence of what the anti-corruption 
researcher Steve Sampson (2005) calls the ideology of ‘anti-corruptionism’.91 Sampson 
argues that, while corruption begins locally and spreads globally, the anti-corruption 
movement begins at the top from the idea of prominent global institutions like the World 
Bank and penetrates locally.92 Under the labels of transparency, accountability and good 
governance, the movement likely carries a mission of moralization of the global society 
and a project of making the market economies more rational and efficient. Anti-
corruption becomes not only a goal, but also a means by which the actors of anti-
corruption can empower themselves through the social images they create and the 
resources they manage. According to Sampson, anti-corruption is not innocent; its actors 
can be ruthless and partisan in pursuing integrity.93 It is indeed an unfortunate irony that 
the actors of anti-corruption can themselves be corrupt. The anti-corruption movement 
loses its efficacy when ending up only with the mechanism of power-play. There must be 
something more to be achieved than the power-play in the promotion of transparency, 
accountability and good governance, something (viz. the good life) that, as I argued, 
would ensure that everyone has the opportunity and the ability to perform well. In other 
words, the process of accountability and transparency should not be driven solely by the 
                                                 
91 Steve Sampson, “Integrity Warriors…”, op. cit., p.108. 
92 Ibid., p.106. 
93 Ibid., p. 127-9. 
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mechanism of power-play, but also and mainly by the motive to prevent the deprivation 
of the autonomy of anyone to perform well. This suggests that an approach that features 
cooperation and enlightenment has to take precedence over an approach that stresses 
confrontation and conflict. It requires again, in parallel, the moral revolution in 
everyone’s attitudes, especially those who are involved directly in the process of 
accountability and transparency. 
The moral revolution requires everyone to expand his sense of self to include the 
ideal state of the communities of which he is a member, as the second principle suggests. 
Here, I shall mention three steps for one to undergo the moral revolution. Firstly, one 
should be aware of his responsibility to develop his own autonomy, for happiness is not 
given by others, but is to be grasped only by himself through his decisions and actions. 
This step is not as easy as one might expect, since in order for it to be possible, one needs 
to strengthen his inner power (the first dimension of power) in a situation in which the 
potential asymmetrical relations of power (e.g. domination, oppression, coercion, 
exploitation and exclusion) may be present, manifesting the outer dimensions of power 
(the second and the third dimensions of power). In such a situation, resistance is 
necessary in order for one to gain a space for self-reflexivity and thereby to remain as a 
true subject. Through resistance, one can learn how the power works, be critical, and 
make the right judgments and decisions for actions. Inner power can only be built and 
strengthened if one – whether he is powerful or powerless in the asymmetrical relations 
of power – resists from being turned into a mere object of the power relations. In the 
context of overwhelming economic power relations, one should avoid being drowned in a 
sea of economic forces. For, if one resigns himself to the economic forces, he is 
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essentially ‘powerless’; he is merely an instrument of things (capitals), and would lose 
himself in the world of things, and therefore, he is no longer a subject. On the contrary, 
one should not excessively resist in a way that would neglect all the power relations. For, 
if he does so, he would be rejected by the others and would lose his nature as a social 
being. By developing his own capacity to deal properly with the power relations, the 
resistance and the space for self-reflexivity, one practically develops his own autonomy. 
Thus, it is this kind of self-empowerment that we need first to pursue, in addition, 
perhaps, to a program of social-empowerment that aims to make a wide range of political 
and economic resources and alternatives (opportunities) open to everyone.94 Here, it is 
the perpetual production of human subjectivity that we should be most concerned about. 
Second, upon gaining his own autonomy, one should expand his communities of 
friendship in the spirit of manifesting good performances such that, though he may and – 
in most cases – ought to give particular preferences to the smaller community that is 
close to him, the particular preferences that he gives are essentially aimed at the 
realization of the ideal larger community. This is a critical road to the expansion of one’s 
sense of self to include the ideal state of all the communities of which he is a member. 
The partiality that is implied from giving the particular preferences is not arbitrary nor 
unfair, for it is not parasitic, and is even supportive, to the realization of the ideal state of 
the larger community of which those who are not receiving the preferences are also 
                                                 
94 Michael Johnston (1998) argues for social empowerment as a way to strengthening civil society and 
fighting systemic corruption. Basically, Johnston argues that, if citizens’ political and economic resources 
and alternatives are widened, they can reduce their vulnerabilities to exploitation, and enhance their ability 
to participate effectively in a healthy politics. Johnston points out three major challenges for social 
empowerment to settle, i.e. the balance between civil society and the state, the orderly interaction between 
private parties and government in the environment of mutual respect, and the balance between political and 
economic opportunities. See: Michael Johnston, “Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundation for 
Institutional Reform”, in Mark Robinson, ed., Corruption and Development (London; Portland, Ore.: F. 
Cass, 1998), pp. 85-104. 
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members.95 It is instructive that one ought to give priority to the vitality of, respectively, 
his working team, his department, his corporation and the locality where his corporation 
operates. Having preferences for the local products, the local employees and the 
healthiness of the local/ national economy should be legitimate and morally advisable 
insofar as these preferences will make the communities of which he is a member 
contribute better to the realization of the ideal larger whole community. The subjectivity 
forces that emerge from the locality of preferences should balance the overwhelming 
economic forces that give no place to human subjectivity.              
Third, in order to settle conflicts that may arise as a result of one having particular 
(local) preferences and to ensure that one’s particular preferences will not damage the 
opportunity of the others to perform well, one should promote justice to work well on all 
the affected parties. By promoting justice, one contributes to the promotion of the 
realization of the ideal workings of the community of which he is a member. It is for the 
reason of realizing the ideal community that one should then promote the formulation, 
reformulation and compliances of the institutional instruments such as the laws, 
regulations, rules and codes of ethics that are required to facilitate and ensure that justice 
would be done to all parties, even though he may accidentally have to suffer the bad luck 
of paying the costs (sanctions) for his own ignorance.96 For the reason of justice, one 
should consider the requirements of impartiality and objectivity when making decisions 
                                                 
95 This kind of partiality is akin to what John Cottingham called ‘philophilic partiality’, a partiality of one 
who loves his friends. It has, as well, the characteristic of the ‘self-directed partiality’, a partiality of which 
one assigns special weight to his own interests for reasons that they are his. But different from Cottingham, 
this kind of philophilic partiality should also have the characteristic of the ‘agent-related partiality’, a 
partiality of which one, as a human agent, gives preferences for reasons that they are part of his own life 
plan and project. See: John Cottingham, “Partiality, Favoritism and Morality”, Philosophical Quarterly 
36:144 (July, 1986), pp. 357-73, p. 368.   
96 The laws, regulations, rules and codes of ethics are here seen as both preventive and corrective systems. 
For this reason also, one should contribute and support the regulatory policies to discourage the ‘strike’ of 
capital and labor, and to encourage transparency and accountability, which I have discussed earlier.   
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on behalf of a community (or of communities), and should avoid or disclose (if 
unavoidable) a potential ‘conflict of interest’ that emerges as a result of holding several 
decision-making positions in the communities.97 A corporate executive, for example, 
should consider the efficiency factor in his corporate decisions, for doing otherwise 
would be an injustice to the shareholders and would violate the original purpose of the 
corporation. A consumer should not buy a careless service from the local producer, for to 
buy it with his hard earned money would be an injustice to himself. Thus, this third step 
accommodates the requirements for objectivity and impartiality as a way to sustain 
healthy human interactions and, therefore, to attain the ideal workings of the community. 
Though the second and the third steps appear to give him two opposing 
requirements, viz. partiality and impartiality, subjectivity and objectivity, one should find 
a way out of the possible dilemmatic situations by adhering to the commitment that any 
particular (local) preferences are to be aimed at the realization of the ideal larger 
community, as the second step suggests. For justice, impartiality and objectivity provide 
strong reasons and motivations to reject the local preferences that are parasitic on the 
realization of the ideal larger community; but on the other hand, with his local 
preferences one should contribute to the reformulation of the misfit institutional 
instruments to ensure that justice is done to all parties and the ideal workings of the 
community are realized. In other words, one should be objective from his perennial status 
as a subject, and should fulfill the impartial requirements from his position as a subject 
                                                 
97 A conflict of interest is a situation in which some person P has a special interest that tends to interfere 
with the judgment and decision which he has to exercise on behalf of another person (say Q). The special 
interest that P has may be his own personal interest or an interest that emerges as a result of his fiduciary 
relationship with still another person (say R). See: Seumas Miller et.al. (2005), p.47. Notice that if (P+Q) is 
a community and (P+R) is another community, we can say that the conflict of interest occurs as a result of 
P having two positions in different communities.     
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having particular preferences. One cannot expect to possess integrity simply by 
complying with the laws, regulations, rules and codes of ethics, as if these institutional 
instruments can serve mechanistically to convert him into a moral agent and regulate his 
virtue, while ignoring the importance of producing human subjectivity and of expanding 
his communities of friendship that the second step suggests.98 
In sum, the moral revolution in everyone’s attitude involves self-awareness and 
the expansion of the sense of self to include the ideal workings of the communities of 
which he is a member. It is not a kind of a selfish enlightenment that deals only with the 
morality of private life, nor is it a kind of social revolution that forces everyone to abide 
by the moral rules defining appropriate behaviors in the society.99 Rather, it is a 
revolution by which everyone should personally feel responsible to contribute to the 
realization of an ideal society that the others would share and regard as the same. As 
such, those who have undergone the moral revolution would never feel fully-realized 
unless they participate in the realization of the ideal society. Those who have undergone 
the moral revolution would be seriously committed to the capital strike prevention policy 
and the good governance with its mechanism of accountability and transparency, because 
these institutional instruments and mechanism are required for the realization of good 
performances and the realization of the ideal society.  
                                                 
98 When ethics and morality are understood as being concerned with the problem of bringing subjectivity 
into objectivity, integrity is clearly indispensable for it essentially leads the subject’s particularities to 
contribute to the realization of something (the ideal community) that is to be objectively shared with the 
other subjects.  
99 Many Indonesians are wondering why some of those who are devoted to religious faiths can still be 
corrupt, while some of those who are not corrupt are hesitant to improve the corrupt society. I believe those 
devout people are rather enlightened only with respect to their own private moral life, viz. they are selfishly 
enlightening themselves, indulging themselves in the religious activities. On the other hand, the devout 
fundamentalists try to initiate a social revolution that gives them the possibility to institute the religion-
based moral rules for curbing corruption. It is not clear whether the institution of strict rules will end up 
with less corruption or with even more chances for corruption.    
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All that said, we need then to deal with the ways of promoting and realizing the 
moral revolution itself. It is clear that, by virtue of producing human subjectivity, the 
moral revolution is not to be established by force, but rather by persuasion, dialogue and 
education. But more than just to empower everyone with the understanding of the human 
good (happiness) and the good performances that constitute it,100 the persuasion, dialogue 
and education should lead everyone to proceed in practice with the real actions and 
performances, according to his abilities, interests, positions and other particularities. 
Accordingly, we can say that integrity that emerges as the final product of the moral 
revolution is a sort of power that an individual will possess to prevent himself from 
committing corruption; however, it is not a power that wholly emerges from the 
understanding of the human good, but rather a power that mainly emerges from his 
disposition to produce good performances, which are themselves constitutive of the 
human good. The power of integrity is rather a power to engage in non-corrupt activities 
and to prepare the institutional instruments and mechanism necessary for them, than a 
power to refrain simply from corruption. 
Integrity is clearly indispensable for any reliable endeavor to curb corruption. The 
idea of institutional instruments and mechanism to cut down the supply side of corruption 
will not attract anyone if there is no one having the virtue of integrity. Although the 
institutional instruments and mechanism are ultimately installed through a political 
process, they will be used merely as a support to the mechanism of power-play that is 
inherently still vulnerable to corruption. The mechanism of power-play will only be 
                                                 
100 Plato’s solution to the problem of corruption seems to rely only on the education that will provide 
people with the understanding of the human good and, thereby, will lead them to the avoidance of 
corruption and abuse. See: Judith Presler, “Plato’s Solution to the Problem of Political Corruption”, in 
Laura Duhan Kaplan and Laurence F. Bove, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on Power and Domination: 
Theories and Practices (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1997), pp.107-113, p.109.  
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reliable if it is placed on integrity as its foundation. Building integrity has to be an 
integrative part of anti-corruption strategy. Interestingly, if immoral behaviors in general 
can be defined in terms of the corruption of the human community, the larger whole 
community, we can say that integrity is indispensable to any endeavor to improve the 
morality in the community. Thus, it is indispensable to a viable moral economy and a 
viable moral society in general. 
The last point I need to note is that although the integrity-based definition of 
corruption offered here is not institutionally operational and is much broader than the 
various definitions commonly used in the popular discourse, it is compatible with the 
institutionally operational definitions. The integrity-based definition is not institutionally 
operational because it is more concerned with the aspect of motivation than the 
observable aspect that we usually use to prove when we accuse someone of being 
corrupt. Indeed, we can fairly accuse someone of being corrupt only if we can prove that 
his act is an act of corruption based on the observable and agreeable standards, such as, 
for example, that he is a public official and that he uses his public role for his own 
benefit. But if we can prove that he is corrupt based on the agreed standards, it is 
impossible for us to deny that, from the motivational aspect, he manipulates or exploits 
for some particular interest the common goods that should be actualized through the 
proper exercise of his role. The directional motivation implied in the agreed standards is 
clear, which is to turn something that should be common (can largely be shared with 
others) into another thing that is particular (cannot largely be shared with others). The 
fact that the directional motivation, which is derived from the integrity-based definition 
of corruption, prevails whenever the agreed standards hold indicates that the integrity-
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based definition of corruption is compatible with the institutionally operational 
definitions. However, the directional motivation has a more basic normative appeal than 
the other measures implied in the institutionally operational definitions. As a result, the 
integrity-based definition can help us evaluate an act that is characteristically corrupt but 
is not a case under the agreed standards. Consider that in the increasing complexity of 
interactions among human beings and institutions, the ways by which one can evade the 
rules and the agreed standards are increasingly varied and complicated. In the grey area 
where many activities are questionable, the integrity-based definition can help us draw 
clear-lines between corrupt acts and non-corrupt acts. It provides a normative foundation 
for evaluating any possible incidence of corruption, some of which may be too complex 
for the agreed standards to cope with. Thus, the integrity-based definition is useful to 
sharpen the application of the institutionally operational definitions.  
Moreover, we can use the integrity-based definition of corruption to evaluate the 
agreed standards in the institutionally operational definitions of corruption. Because the 
standards are generally manifestations of the common good (the good of the institution), 
we can use the integrity-based definition to make sure that the standards are ethically 
sound, viz. they should reflect the common good defined with reference to the good life 
as the ultimate end. More than this, however, it is in fact at the individual level that the 
integrity-based definition of corruption is very useful, because it helps individuals 
understand the issue of integrity and build integrity accordingly to prevent themselves 
from committing corruption. The usefulness of the definition at the individual level is the 





C O N C L U S I O N 
 
 
In this last chapter, I will summarize the argument, argue that its perspective 
should be an important part of the anti-corruption programs in the developing countries, 
and finally identify some areas of future research that may arise from it. I begin the 
argument by showing how we can learn from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. I argue that 
the crisis was caused, to some extent, by the behavior of the market players who lacked 
integrity. In the time of crisis, we can easily distinguish the characteristics of those who 
possess and those who lack integrity. I identify that persons of integrity would not treat 
their economic life as a separate realm and, as a result, would display three distinct 
characteristics, namely, (a) they are concerned with the proper functioning of the 
economy; (b) they pursue their own maximization of profit to the extent that it 
contributes to the proper functioning of the economy; and (c) they would contribute to 
rectify the improper functioning of the economy.  
In order to find an adequate account of integrity that can capture the 
characteristics of persons of integrity, I investigate the nature of integrity by taking 
recourse to the fact that etymologically the sense of wholeness is indispensable. I argue 
that a thing of integrity will perform two processes simultaneously, namely an internal 
self-governance, by which its elements coordinate themselves in a way that would 
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ultimately result in the expression of a single identity, and an external participation, by 
which it contributes to manifesting the integrity of the whole of which it is a part. The 
former brings a sense of harmony and stability, while the latter carries a sense of 
consistency and adaptability. Since both processes simultaneously express the wholeness 
of the thing of integrity, they have to be viewed as two inseparable processes. The aspects 
of harmony, stability, consistency and adaptability are valuable only in virtue of being the 
expression of the sense of wholeness. As a result, reducing integrity into one of its 
aspects is not a proper way of capturing the essence of integrity. In the case of a person of 
integrity, the internal self-governance and the external participation processes 
correspond respectively to the way the person builds and expresses his self-identity and 
the way the person acts morally. I show that using the aspect of integrity, such as 
honesty, reflective character, consistency and ‘being true to one’s commitment’, as a 
single criterion for ascribing a person of integrity is not adequate. I show also that the 
currently available accounts of integrity that reduce integrity to either a matter of how 
one builds and expresses his self-identity (the personal element) or a matter of whether 
one is acting morally (the moral element) are not defensible. The challenge is to find a 
non-reductive account of integrity that can integrate both elements and thereby maintain 
the sense of wholeness. Such an account must take seriously the individuality of persons 
into account. 
Interestingly, the ethical problems in economic life can only be solved 
satisfactorily if the aspect of the individual person is adequately addressed. By taking 
business in the corporate setting as a typical unit of economic activity, I show that the 
ethical problems in economic life typically emerge from the tendency of treating the 
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economy as a separate realm. But if the economy is treated as a separate realm, the moral 
status of corporations is questionable. Instead of arguing whether the corporation is or is 
not a moral entity, I argue that the corporation should be treated as a moral entity. The 
responsibilities of the corporation have to include not only those related to the values of 
effectiveness and efficiency or those demanded by the shareholders (the economic 
responsibilities), but also the social responsibilities demanded by the other stakeholders. 
However, these dual responsibilities leave the managers of the corporation with the so-
called ‘stakeholder paradox’, in which taking ethics into account seems to demand but 
also to forbid a strategic economic mission. The best response to the paradox is not to 
strategically synthesize all the responsibilities at the institutional level. Nor is it to project 
to the corporation (the institution) what the shareholders expect and are expected to do. 
Nor is it to reject at the institutional level the thesis that separates the economic 
responsibilities from the social-moral responsibilities by equalizing them in the so-called 
‘multi-fiduciary stakeholder approach’. I argue that the best response is to reject the 
separation thesis at the individual level. In the rejection of the separation thesis at the 
individual level, the individuality of persons is reasonably and consistently addressed. 
Thus, an ethics that can satisfactorily provide sufficient ground for the non-reductive 
account of integrity and solve the ethical problems in economic life must reject the 
separation thesis at the individual level. 
Aristotelian virtue ethics can meet the requirements of the rejection of the 
separation thesis at the individual level, because, for Aristotle, the ultimate end of every 
human activity is happiness (euadimonia) and his concept of happiness is essentially a 
concept of the good life that has two inseparable elements, the personal and the moral 
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elements. I argue that, for Aristotle, happiness consists only in virtuous activities; the 
good life is thus a life of virtuous activities. If business is to be ethically unproblematic, it 
has to be a virtuous activity. Business is not a means to the good life, but in itself should 
be a constituent of the good life. Business has to be first appreciated as a productive 
activity and then turned into a virtuous activity. In Alasdair MacIntyre’s term, business 
should be a practice, described roughly as a socially cooperative human activity that can 
bring humans to achieve excellence. But business as a practice presupposes the existence 
of communities; therefore, the corporation and the market have to be perceived and 
treated as communities of a certain kind. Each individual has a particular role in the 
corporate community, the corporation has a role in the market community, and the 
market has a social role to serve the larger whole community. The purpose of the larger 
whole community is the good life of all its members. By appealing to the good life as the 
ultimate end, the corporation and the market become the mediating institutions for the 
individuals to obtain the good life. In other words, by appealing to the good life as the 
ultimate end, the individuals contribute to the realization of the ideal communities. By 
ideal communities, I mean the communities that exist for their true purposes, viz. the 
purposes that are hierarchically defined with the good life as the ultimate end. Three 
social virtues and values are indispensable to the ideal communities, namely autonomy, 
friendship and justice. Maximization of profit is regarded as part of the definition of 
business, but has to be put in the framework of realizing the ideal communities. By 
appealing to the realization of the ideal communities and the good life, the individuals 
will not separate business from morality and, consequently, will not separate the 
economic responsibilities from the social-moral responsibilities. If the actual 
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communities are not ideal, the individuals are challenged to transform the actual 
communities to the ideal communities. The disposition of the individuals to take the right 
decisions and actions as a response to the challenge is the virtue of integrity. 
From the Aristotelian perspective, integrity is a virtue manifested in the 
disposition of those who possess it to take the right decisions and actions that would 
promote the socially shared values and the realization of the ideal state of the 
communities of which they are members. This Aristotelian account of integrity meets the 
requirements of the non-reductive account of integrity, because the right decisions and 
actions, which the virtue of integrity produces, do not only constitute the good life (the 
moral element) but also express the wholeness of the self (the personal element). By 
exploring Aristotle’s treatment of friendship, I argue that the Aristotelian self is a moral 
self, construed as an expanded self that grows larger beyond the boundary of the body 
and soul. Through a process of identification, the individual persons are required to 
identify themselves with the ideal state of the communities of which they are members. 
In the context of economic life, for example, the self is to identify itself subsequently 
with the ideal corporation, the ideal market, and the ideal larger whole community. For 
the ideal communities are constitutive parts of the self, the completeness and unity of the 
self can only be manifested if the self takes the right decisions and actions that are aimed 
at a co-realization of the ideal communities (including the life of future generations). As a 
result, the right decisions and actions do not only constitute the good life, but also express 
the wholeness and unity of the self. However, since the virtue of integrity produces the 
right decisions and actions, it is inextricably linked with the intellectual virtue phronesis; 
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and as a consequence, it carries a sense of the unity of the virtues, viz. whoever has one 
virtue must have all the virtues though not necessarily in the same degree. 
Since no separation is imposed between business and morality and between the 
personal and the moral elements of integrity, the individual economic agent who 
possesses integrity can be construed to reveal himself as a good economic agent as well 
as a good man. He would earnestly manage all the particularities in his control in a way 
that would lead him to give the best contribution to the realization of the ideal 
corporation, the ideal market and the ideal larger whole community, of which he is a 
member. If there is a conflict between the value of efficiency and effectiveness and the 
values of autonomy, friendship and justice, he would give as the first priority to the 
values of autonomy, friendship and justice which are the basic values essentially required 
for the realization of the ideal larger whole community. If there is a conflict among the 
values of autonomy, friendship and justice, he would consider one that best fits him 
without undermining the others. Because the realization of the ideal communities is his 
main motive, his act of integrity cannot be charged as an act of self-indulgence, nor can it 
be charged as an act of mediocrity. This Aristotelian account of integrity can explain 
integrity in a comprehensive way in terms of many different virtues and features that are 
each often used separately for ascribing integrity. This Aristotelian account of integrity 
provides also a clear link between the integrity of individuals and the integrity of the 
institution. For, when the individual who possesses integrity contributes to the realization 
of the ideal state of the communities of which he is a member, he essentially contributes 
to the integrity of the respective institutions, manifesting the external participation aspect 
of his integrity. By appealing to the good life as the ultimate end, we can see that the 
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integrity of the corporation does not only feature in the structural and cultural based 
relationships, the effective workings of which result in the ethical and successful business 
operations, but also in an interplay between the individuals and the corporation through 
which the individuals can develop and express their integrity. Corporate integrity 
emerges likely as a manifestation of the integrity of the individuals who live and develop 
their integrity in the corporation. Similarly, market integrity depends on the integrity of 
the market participants and the process of interplay in which the market enables its 
participants to develop and express their integrity. The market participants who possess 
integrity would compete with one another in terms of performance rather than by using 
economic power at their disposal. The mode of competition in the market that possesses 
integrity would never prevent any individual, inside and outside of the market 
transaction, from taking the right decisions and actions. 
Integrity can be seen in contrast with corruption. By seeing the contrast between 
integrity and corruption, we can have a clearer picture of integrity and a better 
understanding of corruption. I argue that understanding corruption from the point of view 
of the fact that the state (or something) is corrupted will leave some unacceptable 
shortcomings. I also argue that corruption cannot be adequately understood simply from 
the point of view of the fact that those who are corrupting violate some standard of 
conducts imposed by the political community. The integrity-based understanding of 
corruption suggests that, while integrity is a virtue the possession of which disposes the 
possessors to manage and express their particularities in the best possible ways to 
promote the common goods necessarily required for the realization of the ideal 
communities, corruption is an expression of a vicious character that disposes the 
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possessors to abuse power by manipulating or exploiting the common goods for some 
particular interest. Since every individual, no matter how high or low his status, has some 
degree of power, he bears moral responsibility for holding his power, and thus should 
exercise his power in a way that expresses his integrity.    
With the integrity-based understanding of corruption, we can see integrity as the 
mean between an excess and a defect. Integrity is just the right way through which the 
individuals promote the common goods, because, in the framework of integrity, the 
goods of the particularities remain manifested whenever contributing to the actualization 
of the common goods. Corruption is the defect and thus a vice, for it promotes the 
particular goods rather than the common goods. Self-abnegation is the excess and thus 
another vice, for it promotes the common goods by sacrificing the particular goods. In 
fact, the attitude of self-abnegation is involved in the so-called ‘noble-cause corruption’, 
which is a corruption committed for the sake of a good end. Thus, integrity and 
corruption are in a direct opposition.  
With the integrity-based understanding of corruption, we have the normative 
foundation to evaluate corruption in any sphere of life. We can comprehend not only the 
corruption that is committed by public officials who abuse political power but also the 
corruption that is committed by private parties who abuse economic power. In the era of 
globalization, the abuse of economic power can be as destructive as the abuse of political 
power. I show how economic corruption works with and without the involvement of 
public officials and why integrity is important in economic life. We cannot deter 
corruption simply by trying to reduce the incentive for corruption (the supply side of 
corruption). We must work also on the attitude of the people (the demand side of 
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corruption), or in other words, we must develop their integrity. I offer three basic 
principles for developing integrity, namely (1) taking good performances as the ultimate 
reference, (2) encouraging every individual to take the responsibility for preparing the 
institutional conditions necessary for the development of integrity, and (3) implementing 
the process of accountability and transparency to ensure that everyone has sufficient 
autonomy to perform well. I propose to establish a capital strike prevention policy, 
implement the performance-oriented mechanism of accountability and transparency, and 
encourage individuals to expand their sense of self to include the ideal state of the 
communities of which they are members. 
The argument and proposal set forth in this work is compatible with the anti-
corruption programs and the integrity-promotion projects numerously offered by many 
institutions such as Transparency International, the World Bank, and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Its emphasis on the good life 
provides a perspective on what is supposed to be the ultimate goal of the programs and 
projects. It can function not only as a complement to the programs and projects, but also 
and mainly as the driving force to guide the programs and projects to the ultimate goal. In 
particular for the case of the developing countries, where the incidences of corruption are 
believed to be mostly higher than in the developed countries,1 the perspective is very 
important to ensure that the anti-corruption programs and the integrity-promotion projects 
run in the right direction. There are at least three reasons to support this argument. First, 
the political infrastructure in the developing countries is generally still too weak to match 
and support the effective workings of the market economy in which it is systemically 
                                                 
1 See the Corruption Perceptions Index of the Transparency International (TI), available at the website: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006. 
 286
believed that individuals have the legitimacy to pursue their self-interests and compete 
with one another for economic resources. Corruption tends to become systemic because it 
is often perceived as part of the way the individuals compete with one another. The 
programs and projects that merely aim at strengthening the political infrastructure and 
liberalizing the economy, without making the participants aware of the ultimate goal of 
living economic life, would result only in an institutional power-play where the 
individuals who are powerless and knowledge-less remain marginalized, and yet 
corruption may not substantively decrease but rather shift to a different playground (non-
public sector). Moreover, an uncertain situation may exist where people in the developing 
countries are in doubt over whether the motive of the international organizations that 
initiate the programs and projects is purely moral, for the programs and projects can 
function also as a vehicle of economic self-interest (e.g. market penetration), political 
ideology and diplomatic leadership.2 By including the perspective of the good life in the 
programs and projects, the individuals who are powerless and knowledge-less will be 
involved in the programs and projects, while no playground is open to corruption because 
the initiative to fight corruption comes principally from every individual. 
Secondly, although people in the developing countries may live with strong 
traditional and religious tenets that condemn a greedy act like corruption, an anti-
corruption cultural program that aims at strengthening people’s belief in the tenets may 
not be effective to substantially reduce the level of corruption. The problem lies, I argue, 
rather in the attitude of the people than in the people’s belief in the tenets. They treat the 
community where they have to hold the tenets and the other community where they 
                                                 
2 Duane Windsor and Kathleen A. Getz, “Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption: Normative 
Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values”, Cornell International Law Journal 33 (2000), pp. 
731-72, p.734. 
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struggle to earn money and achieve economic success as two different incompatible 
worlds, each with its own rules and measures of success. They perceive that the world of 
tenets advises cooperation, friendship and togetherness, while the world of economy 
encourages them to compete with one another and surpass their rivals. Some of them 
think that those emphasizing the world of tenets will lose their competitiveness in the 
world of economy; while, conversely, the others think that the degradation of the world 
of tenets is the main factor that causes corruption and, eventually, the loss of the 
country’s competitiveness in the global economy. The result is not surprising, viz. they 
come into either a dull compromise (mediocrity) or a ‘mafia’ way of life where they 
appear to be pious and devoted to the religious tenets and yet ruthless and corrupt in their 
business. By including the perspective of the good life in the programs and projects, such 
situations should not appear. In the perspective of the good life, no separation thesis 
between economic activity and morality and between the personal and the moral aspects 
is entertained. If they can develop integrity, the right actions that their integrity produces 
integrate economic activity and morality, and express the wholeness of their expanded 
self. Therefore, by including the perspective of the good life in the programs and projects, 
we can expect those who are mediocre to excel and those who are religiously pious and 
yet corrupt to reform themselves. 
Third, the inclusion of the perspective of the good life in the programs and 
projects implies that the development strategies, such as poverty alleviation, employment 
generation and community development, should have been included. Thus, the programs 
and projects should not merely target the elites who have the established positions but 
also the ordinary citizens, employees, laborers, and those who are poor and vulnerable. It 
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is the responsibility of everyone to make corruption recede and a viable moral economy 
spring up. Indeed, the Asian economic crisis which I described in chapter 1 might not 
have been so disastrous had most people in the crisis-hit countries possessed a high 
degree of integrity. They would not have exploited the improper functioning of the 
economy for their own maximization of profit. They would rather contribute to rectify the 
improper functioning of the economy. 
As a closing note, I will mention three areas of future research that may arise as 
an implication of the argument presented in this work. The first area is related to the 
question of finding an economics that is more benign to ethics and morality. From the 
Aristotelian perspective that I developed in this work, the economics in question must be 
different from the mainstream (neoclassical) economics in that it takes as the standard 
economic decision making process the behavior of the producers in making their products 
produced and sold efficiently, rather than the consumers’ preference maximizing 
behavior. For, with respect to his/ her status as a member of community, an economic 
agent can only turn the act of production, not the act of consumption, into a virtuous 
action.3 The act of acquisition and consumption is essentially an act that excludes others 
whereas the act of production tends to include and invite the others into cooperation.4 
Only in the framework of productive activity  can  economic  behavior  be  understood  as 
 
                                                 
3 Of course, one should eat a proper amount of food, neither too much nor too little, and by so doing, one 
should have done a virtuous action. In this case, however, the virtuous action is not the act of consumption 
per se, but rather the act of choosing the right amount of food to consume.  
4 Scott Meikle (1995) argues that, from the Aristotelian perspective, the divorce between ethics and 
economics seems inevitable rather than extraordinary. Indeed, I argue, if the act of acquisition and 
consumption is used as the basis of economics, the divorce is inevitable. This is the reason why I propose to 
use the act of production as the basis for a more benign economics. See: Scott Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic 
Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press; NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 108.   
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social and moral behavior.5 The second area of research is in the fields of Organization 
Behavior and Human Resource Management. For the good life is the ultimate goal of 
business, employees are not only treated as an important ‘resource’ contributing to the 
success of the corporation (in contrast to an ‘expense’ or economic factor that is to be 
controlled) but also and mainly treated as the determinant of the success and as the 
constituents of the ultimate goal. As a result, there can be many issues worth exploring, 
e.g. the organization structure is hierarchically flatter; the employees get greater 
autonomy and their job tasks are enlarged; the best practice of performance appraisal can 
be to ask the employees to evaluate each other; the organization will be more flexible to 
adapt to the fast-changing business environment; and so on. Human Resource 
Management will seem to be more concerned with the intangible elements of the 
workplace, such as the beliefs and the cultural norms and values; but these elements will 
be perceived rather as media for the employees to work together than as things that 
mould the behavior of the employees to achieve a certain external goal (e.g. profit). The 
third area of research is in the field of designing anti-corruption strategies that 
accommodate the principles and proposal, which I described in the previous chapter, and 
befit the respective particular societies and organizations. The right strategy must be clear 
and coherent; it must not consist of elements that invite uncertainty and unwillingness of 
the people who will implement it to build integrity.    
                                                 
5 With a different kind of argument, Irene van Staveren (1999) insists that economic behavior should be 
understood as social and moral behavior. She shows how the fundamental values of freedom, justice, and 
care can be conceptualized in economic theory. According to her, these three values should not be 
subjected to utility, if they are not to lose their ethical meaning. She develops a conceptual framework in 
which each of these values makes a different value-domain and shows that a relation between value-
domains plays in the practices of economic life. Thus, although conflicts may occur between these values, 
the economic agents will always find resolutions in their formal and informal routines of interaction. See: 
Irene van Staveren, Caring for Economics: An Aristotelian Perspective (Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon, 1999), 
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A RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS AND CRITICISM OF THE EXAMINERS 
 
 
1. MacIntyre and Radical Change 
        
       The examiner objects to my view of radical cultural change. In one part of this 
work, I oppose MacIntyre’s aspiration to a radical cultural change, but in another part I 
call for a moral revolution which, according to the examiner, suggests the same radical 
cultural transformation. What makes my view different from MacIntyre’s view? The 
examiner also raises doubts about whether virtuous individuals and virtuous business can 
survive against a corrosive competition that MacIntyre envisages.     
             I have argued in section 4.2 that demanding a radical cultural change as a 
precondition for a virtuous business (business as a practice), as is suggested by 
MacIntyre, is too utopian. MacIntyre’s criticism of modernity leads him to believe that 
business under modern social and cultural structure cannot be turned into a practice 
without radical cultural and institutional reform. In other words, MacIntyre demands an 
ideal community for solving the problem of turning business into a practice; he does not 
believe in the resolution of individuals. However, I argue that moral reform of individuals 
is the key element to solve the problem and that a cultural change and an ideal 
community cannot be actualized without changing the perception of individuals and 
 311
reforming their moral attitude.1 In fact, as I have argued in section 4.3, individuals are the 
acting subjects that make and remake a culture; thus, they are the sources of cultural 
change. I defend this view consistently from the beginning of the thesis where I 
emphasize the importance of individuals rejecting the separation thesis (section 3.3) to 
the end of the thesis where I propose a moral revolution in the attitude of individuals 
(section 6.3). 
     By introducing integrity into business, I expect that business provides the way for 
individuals to develop and exercise virtues and for corporations to undertake virtuous 
activities. The question is whether these individuals and corporations can survive against 
corrosive competition that promotes the profitability of business as the ultimate end. My 
answer to the question is positive, because profit is inherently considered in virtuous 
business activity though not as the ultimate end. The ultimate end of virtuous business is 
the good life in the perspective of the flourishing of the community. But the problem is 
practical as to how individuals, who are in charge of operating the corporation, can 
transform a profit creating productive activity into a just and friendship activity. I argue 
that the practical solution is highly possible in modern social and cultural conditions as 
the consumers or the buyers, and the stakeholders generally, would prefer to deal with a 
just friendship business activity rather than an unjust and ruthless business activity. In 
section 4.5, I argued that the exercise of friendship and justice is compatible with profit 
maximization in the way that a maximum profit can be generated by maximizing the 
                                                 
1 This different position is in some way related to the fact that MacIntyre subscribes to a social teleology 
while I maintain my belief in Aristotle’s biological or natural teleology. See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After 
Virtue: a study in moral theory, 2nd edition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 
p. 195. MacIntyre’s emphasis on the social aspect of a human being leads him likely to believe that 
happiness and the good life can only be actualized in an ideal community, while my emphasis on both 
rational and social aspects of a human being lead me to believe that happiness and the good life can be 
actualized when an individual take the right decisions and actions that would contribute to transform the 
actual community into an ideal state. 
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value appreciated voluntarily by the consumers or the buyers. The appreciated value is 
created in the framework of the prospective realization of the ideal community where 
autonomy, friendship and justice are well respected. 
 
 
2. The Expanded Self 
 
     The examiner is unconvinced by the way I derive the concept of the expanded self 
from Aristotle’s account of friendship, and suggests that I can find another way of 
developing the concept.  He raises two matters to clear up. First, he is concerned with the 
obscure connection between the idea of pursuing happiness and the idea that a pursuit of 
ideal communities is essential to us. He is also concerned whether the connection has 
anything to do with my claim that the concept of an expanded self is a moral concept. 
Secondly, he raises a question about the idea that ideal communities are part of our 
selves, and about the motivation underlying our pursuit of ideal communities. 
      I think that the only plausible way to develop a concept of an expanded self is by 
deriving it from Aristotle’s account of the virtuous friend as “another self”. The reason is 
that friendship, not any other kind of human relationship, can transcend the limitation 
resulting from individual separateness and generate a kind of psychic unity between 
individuals who are still maintaining their separateness and uniqueness. Friendship 
enables individuals to expand their sense of self, beyond the natural boundary of self that 
separate one from another. I agree with Aristotle that such unity is reasonable only if the 
individuals are virtuous, because virtuous individuals have all dispositions to behave 
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ideally according to the standards that make them befriend each other. These virtuous 
individuals’ ideal behaviors represent and actualize an ideal relationship that sustains 
them in a friendship. If the unity between virtuous individuals in a friendship is 
designated as an ideal community, we can infer that the virtuous individuals internalize 
the ideal relationship or the relationship of the ideal community into their sense of self. In 
other words, we can say that the virtuous individuals expand their sense of self to include 
the ideal community. 
      The idea of pursuing happiness and the idea of contributing to the realization of 
ideal communities are inherently interrelated through right actions. I do not subscribe to a 
view (likely held by MacIntyre) that happiness is not possible except in ideal 
communities. In my view, though an individual lives in a non-ideal community, he can 
obtain happiness by undertaking the right actions that would in some way contribute to 
the transformation of the actual community into an ideal one. Thus, rightly contributing 
to the realization of the ideal state of the communities is a constituent of happiness. If we 
consciously pursue happiness, we must consciously pursue the way to contribute to the 
realization of ideal communities. In this view, happiness is not so much loaded with 
philosophical depth, as it is practical and obtainable only by taking the right actions. 
       By taking the right actions, an individual does not only obtain happiness but also 
realize the wholeness and unity of his expanded self. Accordingly, it is reasonable to state 
that the concept of the expanded self is a moral concept with a sense of achievement. 
Integrity comes into the picture because, by referring to the right actions, it integrates two 
indispensable elements, namely, the wholeness of the self and the morality of the actions. 
The ground of integrity and the focus of attention are not a matter of whether an 
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individual lives a whole and undivided life, but rather a matter of whether the individual 
undertakes the right actions. 
     The question remains as to how we can find ideal communities, which are likely 
abstract objects, as part of one’s sense of self? This question is concerned with 
identification that I lengthily explain in section 5.1.3. I agree that identification is an 
explanatory notion. In fact, following the words of Eco-philosopher Joanna Macy, the 
self is just a metaphoric construct of identity.2 Thus, it must be acceptable to take a 
generic definition in which identification is simply “an act of identifying through which 
something I identify myself with would, at least partly, define and explain who I am and 
why I make a certain response at a particular circumstance with respect to it”. The 
problem is not in the definition of identification but in the process as to how one 
identifies oneself with the ideal communities. My position in this matter is clear; I apply 
friendship in the process of identification and formulate the process in terms of projecting 
the ideal communities into one’s sense of self. As a result, one’s self-realization can only 
be appreciated in the perspective of co-realization with the ideal communities. The 
motivation for realizing the ideal communities is inherently associated with the 
motivation for self-realization in which one has to undertake the right actions to obtain it. 
I do not subscribe to a kind of view that one is motivated to pursue the ideal communities 
for the reason that one has identity conferring commitments to ideal communities. Rather, 
I subscribe to the view that one is motivated to contribute to the realization of the ideal 
communities for the reason that one wants to obtain happiness, and happiness consists in 
the right actions that contribute in some way to the realization of the ideal communities. 
                                                 
2 See: Joanna Macy, World as Lover, World as Self (Berkeley, California: Parallax Press, 1991), p. 183, 
189. 
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3. The Definition of Corruption 
 
         The examiner claims that the integrity-based definition of corruption is either too 
broad or too inexplicit. The examiner takes a counterexample in which a person uses 
(exploits) the common good of his community’s wilderness park to go for a hike. 
According to the examiner, this innocent person is corrupt under the integrity-based 
definition of corruption. He suggests that I can refine the concept of corruption with cases 
of legitimate or morally neutral use of common good.  
      The integrity-based definition of corruption offered in the dissertation is broad but 
explicit and fundamental. It clearly points out the directional motivation underlying any 
incidence of corruption. The counterexample revealing a case in which those who go for 
a hike in the community’s wilderness park are possibly categorized as “corrupt” under 
the integrity-based definition is indeed mistaken. “Common good” is not to be confused 
with “public good”. Those who go for a hike in the wilderness park have nothing to do 
with “abuse of power” and “exploitation of common good”. In fact, those persons may, to 
a certain extent, promote common good when the use of the park leads them to strengthen 
their friendship with one another. 
     I want to take another strategy to explain what common good looks like. Let us 
illustrate the meaning of community by using the Aristotelian conception of the expanded 
self. A community can be illustrated as the “largest space” that comes from the 
intersection between all expanded selves. Since the ideal community perceived by an 
individual is the constituent of the respective individual’s expanded self, while one 
individual may perceive it differently from another, a community is the intersection of the 
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ideal communities perceived by individuals who compose it. This community is a 
common good in the relevant sense of the word. The values and norms required to sustain 
this community, most notably autonomy, friendship and justice, are also common goods. 
As a result, corruption, which is defined as an abuse of power by manipulating or 
exploiting the common good for some particular interest, would certainly ruin the 
realization of the ideal community, because it manipulates the values or norms, betrays 
mutual trust and confidence, and contributes to the degeneration of the community. 
      As I have shown in section 6.1.3 the common goods can manifest themselves in 
many different tangible and intangible forms, including the agreed rules and procedures 
and the agreed ownership of resources. Those people who go for a hike in the wilderness 
park do not manipulate or exploit for some particular interest any common good 
manifested in the agreed rules and procedures and the agreed ownership of resources; 
thus, it is clear that their action is not corrupt. 
